Caesar - Life of a Colossus

CAESAR
LIFE OF A COLOSSUS

CAESAR
life of a colossus
adrian goldsworthy
YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS
NEW HAVEN AND LONDON
First published in the United States in 2006 by Yale University Press.
First published in Great Britain in 2006 by Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
Copyright © 2006 by Adrian Goldsworthy.
All rights reserved.
This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, including illustrations, in any
form (beyond that copying permitted by Sections 107 and 108 of the U.S. Copyright
Law and except by reviewers for the public press), without written permission from the
publishers.
Text design: www.carrstudio.co.uk.
Printed in the United States of America.
Library of Congress Control Number: 2006922060
ISBN-13: 978-0-300-12048-6 (cloth : alk. paper)
ISBN-10: 0-300-12048-6 (cloth : alk. paper)
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of the
Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council on Library
Resources.
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Acknowledgements vii
Map list viii
Introduction 1
I – THE RISE TO THE CONSULSHIP, 100–59 BC
1 Caesar’s World 10
2 Caesar’s childhood 30
3 The First Dictator 48
4 The Young Caesar 61
5 Candidate 82
6 Conspiracy 109
7 Scandal 130
8 Consul 152
II – PROCONSUL, 58–50 BC
9 Gaul 184
10 Migrants and Mercenaries:The first campaigns, 58 BC 205
11 ‘The Bravest of the Gaulish Peoples’: The Belgae, 57 BC 233
12 Politics and War: The Conference of Luca 253
13 ‘Over the Waters’: The British and German Expeditions,
55–54 BC 269
14 Rebellion, Disaster and Vengeance 293
15 The Man and the Hour: Vercingetorix and
the Great Revolt, 52 BC 315
16 ‘All Gaul is Conquered’ 343
Contents
III – CIVIL WAR AND DICTATORSHIP, 49–44 BC
17 The Road to the Rubicon 358
18 Blitzkrieg: Italy and Spain, Winter–Autumn, 49 BC 380
19 Macedonia, November 49–August 48 BC 405
20 Cleopatra, Egypt and the East,
Autumn 48–Summer 47 BC 432
21 Africa, September 47–June 46 BC 448
22 Dictator, 46–44 BC 468
23 The Ides of March 490
Epilogue 512
Chronology 520
Glossary 524
Bibliography 529
Abbreviations 534
Notes 535
Index 565
vii
Acknowledgements
A number of people read through some or part of this book and I should
begin by expressing my deep gratitude to them all. Thanks must go to my
former undergraduate tutor, Nicholas Purcell, who very kindly agreed to
have a look at a draft of the manuscript. Many useful comments came from
Philip Matyszak, who knows more than I ever shall about the workings of
the Roman Senate in this period. As ever, Ian Hughes was extremely thorough
and helpful in checking and commenting on each chapter as it was written.
Kevin Powell read the entire thing through and provided a number of useful
comments. Ian Haynes was kind enough to look at Part Two for me and
raised several points. To these, and anyone else who read some or all of the
text, I offer my most sincere thanks. Thanks should also go to my agent,
Georgina Capel, who negotiated a contract which gave me the opportunity
to do this subject justice. Finally, I must thank Keith Lowe and the other
staff at Orion for their work on, and enthusiasm for, this project.
Map List
The Roman Empire in the first century BC, – 12
The City of Rome – central area, Forum etc. – 20
Gaul and its tribes – 198
Battle of Bibracte – 221
Battle vrs Ariovistus – 231
Battle of the Sambre – 245
The coastline of Britain and Gaul – 279
Siege of Alesia – 337
The Italian campaign 49 BC – 386
Battle of Ilerda – 403
The lines at Dyrrachium – 417
Battle of Pharsalus – 426
Alexandria – 436
Battle of Thapsus – 463
Battle of Munda – 484
viii
Introduction
The story of Julius Caesar is an intensely dramatic one, which has fascinated
generation after generation, attracting the attention of Shakespeare and
Shaw, not to mention numerous novelists and screenwriters. Caesar was one
of the ablest generals of any era, who left accounts of his own campaigns
that have rarely – perhaps never – been surpassed in literary quality. At the
same time he was a politician and statesman who eventually took supreme
power in the Roman Republic and made himself a monarch in every practical
respect, although he never took the name of king. Caesar was not a cruel ruler
and paraded his clemency to his defeated enemies, but in the end he was
stabbed to death as a result of a conspiracy led by two pardoned men, which
also included many of his own supporters. Later his adopted son Octavian
– fully Caius Julius Caesar Octavianus – became Rome’s first emperor. The
family line perished with Nero in AD 68, but all later emperors still took the
name of Caesar, even though there was no link by blood or adoption. What
had simply been the name of one aristocratic family – and a fairly obscure
one at that – became effectively a title symbolising supreme and legitimate
power. So strong was the association that when the twentieth century opened,
two of the world’s great powers were still led by a kaiser and a tsar, each name
a rendering of Caesar. Today the Classics have lost their central position in
Western education, but even so Julius Caesar remains one of a handful of
figures from the ancient world whose name commands instant recognition.
Plenty of people with no knowledge of Latin will recall Shakespeare’s version
of his dying words, et tu Brute (in fact, he probably said something else (see
p.508–9) but that is by the way). Of other Romans only Nero, and perhaps
Mark Antony, enjoy similar fame, and from other nations probably only
Alexander the Great, the Greek philosophers, Hannibal and, most of all,
Cleopatra remain so high in the public consciousness. Cleopatra was Caesar’s
lover and Antony one of his senior lieutenants, and so both form part of his
story.
Caesar was a great man. Napoleon is just one of many famous commanders
who admitted that he had learned much from studying Caesar’s campaigns.
Politically he had a huge impact on Roman history, playing a key role in ending
the Republican system of government, which had endured for four and a half
centuries. Although he was fiercely intelligent and highly educated, Caesar was
1
CAESAR
a man of action and it is for this that he is remembered. His talents were varied
and exceptional, from his skill as an orator and writer, as framer of laws and
as political operator, to his talent as soldier and general. Most of all there was
his charm that so often won over the crowd in Rome, the legionaries on campaign
and the many women whom he seduced. Caesar made plenty of mistakes, both
as commander and as politician, but then which human being has not? His
great knack was to recover from setbacks, admit, at least to himself, that he
had been wrong, and then adapt to the new situation and somehow win in the
long run.
Few would dispute Caesar’s claim to greatness, but it is much harder to
say that he was a good man, or that the consequences of his career were
unambiguously good. He was not a Hitler or a Stalin, nor indeed a Genghis
Khan. Even so one source claims that over a million enemies were killed
during his campaigns. Ancient attitudes differed from those of today, and the
Romans had few qualms about Caesar’s wars against foreign opponents like
the tribes of Gaul. In eight years of campaigning at the very least Caesar’s
legions killed hundreds of thousands of people in the region, and enslaved
as many more. At times he was utterly ruthless, ordering massacres and
executions, and on one occasion the mass mutilation of prisoners whose
hands were cut off before they were set free. More often he was merciful to
defeated enemies, for the essentially practical reason that he wanted them
to accept Roman rule and so become the peaceful tax-paying population of
a new province. His attitude was coldly pragmatic, deciding on clemency or
atrocity according to which seemed to offer him the greatest advantage. He
was an active and energetic imperialist, but having said that he was not the
creator of Roman imperialism, merely one of its many agents. His campaigns
were not noticeably more brutal than other Roman wars. Far more
controversial at the time were his activities in Rome and his willingness to
fight a civil war when he felt that his political rivals were determined to end
his career. His grievances had more than a little justice, but even so when
Caesar took his army from his province into Italy in January 49 BC he became
a rebel. The civil wars that followed his assassination finally brought the
Roman Republic to an end. Its condition may already have been terminal
because of Caesar’s own actions. The Republic fell and was replaced by the
rule of emperors, the first of whom was his heir. During his dictatorship
Caesar held supreme power and had generally governed well, bringing in
measures that were sensible and statesmanlike and for the good of Rome.
Previously the Republic had been dominated by a narrow senatorial elite,
whose members all too often abused their position to enrich themselves by
2
Introduction
exploiting poorer Romans and the inhabitants of the provinces alike. Caesar
took action to deal with problems that had been acknowledged as real and
serious for some time, but which had not been resolved because of a
reluctance to let any individual senator gain the credit for the act. The
Republican system was pretty rotten and had been troubled by violence from
before Caesar’s birth, and civil war from early in his life. He won supreme
power by military force, and we know that he employed bribery and
intimidation at other stages in his career. His opponents were no different
in their methods and were as willing to fight a civil war to destroy Caesar’s
position as he was to defend it, but that is only to say that he was no better
or worse than they were. After his victory he ruled in a very responsible
manner and in marked contrast to the senatorial aristocracy – his measures
were designed to benefit a much broader section of society. His regime was
not repressive and he pardoned and promoted many former enemies. Rome,
Italy and the provinces were all better off under Caesar than they had been
for some time. Yet if he governed responsibly, his rule also effectively meant
the end to free elections, and however just his rule was, in the end monarchy
would lead to emperors like Caligula and Nero. It was the wealthy elite at
Rome who tended to write the histories and Caesar’s rise meant a reduction
in the power of this class. Therefore, many sources are critical of him for this
reason.
Caesar was not a moral man; indeed, in many respects he seems amoral.
It does seem to have been true that his nature was kind, generous and inclined
to forget grudges and turn enemies into friends, but he was also willing to
be utterly ruthless. He was an inveterate womaniser, disloyal to his wives
and his numerous lovers. Cleopatra is by far the most famous of these – and
the romance may have been genuine on both sides, but it did not stop Caesar
from having an affair with another queen soon afterwards, or from
continuing his pursuit of the aristocratic women of Rome. He was extremely
proud, even vain, especially of his appearance. It is hard to avoid the
conclusion that from a young age Caesar was absolutely convinced of his own
superiority. Much of this self-esteem was justified, for he was brighter and
more capable than the overwhelming majority of other senators. Perhaps
like Napoleon he was so fascinated by his own character that this made it
easier to enthral others. Also like the French emperor there were many
contradictions in his character. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle once wrote of
Napoleon that: ‘He was a wonderful man – perhaps the most wonderful
man who ever lived. What strikes me is the lack of finality in his character.
When you make up your mind that he is a complete villain, you come on some
3
CAESAR
noble trait, and then your admiration of this is lost in some act of incredible
meanness.’1 There is something of the same odd mixture with Caesar,
although perhaps it was less extreme.
It is striking that while today academics are supposed to be trained to examine
the past dispassionately, it is very rare to meet an ancient historian who does not
have a strong opinion about Caesar. In the past some have admired, even idolised,
him, seeing him as a visionary who perceived the huge problems facing the
Republic and realised how to solve them. Others are far more critical and view
him as merely another aristocrat with very traditional ambitions who scrambled
to the top regardless of the cost to law and precedent, but then had no clear idea
of what to do with his power. Such commentators tend to emphasise the
opportunism that marked his rise to power. Caesar certainly was an opportunist,
but the same has surely been true of virtually every successful politician. He
believed strongly in the power of chance in all human affairs and felt that he was
especially lucky. With hindsight we know that Octavian – these days more often
referred to as Augustus – created the system through which emperors would
rule the Roman Empire for centuries. Debate rages over the extent to which
Caesar’s years in control of Rome began what Augustus was able to complete,
or were a false start and only provided an example that his adopted son
consciously avoided in an effort to escape the same fate. Opinion remains
fiercely divided and it is unlikely that this will ever change. The truth probably
lies somewhere between the extreme views.
The aim of this book is to examine Caesar’s life on its own terms, and to place
it firmly within the context of Roman society in the first century BC. It is not
concerned with what happened after his death, and there will be no real
discussion of the differences between his regime and that which evolved in the
years when Augustus held power. Instead the focus is on what Caesar did, and
on trying to understand why and how he did it. Hindsight is obviously inevitable,
but it does attempt to avoid assuming that the Civil War and the collapse of the
Republic were inevitable, or the opposite extreme, which claims that there was
nothing wrong with the Republic at all. There has been a tendency in the past
for books to look at Caesar either as a politician or as a general. This distinction
had no real meaning at Rome, in contrast to modern Western democracies. A
Roman senator received military and civilian tasks to perform throughout his
career, both being a normal part of public life. Neither one can fully be
understood without the other, and here the two will be covered in equal detail.
This is a long book, but it cannot hope to provide a full account of politics at
Rome during Caesar’s lifetime, nor does it attempt a complete analysis of the
campaigns in Gaul and the Civil War. The focus is always on Caesar, and no
4
Introduction
more description is provided for events in which he was not personally involved
than is essential. Many points of controversy are skimmed over – for instance,
the details of a particular law or trial at Rome, or topographic and other
questions related to military operations. However interesting, such points would
be digressions unless they have a significant part to play in understanding Caesar.
Those so inclined will be able to find out more about such things from the
works cited in the notes collected at the end of this book. Similarly, as far as
possible the main text avoids direct mention of the many distinguished scholars
who have written about Caesar and discussion of their specific interpretations.
Such things are a major and essential concern in an academic study, but are
tedious in the extreme for the general reader. Once again the relevant works
are cited in the notes at the end of the book.
For all his fame, and the fact that he lived in probably the best documented
decades of Roman history, there are still many things we do not know about
Caesar. Most of our evidence has been available for some time. Archaeological
excavation continues to reveal more about the world in which Caesar lived – at
the time of writing on-going work in, for instance, France and Egypt is likely
to tell us a good deal more about Gaul in Caesar’s day and the Alexandria of
Cleopatra. However, it is unlikely that any discoveries will radically alter our
understanding of Caesar’s career and life. For this we are largely reliant on the
literary sources in Latin and Greek that have survived from the ancient world,
occasionally supplemented by inscriptions on bronze or in stone. Caesar’s own
Commentaries on his campaigns survive and provide us with detailed accounts
of his campaigns in Gaul and the first two years of the Civil War. They are
supplemented by four extra books written after his death by his officers, which
cover his remaining operations. In addition we have the letters, speeches and
theoretical works of Cicero, which provide us with a wealth of detail for this
period. Cicero’s correspondence, which includes letters written to him by many
of the leading men of the Republic, was published after his death and contains
a handful of short messages from Caesar himself. We know that complete
books of correspondence between Cicero and Caesar, as well as another
consisting of exchanges between Cicero and Pompey, were published, but sadly
these have not survived. The same is true of Caesar’s other literary works and
published speeches. It is always important to remind ourselves that only a tiny
fraction of one per cent of the literature of the ancient world is available today.
There are some deliberate omissions from Cicero’s published letters, most
notably his letters to his friend Atticus in the first three months of 44 BC. Atticus
was involved in the release of the correspondence, but this did not occur until
Augustus was established as master of Rome. It is more than likely that the
5
caesAr
missing letters contained something that might have implicated Atticus in
involvement in the conspiracy against Caesar, or more probably suggested either
knowledge of it or subsequent approval, and that these were deliberately
suppressed to protect himself. Another nearly contemporary source is Sallust,
who wrote several histories, including an account of Catiline’s conspiracy.
During the Civil War Sallust had fought for Caesar and been reinstated to the
Senate as a reward. Sent to govern Africa, he was subsequently condemned for
extortion, but was let off by Caesar. More favourable to Caesar than Cicero,
Sallust wrote with the benefit of hindsight and his opinion of the dictator
seems to have become rather mixed. Ironically, given his own career – though
he always strenuously denied any wrongdoing – his theme was that all of
Rome’s ills were caused by a moral decline amongst the aristocracy, and so
inevitably this coloured his narrative. Cicero, Sallust and Caesar were all
active participants in public life. Caesar in particular wrote to celebrate his
deeds and win support for his continuing career. Neither he nor the others were
dispassionate observers keen only to report unvarnished fact.
Most other sources are much later. Livy wrote during the reign of Augustus
and so some events were still within living memory, but the books covering
this period have been lost and only brief summaries survive. Velleius
Paterculus wrote a little later and there is some useful material in his brief
narrative of the period. However, a good deal of our evidence for Caesar was
not written until the early second century AD, over one hundred and fifty years
after the dictator’s murder. The Greek writer Appian produced a massive
history of Rome, of which two books cover the civil wars and disturbances
from 133 to 44 BC. Plutarch was also Greek, but his most important work
for our purposes was his Parallel Lives, biographies pairing a famous Greek
and Roman figure. Caesar was paired with Alexander the Great as the two
most successful generals of all time. Also of relevance are his lives of Marius,
Sulla, Crassus, Pompey, Cicero, Cato, Brutus and Mark Antony. Suetonius
was a Roman who produced biographies of the first twelve emperors,
beginning with Caesar. Cassius Dio was of Greek origin, but was also a
Roman citizen and a senator who was active in public life in the early third
century AD. He provides the most detailed continuous narrative of the period.
All of these writers had access to sources, many of them contemporary to
Caesar and including some of his own lost works, which are no longer
available. Yet we need always to remind ourselves that each was written
much later, and we cannot always be sure that they understood or accurately
reflected the attitudes of the first century BC. There are some notable gaps
in our evidence. By a curious coincidence the opening section of both
6
Introduction
Suetonius’ and Plutarch’s biographies of Caesar are missing and so we do
not know with absolute certainty in which year he was born. Each author
had his own biases, interest or viewpoint, and made use of sources that were
in turn prejudiced and often open propaganda. Care needs to be taken when
using any source. Unlike those studying more recent history, ancient
historians often have to make the best of limited and possibly unreliable
sources, as well as balancing apparently contradictory accounts. Throughout
I have attempted to give some idea of this process.
