Immigration Journal

1912

FEBRUARY 6TH

Today my mother sent me a letter, detailing the death of my father:

He’d died in the greatest railway crash of all United Kingdom history called the Quintinshill Rail Crash.

The accident occurred due to poor working practices on the part of the two signalmen involved; George Meakin, who had worked the night shift, and James Tinsley, working the early day shift. If they had been working correctly then Tinsley would taken over from Meakin at 6.00 am, however the two men had an developed an informal arrangement allowing whichever was working the early shift to arrive later. If the local passenger train from Carlisle to Beattock was due to be shunted at Quintinshill then the signalmen at Gretna would advise whichever was working the early shift of this and the day signalman would hitch a ride on the local train to Quintinshill thus saving himself the 1.5 miles (2.4 km) walk from Gretna. To avoid their malpractice being detected by company management whoever was working the night shift would record all train movements after 6.00 am on a piece of paper rather than record them in the train register. The day man would, on arrival, copy the entries from the paper into the train register making it look as if the shift change had occurred at the correct time.

On the morning of 22 May the night expresses were both running late so the local train would have to be shunted at Quintinshill and therefore Tinsley took advantage of the free ride on the local train to arrive at Quintinshill at about 6.30 am. As the goods loop was occupied with the 4.50 am goods train from Carlisle, Meakin decided to shunt the local passenger train onto the Up main line. Although not a preferred method of operation if the proper precautions were made this was a not a dangerous thing to do and out of the previous 21 occasions that the local train had been shunted at Quintinshill, on four occasions it had been shunted onto the Up line.

On this occasion neither of the important safety precautions were taken; firstly Kirkpatrick signal box (the previous box in the Up direction) should have been sent the "blocking back" signal; this would have informed the Kirkpatrick signalman that the line was occupied and not to send any more trains towards Quintinshill. Secondly the signalman at Quintinshill should have placed a signal lever collar over the relevant signal lever to stop himself from clearing the signal and allowing another train to proceed from Kirkpatrick.  The laxity of the fireman of the local train, George Hutchinson, in carrying out his duties under Rule 55 meant that Tinsley and Meakin's failures went unobserved. Had Hutchinson carried out his duty correctly he would have reminded the signalman that his train was stood on the main line and have checked that a lever collar was in place before returning to his train. As it was he did neither and merely signed the train register and left the signal box at 6.46 am.  Also in the signal box, against the rules, were two other railwaymen (brakesmen from the two goods trains) whose presence distracted the Tinsley and Meakin from their jobs; Tinsley was intent on writing up the train register and Meakin was discussing the war with the two brakesmen.[9]

At 6.36 am one of the signalmen, which it was never established, gave the "train out of section" bell to Kirkpatrick for the coal train which now stood in the up goods loop. After giving train out of section, this was the point at which the "blocking back" signal should have been given to Kirkpatrick but neither man did this. At 6.38 am the first of the expresses from Carlisle passed Quintinshill heading north. At 6.42 am Kirkpatrick "offered" the troop train to Tinsley. Tinsley immediately accepted this and four minutes later was offered the second northbound express from Gretna Junction. At 6.47 am Tinsley received the "train entering section" signal from Kirkpatrick for the troop train and offered it forward to Gretna Junction, having forgotten all about the local passenger train which was occupying the Up line. It was immediately accepted by Gretna Junction so Tinsley pulled "off" his Up home signal to allow the troop train forward.

Had he placed a lever collar on this signal as he should have done (and as Hutchinson should have checked) then Tinsley would not have been able to pull the signal lever.