Some aspects of Caesar’s inner life remain closed to us. It would be
interesting and revealing to know more about his personal and private
relationships with his family, his wives, lovers and friends. In the case of the
latter it does seem that for much of his life and certainly in his last years he
had no friend who was in any way his equal, although he was clearly close to
and fond of many of his subordinates and assistants. We also know next to
nothing about his religious beliefs. Ritual and religion pervaded every aspect
of life in the Roman world. Caesar was one of Rome’s most senior priests
and regularly carried out or presided over prayers, sacrifices and other rites.
He also made the most of the family tradition that claimed descent from the
goddess Venus. We have no idea, however, what any of this meant to him. He
was rarely, if ever, restrained from doing anything because of religious scruples
and was willing to manipulate religion for his own benefit, but that does not
necessarily mean that he was entirely cynical and had no beliefs. In the end
we simply do not know. Part of the fascination with Caesar is because he is
so difficult to pin down and because mysteries remain, for instance, as to
what he really intended in the last months of his life. In his fifty-six years he
was at times many things, including a fugitive, prisoner, rising politician,
army leader, legal advocate, rebel, dictator – perhaps even a god – as well as
a husband, father, lover and adulterer. Few fictional heroes have ever done as
much as Caius Julius Caesar.
7

Pa rt on e

THE RISE TO
THE CONSULSHIP
100–59 BC
I
Caesar’s World
‘For, when Rome was freed of the fear of Carthage, and her rival in empire
was out of her way, the path of virtue was abandoned for that of corruption,
not gradually, but in headlong course. The older discipline was discarded
to give place to the new. The state passed from vigilance to slumber, from
the pursuit of arms to the pursuit of pleasure, from activity to idleness.’
– Velleius Paterculus, early first century AD.1
‘The Republic is nothing, merely a name without body or shape.’
– Julius Caesar.2
By the end of the second century BC the Roman Republic was the only great
power left in the Mediterranean world. Carthage, the Phoenician colony
whose trading empire had dominated the West for so long, had been razed
to the ground by the legions in 146 BC. At almost the same time, Alexander
the Great’s homeland of Macedonia became a Roman province. The other
major kingdoms that had emerged when Alexander’s generals had torn apart
his vast but short-lived empire had already been humbled and had dwindled
to shadows of their former might. Many of the lands in and around the
Mediterranean – the entire Italian Peninsula, southern Gaul, Sicily, Sardinia
and Corsica, Macedonia and part of Illyricum, Asia Minor, much of Spain
and a corner of North Africa – were directly ruled by the Romans. Elsewhere
Rome’s power was acknowledged, however grudgingly, or at the very least
feared. None of the kingdoms, tribes or states in contact with the Romans
could match their power and there was no real prospect of their uniting in
opposition. In 100 BC Rome was hugely strong and very rich and there was
nothing to suggest that this would change. With hindsight, we know that
Rome would in fact grow even stronger and richer, and within little more than
a century would have conquered the bulk of an empire that would endure
for five centuries.
10
Caesar’s World
Rome’s rise from a purely Italian power to Mediterranean superpower
had been rapid, shockingly so to the Greek-speaking world, which had in the
past scarcely regarded this particular group of western barbarians. The
struggle with Carthage had lasted over a century and involved massive losses,
whereas the defeat of the Hellenistic powers had taken half the time and
been achieved at trifling cost. A generation before Caesar’s birth, the Greek
historian Polybius had written a Universal History with the express purpose
of explaining just how Rome’s dominance had been achieved. He had himself
witnessed the closing stages of the process, having fought against the Romans
in the Third Macedonian War (172–167 BC), then gone to Rome as a hostage,
living in the household of a Roman nobleman and accompanying him on
campaign to witness the destruction of Carthage. Although he paid attention
to the effectiveness of the Roman military system, Polybius believed that
Rome’s success rested far more on its political system. For him the Republic’s
constitution, which was carefully balanced to prevent any one individual or
section of society from gaining overwhelming control, granted Rome freedom
from the frequent revolution and civil strife that had plagued most Greek citystates.
Internally stable, the Roman Republic was able to devote itself to
waging war on a scale and with a relentlessness unmatched by any rival. It
is doubtful that any other contemporary state could have survived the
catastrophic losses and devastation inflicted by Hannibal, and still gone on
to win the war.3
Caesar was born into a Republic that was some four centuries old and had
proved itself in Rome’s steady rise. Rome itself would go on to even greater
power, but the Republican system was nearing an end. In his own lifetime
Caesar would see the Republic torn apart by civil wars – conflicts in which
he himself was to play a leading role. Some Romans felt that the system had
not outlived Caesar, many naming him as its principal assassin. None
doubted that the Republic was no more than a memory by the time that
Caesar’s adopted son Augustus had made himself Rome’s first emperor. For
all its earlier, long-term success, the Roman Republic was nearing the end
of its life by the close of the second century BC with some signs that not
everything was functioning properly.
In 105 BC a group of migrating Germanic tribes called the Cimbri and
Teutones had smashed an exceptionally large Roman army at Arausio
(modern Orange in southern France). The casualties from this battle rivalled
those of Cannae in 216 BC, when Hannibal had massacred almost 50,000
Roman and allied soldiers in a single day. It was the latest and worst of a
string of defeats inflicted by these barbarians, who had been provoked into
11
TRANSALPINE
GAUL CISALPINE
GAUL
NEARER
SPAIN
FURTHER
SPAIN
SARDINIA
AND
CORSICA
I T A L I A
SICILY
ASIA
BITHYNIA AND
PONTUS
A FR I C A
Mauretania Numidia
Rome
CYRENE
I LLY R I C U M
MA C E DO NI A
CILICIA
SYRIA
Galatia
Alexandria
Egypt
Nilus
0
0
300 miles
500 km
Approximate provincial boundaries
Roman province
Principal ‘client’ kingdoms
SYRIA
Egypt
Euphrates
CRETE
•
The Roman Empire in the first century BC.
Caesar’s World
fighting by the first Roman commander to encounter them back in 113 BC.
The Cimbri and Teutones were peoples on the move in search of new land,
not a professional army engaged in an all-out war. In battle their warriors
were terrifying in appearance and individually brave, but they lacked
discipline. At a strategic level the tribes were not guided by rigid objectives.
After Arausio they wandered off towards Spain, not returning to invade
Italy for several years. This temporary relief did little to reduce the
widespread panic at Rome, fuelled by folk memories of the sack of the city
in 390 BC by large, fair complexioned and savage warriors – in that case
Gauls rather than Germans – but the Romans retained a deep-seated fear of
all northern barbarians. There was widespread criticism of the incompetent
aristocratic generals who had presided over the recent disasters. Instead they
insisted that the war against the tribes must now be entrusted to Caius
Marius, who had just won a victory in Numidia, ending a war that had also
initially been characterised by corruption and ineptitude in high places.
Marius was married to Caesar’s aunt and was the first of his family to enter
politics, and had already achieved much by being elected as one of the two
consuls for 107 BC. The consuls were the senior executive officers of the
Republic, charged with the most important civil responsibilities or military
commands for the twelve months during which they held office. Ten years
were supposed to elapse before a man was permitted to hold a second
consulship, but Marius was voted into the office for five consecutive years
from 104 to 100 BC. This was both unprecedented and of dubious legality,
but did have the desired result, as he defeated the Teutones in 102 BC and the
Cimbri in the following year.4
Marius’ successive consulships violated a fundamental principle of Roman
public life, but they could be interpreted as a necessary expedient to guide
the State through a time of crisis. In the past the Republic had demonstrated
a degree of flexibility, which had helped the Romans to deal with other
emergencies. Far more disturbing was the recent tendency for political
disputes to turn violent. In the autumn of 100 BC, a senator called Memmius,
who had just been elected to the consulship for the following year, was beaten
to death in the Forum by the henchmen of one of the unsuccessful candidates.
This man, Caius Servilius Glaucia, along with his associate Lucius Appuleius
Saturninus had employed threats and mob violence before to force through
their legislation. They were widely believed to have arranged the murder of
another of their rivals in the previous year. Memmius’ lynching was blatant
and prompted a swift backlash. Marius, who up until this point had been
content to use Saturninus for his own purposes, now turned against him
13
the rise to the consulship, 100–59 bc
and responded to the Senate’s call for him to save the Republic. Arming his
supporters, he blockaded Saturninus and Glaucia’s partisans on the
Capitoline Hill, and soon forced them to surrender. Marius may have
promised the radicals their lives, but the general mood was less inclined to
lenience. Most of the captives were shut in the Senate House when a crowd
mobbed the building. Some climbed onto the roof and started tearing off the
tiles, hurling the heavy projectiles down into the interior until all the prisoners
had been killed. To protect the Republic, normal law had been suspended
and violence was crushed by greater violence. It was a far cry from the,
admittedly idealised, picture of the perfectly balanced constitution presented
by Polybius, although even he had hinted that Rome’s internal stability might
not always endure. To understand Caesar’s story we must first look at the
nature of the Roman Republic, both in theory and in the changing practice
of the closing decades of the second century BC.5
The Republic
Tradition maintained that Rome had been founded in 753 BC. For the Romans
this was Year One and subsequent events were formally dated as so many
years from the ‘foundation of the city’ (ab urbe condita). The archaeological
evidence for the origins of Rome is less clear-cut, since it is difficult to judge
when the small communities dotted around the hills of what would become
Rome merged into a single city. Few records were preserved from the earliest
periods and there were many things that even the Romans did not know
with certainty by the time they began to write histories at the beginning of
the second century BC. The tales of the City’s early days probably contain
some measure of truth, but it is all but impossible to verify individuals and
particular incidents. Clearly, Rome was first ruled by kings, although it is hard
to know whether any of the seven individual monarchs recorded in tradition
were actual figures. Near the end of the sixth century BC – the traditional
date of 509 BC may well be accurate – internal upheaval resulted in the
monarchy being replaced by a republic.
The political system of the Roman Republic evolved gradually over many
years and was never rigidly fixed. Resembling more modern Britain than
the United States of America, Rome did not have a written constitution,
but a patchwork of legislation, precedent and tradition. The expression res
publica, from which we have derived our word republic, literally means ‘the
public thing’ and can perhaps best be translated as ‘the State’ or the ‘body
14
Caesar’s World
politic’. The vagueness ensured that it meant different things to different
people. Caesar would later dismiss it as an empty phrase.6 The looseness of
the system permitted considerable flexibility, which for centuries proved a
source of strength. At the same time its very nature ensured that any new
precedent or law, whether good or bad, could easily modify forever the way
that things were done. At the heart of the system was the desire to prevent
any one individual from gaining too much permanent power. Fear of a revival
of monarchic rule was widespread and most deeply entrenched among the
aristocracy, who monopolised high office. Therefore power within the
Republic was vested in a number of different institutions, the most important
of which were the magistrates, the Senate and the Popular Assemblies.
Magistrates had considerable power, the most senior formally holding
imperium, the right to command troops and dispense justice, but this was
essentially temporary and lasted only for the twelve months of office. It was
also limited by the equal power of colleagues holding the same office. There
were two consuls each year and six praetors holding the next most important
magistracy. A man could not seek re-election to the same post until a tenyear
interval had elapsed, nor could he stand in the first place until he had
reached the age of thirty-nine for the praetorship and forty-two for the
consulship. There was no division between political and military power and
the magistrates performed military or civil tasks as necessary. The most
important duties and military commands went to the consuls, the lesser to
the praetors. Most senior magistrates were sent out to govern a province
during their year of office. The Senate was able to extend a consul or praetor’s
imperium as a pro-magistrate – proconsul or propraetor respectively – on
an annual basis. This was frequently necessary to provide the Republic with
the number of provincial governors needed to control a large empire, but it
did not alter the essentially temporary nature of power. An extension of
more than two years was extremely rare. Therefore, while the offices
themselves wielded great power, the individual consuls and other magistrates
changed every year.
In contrast the Senate’s importance was based less on its formal functions than
its sheer permanence. It consisted of around 300 senators and met when
summoned by a magistrate, usually a consul when one was present. Senators
were not elected, but enrolled – and very occasionally expelled – in the Senate
by the two censors, who every five years carried out a census of Roman citizens.
It was expected that these would enrol anyone elected to a magistracy since the
last census, although there was no legal obligation to do this. However, there
were comparatively few offices to hold, and many senators, perhaps half, had
15
the rise to the consulship, 100–59 bc
never been elected to a magistracy. Senators had to belong to the equestrian
order, the wealthiest property-holding class listed in the census. Their name,
equites or ‘knights’, derived from their traditional role as cavalrymen in the
Roman army. However, the vast majority of equestrians never sought to enter
public life and the Senate tended to be drawn from an informal inner elite within
the class. Wealthy, and given a prominent role in guiding the State, they were
therefore men who had a strong vested interest in preserving the Republic.
Debates were dominated by the ex-magistrates, for procedure dictated that the
former consuls be asked their opinion first, followed by the former praetors
and so on down to the most junior posts. Individuals who had served
the Republic in a prominent position possessed huge influence or auctoritas
(see p. 524) and the collective prestige of the Senate as a body was based to a
large extent on the inclusion of such men. The Senate did not have the power
to legislate, but the decrees resulting from its debates went to the Popular
Assemblies for approval with a very strong recommendation. It also acted as an
advisory council for the magistrates when these were in Rome, decided which
provinces would be available for each year, and could grant imperium as a promagistrate.
In addition, it was the Senate that received foreign embassies and
despatched ambassadors, and also sent commissioners to oversee administrative
arrangements in the provinces, giving it a critical role in shaping foreign affairs.
The various voting assemblies of the Roman people possessed considerable
power within the Republic, but had little or no scope for independent action.
They elected all magistrates, passed laws and had formally to ratify
declarations of war and the peace treaties concluding a conflict. All adult
male citizens were able to vote if they were present, but their votes were not
all of equal value. In the Comitia Centuriata, which elected the consuls and
had a number of other important functions, the people were divided into
voting units based upon their property as registered in the most recent census.
Its structure had its origins in the organisation of the archaic Roman army,
where the wealthiest were best able to afford the expensive equipment
required to fight in the more conspicuous and dangerous roles. Inevitably
there were fewer members in the most senior voting units or centuries, simply
because there were fewer rich than poor. Each century’s vote was supposed
to carry equal weight, but those of the wealthier classes voted first and it was
often the case that a decision had already been reached before the poorest
centuries had had their say. Other assemblies were based on tribal divisions,
again determined by the census, and here the inequalities were similarly
great if of a slightly different character. Each tribe voted according to a
majority decision of those members present. However, the urban tribes,
16
Caesar’s World
which included many of Rome’s poor, usually contained on the day of any
vote far more citizens than the rural tribes, where only the wealthy members
were likely to have travelled to Rome. Therefore in most respects the opinion
of the more prosperous citizens had a far greater impact on the outcome of
all votes than that of the more numerous poor. None of these assemblies
provided an opportunity for debate. Instead they simply chose from a list of
candidates or voted for or against a particular proposal. Assemblies were
summoned by a magistrate, who presided over them and dictated their
business. Compared to the Assembly of Athens in the later fifth century BC,
the democratic elements within the Roman system might seem tightly
controlled, but that does not mean that they were unimportant. The outcome
of voting, particularly in elections, remained unpredictable.
Only those registered as equestrians in the highest property class in the
census were eligible for a political career. Reaching the magistracies depended
on winning favour with the electorate. At Rome there was nothing even
vaguely resembling modern political parties – although given the stifling
impact of these, this may well have made it more rather than less democratic
than many countries today – and each candidate for office competed as an
individual. Only rarely did they advocate specific policies, although
commenting on issues of current importance was more common. In the
main voters looked more for a capable individual who once elected could do
whatever the State required. Past deeds stood as proof of ability, but where
these were lacking, especially at the early stages of a career, a candidate
paraded the achievements of earlier generations of his family. The Romans
believed strongly that families possessed clear character traits and it was
assumed that a man whose father and grandfather had fought successful
wars against Rome’s foes would prove similarly capable himself. Aristocratic
families took great pains to advertise the deeds of their members, past and
present, so that their names sparked recognition amongst the voters. The
combination of their fame and wealth allowed a comparatively small number
of families to dominate the ranks of the magistracies and, in particular, the
consulship. Even so, it was never impossible for a man, even one who was
the first of his family to enter the Senate, to become consul. Someone who
achieved this feat was known as a ‘new man’ (novus homo). Marius, with
his unprecedented string of consulships, was the greatest of these, and for
most ‘new men’ a single term was a sufficiently difficult achievement. Politics
was highly competitive and even members of established families needed to
work to maintain their advantage. The number of each college of magistrates
declined with seniority, so that the struggle for office became even harder as
17
the rise to the consulship, 100–59 bc
a man progressed up the ladder. By simple arithmetic, only one-third of the
six praetors elected each year could hope to become consul. This fierce
competitiveness ensured that long-term political groupings were rare, and
permanent parties unimaginable, for no one could share a magistracy.
In many ways the system worked well, providing the Republic each year
with a new crop of magistrates, all eager to do great deeds on Rome’s behalf
before their twelve months of office expired. The formal power of imperium
lasted only for this time, but a man’s successes would greatly enhance his
auctoritas. Like so many Roman concepts this term is hard to translate in
a single English word, for it combined authority, reputation and influence
with sheer importance or status. Auctoritas endured after an office was laid
down, though it could be diminished by a man’s subsequent behaviour or
eclipsed by that of other senators. It determined how often and how early
a man’s opinion would be sought by the magistrate presiding over a meeting
of the Senate, and the weight his view would carry with others. Auctoritas
existed only when it was acknowledged by others, but men were aware of
their status and could at times use it bluntly. In 90 BC the distinguished
former consul and censor, and current senior senator (princeps senatus),
Marcus Aemilius Scaurus was accused of taking bribes from a hostile king.
His prosecutor was the undistinguished Quintus Varius Severus, who,
although a Roman, had been born in the city of Sucro in Spain. As the key
to his defence, Scaurus turned to the court and the watching crowd and
asked a simple question. ‘Varius Severus of Sucro claims that Aemilius
Scaurus, seduced by a royal bribe, betrayed the imperium of the Roman
people; Aemilius Scaurus denies the charge. Which of the two would you
rather believe?’ In reply Varius was jeered from the court and the charge
dropped.7
Competition did not stop when a man won the consulship. His subsequent
status depended on how well he performed in the office in comparison with
other consuls. Leading an army to victory over an enemy of the Republic was
a great achievement, especially if it was acknowledged by the award of a
triumph on his return to Rome. In this ceremony the victor rode in a chariot
through the centre of the city as part of a procession including his captives,
the spoils won and other symbols of success, as well as his own soldiers
parading in their finest equipment. The general was dressed in the regalia
of Rome’s most important deity, Jupiter Optimus Maximus, even to the
extent of having his face painted red to resemble the old terracotta statues
of the god. Behind him stood a slave holding the victor’s laurel wreath over
the general’s head, but also whispering a reminder that he was a mortal. It
18
Caesar’s World
was a great honour, commemorated for ever by hanging laurel wreaths (or
carving their likeness) in the porch of a man’s house. Such an achievement
was highly valued, but it was also compared to the victories of other senators.
It was important to have won better and greater battles over stronger or
more exotic enemies for this enhanced a man’s auctoritas in relation to other
former generals. Most men had won and completed their first consulship by
the time they were in their mid forties, and could expect to live on and remain
active in the Senate for decades. Their continued prominence in public life
depended on their auctoritas, and in time might further add to this.
Competition was at the heart of Roman public life, senators struggling
throughout their careers to win fame and influence for themselves, and
prevent others from acquiring too much of the same things. The annual
election of new magistrates and the restrictions on office-holding helped to
provide many senators with the chance to serve the Republic in a
distinguished capacity, and prevented any one individual from establishing
a monopoly of glory and influence. All aristocrats wanted to excel, but their
deepest fear was always that someone else would surpass all rivals by too
great a margin and win a more permanent pre-eminence, raising the spectre
of monarchy. Too much success for an individual reduced the number of
honours available for everyone else to contest.

Although the Republic had become the great power of the Mediterranean
world by the end of the second century BC, Rome itself remained the focus
of all aspects of political life. There, and only there, could the Senate meet,
courts convene or Popular Assemblies gather to elect magistrates or pass
legislation. By 100 BC Rome was the largest city in the known world, dwarfing
even its nearest rivals such as Alexandria. By the close of the first century
BC its population may well have been around the million mark, and even in
100 BC there were certainly several hundred thousand people living there,
perhaps half a million or more. We lack the evidence to be more precise, but
these numbers at least give some sense of the order of magnitude. Huge
though the population was, in an age before any form of transport faster than
a man could walk or ride, Rome did not sprawl over as wide an area as more
modern cities. Housing, especially in the poorer areas, was very densely
packed. Yet at the heart of Rome in every sense was the open space of the
Forum. This was a place of commerce, from the fashionable shops, which
bordered on its great buildings and provided the luxuries that were the prize
of empire, to the representatives of the big merchant companies and grain
19
the rise to the consulship, 100–59 bc
suppliers. It was also the place of law and justice, where the courts convened,
advocates presented their cases and juries gave their verdict, all in open view.
Through the Forum ran the Sacra Via, the route of triumphal processions.
More than anything else, it was in and around the Forum that the public life
of the Republic was conducted. Magistrates, such as the tribunes, aediles and
praetors, had set places in the Forum where they sat to conduct business.
When the Senate met it was with very rare exceptions in a building on the
edge of the Forum, either the Senate House (Curia) or one of the great
temples. Outside the Senate House was the Speakers Platform or Rostra,
whose name was derived from its decoration with the prows of enemy
warships during the wars with Carthage. From the Rostra speeches were
made to informal meetings of the Roman people as magistrates and
prominent men sought to persuade them to vote for or against a bill, or to
favour someone at an election. At the command of a suitable magistrate, the
same crowd of Romans could be told to convene as an Assembly of tribes
(either the Concilium Plebis or Comitia Tributa) and pass legislation. Other
than for elections, this almost always occurred in the Forum. In so many
ways the Forum was the beating heart of Rome.8
20
Cloaca maxima
CLIVUS CAPITOLINUS
VIA SACRA
0
0 100 metres
100 yards
BASILICA PAULI
BASILICA FULVIA
Area of TABERNAE NOVAE
Area of
Praetors’
Tribunal
REGIA
BASILICA
AEMILIA ?
DOMUS PUBLICA
SENATE
HOUSE
BASILICA
PORCIA
VICUS IUGARIUS
CARCER
ROSTRA
C A P I T O L I N E
H I L L
? Auguraculum Scalae Gemoniae
TEMPLE of
CONCORD and
BASILICA
OPIMIA
Lacus
Curtius
PALATINE
HILL
TEMPLE of
VESTA
? Scalae
Graecae
TEMPLE
of
CASTOR
TEMPLE
of
SATURN
Lacus
luturnus
VICUS TUSCUS
Area of TABERNAE VETERES
BASILICA IULIA
BASILICA
SEMPRONIA ?
V E L A B R U M
F O R U M
R O M A N U M
TABULARIUM
AREA
CAPITOLINA
ARGILETUM
COMITIUM
The City of Rome – central area, Forum etc. (after CAH2 ix (1994) p.370). Some of the
details are conjectural.
Caesar’s World
The Profits and the Price of Empire
The Roman Republic was frequently at war, for long periods virtually on an
annual basis. Frequent war-making was not unusual in the ancient world,
where states rarely needed much more reason to attack their neighbours
than a belief that they were vulnerable. The great period of Classical Greek
culture, with its flourishing arts, literature and philosophy, had come at a
period when warfare between the Greek city-states was endemic. Yet from
early on in its history Rome’s war-making was distinctive in character, not
simply because it was so successful, but through its talent for consolidating
success on a permanent basis, as defeated enemies were absorbed and turned
into reliable allies. By the beginning of the third century BC virtually all of
the Italian Peninsula had come under Roman control. Within this territory
some communities had been granted Roman citizenship and these, in
addition to the colonies planted on conquered land, allowed the number of
Roman citizens to grow in size far beyond the populations of other citystates.
Other peoples were granted Latin status, conveying lesser, though
still significant privileges, while the remainder were simply allies or socii.
Comparatively early on, both Roman and Latin status had lost any real
association with particular ethnic or even linguistic groups, and had become
primarily legal distinctions. Over time, communities not granted such
privileges could hope to gain them, progressing by stages from Latin rights
to citizenship without the vote, and finally to full Roman citizenship. Each
community was tied to Rome by a specific treaty, which made clear both its
rights and obligations. Even more obvious was the fundamental fact that
Rome was the superior partner in any such agreement and that this was not
a settlement between equals. The most common obligation of all types of
ally, including the Latins, was to supply Rome with men and resources in time
of war. At least half of any Roman army invariably consisted of allied
soldiers. In this way the defeated enemies of the past helped to win the wars
of the present. Apart from confirming their loyalty to Rome in this way, the
allied communities were also allowed a small, but significant, share in the
profits of warfare. Since Roman war-making was so frequent – and some
scholars have even suggested that the Republic needed to go to war to remind
her allies of their obligations – there were plenty of opportunities for both
service and profit.9
In 264 BC the Romans sent an army outside Italy for the first time,
provoking the long conflict with the Carthaginians, who were of Phoenician
origin, hence the Roman name of Poeni (Punic). The First Punic War
21
the rise to the consulship, 100–59 bc
(264–241 BC) brought Rome its first overseas province in Sicily, to which was
added Sardinia in the conflict’s immediate aftermath. The Second Punic
War (218–201 BC) resulted in a permanent Roman presence in Spain and
involvement in Macedonia. The Republic’s huge reserves of citizen and allied
manpower and the willingness to absorb staggeringly high losses were major
factors in securing the victory over Carthage. These conflicts also accustomed
the Romans to despatching and supplying armies very far afield, something
that was made possible by the creation of a large navy during the First Punic
War. The Republic became used to waging war in several widely different
theatres simultaneously. In the early decades of the second century BC, Rome
defeated Macedonia and the Seleucid Empire. These, along with the
Ptolemies of Egypt, were the most powerful of the Hellenistic kingdoms to
emerge from the wreck of Alexander the Great’s empire. The destruction of
both Carthage and Corinth at the hands of Roman armies in 146 BC
symbolised Roman dominance over the older powers of the Mediterranean
world. More provinces were established in Macedonia and Africa, while
elsewhere the conquest of the Po Valley was completed and a presence in
Illyricum reinforced. Near the end of the century Transalpine Gaul (modern
Provence in southern France) was conquered, establishing a Roman controlled
land link with the provinces in Spain, just as Illyricum provided a connection
with Macedonia. Soon Roman roads would be constructed linking one
province to another in a monumental but highly practical way. Around the
same time, the wealthy province of Asia was acquired. The link between
Rome and her overseas provinces was at this time far less intimate than the
bonds with the peoples of Italy, and there was no question as yet of
widespread grants of Latin or Roman status to the indigenous populations.
Communities in the provinces often provided troops to serve with the Roman
army, but this was not their most important obligation, which took the form
of regular tribute or taxation.
Many Romans benefited greatly from overseas expansion. For the
aristocracy it provided plentiful opportunities to win glory during their
magistracies by fighting a war. Campaigns against the tribal peoples in
Spain, Gaul, Illyricum and Thrace were frequent. Wars with the famous
states of the Hellenistic world occurred less often but were far more
spectacular. With warfare so frequent, competition amongst senators focused
on having won a bigger or more dangerous war than anyone else, and the
honour of being the first to defeat a people was equally valued. Along with
glory came great riches from plunder and the sale of captives as slaves. Some
of this wealth went to the Republic, and some to the men serving in the
22
Caesar’s World
army, but since greater shares went to the more senior ranks, it was the
commanders more than anyone else who benefited. Victories won in the
eastern Mediterranean were especially lucrative, and during the second
century BC a succession of generals returned from such wars to celebrate
more lavish and more spectacular triumphs than had ever been seen before.
It was at this period that the city of Rome began to be rebuilt in a far more
spectacular form as successful commanders used some of their spoils to
construct grand temples and other public buildings as permanent reminders
of their achievements. Competition for fame and influence continued to
dominate public life, but it was becoming an increasingly expensive business
as some men brought back massive fortunes from their victories. Senators
from families who had not managed to win commands during the most
profitable campaigns had increasing difficulty maintaining the costs of a
political career. The gap between the richest and poorest senators steadily
widened, reducing the number of men able to compete for the highest
magistracies and commands.
It was not only senators who profited from the creation of the empire, but
in general it was the wealthy who did best in the new conditions. The
Republic did not create an extensive bureaucratic machine to administer the
provinces, so that governors had only a small number of officials
supplemented by members of their own households with which to govern.
As a result, much day-to-day business was left to the local communities and
a good deal was carried out by private companies controlled by wealthy
Romans. These men were usually members of the equestrian order, for
senators themselves were forbidden by law from undertaking such contracts.
(This was supposed to prevent business interests from influencing the
opinions they expressed in the Senate. However, many may have covertly
invested money in companies run openly by equestrians.) Companies headed
by such men bid for the right to collect taxes in a region, to sell war captives
and other plunder, or to undertake massive contracts supplying the army with
food and equipment. They were known as the publicani – the publicans of
the King James Bible – for undertaking such tasks required by the Republic,
but their primary motive was profit and not public service. Once a company
had agreed to pay the Treasury a set sum for the right to collect the taxes in
a particular region or province, it was therefore necessary for them to collect
more than this from the provincials. The company’s agents at all levels were
inclined to take a cut of the profits, and inevitably the amount actually taken
from the population of the province was often substantially higher than the
sum received by the Treasury. Yet in the main the Republic was satisfied with
23
the rise to the consulship, 100–59 bc
this arrangement and resentment on the part of the provincials could, if
necessary, be met by the force of the army. Apart from the publicani, many
other Romans and their agents were active in business in the provinces.
Merely being a Roman – and most Italians were taken for Romans by other
races – gave merchants (negotiatores) considerable advantages, simply
through association with the imperial power. The more influential men –
once again usually the wealthiest or their representatives – were often able
to draw on more direct aid from provincial governors. The activities of
traders rarely feature other than peripherally in our ancient sources, but it
is important not to underestimate their numbers or the scale of their
operations. Such men profited greatly from Roman imperialism, even if it
seems extremely unlikely that they had much influence on the decisionmaking
process that directed the Republic’s foreign affairs.10
Over the generations, an exceptionally high proportion of Roman men
served in the army. Not until the government in Revolutionary France
introduced mass conscription did a state of comparable size mobilise so
much of its manpower over so long a period of time. Until the middle of the
second century BC there appears to have been little popular resistance to
this, and most men willingly undertook their military duties. For some active
service was very attractive, in spite of the extremely brutal discipline imposed
on the legions, for there was every prospect of plunder and winning honours.
The Romans were also fiercely patriotic and valued this demonstration of
their commitment to the Republic. The army recruited from the propertied
classes, for each soldier was expected to provide himself with the necessary
equipment to serve as a horseman for the very wealthy, a heavy infantryman
for the majority, or a light infantryman for the poorer and younger recruits.
The heart of the legions consisted of farmers, for land remained the most
common form of property. Service lasted until the legion was disbanded,
which often occurred at the end of a war. In the early days of the Republic,
a spell in the army may well have taken no more than a few weeks, or at
most months, for the foe was usually close by and the fighting small in scale
and brief in duration. Ideally it allowed the farmer-soldier to win a quick
victory and then return home in time to harvest his own fields. As Rome
expanded, wars were fought further and further away and tended to last
longer. During the Punic Wars tens of thousands of Romans were away from
their homes for years. A number of overseas provinces demanded permanent
garrisons, so that men unfortunate enough to be posted to somewhere like
Spain often had to undergo five or ten years’ continuous service. In their
absence their own small farms risked falling into ruin, their families into
24
Caesar’s World
destitution. The situation was worsened as the minimum property
qualification was lowered to provide more manpower, since such recruits
inevitably lived that much closer to the poverty line. Prolonged military
service ruined many small farmers, and the loss of their land meant that
such men would in future lack sufficient property to make them eligible for
call up to the legions. Concern grew from the middle of the second century
BC that the number of citizens liable for the army was in terminal decline.
The difficulties of many small farmers occurred at the same time as other
factors were reshaping Italian agriculture. The profits of expansion brought
fabulous wealth to many senators and equestrians. Such men invested a
good deal of their fortunes in huge landed estates, often absorbing land that
had formerly been divided into many smallholdings. Such estates (latifundia)
were invariably worked by a servile labour force, since frequent war ensured
that slaves were both plentiful and cheap. The size of a man’s landholdings,
the number of slaves who worked them and the lavishness of the villas built
for when the owner chose to visit were all new ways in which men could
compete in displaying their fabulous riches. In more practical terms, large
estates could be devoted to commercial farming, which provided a steady,
low-risk profit. In many respects it was a vicious circle, as repeated wars in
distant provinces took more citizen farmers away from their land and often
left them and their families in penury, while the same conflicts further
enriched the elite of society and provided them with the means to create
more big latifundia. It has proved very difficult archaeologically to quantify
the shifts in farming patterns in Italy during the period, and in some areas
at least it seems that small-scale farming continued. Nevertheless, significant
change clearly did occur over wide areas, and it is certain that the Romans
themselves perceived this to be a serious problem.11
Politics and bloodshed
In 133 BC Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, one of the ten annually elected
tribunes of the plebs, launched an ambitious reform programme aimed at
dealing with this very problem. The tribunes differed from other magistrates
in that they had no role outside Rome itself. Originally the office had been
created to provide the people with some protection against the abuse of
power by senior magistrates, but by this time it was essentially just another
step in a normal career path. Tiberius was in his early thirties, from a highly
distinguished family – his father had been censor and twice consul – and was
25
the rise to the consulship, 100–59 bc
expected to go far. In his tribunate he focused on the public land (ager
publicus) confiscated over the centuries from defeated Italian enemies. In
both law and theory this was supposed to have been shared out in
comparatively small lots amongst many citizens, but in practice large swathes
had been absorbed into latifundia. The tribune passed a law confirming the
legal limit of public land each individual was permitted to occupy, and
redistributing the rest to poor citizens, thus raising these to the property
class eligible for military service. Some senators supported Gracchus, but
many more stood to lose directly from the confiscation of improperly held
public land, as did many influential equestrians. Unable to secure approval
for his law in the Senate, Tiberius violated tradition by taking it directly to
the Popular Assembly. When a colleague in the tribunate tried to stop
proceedings by imposing his veto, Gracchus organised a vote and had the man
deposed from office. This may or may not have been legal, since in theory
the people could legislate on anything, but it struck at the very heart of the
Republican system by challenging the assumption that all magistrates of
the same rank were equal.
Some senators who may have sympathised with the aims of Gracchus’
legislation became worried that the tribune’s ambitions had more to do with
personal dominance than altruistic reform, for Tiberius stood to gain vast
prestige and auctoritas if he was successful in improving the lot of so many
citizens. The fear grew that he was aiming at something even more
spectacular than the very successful career expected for a man of his
background. That Tiberius, his father-in-law and his younger brother Caius
were the three commissioners appointed to oversee the distribution of land
raised more hackles by giving them so much patronage. Some began to
accuse him of seeking regnum, the permanent power of a monarch. The
final straw came when Tiberius, claiming the need to ensure that his laws
were not immediately repealed, stood for election as tribune for 132 BC. His
success was not certain, since by the very nature of his reforms many of the
citizens most indebted to him had been settled on farms too far from Rome
for them to attend an election. However, emotions spilled over when the
consul presiding over the Senate refused to take action against the tribune.
A group of angry senators led by Tiberius’ cousin, Scipio Nasica, stormed
out of the meeting and lynched the tribune and many of his supporters.
Gracchus had his head staved in with a chair leg. His body, along with those
of many of his supporters, was thrown into the Tiber.
This was the first time that political disputes had ended in widespread and
fatal violence, and Rome was left in a state of shock. (A few stories of the
26
Caesar’s World
early years of the Republic told of demagogues or other men who had
threatened the State being lynched, but these had long been consigned to
ancient history in the Roman mind.) In the aftermath of the riot much of
Tiberius’ legislation remained in force, even as some of his surviving
supporters came under attack. The tribune’s brother Caius was serving with
the army in Spain at the time and on his eventual return to Rome was
permitted to continue his career. Embittered by the fate of Tiberius, Caius
was still in his early twenties and it was not until he was elected to the
tribunate in 123 BC that he embarked upon his own series of reforms, which
were far more radical and wide ranging than those of his brother. In part this
was because he had more time, managing to gain a second term as tribune
for 122 BC without provoking any serious opposition. Many of his reforms
were concerned with sharing the spoils of empire more widely. Caius
confirmed his brother’s legislation and extended his drive to restore the
number of property-owning citizens by establishing a colony on the site of
Carthage. He also won many supporters amongst the equestrian order by
establishing a court to try senators accused of malpractice while serving as
provincial governors (the quaestio de rebus repetundis) and forming the jury
from equestrians. Up until this point a senator had only ever been tried by
his peers. Less popular with Romans was Caius’ move to extend citizenship
to many more Latins and Italians, and his attempt to win a third term as
tribune failed. From the beginning both Caius and his opponents were more
prepared to employ intimidation and threats than anyone had been ten years
before. Matters came to a head when a scuffle resulted in the death of one
of the consul Opimius’ servants. The Senate passed a decree – known to
scholars as the senatus consultum ultimum (ultimate decree) due to a phrase
used by Caesar, though it is not known what it was called at the time –
calling upon the consul to defend the Republic by any means necessary.
Normal law was suspended and the partisans of both sides armed themselves.
Opimius added to his force a group of mercenary Cretan archers who were
waiting just outside Rome, suggesting a degree of premeditation in his
actions. Caius and his outnumbered supporters occupied the Temple of
Diana on the Aventine Hill, but the consul refused all offers of negotiation
and stormed the building. Gracchus died in the fighting and his head was
brought to Opimius who had promised a reward of its weight in gold.12
We cannot know whether the Gracchi were genuine reformers desperate
to solve what they saw as the Republic’s problems, or ambitious men out
solely to win massive popularity. Probably their motives were mixed, for it
is hard to believe that a Roman senator could be unaware of the personal
27
the rise to the consulship, 100–59 bc
advantages to be gained through such sweeping legislation. Regardless of
their personal motivation they highlighted existing problems within society,
most notably the plight of the many poor citizens, and the desire of those
excluded from power, whether the equestrian order or the population of
Italy, to have some greater share of it. The impact of the Gracchi’s careers
on public life was not immediate – the vast majority of tribunes continued
to be elected for only a single term and political violence was rare – but it
was to prove profound. In a system so reliant on precedent, many
fundamental principles had been shattered. The brothers had shown how
great influence, if temporary and somewhat precarious, could be obtained
by appealing to the growing consciousness of social groups in a new way. It
was only a question of time before someone else would possess both the
initial prestige and the desire to emulate them. Things were not helped by
the inertia of the Senate in dealing with the problems that the Gracchi had
highlighted, and its preference for doing nothing, rather than allowing anyone
to gain credit through providing a solution. On top of this, the closing
decades of the second century were not distinguished by widespread
competence and honesty on the part of many magistrates.
A dynastic struggle in the allied Kingdom of Numidia in North Africa
resulted in a succession of scandals, as senators were bribed on a lavish scale
to favour the claim of Jugurtha. The massacre of thousands of Roman and
Italian traders at the town of Cirta caused outrage at Rome, forcing an army
to be sent against Jugurtha, but the war was waged in a lethargic way and
in 110 BC this force was defeated and surrendered to the enemy. A consul of
greater ability was sent to take charge after this, but the whole episode had
seriously damaged the faith of the wider population in the ability of the
senatorial elite to lead. Exploiting this mood, Caius Marius campaigned
for the consulship for 107 BC, contrasting himself, a tough and experienced
soldier who had succeeded only through personal merit, with the scions of
the noble houses who relied on their ancestors’ glory rather than their own
ability. Marius won comfortably and, through the aid of a tribune who
passed a law in the Assembly to override the Senate’s allocation of provinces,
was given the command in Numidia. A further attempt to frustrate him
came when the Senate refused to let him raise new legions to take to Africa,
instead granting him permission only to take volunteers. Marius
outmanoeuvred them by seeking volunteers from the poorest class, men not
normally eligible for military service. It was an important stage in the
transition from a militia army conscripted from a cross-section of the
property-owning classes, to a professional army recruited overwhelmingly
28
Caesar’s World
from the very poor. The change was not instant, but its significance was to
be deep and contributed much to the end of the Republic.13
Marius eventually won the war in Numidia by late 105 BC, but by this time
the menace of the Cimbri and Teutones hung heavy over Italy. The early
contacts with these tribes had again been marked by scandals and
incompetence on the part of magistrates, many of them from the old
established families. There was a strong feeling, evidently amongst the better
off as well as the poor, for it was the former who dominated the voting in the
Comitia Centuriata, that only Marius could be trusted to defeat the barbarians.
This led to his unprecedented run of consulships, a far more serious breach
of precedent than Caius Gracchus’ consecutive tribunates. Saturninus and
Glaucia offered support to Marius and at the same time hoped to capitalise
on his success. In 103 BC Saturninus was tribune and passed a law granting land
in North Africa to many of Marius’ veterans from the war in Numidia.
Caesar’s father was one of the commissioners appointed to oversee the
implementation of either this bill or more probably a similar one passed by
Saturninus in 100 BC. The reliance on recruits from the poorest sections of
society did mean that these men had no source of livelihood when they were
discharged back to civilian life. Part of Saturninus’ legislation in 100 BC was
aimed at providing for the discharged soldiers of the operations against the
Cimbri. Saturninus used the tribunate in much the same way as the Gracchi,
bringing forward popular measures to distribute land, particularly land in
the provinces, and renewing a measure that made wheat available to all citizens
at a set price irrespective of the market. The latter had been introduced by Caius
Gracchus, but abandoned after his death. Yet from the beginning Saturninus
and Glaucia were less reputable than the Gracchi and far more inclined to
resort to violence. In the end they went too far, losing the support of Marius
who, acting under the Senate’s ultimate decree just as Opimius had in 122 BC,
led their suppression. The Republic into which Caesar was born was not
coping well with some of the problems facing it.
29
II
Caesar’s Childhood
‘Born into the most noble family of the Julii, and tracing his ancestry back
to Anchises and Venus – a claim acknowledged by all those who study the
ancient past – he surpassed all other citizens in the excellence of his
appearance.’ – Velleius Paterculus, early first century AD.1
‘In this Caesar there are many Mariuses.’ – Sulla.2
Caius Julius Caesar was born on 13 July 100 BC according to the modern
calendar. The day is certain, the year subject to just a little doubt, as by
chance the opening sections of both Suetonius’ and Plutarch’s biographies
of Caesar have been lost. A few scholars have dated his birth to 102 or 101,
but their arguments have failed to convince, and the consensus of opinion
remains firmly with a date of 100. By the Roman calendar Caesar was born
on the third day before the Ides of Quinctilis in the consulship of Caius
Marius and Lucius Valerius Flaccus, which in turn was the six hundredth and
fifty-fourth year ‘from the foundation of the City’. Quinctilis – the name is
related to quintus or fifth – was the fifth month of the Republic’s year, which
began in March (Martius). Later during Caesar’s dictatorship the month
would be renamed Julius in his honour, hence the modern July. The Ides of
Quinctilis, as in March, fell on the fifteenth, but the Romans included the
day itself when they counted back or forward from such dates.
Names revealed much about a person’s place in Roman society. Caesar
possessed the full tria nomina or ‘three names’ of a Roman citizen. The first
name (praenomen) served much the same purpose as its modern equivalent,
identifying the individual member of a family and being used in informal
conversation. Most families employed the same first names for their sons
generation after generation. Caesar’s father and grandfather were both also
named Caius, as presumably had been many more first sons of this line of
Julii Caesares. The second or main name (nomen) was most important for
30
it was the name of the ‘clan’ or broad group of families to which a man
belonged. The third name (cognomen) specified the particular branch of
this wider grouping, although not all families even amongst the aristocracy
were distinguished in this way. Caesar’s great rival Cnaeus Pompey and his
own lieutenant Mark Antony both belonged to families who did not possess
cognomina. A few individuals acquired an additional, semi-official nickname,
which, given the Romans’ robust sense of humour, was often at the expense
of their appearance. Pompey’s father was known as Strabo or ‘Squinty’, as
was a distant cousin of Caesar’s, Caius Julius Caesar Strabo. Caesar’s name
was never added to in this way. As a boy he received the full three names, but
had he been born a girl he would have been known only by the feminine
form of the nomen. Caesar’s aunt, sisters and daughter were all called simply
Julia, as indeed was any female member of any branch of the Julian clan.
If a family had more than one daughter, in official contexts their name was
followed by a number to distinguish them. This disparity between the sexes
says much about the Roman world. Men, and only men, could play a role
in public life and it was important to know precisely who each individual was
in the competitive world of politics. Women had no political role and did not
need such specific identification.3
The Julii were patricians, which meant that they were members of the
oldest aristocratic class at Rome, who in the early Republic had monopolised
power, ruling over the far more numerous plebians. Little is known about the
dozen or so members of the clan who won election to the higher magistracies
in the first two centuries of the Republic. Unlike other more successful
patrician clans such as the Fabii and Manlii, the Julii do not appear to have
preserved and promoted the achievements of their ancestors as effectively.
Several of these other families continued to be very influential while the
patricians’ exclusive hold on power was gradually eroded as the plebians
demanded more rights, and wealthy plebian families forced their way into
the ruling elite. From 342 BC one of each year’s consuls had to be a plebian.
By the end of the second century BC the majority of the most influential
families amongst the senatorial elite were plebian. A few honours continued
to be open only to patricians, who in turn were barred from becoming
tribunes of the plebs, but on the whole the differences between the two were
minimal. Merely being patrician did not guarantee political success for a
family. There was no process for creating new patricians, and over the
centuries a number of families died out altogether or faded into obscurity.
The Julii survived, but enjoyed little prominence in public life. A Julius
Caesar – the first man known to have had that cognomen – reached the
31
Caesar’s Childhood
the rise to the consulship, 100–59 bc
praetorship during the Second Punic War. A much later author claimed that
this man took the name because he had killed an enemy war elephant in
battle and that it was copied from the Punic word for elephant. Another
story was that the name meant ‘hairy’ and that the family were renowned
for their thick heads of hair. The story may be an invention. It does seem that
around about the same time the line divided into two distinct branches, both
called Julius Caesar but registered in different tribes in the census. In 157 BC
Lucius Julius Caesar reached the consulship, the only Caesar in the second
century BC to manage this. He was not an ancestor of Caius, but came from
the other, marginally more successful branch of the family. In the early years
of the first century a number of Julii Caesares would begin to enjoy greater
electoral success. In 91 BC Sextus Julius Caesar was consul, as was Lucius
Julius Caesar in 90. The latter’s younger brother, Caius Julius Caesar Strabo,
was aedile in the same year. Aediles were junior magistrates whose
responsibilities included the supervision of public festivals and
entertainments. Lucius and Caius were from the other branch of the family,
and so distant cousins of Caesar’s father. Strabo was widely respected as
one of the leading orators of his day. Sextus Julius Caesar is something of
a mystery, as it is unclear from which branch of the family he came. It is
even possible that he was Caesar’s uncle, the younger, or perhaps more
probably older, brother of his father Caius, but there is no positive evidence
for this and he may instead have been a cousin.4
Although the Julii had made less of an impact on the Republic’s history
than other clans, their antiquity was widely acknowledged. They were said
to have settled in Rome in the middle of the seventh century BC after the
capture and destruction of the neighbouring city of Alba Longa by Tullus
Hostilius, the Romans’ third king. Yet the association with Rome’s earliest
days did not begin with this event, for the family claimed that their name was
derived from Iulus, the son of Aeneas, the leader of the Trojan exiles who
had settled in Italy after the fall of Troy. Aeneas himself was the son of the
human Anchises and the goddess Venus, so that the ancestry of the Julii
was divine. As yet the myths of these early times had not crystallised into
the form they would take in the Augustan age, when the poet Virgil and the
historian Livy would recount the stories in some detail. Even Livy would
acknowledge that there were differing versions of the story of Aeneas and
his descendants. He was unsure whether it was Iulus or another son of
Aeneas who had founded Alba Longa and became its first king, establishing
the dynasty that would in time produce Rhea Silvia, the mother of Romulus
and Remus. There is little suggestion that in the early first century BC many
32
Caesar’s Childhood
Romans were aware of such a possible association between the Julii and
Romulus. In contrast the clan’s claim of descent from Venus was fairly widely
known and presumably not of recent invention. Part of the oration delivered
by Caesar at his aunt’s funeral in 69 BC is recorded by Suetonius:
My Aunt Julia’s family is descended on her mother’s side from kings,
and on her father’s side from the immortal gods. For the Marcii Reges
– her mother’s family – descend from Ancus Marcius; the Julii – the clan
of which our family is part – go back to Venus. Therefore our blood
has both the sanctity of kings, who wield the greatest power amongst
men, and an association with the reverence owed to the gods, who in
turn hold power even over kings.5
Caesar clearly assumed that his audience would not be surprised by such
statements. Some scholars have pointed out that the name Rex (King) may
have been derived from a role in religious ceremonies early in the Republic
rather than connection with the monarchy. This is almost certainly correct, but
such distinctions are unlikely to have been too clear in the first century BC.

Virtually nothing is known about Caesar’s grandfather, Caius Julius Caesar,
but it is just possible that he may have held the praetorship. His wife was
Marcia, daughter of Quintus Marcius Rex, who had been praetor in 144
BC. They had at least two children, Caesar’s father Caius and his aunt Julia,
who was to marry Caius Marius. As we have seen it is also possible that
there was another son, Sextus, who reached the consulship in 91 BC. Caius
embarked upon a public career with some success, holding the quaestorship
either just before, or soon after the birth of his son. His wife was Aurelia,
who came from a highly successful family of plebian nobles. Both her father
and grandfather had reached the consulship, in 144 and 119 BC respectively,
and three of her cousins, Caius, Marcus and Lucius Aurelius Cotta would
also achieve this distinction. Marriage into this family probably did much
to help the political prospects of Caius Caesar, but these were boosted even
more as a result of his sister’s marriage to Marius. As already noted, Caius
was one of ten commissioners tasked with overseeing part of the colonisation
programme created by Saturninus for Marius’ veterans in 103 or 100 BC. In
due course he would be elected praetor, but the year in which he achieved
this is unknown, and estimates have varied from 92 BC to as late as 85 BC. An
early date seems more likely, for the year as magistrate was followed by a
33
the rise to the consulship, 100–59 bc
period as governor of the province of Asia and the most likely time for this
is about 91 BC. Caius died early in 84 BC, and we cannot know whether or
not his connections would have been enough to lift him to the consulship.
If his praetorship had indeed been as early as 92 BC, then he would certainly
have been old enough to seek the highest magistracy – and if Sextus Caesar
was in fact his brother, then his electoral success in 91 BC would surely have
encouraged his brother. However, if Caius ever stood for the consulship
then he evidently failed. Ultimately, our evidence for Caesar’s family is so
poor and confusing that there is very little that we can say with any certainty,
beyond the overall conclusion that his father’s career was reasonably
successful, if unspectacular. We cannot say whether his achievements satisfied
or disappointed Caius himself and his immediate family.
Caius and Aurelia are known to have had three children, Caesar and two
sisters, both of course called Julia. It is more than possible that other children
were born but failed to survive into adulthood for the rate of infant mortality
was staggeringly high at Rome (and indeed throughout the ancient world),
even amongst the aristocracy. Cornelia, the mother of the Gracchi, is said
to have given birth to twelve babies, of whom only three – Tiberius, Caius
and their sister Sempronia – survived. This was probably exceptional, but
two or three children reaching maturity does seem to have been a steady
average for senatorial families. There were exceptions; the Metelli, a plebian
noble family of considerable wealth and influence, seem to have been
especially fertile and as a result figure heavily amongst the ranks of the
senior magistracies in the last hundred years of the Republic.6
Early Years and Education
Little has been recorded about Caesar’s earliest years, but some things can be
inferred from what is known more generally about the aristocracy in
contemporary Rome. As in most societies until the comparatively recent past,
babies were usually born at home. The birth of a child was an important
event for a senatorial family and tradition demanded that it be witnessed.
When the event seemed imminent, messages would be sent to inform relatives
and political associates, who would usually then go to the house. Traditionally
their role had been in part to act as witnesses that the child was truly a member
of the aristocracy, and an element of this remained. Neither the father nor these
guests would actually be present in the room where the mother was confined,
attended by a midwife and probably some female relations as well as slaves.
34
Caesar’s Childhood
In a few cases a male doctor might attend, but he was the only man present
with the mother. Although the procedure would later bear his name, there is
no ancient evidence to suggest that Caesar was delivered by Caesarean section,
although the procedure was known in the ancient world. In fact, it is extremely
unlikely, since the operation was usually fatal for the mother and Aurelia lived
on for decades. (One much later source claims that one of Caesar’s ancestors
was born in this way.) Indeed, no source indicates that his birth was anything
other than normal – breech deliveries or other difficult births were seen as a
bad omen and are recorded for some individuals, most notably the Emperor
Nero. Once the baby was born the midwife would lay it down on the floor and
inspect it for abnormalities or defects, at the most basic level assessing its
chance of survival. Only after this would the parents decide whether or not
to accept and try to raise the child. In law this decision was to be made by the
father, but it seems extremely unlikely the mother was not involved, especially
when she was as formidable a character as Aurelia.7
Once a child had been accepted fires would be lit on altars in the parents’
house. Many of the guests would perform the same ritual when they returned
to their own homes. Birthdays were important to the Romans and were
widely celebrated throughout someone’s life. When a boy was nine days old
– for obscure reasons the same ceremony occurred a day earlier for a girl –
the family held a formal ceremony of purification (lustratio). This was
intended to free the child of any malign spirits or pollution that may have
entered it during the birth process. On the preceding night a vigil was held
and a series of rites performed, culminating on the day itself in sacrifices and
the observation of the flight of birds as a guide to the child’s future. A boy
was presented with a special charm, usually of gold, known as the bulla. This
was placed in a leather bag and worn around the boy’s neck. As part of the
ceremony the child was named, and the name subsequently registered
officially. Ritual and religion surrounded every Roman, especially an
aristocrat, throughout every stage of his life.8
Normally the mother played the dominant role in the early years of raising
a child. It is unlikely that Aurelia breast-fed any of her babies, for much
earlier in the second century BC the wife of Cato the Elder was seen as
exceptional for doing this. This and other stories suggest that it was no
longer normal for an aristocratic woman to breast-feed her children.9 Most
probably a wet nurse was found amongst the substantial slave household
maintained by any aristocratic family, even one of such comparatively modest
wealth as the Caesars. Selecting a nurse and other slaves to care for the infant
were important tasks for a mother, who supervised them closely and
35
the rise to the consulship, 100–59 bc
performed many tasks herself. Another tale celebrating the importance Cato
attached to his role as father tells of his care to be present whenever his wife
Licinia bathed their son. This rather implies that the mother’s presence was
taken for granted on such occasions. Mothers were not supposed to be
distant figures to children looked after principally by servants, but even so
their authority was considerable. Tacitus, writing in the late first or early
second century AD, discussed the mother’s role in raising children in a passage
that presented Aurelia as an ideal:
In the good old days, every man’s son, born in wedlock, was brought
up not in the chamber of some hireling nurse, but in his mother’s lap,
and at her knee. And that mother could have no higher praise than
that she managed the house and gave herself to her children. . .. In the
presence of such a one no base word could be uttered without grave
offence, and no wrong deed done. Religiously and with the utmost
diligence she regulated not only the serious tasks of her youthful
charges, but their recreations also and their games. It was in this spirit,
we are told, that Cornelia, the mother of the Gracchi, directed their
upbringing, Aurelia that of Caesar, Atia of Augustus: thus it was that
these mothers trained their princely children.10
Aurelia’s influence on her son was clearly very strong and lasted well
beyond his childhood. Caesar was forty-six when he finally lost his mother,
who had lived on as a widow for three decades. In itself this was not
uncommon amongst the aristocracy for husbands were often considerably
older than their wives, especially in the second, third or even fourth
marriages that senators might contract for political reasons. Therefore,
assuming that the wife survived the rigours of child bearing, it was more
than probable that she would outlive her spouse, and so a senator was far
more likely to have a living mother than father by the time that he began
to reach important office. Mothers, especially those like Aurelia who
conformed so closely to the ideal of motherhood, were greatly admired by
the Romans. One of their most cherished stories was told of Coriolanus,
the great general who, mistreated by political rivals, had defected to the
enemy and led them against Rome. On the point of destroying his homeland
he withdrew his army, moved less by a sense of patriotism than by a direct
appeal from his mother.11
For the aristocracy education was managed entirely within the family.
Many Romans took pride in this, contrasting it with the prescriptive State-
36
Caesar’s Childhood
controlled systems common in many Greek cities. At Rome, it tended to be
those of middle income who sent their children to the fee-paying primary
schools, which took children from about the age of seven. For the aristocracy,
education continued to occur in the home and, at least initially, boys and girls
were educated alike, being taught reading, writing and basic calculation
and mathematics. By Caesar’s day it was rare for senators’ children not to
be brought up to be bilingual in Latin and Greek. Early tuition in the latter
probably came from a Greek slave (paedagogus) who attended to the child.
There would also be much instruction in the rituals and traditions of the
family and in the history of Rome. This last invariably emphasised the role
played by the boy’s ancestors. These and other great figures from the past
were held up as object lessons in what it meant to be Roman. Children
learned to admire such quintessentially Roman qualities as dignitas, pietas
and virtus, all words with a far more powerful resonance than their English
derivatives, dignity, piety, and virtue. Dignitas was the sober bearing that
displayed openly the importance and responsibility of a man and so
commanded respect. This was considerable for any citizen of Rome, greater
for an aristocrat, and greater still for a man who had held a magistracy.
Pietas embraced not merely respect for the gods, but for family and parents,
and the law and traditions of the Republic. Virtus had strongly military
overtones, embracing not simply physical bravery, but confidence, moral
courage and the skills required by both soldier and commander.12
For the Romans, Rome was great because earlier generations had displayed
just these qualities to a degree unmatched by any other nation. The stern
faces carved on funerary monuments of the first century BC, depicting in
detail all the idiosyncrasies and flaws of the man in life and so unlike the
idealised portraiture of Classical Greece, radiate massive pride and selfassurance.
The Romans took themselves very seriously and raised their
children not simply to believe, but to know that they were special. Their
pride in themselves and in belonging to the Republic was very strong amongst
even the poorest citizens, and even more pronounced in those of greater
wealth and more privileged birth. Roman senators had long come to see
themselves as the superiors of any foreign kings. Young aristocrats were
brought up to know this, but also to believe that they and their family were
distinguished even amongst the Roman elite. Caesar’s family, with few
ancestors who had reached high office and done great deeds in the service
of the Republic, still doubtless had some achievements to recount, as well,
of course, as the great antiquity of the line and its divine origins. With this
sense of importance came a massive sense of duty and of the obligation to
37
the rise to the consulship, 100–59 bc
live up to the standards expected by the family and the wider community of
the Republic. Children were raised to see themselves as intimately connected
with their family’s and Rome’s past. As Cicero would later declare, ‘For
what is the life of a man, if it is not interwoven with the life of former
generations by a sense of history?’13
Caesar was raised to think of himself as special. In itself this was nothing
unusual, but as the only son to carry on the family line, and with a
particularly forceful and admired mother, he from the beginning doubtless
developed an unusually high, though probably not unique, sense of his own
worth. Roman education had an essentially practical purpose of preparing
a child for its role as an adult. For an aristocratic boy this meant a career in
public life and the chance to win new glory for the family, as well as becoming
one day the head of his own household, the paterfamilias, in charge of
raising the next generation. From around the age of seven boys began to
spend more time with their fathers, accompanying them about the business.
At the same stage a girl would watch her mother as she ran the household,
overseeing the slaves and, at least in traditional households, weaving clothes
for the family. Boys saw their fathers meet and greet other senators, and
were permitted to sit outside the open doors of the Senate’s meeting place
and listen to the debates. They began to learn who had most influence in the
Senate and why. From an early age they saw the great affairs of the Republic
being conducted, and so naturally grew up feeling a part of that world and
expecting to participate in it once they were old enough. Informal ties of
favour and obligation bound Roman society together in a system known as
patronage. The patron was the man with wealth, influence and power, to
whom the less well off (or clients) came to ask for help, which might take
the form of securing a position, winning a contract, assistance in business
or legal disputes, or even at its most basic level gifts of food. In return the
client had duties to assist his patron in various ways. Most would come to
greet him formally each morning. The number of clients a man had added
to his prestige, especially if they were distinguished or exotic. Senators might
well include entire communities, including towns or cities in Italy and the
provinces, amongst their clients. It was quite possible for a patron, even
some less distinguished senators, to in turn be the client of an even more
powerful man, although in this case the name itself would not have been
used. A great part of a senator’s time was spent in seeing his clients, in doing
enough for them to ensure their continued attachment, while in turn ensuring
that they provided him with the support he wanted. Much of Roman politics
was conducted informally.14
38
Caesar’s Childhood
At the same time more formal education continued, perhaps involving
attendance at one of the twenty or so schools teaching grammatica or,
probably more often, similar instruction at home or with other children at
the house of a relative. Caesar was educated at home and for this stage of
his life we know that his tutor was a certain Marcus Antonius Gnipho.
Originally from the Hellenistic East and educated at Alexandria, Gnipho had
been a slave, but had subsequently been freed by the Antonius family,
presumably out of their satisfaction at his teaching of their children. He
was highly respected as a teacher of both Greek and Latin rhetoric. In this
secondary stage of education there was detailed study of literature in both
languages as well as practice in rhetoric. Literature occupied a central role
in learning and the aristocracy had the advantage of being able to afford
copies of manuscripts in a world before the printing press made the copying
of books so much easier. Many senators maintained extensive libraries in
their houses, which their young relatives and associates were able to use.
Caesar’s own future father-in-law Calpurnius Piso possessed a very large
collection of books, mainly dealing with Epicurean philosophy, remnants of
which have been discovered in the ruins of his villa near Herculaneum. It was
also common to entertain visiting scholars and philosophers, further adding
to the cultural environment in which young aristocrats were raised. For
Caesar, like many other young aristocrats, it was not enough simply to read
great literature – he was also inspired to compose his own works. Suetonius
mentions a poem praising Hercules as well as a tragedy entitled Oedipus. The
quality of these immature works may not have been especially high – though
probably no better or no worse than those written by other aristocrats who
later went on to greater things – and they were suppressed by Caesar’s
adopted son, Emperor Augustus.15
Some learning by rote continued, as children memorised such things as
the Twelve Tables, the ultimate basis of Roman law. In 92 BC an edict closed
down schools teaching rhetoric in Latin, stating that instruction in Greek was
superior, even for teaching a man to make speeches in Latin. It is possible
that this measure was in part intended to prevent the oratorical skills useful
in public life from becoming too common, for such schools were most likely
to have taken pupils from those families outside the Senate. Some skill at
public speaking was essential in the Roman political environment, so this
continued the emphasis on what would be useful rather than on acquiring
purely academic learning. Cicero, who was six years older than Caesar,
recalled how in 91 BC he had gone ‘almost every day’ to listen to the finest
orators speaking in the Popular Assemblies and in the courts. He also
39
the rise to the consulship, 100–59 bc
described how ‘I wrote, read, and declaimed all the time with great energy,
but was not content to restrict myself just to rhetorical exercises’ and soon
began observing the activities of one of the leading jurists of the day. Caesar
seems to have been particularly influenced by the oratorical style of his
relative Caesar Strabo, so may well have heard him in action.16
Physical training was directed by similarly utilitarian aims to academic
education. In the Hellenistic world athletic perfection was pursued as an
end in itself and was not direct preparation for the duties of an adult. In the
gymnasia exercise was carried out naked and in many cities these institutions
tended to celebrate homosexuality, both aspects very alien to the Romans.
For them exercise was intended to promote physical fitness and had a strongly
military flavour. Most usually on the Campus Martius – the plain of Mars
the war god, where the army had mustered when Rome was still a small city
– young aristocrats learned how to run, swim in the Tiber and fight with
weapons, most particularly the sword and javelin. They were also taught to
ride, and Varro, a near contemporary of Caesar’s, tells us that at first he
rode bareback rather than with a saddle. Much of the instruction in all these
skills was supposed to be given by the father or another male relative. It was
highly significant that all this occurred in public view. Boys of a similar age,
who would in time go on to be competitors in the scramble for political
office, trained in full view of each other, and even at this early stage in life
might begin to forge a reputation. Caesar was slightly built and not
particularly robust, but his great determination seems to have made up for
this. Plutarch tells us that he was a natural horseman and we also read that
he accustomed himself to riding with his arms folded behind his back,
guiding the trotting horse with his knees. In later life his skill at arms was
also praised, and the Romans believed that all good commanders should
handle sword, javelin and shield as well as they controlled whole legions.17
The Lull and the Storms
After the savage suppression of Saturninus and Glaucia in the autumn of 100
BC, Roman public life had returned to something like normality. Marius’
reputation had suffered through his earlier association with the pair, even
though he had led the forces of the Republic against them. There were
rumours that he had been tempted to join Saturninus. One of the wilder
stories claimed that on the night before the final confrontation he had
received both the radical leaders and a delegation from the Senate in his
40
Caesar’s Childhood
house at the same time. Marius is supposed to have feigned a nasty attack
of diarrhoea, using this pretext to dash suddenly out of the room and leave
one group whenever he wanted to talk to the others. Yet apart from his
questionable role in this affair, Marius was simply not skilful enough at the
political game to make the most of his wealth and military glory. The daily
business of greeting friends and associates, of doing favours to as many
people as possible and so placing them under an obligation without making
them feel inferior, occupied a great part of a senator’s time, but were not
things at which Marius excelled. Plutarch tells us that few people chose to
seek his assistance, even after he had constructed a new house for himself
close to the Forum, declaring that visitors should not have to walk too far
to see him. We do not know how much contact the young Caesar had with
his famous uncle during the nineties BC, but it seems doubtful that he learned
much from him about how to gain influence in the Senate.18
The legislation of the Gracchi and Saturninus had provoked much
opposition, but in the end it was the fear of the power and influence that these
radical tribunes would win through their actions that contributed most to
their violent deaths. Ultimately, most of the Roman elite preferred to allow
some of the major problems facing the Republic to go unanswered rather
than see someone else gain the credit for dealing with them. Yet the issues
remained, many of them connected with the fundamental question of who
should benefit from the profits of empire. A magistrate proposing a new
distribution of land, State-subsidised corn for the urban poor or an extension
of the public role of the equestrian order as jurors could expect to find ready
support. The success of the radical tribunes in the last decades had
demonstrated this clearly, just as their violent ends had shown how difficult
it was to maintain popularity with such disparate interest groups over the
long term.
One group whose favour offered less immediate advantage to a senator
were the Italian allies or socii. Tiberius Gracchus had incurred the hostility
of the Italian aristocracy by his land law, since many of these men held large
sections of ager publicus. Directly, such men had no power at Rome but they
were able to influence sufficient important senators to oppose the tribune.
Caius Gracchus had sought to win over the Italians by granting Roman
citizenship to them, but in the process had alienated many of his Roman
supporters. The Roman elite disliked the idea of the wealthiest new citizens
adding to the competition for public office, while the poor, especially the
urban poor, feared that crowds of Italians would overwhelm them at games
and entertainments and make their votes of less value in the assemblies. The
41
the rise to the consulship, 100–59 bc
failure of Caius’ legislation seems to have increased existing resentment of
their treatment amongst Rome’s Italian allies. These communities invariably
supplied at least half of the soldiers in any Roman army – and it is possible
that in recent decades the proportion had risen even higher – and suffered
casualties accordingly. Yet they do not by this time seem to have shared the
spoils of expansion to the same degree. The arrogant behaviour of some
Roman magistrates in their dealings with the socii offered a further source
of resentment. In 125 BC the colony of Fregellae, which possessed Latin
status and so was comparatively privileged, had rebelled against Rome and
been brutally suppressed. Many Italians seem to have reached the conclusion
that only when they became Roman citizens would Rome’s rule be made
more palatable. Some drifted to Rome and somehow managed to get
themselves enrolled as citizens, but during the early first century a series of
especially strict censors did their best to remove the names of such men who
had no real claim to be Romans.19
In 91 BC the tribune Marcus Livius Drusus once again advocated granting
citizenship to the allies. This was the centrepiece of a series of reforms
strongly reminiscent of those of the Gracchi – ironically, since Drusus’ father
had been one of Caius’ chief opponents. Like the brothers, Drusus came
from an extremely wealthy and influential family, which allowed him to be
bolder in his legislation, while also adding to fears of what his long-term
ambitions were. There was considerable opposition to the tribune,
particularly to his plan to extend the franchise. However, before the
citizenship law could be voted on by the Assembly, Drusus was fatally stabbed
with a leather worker’s knife while greeting callers in the porch of his house.
The identity of the murderer was never established, but it was clear that his
law would never now be passed. A large number of Italian noblemen, some
of them close associates of Drusus, soon resolved to take things into their
own hands. The result was the rebellion of large sections of Italy in what
became known as the Social War – the name comes from socii, the Latin for
allies. The rebels created their own state, with a capital at Corfinium and a
constitution heavily based on the Roman system, having as its key magistrates
two consuls and twelve praetors elected every year. Coins were minted
showing the bull of Italy goring the Roman wolf and a large army speedily
mobilised, its equipment, training and tactical doctrine identical to those of
the legions. By the end of 91 BC heavy fighting had broken out, with
considerable losses on both sides. Allegiances in the struggle were complex
and at many points it resembled more closely a civil war than rebellion.
Many Italian communities, including virtually all the Latin towns, remained
42
Caesar’s Childhood
loyal to Rome, while numbers of captured Roman soldiers were willing to
enlist in the Italian armies and fight against their fellow citizens.20
Caesar was too young to take part in the Social War, but a number of
those who would play major roles in his story, notably Cicero and Pompey,
had their first taste of military service during this conflict. It is quite possible
that Caesar’s father served in some capacity, but the sources are silent on
this. If he was indeed governor of Asia in 91 BC then he would have missed
the start of the war, but probably returned before it was complete. The Lucius
Julius Caesar, who was consul in 90 BC and proved an uninspired commander
in his operations against the rebels, was a member of the other branch of
the family. Sextus Julius Caesar, who as already mentioned may or may not
have been Caius’ brother, had held the office in the previous year and also took
part in the conflict. He died of disease while a proconsul in command of an
army. The sheer scale of the fighting in the Social War, added to the deaths
of several magistrates at the hands of the enemy and the incompetence shown
by others, ensured that many experienced senators received commands as
pro-magistrates. Marius played a major role in the first year of fighting,
winning a number of small actions and, perhaps more importantly, avoiding
defeat. He was now in his late sixties, which the Romans considered very old
for a general in the field, and there was some criticism of his conduct as too
cautious. Whether because of this, or through failing health, he does not
seem to have played any active role in the war after 90 BC. Two other
commanders, Lucius Cornelius Sulla and Cnaeus Pompeius Strabo, were
credited with doing more than anyone else to ensure Rome’s military victory.
Yet the Social War was won as much through diplomacy and conciliation as
by force, and from the beginning the Senate had started to grant what the
Italians had unsuccessfully demanded in the first place. Allied communities
who had remained loyal were given citizenship, as were those who quickly
surrendered and, very quickly, those who had been defeated. The readiness
with which the Romans extended the franchise to virtually the entire free
population of Italy south of the River Po underlined the essential pointlessness
of the conflict. The way in which it was done also illustrated the reluctance
to alter the existing political balance in Rome itself, for the new citizens were
concentrated in a few voting tribes to minimise their influence.21
Sulla had gained much credit for his role in suppressing the rebels and
by the end of 89 BC he returned to Rome and won election to the consulship
for the following year, defeating as one of his main competitors Caius Julius
Caesar Strabo. In many ways Sulla’s career foreshadowed that of Caesar.
Both were patricians, but ones whose families had long since fallen from
43
the rise to the consulship, 100–59 bc
prominence so that their own progress in public life was almost as hard
fought as that of any ‘new man’. Sulla began his career rather later than
was normal, but served as Marius’ quaestor in Numidia and played the
principal role in arranging the betrayal and capture of Jugurtha. It was an
achievement that he constantly paraded, fuelling a growing jealousy in his
former commander who felt that this diminished his own glory. Although
during the war with the Cimbri Sulla at first served under Marius, he soon
transferred to the army of his colleague and relations between the two men
seem never to have been cordial after this. As consul in 88 BC the Senate gave
Sulla the war with King Mithridates VI of Pontus as his province. Mithridates
ruled one of the Hellenised eastern kingdoms, which had grown in power
with the decline of Macedonia and the Seleucids. While the Romans were
busy with the war in Italy, the king had overrun the Roman province in Asia
and ordered the massacre of the Romans and Italians in the region. This
success was followed by an invasion of Greece. For Sulla this command was
a great opportunity to campaign amidst the famous, and extremely wealthy,
cities of the east and he set about forming an army to take with him. There
seems to have been little shortage of recruits, for wars in the east were
renowned for the easy fighting and rich plunder.22
In ordinary circumstances Sulla would simply have gone to the war and
done his best to add new lustre to his family name. However, a tribune
named Sulpicius passed a bill through the Assembly giving the eastern
command to Marius in place of Sulla. It was one of a series of laws in which
he tried to follow in the path of the Gracchi and Saturninus by using the
tribunate for a wide-ranging reform programme. Another bill was designed
to spread the newly enfranchised citizens more evenly amongst the voting
tribes. Marius was happy to use Sulpicius as he had once used Saturninus,
and Sulpicius was equally content to benefit from association with the
popular war hero. It is unlikely that either would have hesitated to break with
the other if this offered more advantage, especially once their immediate
objectives had been achieved. We must always remind ourselves that politics
was about individual success and not parties. For the moment Marius had
clearly decided that he needed once again to fight a war in order to win back
the adulation he had enjoyed after defeating Jugurtha and the northern
barbarians. Sulpicius as a tribune with great sway in the Assembly could
provide him with the opportunity to fight another war. Marius was sixtynine
and had not held an elected magistracy since 100 BC, while Sulla’s own
record had demonstrated his competence so that there was no reason for
such a break with the traditional methods of allocating commands. However,
44
Caesar’s Childhood
the Gracchi had confirmed that the Popular Assembly could legislate on
any matter. Sympathy and all precedents were with Sulla, but technically
there was nothing illegal about this. Sulpicius backed up this legality with
mob violence and one story maintained that Sulla only escaped with his life
by taking refuge in Marius’ house.23
Sulla had been unfairly treated, his dignitas as an aristocrat, senator
and consul severely dented. If his bitterness was understandable, his
response was shocking. Leaving Rome he went to his army and told the
soldiers that now that he had been supplanted in the eastern command, it
was inevitable that Marius would raise his own legions to fight the war.
Rather than let this happen, he called upon the legionaries to follow him
to Rome and free the Republic from the faction that had seized power.
None of the senatorial officers, save one, responded to his appeal, but this
reluctance was not shared by the remainder of the army. Whether through
fear of being denied the chance of booty from the war, or even a sense of
the injustice of their commander’s treatment, the legions followed Sulla to
Rome. It was the first time that a Roman army had marched against the
city. Two praetors sent to confront the army were roughly handled, their
robes were torn and the fasces, carried by their attendants to symbolise that
they held imperium, were smashed by the angry legionaries. Later, other
senatorial delegations asking the consul to halt and allow time for a
peaceful settlement were received cordially, but ignored. When the entry
into Rome of a small force was stopped by hastily organised forces loyal
to Marius and Sulpicius, Sulla responded with greater force, his men
fighting their way through the streets and burning down a number of
houses in the process. Opposition was initially fierce but poorly equipped,
and was soon crushed. Sulla outlawed twelve of the opposing leaders,
including Marius and his son, as well as Sulpicius, making it legal for
anyone to kill them and then claim a reward. The tribune was betrayed by
one of his own slaves and killed. (Sulla gave the slave his freedom and then
had the man thrown to his death from the Tarpeian Rock for disloyalty to
his former master. Such a severe gesture was well in keeping with Roman
traditions of respect for both law and duty.) The other fugitives avoided
pursuit and escaped. Marius, after a series of picturesque adventures – no
doubt much embellished by later legend – eventually reached Africa where
he was welcomed by the communities of his veterans established there
after the Numidian war. Sulla took some measures to restore normality and
then left with his army to fight Mithridates, not returning to Italy for
almost five years.24
45
the rise to the consulship, 100–59 bc
The two consuls for 87 BC swiftly fell out and one, Lucius Cornelius
Cinna, was declared an enemy of the Republic and expelled from office after
attempts to undo Sulla’s legislation. Copying Sulla, Cinna fled to one of the
armies still engaged in stamping out the last embers of the Italian revolt
and persuaded the soldiers to support him. Soon he was joined by Marius
who had returned from Africa with a mass of volunteers, who were little more
than a rabble. Most notorious of all were the Bardyaei, a band of freed
slaves who formed Marius’ personal bodyguard and often acted as
executioners. Near the end of the year Marius and Cinna marched on Rome
and were ineffectually opposed by the consul Cnaeus Octavius, a man of
high principle but very modest talent. The ambiguous behaviour of Pompeius
Strabo, who was still at the head of his army and had been angling for a
second consulship for several years, only made matters worse. Sulla had
sent Quintus Pompeius, his fellow consul for 88 BC, to take charge of Strabo’s
legions. Quintus and Strabo were distant cousins, but that did not prevent
the former from being murdered by the latter’s legionaries, almost certainly
with their commander’s approval. Strabo may well have been unsure of
which side to join and probably made overtures to both. In the event he
joined Octavius, but failed to support him effectively and their forces were
defeated. Strabo died soon afterwards, perhaps from disease or just possibly
after being struck by lightning.
Octavius refused to flee when the enemy entered the city and was killed
as he sat in his chair of office on the Janiculum Hill. His severed head was
brought to Cinna, who had it fastened to the Rostra in the Forum. It was soon
joined by the heads of a number of other senators. In our sources Marius
receives the chief blame for the wave of executions that followed, but it
seems likely that Cinna played as full a part. The famous orator Marcus
Antonius – the grandfather of the Mark Antony who would follow Caesar
– was killed, as were the father and older brother of Marcus Licinius Crassus,
and Lucius Caesar and his brother Caesar Strabo. A few men were given
sham trials, but most were simply killed as soon as they were caught. Sulla’s
house was burned to the ground in an important symbolic gesture, for a
senator’s residence was not only the location for so much political activity
but was a visible sign of his importance. His wife and family were sought
out, but managed to evade capture and eventually joined him in Greece. If
Sulla’s seizure of Rome had been shocking, the brutality of this second
occupation was far worse. Marius and Cinna were elected consuls for 86
BC, but the former died suddenly a few weeks after taking up the office. He
was seventy.25
46
Caesar’s Childhood
The role, if any, of Caesar’s father in these events is unknown. Nor is it
possible to say whether or not the young Caesar was actually in Rome on
either of the occasions when the city was stormed, or saw the corpses floating
in the Tiber and the heads hanging from the Rostra. The education of young
aristocrats was highly traditional and they were supposed to learn much by
watching their elders conducting their daily affairs. Yet in these years public
life was so disordered and often violent that they were inevitably absorbing
a very different impression of the Republic to earlier generations. Worse
was to come.
47
III
The First Dictator
‘Lists of proscribed people were posted not only in Rome, but in every
city in Italy. There was nowhere that remained free from the stain of
bloodshed – no god’s temple, no guest-friend’s hearth, no family home.
Husbands were butchered in the arms of their wives, sons in the arms of
their mothers. Only a tiny proportion of the dead were killed because they
had angered or made an enemy of someone; far more were killed for their
property, and even the executioners tended to say that this man was killed
by his large house, this one by his garden, that one by his warm springs.’
– Plutarch, early second century AD.1
Caesar’s father died suddenly, collapsing one morning while in the act of
putting on his shoes. His son was nearly sixteen, but had probably already
formally become a man, laying aside the purple-bordered toga praetexta
– worn only by boys and magistrates – and replacing this with the plain
toga virilis of an adult. As part of this ceremony the boy also removed the
bulla charm from around his neck and laid it aside forever. For the first
time in his life he was shaved, and his hair was cut in the short style
appropriate for an adult citizen, rather than the somewhat longer fashion
acceptable for a boy. There was no fixed age for this ceremony, and like
so many other aspects of Roman education it was left to each family to
decide. Usually it occurred between the ages of fourteen and sixteen,
although cases are known of individuals as young as twelve and as old as
eighteen. Equally often the ceremony took place at the Liberalia festival,
which occurred on 17 March, though again there was no legal obligation
to hold it on this day. Apart from ceremonies within the household, an
aristocratic child would be paraded through the heart of the city by his
father and his father’s friends, symbolising the son’s admission as an adult
into the wider community of the Republic. After passing through the
Forum, the group would ascend the Capitoline Hill to perform a sacrifice
48
the first dictator
in the Temple of Jupiter, making an offering to Iuventus, the deity of
youth.2
After his father’s death Caesar was not simply an adult, but also the
paterfamilias or head of the household. There were few close male relatives
to guide his future career, but the young man from the beginning displayed
considerable self-confidence. Within a year he broke off the betrothal
arranged for him at some earlier date by his parents. This was to a certain
Cossutia, whose father was an equestrian not a senator. Her family was
very wealthy, and would doubtless have provided a large dowry, but although
this money would have been very useful for launching a political career the
alliance offered few other advantages. It is possible that the couple were
actually married, rather than simply betrothed, for the word used by
Suetonius often means an actual divorce, while Plutarch clearly counted
Cossutia as one of Caesar’s wives. Their age makes this a little unlikely, but
certainly not impossible. Whatever the precise nature of the union, it was
broken. Instead Caesar wed Cornelia, the daughter of Cinna, a fellow
patrician, consul for four consecutive years from 87–84 BC, and the most
powerful man in Rome.3
It is not clear precisely why Cinna chose to honour Caesar in this way.
Clearly the execution of two Julii Caesares did not count against him, which
in itself illustrates just how separate the two branches of the family were.
Marius was the boy’s uncle, which doubtless brought favour, but the
importance of this link had diminished to some extent with Marius’ death
early in 86 BC. In the last weeks of his life it is true that he and Cinna had
nominated the boy for the post of Flamen Dialis, one of Rome’s most
prestigious priesthoods. The previous incumbent, Lucius Cornelius Merula,
had been made suffect (acting) consul in 87 BC by Octavius to replace the
dismissed Cinna. When the Marian and Cinnan forces captured Rome,
Merula had anticipated execution by committing suicide. The flamen had
to be a patrician married to a patrician by an ancient, rarely used form of
the wedding ceremony known as confarreatio. Caesar was too young to take
up the post in 86 BC and the arrangement of the marriage to the patrician
Cornelia in 84 BC was in part to prepare him for his priesthood. Yet it is
hard to believe that Cinna’s daughter was the only available patrician girl to
be married to the flamen designate, or that the desire to ensure that Caesar
was qualified for the priesthood overruled the normal priorities of a senator
looking for a son-in-law. Indeed the youth was in fact not really eligible for
the priesthood at all, because a flamen was supposed to be the son of
patrician parents married according to the ritual of confarreatio and Aurelia
49
was plebian. Cinna must have had a high opinion of the young Caesar.
If so, then the decision to make him Flamen Dialis seems more than a little
peculiar. The flaminate was one of Rome’s most ancient religious orders.
There were fifteen of these priests all told, each dedicated to the worship
of a particular deity, but three were of far greater importance and prestige
than the rest. These were the priests of Quirinus (Flamen Quirinalis), Mars
(Flamen Martialis), and Jupiter (Flamen Dialis). Jupiter was Rome’s most
important god, and his flamen was correspondingly the most senior. The
great antiquity of the flaminate was attested by the host of strange taboos
binding him, for the flamen and his wife were considered to be permanently
engaged in the propitiation of the god, and so could not risk any form of
ritual pollution. Amongst many other things, the Flamen Dialis was not
allowed to take an oath, to pass more than three nights away from the city,
or to see a corpse, an army on campaign or anyone working on a festival
day. In addition he could not ride a horse, have a knot anywhere within his
house or even in his clothing, and could not be presented with a table
without food since he was never to appear to be in want. Furthermore, he
could only be shaved or have his hair cut by a slave using a bronze knife –
surely another indication of antiquity – and the cut hair, along with other
things such as nail clippings, had to be buried in a secret place. The flamen
wore a special hat called the apex, which appears to have been made from
fur, had a point on top and flaps over the ears. These restrictions made a
normal senatorial career impossible.4
The prestige of the Flamen Dialis was very great, and in the last century
holders of this priesthood had asserted their right to sit in the Senate and
hold magistracies that did not require them to leave Rome. This required
them to be exempted from the oath normally taken by any magistrate at the
beginning of his term of office. The restrictions preventing the flamen from
holding military command could not be bypassed so easily. Merula’s
consulship was unlikely to have occurred without the peculiar circumstances
of Cinna’s deposition in 87 BC. He claimed later that he had not wanted to
stand, but was presumably voted into office by the Comitia Centuriata in
the normal way. The taboos imposed by his priesthood ensured that he
could not play a very active part in events, and it may be that this was why
Octavius had wanted him as a colleague. When Cinna and Marius seized
Rome, Merula had voluntarily laid down his consulship but swiftly realised
that this would not be enough to save his life. He went to the Temple of
Jupiter on the Capitoline Hill and there removed the apex hat, formally
laying down his office, before cutting his wrists with a knife. He died roundly
50
the rise to the consulship, 100–59 bc
the first dictator
cursing Cinna and his supporters, but was careful to leave a note explaining
that he had been careful to avoid polluting his priesthood.5
Caesar and Cornelia were married by the peculiar confarreatio ceremony.
The name came from that of emmer wheat – far in Latin – which was used
to make a loaf for a sacrificial offering to Jupiter Farreus. This was carried
ahead of the bride, and may well have been eaten by the couple as part of
the ritual. Ten witnesses needed to be present and the ceremony was supposed
to be conducted by two of Rome’s most senior priests, the Pontifex Maximus
and the Flamen Dialis. Since the latter post remained vacant after Merula’s
death this part of the ritual cannot have been fulfilled. Given that Caesar was
marked out for this post and therefore that his wife would become the
flaminica, their wedding was also marked by the sacrifice of a sheep.
Afterwards, their heads veiled, the couple sat on seats covered in sheepskin.6
The selection of Caesar for the vacant priesthood was a considerable
honour, which would make him an important figure in the Republic and a
member of the Senate at a very young age. Yet this prominence came at the
price of severely limiting opportunities for his future career. At best Caesar
might hope to reach the praetorship like his father, but he could not have left
Rome to govern a province and certainly would have had no opportunity for
military glory. Given the family’s fairly modest achievements in the past, a
career of this sort may have been considered ample reward for the boy, for
certainly no one would have guessed at his eventual achievements. However,
there is no evidence that it was felt that lack of talent or poor health would
anyway have prevented the lad from doing well in the normal way – Caesar
had not yet begun to suffer from the epileptic fits to which he would be
prone in later life. The marriage with Cornelia also suggests that the boy was
not seen as wholly lacking in merit. Cinna and Marius clearly agreed on the
appointment in the first place, and the former maintained the decision after
his ally’s death, but in the end we cannot know their reasons, or indeed the
attitude of the young Caesar towards it. Whatever their thinking, there does
not seem to have been any great urgency about the whole business, and
although one of our sources claims that he was actually invested with the
flaminate, it is most probable that the other authors were right to say that
this did not actually occur. At first his youth may have been an obstacle.
More importantly Cinna himself could not make the actual appointment,
which had to be done in accordance with a strict procedure by another of
Rome’s senior priests, the Pontifex Maximus. At the time this was Quintus
Mucius Scaevola, who was not a friend of the new regime, having already
survived a murder attempt by one of Cinna’s henchmen. An ex-consul and
51
the rise to the consulship, 100–59 bc
a famous jurist – the Pontifex Maximus was not bound by such oppressive
rules as the flamen and so could follow an active public career – Scaevola may
have objected to Caesar on technical grounds, given Aurelia’s plebian status,
or perhaps simply refused to bow to pressure from Cinna. Ultimately this
was a very minor issue and Cinna’s preoccupation with other, far more
important matters ensured that it was left unresolved.7
Waiting for Sulla
The years when Cinna and his supporters dominated Rome are not recorded
in any detail by our sources. Yet it is probably not merely this lack of
information that suggests he made no attempt at major reforms. Although
he had appealed to the newly enfranchised Italians and to other discontented
groups before his victory, Cinna made little attempt to satisfy their demands
afterwards. Rome’s first period of civil war – and indeed the latter conflicts
– had little to do with conflicting ideology or policies, but were violent
extensions of the traditional competition between individuals. Cinna had no
revolutionary ambitions to reform the Republic, but craved personal power
and influence within the existing system. Therefore, once he had won these
things through the use of force, his chief priority was to retain them. Already
consul for 86 BC, Cinna made sure than he was elected to the office for 85
and 84 – quite probably only his name and that of a chosen colleague were
allowed to be put forward as candidates. As consul he held imperium and
so had a legal right to command the armies that he would need to protect
himself from Sulla or any other rival. As a magistrate he was exempt from
prosecution, for it seems that there was some activity in the courts at Rome,
although a few prominent advocates appear to have chosen to cease
appearing. Cinna and Marius had killed some senators and caused others
to flee abroad, but the majority of the Senate remained in Rome and
continued to meet. Many senators were not strong supporters of Cinna and
his associates, but equally had no particular love for Sulla. The Senate’s
debates appear to have been comparatively free and at times it voted for
measures that were not particularly pleasing to Cinna, for instance, when it
began negotiations with Sulla. Yet it could not restrain him or prevent his
consecutive consulships, for in the end he controlled an army and the Senate
did not. In Cinna’s Rome the Senate convened, the courts functioned and
elections were held, creating at least a veneer of normality. There was a
remarkable elasticity in the main institutions of the Republic, which tended
52
the first dictator
to continue running in some form under almost any circumstances,
interrupted only temporarily by riot and bloodshed. Senators’ lives revolved
around the doing of favours to win support, gaining influence and seeking
office. Whatever the circumstances, they naturally continued to try and do
these things as far as was possible.8
Cinna’s position was incompatible with a properly functioning Republic,
for in the end his position rested on his army and he showed no signs of
giving this up, while his repeated consulships denied others the chance at high
office and also limited the number of magistrates available to govern the
provinces. Yet Cinna could not feel secure while Sulla remained at large and
in command of his legions. Marius had been allocated the war against
Mithridates as his province in 86 BC, but had died before he had even set
out. His replacement as consul, Lucius Valerius Flaccus, also inherited his
province and did at last go to the east with an army. It was soon evident
that Sulla was not about to allow himself to be replaced, but Flaccus may
well have attempted to negotiate with him with a view to their joining forces
against Mithridates. However, Flaccus was promptly murdered by his own
quaestor, Caius Flavius Fimbria, who took over the army and tried to defeat
Pontus on his own. Showing less talent for warfare than he had for treachery
and murder, Fimbria eventually committed suicide after his soldiers had
mutinied. Over the next few years, the Senate made a few approaches to
Sulla, hoping to reconcile him with Cinna and avoid further civil war, but
neither of the leaders showed much enthusiasm for this. Sulla maintained that
he was a properly elected magistrate, sent as proconsul by the Senate to
wage war against an enemy of the Republic, and must be acknowledged as
such and left to complete his task. By 85 BC as it became clear that the war
with Mithridates was drawing to a close, Cinna and his associates threw
themselves into raising troops and massing supplies for what they saw as
the inevitable clash with Sulla.9
Lucius Cornelius Sulla was a man of striking appearance, with
exceptionally fair skin, piercing grey eyes and reddish hair. In later life his
appearance was marred by a skin condition that speckled his face with red
patches. (An obscure piece of military law from several centuries later also
claims that he had only one testicle, and that his achievements make it clear
that such a defect was no bar to becoming a successful soldier.) Sulla could
be very charming, winning over soldier and senator alike, but many
aristocrats remained deeply uncertain of him. In spite of his late entry into
public life he had been reasonably successful, and demonstrated his military
skill on repeated occasions. His consulship came when he was fifty, which
53
the rise to the consulship, 100–59 bc
was unusually old for a first term, and in the preceding decade it had taken
two attempts for him to win the praetorship. Many senators probably found
it hard to forget the poverty of his youth and the decay of his family. It is
common for those who flourish under any system to feel that the failure of
others is deserved. Sulla had been poor and revelled in the company of actors
and musicians, professions considered extremely disreputable. Such
behaviour was bad enough in his youth, and far worse for a senator and
magistrate, but Sulla remained loyal to his old friends throughout his life.
He was a heavy drinker, enjoyed feasting and was widely believed to be very
active sexually, taking both men and women as lovers. For much of his life
he publicly associated with the actor Metrobius, who specialised in playing
female roles on stage, and the pair were believed to be having an affair. The
inner elite of the Senate were fairly grudging in their acceptance of Sulla’s
political success, although at times evidently preferring him to some of the
other alternatives. This in itself may not have mattered to him, but he was
unshakeable in his determination to have his success publicly acknowledged
and not be robbed of his achievements. In 88 BC he marched on Rome
claiming that he was the legitimate representative of the Republic and that
he needed to free Rome from the unlawful domination of a faction.
Afterwards he always presented himself as a proconsul of Rome, denying the
validity of Marius’ and Cinna’s declaration proclaiming him an enemy of
the State. Sulla was a man whose self-proclaimed epitaph would be that he
had never failed to do good to a friend or harm to an enemy.10
As far as Sulla was concerned his imperium and command were legitimate,
and his opponents had acted illegally and as enemies of the Republic.
Therefore it was both his right and duty to suppress them by any means
necessary. It was also important for him to protect his own dignitas, for his
achievements deserved respect for himself and his family. The Romans openly
stressed the great part played by luck in all human activities, especially
warfare, and – anticipating Napoleon – believed that being lucky was one
of the most important virtues of a general. Commanders were not supposed
to rely on blind chance, and were to make every preparation possible to
ensure success, but in the chaos of war the best plans could fall apart and
victory or defeat depend on chance. Sulla paraded his good fortune
throughout his career. Being fortunate implied divine favour, in his case the
support of Venus and, on occasions, Apollo and others. Sulla claimed that
he had had prophetic dreams before many of the great events in his life, in
which a god or goddess urged him to take the action he planned and promised
him success. Marius had similarly been inspired by oracles foretelling his
54
the first dictator
great future, most famously that he would hold seven consulships. Both
men were ruthlessly ambitious, but the belief that their success was divinely
ordained and therefore right, further boosted their already considerable selfconfidence.
Nor should modern cynicism blind us to the fact that such claims
of divine favour often made highly effective propaganda.11
Sulla had used force once already to defend his position. The brutality of
Cinna’s own capture of the city cannot have led him to anticipate any milder
behaviour from his enemy. In 85 BC Sulla signed the Peace of Dardanus
concluding the war with Mithridates. It was not a complete victory by
Roman standards, for the King of Pontus remained independent and still
possessed considerable power, but he had been expelled from Roman territory
and his armies humiliatingly defeated in battle. Sulla was not able to return
to Italy immediately, for there was much administrative work to be done to
settle the eastern provinces. In 84 BC Cinna had decided to fight his rival in
Greece rather than Italy, but there were severe delays when the weather in the
Adriatic turned bad and one convoy of soldiers was blown back to Italy.
Soon afterwards the soldiers mutinied – probably through a reluctance to
fight other Romans, although our sources are contradictory on this point –
and Cinna was killed by his own men. The leadership of his supporters was
taken over by Cnaeus Papirius Carbo, who was his fellow consul in this and
the preceding year. In 82 BC he would hold a third term as consul with
Marius’ son as his colleague, in spite of the fact that the latter was too young
for the post. A growing number of senators had already either decided that
Italy was no longer safe for them, or perhaps guessed which way the wind
was blowing, and had fled to join Sulla in the east. More would rally to his
cause when he finally landed at Brundisium (modern Brindisi) in southern
Italy in the autumn of 83 BC.12
The odds against Sulla were huge, but his opponents consistently failed to
make the most of their numbers, and army after army was defeated, or on
one occasion persuaded to defect en masse. Few of the leaders opposing him
displayed much military talent. After a lull during the winter months the
campaign resumed and Sulla was able to take Rome in 82 BC. A sudden enemy
counter-offensive led to a desperate battle outside the Colline Gate. During
the fighting Sulla himself narrowly escaped being killed and one wing of his
army collapsed, but in the end the remainder of his troops carried on to win
a victory. As their fortunes failed the enemy leaders became more vindictive.
The Younger Marius ordered the execution of Scaevola, the Pontifex
Maximus, an action that his mother Julia is supposed to have condemned.
Marius himself was besieged in Praeneste and either killed or committed
55
the rise to the consulship, 100–59 bc
suicide when the city surrendered. When his head was taken to Sulla the
victor commented that such a stripling ought to have ‘learned to pull an oar
before he tried to steer the ship’. Carbo escaped to Sicily to continue the
resistance, but was defeated and executed by one of Sulla’s subordinates.13
Just as the Marian capture of Rome had greatly surpassed Sulla’s march
on the City in the scale of massacre and execution it brought, now both
were eclipsed by the savagery of Sulla’s return. Addressing the Senate in the
Temple of Bellona on the outskirts of Rome, the victor’s speech was
accompanied by the screams of thousands of captured soldiers – mostly
Italians who were treated more harshly than Romans – being executed a
short distance away. It was not simply the rank and file of the enemy who
suffered. Most prominent leaders were executed as soon as they were taken
or anticipated this outcome by taking their own lives. Many more senators
and equestrians seen to be hostile to Sulla were killed by his men in the
aftermath of victory.14
At first the executions occurred without warning, but complaints from a
nervous Senate wishing to know just who was going to suffer led to the
process becoming more formal. Sulla ordered that the proscriptions – lists
of names of men who thereby lost all protection of law – be posted up in
the Forum, and copies were subsequently sent to other parts of Italy. Those
proscribed could be killed by anyone and a reward claimed on presentation
of their severed heads to Sulla, who had them displayed on and around the
Rostra. Usually the victim’s property was confiscated and auctioned off,
much of it being purchased at a knock-down price by Sulla’s associates. The
victims were principally either senators or equestrians. Several lists were
posted and, though we have no precise figure, the total amounted to some
hundreds. Most had opposed Sulla, but other names were added simply
because of a man’s wealth. One equestrian who had taken little interest in
public life is supposed to have seen his name on one of the lists and declared
that his Alban estate wanted to see him dead. He was soon killed.15 Many
private hatreds were exercised, and there were more than a few cases of
names being added to the lists after the man had been killed in order to
legitimise murder. Sulla does not appear to have supervised the process too
closely, but he did form a bodyguard of the freed slaves of many of the
proscribed and these were widely accused of abusing their new-found power.
The proscriptions formally ended on 1 June 81 BC, but their horror lived on
and scarred the Romans’ collective consciousness for the rest of the century.16
Sulla’s power came directly from his control of an army that had defeated
all his rivals, but the man who had done so much to defend his legitimacy as
56
the first dictator
proconsul soon gave himself a more formal position to justify his domination
of the State. At times of severe crisis the Republic had occasionally set aside
its fear of the rule of one man and had appointed a dictator, a single
magistrate with supreme imperium. It had always been a temporary post,
laid down after six months, but Sulla discarded these restrictions and set no
time limit to his office. He was named dictator legibus faciendis et rei publicae
constituendae (dictator to make laws and reconstitute the State) by a vote in
the Popular Assembly. His office was unprecedented, as was the violence he
used to crush any opposition. On one occasion he casually ordered the
execution of his own senior officer in the Forum because the man persisted
in standing for the consulship in defiance of the dictator’s orders.17
Fugitive
Caesar was about eighteen when Sulla’s army took Rome for the second time.
He had not taken any part in the civil war. His father-in-law Cinna was dead
and there is no evidence to suggest a particularly close relationship with the
Younger Marius. More importantly he was probably already expected to
follow the rules laid down for the Flamen Dialis even if he had not yet formally
been invested with the priesthood. The same restrictions that prevented him
from going to war should have meant that he was in Rome when the city was
taken and the great battle fought outside the Colline Gate, and that he
witnessed the bloodbath of the proscriptions. The flamen was not supposed
to see a corpse, but it must have been difficult to have avoided doing so at this
time. Whether he saw them or not, the youth must have been aware of the
heads of so many prominent Romans being displayed in the city’s heart. At
one point it seemed as if his own would shortly join them.
Caesar himself was neither important enough nor sufficiently wealthy
to warrant his inclusion in the proscriptions. However, he was married to
Cinna’s daughter Cornelia and such a connection was not one to win favour
with the new regime. Sulla instructed the youth to divorce his wife. He had
given similar orders to other men, at times arranging a more favourable
match for them, often involving some of his own female relations. The most
famous case was of Cnaeus Pompey, the son of Pompeius Strabo and one of
Sulla’s most effective commanders, who was told to divorce his wife and
instead marry the dictator’s stepdaughter. The latter was both already
married and heavily pregnant, but this did not prevent a rapid divorce and
equally speedy union with Pompey. We know of at least one other man who
57
the rise to the consulship, 100–59 bc
put aside his wife on the instructions of Sulla. Caesar was the only man to
refuse, and to persist in that refusal in spite of threats and offers of favours,
quite possibly including a marriage link to the dictator’s family. Given recent
events this was remarkable boldness, most of all for a youth who could easily
be removed and anyway had connections with the opposition. Why he did
this is unknown. The marriage to Cornelia does appear to have been a happy
one, but it may just as easily have been innate stubbornness or pride.
Sulla’s threats became stronger. Cornelia’s dowry was confiscated and
added to the Republic’s Treasury as punishment. At some point the flaminate
was also taken from Caesar. This may have happened anyway given that it
had been bestowed by Marius and Cinna, but our sources tend to associate
this with the dispute over Cornelia. Alternatively someone may have been
scrupulous enough to point out that Caesar was not technically eligible in
the first place. Rome had survived without a Flamen Dialis since 87 BC, and
there was evidently no urgency to appoint a replacement, for the post would
in fact remain vacant until 12 BC. There seems to have been little enthusiasm
amongst the aristocracy for such a restrictive honour. Plutarch tells us that
Caesar also tried to stand for election to an unspecified priesthood, but was
secretly opposed by Sulla and so failed in the attempt. This may simply be
a confused version of the story of the flaminate, although this was not
bestowed by election, or an invention intended to emphasise the confidence
displayed by the young Caesar in the face of the mighty dictator.18Whatever
the extent of his public opposition to Sulla, this was a dangerous path and
soon led to orders being issued for his arrest, which was usually a prelude
to execution. It is unclear whether Sulla himself gave these instructions, and
it may actually be that the initiative was taken by some of his subordinates.
If so, then the dictator soon seems to have learned of it and did not at first
do anything to restrain his men.19
Caesar fled from Rome and sought sanctuary in Sabine territory to the
north-east. The dictator’s forces were active throughout Italy – he would
soon give orders for the demobilisation and settlement of some 120,000
veterans, which gives an indication of the sheer size of his army. Caesar
could not hope simply to vanish, blending into one of the small communities.
He had to move virtually every night to avoid patrols, and there was always
the risk of betrayal since it is probable that the rewards given to those who
brought in fugitives during the proscriptions were still in force. The young
aristocrat who in recent years had probably had to follow the strictly
regulated routine of the flaminate now had to live rough. He may have had
some slaves with him, perhaps even some friends, but such a lifestyle was at
58
the first dictator
marked contrast to his earlier years. To make matters worse he contracted
malaria. While suffering from an attack, he had to move by night from one
shelter to the next safe house when he was intercepted and taken by a group
of Sullan soldiers. These men, under the command of a certain Cornelius
Phagites who may have been a centurion, were sweeping the area for the
dictator’s enemies, and according to Suetonius had been hounding him for
days. Caesar offered them money to let him go, eventually buying his freedom
for 12,000 silver denarii – almost one hundred years’ pay for an ordinary
soldier, although centurions received considerably more.20
In the end Caesar was saved by his mother. Aurelia persuaded the Vestal
Virgins, along with some of her relations – most notably her cousin Caius
Aurelius Cotta as well as Mamercus Aemilius Lepidus – to plead with the
dictator for her son’s life. Cotta and Lepidus had both sided with Sulla in
the civil war and would each win the consulship in the next few years. The
lobbying of such influential men, combined with Caesar’s lack of real
importance, won a pardon. Not only was Caesar’s life spared, but he was
permitted to begin his public career. This was a considerable concession,
since the sons and grandsons of the proscribed were barred from holding any
office or entering the Senate. Legend maintained that when Sulla finally
relented, he declared that ‘they could have their way and take him, but they
ought to realise that the one they so desire to save will one day destroy the
party of the best men (optimates), which I and they have both defended; for
in this Caesar there are many Mariuses.’ This may be no more than a later
myth, but it is certainly not impossible that the dictator recognised the
massive ambition – and perhaps also the talent – of the cocksure youngster
who had stood up to him.21

Sulla laid down his dictatorship at the end of 80 or beginning of 79 BC. He
had enlarged the Senate, adding 300 new members from the equestrian order,
and done much to restore its prominent guiding role in the Republic. The
tribunate, which Sulpicius had used to give his eastern command to Marius,
was crippled, no longer able to propose legislation to the Assembly. Even
more importantly a tribune was barred from holding any further
magistracies, effectively ensuring that only the unambitious would now seek
it. Legislation confirmed the traditional age limits on office-holding, and
expressly forbade consecutive terms in the same post, while the activities of
governors in their provinces were regulated. Sulla, who had always claimed
to be a properly appointed servant of the Republic, had used his supreme
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the rise to the consulship, 100–59 bc
power to re-establish a very conservative vision of the Republic. Even more
importantly he had filled the Senate with his own men. If the system was to
work, then it would depend on those men playing their part and acting
within the traditional boundaries that Sulla’s laws had sought to restore.
The system did not require a dictator to oversee it and so Sulla retired. For
a while he walked through the streets of Rome just like any other senator,
accompanied by his friends, but unprotected by bodyguards. It was a sign
of the respect and fear felt for him that he did this without being molested
in any way. However, one story claims that he was followed about by a youth
who continually shouted abuse, so that Sulla declared that this young fool
would prevent any future dictator from giving up power. This may well be
another invention. Much later Caesar said that ‘Sulla was a political illiterate
when he resigned from the dictatorship’.22
Soon afterwards Sulla retired to a rural estate. He had recently remarried,
his wife having died from the after-effects of giving birth to twins. Sulla was
a member of the priesthood of augurs and had scrupulously followed the
rules of the order by divorcing his dying wife because his house could not
be polluted by death at a time of festival. He refused even to see her during
this period but, in another display of both stern adherence to duty and
personal affection, gave her a lavish funeral. Later he encountered a young
divorcee at the games. What began as a flirtation initiated by the woman,
soon proceeded in a proper aristocratic way as the intrigued Sulla made
discreet enquiries about her family and then arranged the marriage. After
his retirement there were many rumours of wild parties as Sulla lived in the
country with his wife and many of the theatrical friends he had kept since
his youth. He died suddenly at the beginning of 78 BC.23
Rome had had her first taste of civil war and dictatorship. The young
Caesar – and it is important to remember that all these events occurred
while he was in his teens – had seen the personal rivalries of leading senators
spill over into savage bloodshed. Consuls and other distinguished men had
been executed or forced into suicide, showing that even the most prominent
men in the Republic could have their careers violently and suddenly
terminated. Caesar himself had narrowly avoided death. He had also stood
up to the overwhelming power of the dictator, refusing to back down, and
he had survived the experience. Senators’ sons were raised to have a very
high opinion of themselves and Caesar was no exception to this. The
experience of the last few years can only have reinforced this sense of his own
unique worth. He had resisted tyranny when everyone else was cowed into
submission. Perhaps the rules that bound others did not apply to him?
60
IV
The Young Caesar
‘This is what I wish for my orator: when it is reported that he is going to
speak let every place on the benches be taken, the judges’ tribunal full, the
clerks busy and obliging in assigning or giving up places, a listening crowd
thronging about, the presiding judge erect and attentive; when the speaker
rises the whole throng will give a sign for silence, then expressions of
assent, frequent applause; laughter when he wills it, or if he wills, tears;
so that a mere passer-by observing from a distance, though quite ignorant
of the case in question, will recognise that he is succeeding and that a
Roscius [a famous actor of the day] is on stage.’ – Cicero, 46 BC.1
A number of portrait images of Caesar survive as busts or on coins, some
either made during his lifetime or copied from originals that were, but all
portray him in middle age. They show the great general or the dictator, his
features stern and strong, his face lined and – at least in the few more realistic
portraits – his hair thinning. These images radiate power, experience and
monumental self-confidence, and at least hint at the force of personality of
the man, although no portrait, whether sculpted, painted or even
photographic can ever truly capture this. Ancient portraits often seem
especially formal and rather lifeless to the modern eye and it is all too easy
to forget that many were originally painted, for we have a deeply entrenched
vision of the Classical world as a place of bare stone and marble. Even
enhanced by paint – and the great statue painters were as revered as the
great sculptors – a portrait bust revealed only some aspects of character. In
Caesar’s case they do suggest a keen intelligence, but do not hint at the
liveliness, wit and charm that his contemporaries commented upon so often.
It is also difficult when looking at portraits of the mature Caesar to
imagine his features softened by youth, though some sense of his appearance
is provided by our literary sources. According to Suetonius, Caesar ‘is said
to have been tall, with fair skin, slender limbs, a face that was just a little too
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the rise to the consulship, 100–59 bc
full, and very dark, piercing eyes’. Plutarch confirms some of this when he
notes that Caesar was slightly built and pale, which made his feats of physical
endurance during his later campaigns all the more remarkable. Much of
this is highly subjective and it is hard to know, for instance, just how tall he
was. Suetonius’ comment may well mean no more than that Caesar did not
strike people as particularly small even though he was rather slim. We really
have no idea of what sort of stature first-century-BC Romans considered to
be tall or indeed of average size. In most respects there was nothing especially
unusual in Caesar’s physical appearance, for there were surely plenty of
other aristocrats who had dark eyes, dark brown or black hair (presumably,
since we have no explicit comment on its colour) and pale complexions. It
was his manner that most marked out the young man as unusual. We have
already encountered the extraordinary boldness with which he stood up to
Sulla, when everyone else seemed terrified into submission. Caesar revelled
in standing out from the crowd, and dressed in a highly distinctive way.
Instead of the normal short-sleeved senator’s tunic, which was white with
a purple stripe – the evidence is unclear as to whether this ran vertically
down the centre or horizontally around the border – he wore his own
unconventional version. This had long sleeves that reached down to his
wrists and ended in a fringe. Although it was not normal to wear a belt or
girdle with this tunic, Caesar did so, but perversely kept it very loose. Sulla
is supposed to have warned the other senators to keep an eye on that ‘loosegirded
boy’. It is just possible that this style was intended to serve as a
reminder of his earlier designation for the flaminate, given that the flamen
was not permitted to have knots in his clothing, but it may simply have been
mere affectation. Whatever its purpose, the result was the same. Caesar
dressed so that he was recognisably a member of a senatorial family, but at
the same time marked himself out as not quite the same as his peers.2
Appearance and grooming were very important to the Romans, and
especially the aristocracy. It was no coincidence that the bath-house, a
complex devoted to the comfort and cleanliness of citizens, required some
of the most sophisticated engineering ever devised by the Romans. The very
nature of political life, where senators frequently visited or were visited by
potential allies and clients, and where they walked through the streets to
attend public meetings, ensured that dress and bearing were always under
scrutiny. Caesar was very much the dandy, his turnout impeccable even if
his clothing was a little eccentric. The same was true of many other young
aristocrats in a Rome whose wealth ensured that expensive and exotic
materials were readily available. Young men of senatorial families had the
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The Young Caesar
money to spend on such things, as well as great numbers of slaves to pamper
to their needs. Those who lacked the funds for such a lavish lifestyle were
often willing to place themselves in debt so that they could keep up with
those who could. Yet even amongst the ‘fashionable set’ in Rome, Caesar’s
fastidiousness about his appearance was seen as excessive. To be closely
shaven and have short, neatly trimmed hair was entirely proper, but rumours
circulated that Caesar had all his other body hair removed. In many ways
it was perhaps the contradictory nature of his character that perplexed
observers. Most of the fashionable young aristocrats in Rome spent as
lavishly on wild living as they did on their own appearance. In contrast
Caesar ate sparingly and drank little and never to excess, although his guests
were always well entertained. He thus presented an odd mixture of traditional
frugality and modern self indulgence.3
Caesar’s family was not especially wealthy by aristocratic standards and
the loss of Cornelia’s dowry had doubtless been a heavy blow. A senator’s
prominence and wealth were usually indicated by the location of his house,
with the leading men in the Republic living on the slopes of the Palatine
along the Sacra Via, the road taken by processions through the heart of the
city. Marius had signalled his success over the barbarians by purchasing a
house in this area, close to the Forum. Some of the great houses were very
old, but it seems to have been rare for the same family to remain in one
house for many generations. In part this was because the Roman aristocracy
had no concept of primogeniture and instead tended to divide property
between their children, often along with political associates whom it was felt
important to honour by a legacy. To facilitate this, houses and other property
appear to have been bought and sold with great frequency. The house that
the orator Cicero would own at the height of his career had originally been
owned by Marcus Livius Drusus until his murder in 91 BC. Cicero had bought
it from another senator, Marcus Licinius Crassus, a prominent supporter of
Sulla who is known to have bought up a lot of property during the
proscriptions. The same house had at least two other, unrelated owners in
the decades following Cicero’s death in 43 BC. This was a grand building in
a position that indicated the great prominence of its occupant. In contrast
the young Caesar had a smaller place in the unfashionable district known
as the Subura. Situated in a valley between the Esquiline and Viminal hills,
and some distance from the main Forum, the Subura was dominated by
large areas of slum housing, where many of the poorest occupants lived in
badly built blocks of flats off narrow streets and alleys. It was an area of
constant bustle, teeming with people and notorious for a number of
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disreputable activities, most notably prostitution. The occupants were
probably mainly citizens, including many former slaves, but may well also
have included substantial foreign communities. There is evidence for a
synagogue in the area at a later date and it is not impossible that one already
existed in Caesar’s day.4
Much of a senator’s business was conducted in his home and this was
reflected in the design of houses. A porch for meeting visitors, including the
clients who were expected formally to greet their patron each morning, and
for displaying the busts or ancestors and the symbols of honours and
achievements won by them or the present resident was essential. Equally
important were rooms for more private discussions and places to entertain
dinner guests. The usual layout with a central, enclosed courtyard did offer
some privacy, but ambitious men were reluctant to shut out the world. Livius
Drusus’ architect is supposed to have offered to construct his house so that
he would be free from all outside gaze, prompting the reply that if it were
possible he would prefer it built so that everything he did was visible.5 For
all their wealth, status and influence, men in public life could not afford to
close themselves off from the life and business of the wider city. Therefore,
though he doubtless lived on the fringes of the Subura, and certainly is most
unlikely to have had a house in the very poorest part of the region, Caesar
cannot have been entirely detached from what was going on around him. It
may even be that daily contact with the less well off taught him some of the
skill he would later show in handling crowds and in talking to the rank and
file of the legions.
Living in the Subura may have proved advantageous, allowing the foppish
aristocrat to understand better the wider population, but the reason for
living there is unlikely to have been anything other than his own modest
means. The young Sulla had been even worse off, having to rent a flat in an
apartment block since he could not even afford a house, and paying only a
little more for his accommodation than the freedman who lived above him.
Caesar’s house indicated both his lack of funds and his comparative
unimportance in the Republic. To an extent his desire to stand out conflicted
with this, as did his willingness to spend beyond his means. Usually this
was to further his career, but occasionally it seemed little more than whim.
Suetonius tells us that he decided to have a country villa constructed on one
of his estates. However, when the foundations had already been laid and
building was underway, he was dissatisfied with the design. He immediately
ordered the structure to be demolished and a new one built in its place. The
date of this incident is uncertain, and it may well have occurred somewhat
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later in his career, but it helps to illustrate the point that, at least in certain
things, Caesar demanded perfection. For much of his life he was an
enthusiastic collector of fine art, gems and pearls, which was a rather
expensive hobby given his circumstances.6
A Crown and a King
Caesar had gone abroad soon after escaping from Sulla’s men and did not
return to Rome until after the dictator’s death. During these years he began
the military service that was the legal preliminary to a public career. He
served first with the governor of Asia, the propraetor Marcus Minucius
Thermus. Caesar’s father had governed the same province about a decade
before, so that the family name was already a familiar one to the provincials
and the son inherited a number of important connections with leading men
in the region. Thermus was a prominent Sullan and Caesar became one of
his contubernales (‘tent-companions’), young men who messed with the
commander and performed whatever duties he allocated to them. Ideally
this provided the governor with a pool of useful subordinates for minor
staff functions, while at the same time teaching the youths about soldiering
and command. The contubernales were supposed to learn by observation,
just as younger boys learned how the Republic worked by accompanying
prominent senators in the daily duties at Rome. Like so many aspects of an
aristocrat’s early years, the details of where and with whom he would serve
were not centrally controlled by the State, but arranged by individual families.
The connection between Caesar and Thermus is obscure and may well have
been indirect, via someone else with whom both parties had bonds of
political friendship.7
Under normal circumstances Asia was a peaceful and prosperous province,
making it the sort of posting where a Roman governor and his staff could
expect to make a handsome profit during their service. Yet it was only seven
years since Mithridates of Pontus had overrun the whole area and ordered
the communities to massacre all the Romans living amongst them. Sulla
had defeated Mithridates and for the moment the king was once again at
peace with Rome, but some of his recent allies had yet to be defeated. One
of Thermus’ main tasks was to defeat the city of Mytilene, which was
besieged and eventually taken by storm. During the course of the fighting
the nineteen-year-old Caesar won Rome’s highest award for gallantry, the civic
crown (corona civica). Traditionally this decoration was given only to those
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who had risked their own life to save that of another citizen. The rescued man
was supposed to plait a simple wreath of oak leaves – a tree that was sacred
to Jupiter – and present this to his saviour as an open acknowledgement of
his debt. However, by Caesar’s day it was normally awarded by the magistrate
commanding the army. The wreath was worn at military parades, but
winners of the crown were also permitted to wear them during festivals in
Rome. None of our sources preserve any details of the exploit that led to
Caesar being awarded the crown, but the corona civica was never lightly
bestowed and commanded immense respect. During the crisis of the Second
Punic War, when the Roman Senate had suffered huge casualties and needed
to replenish its numbers, men who had won the corona civica were one of
the main groups chosen for admission. It is just possible that Sulla had
decreed a similar measure, so that aristocratic winners of the crown were
immediately enrolled in the Senate, but even if this was not true, the
decoration was guaranteed to impress the electorate and help a man’s career.8
Not all of Caesar’s first term of overseas service was so creditable. Before
the storming of Mytilene, the propraetor had sent him to the court of King
Nicomedes of Bithynia (on the north coast of modern Turkey) to arrange for
the despatch of a squadron of warships to support the Roman campaign.
Bithynia was a client kingdom, allied to Rome and obliged to make such
contributions. Nicomedes was elderly and had doubtless encountered Caesar’s
father, which probably ensured that the welcome given to the son was
especially warm. The youth seems to have revelled in the luxury he
encountered, and was accused of lingering far longer than was necessary to
perform his task. Caesar was young, had led a comparatively sheltered life
because of the burdens of the flaminate, and was getting his first taste of the
wider world and of royalty. He was also moving amongst those steeped in the
Hellenic culture that was so admired by the Roman aristocracy. Any of this
might explain his tarrying overlong at the king’s court, but gossip soon spread
that the real reason was that Nicomedes had seduced the youth. Stories began
to circulate portraying Caesar as a very willing lover, claiming that he had
acted as the king’s cup-bearer at a drunken feast attended by a number of
Roman businessmen. Another tale had him being led by the royal attendants
into the royal bedroom, dressed in fine purple robes and left reclining on a
golden couch to wait for Nicomedes. The rumours spread rapidly and were
fed when Caesar returned to Bithynia not long after leaving, claiming that he
needed to oversee the business affairs of one of his freedmen.9
It was a scandal that would dog Caesar throughout his life. The Roman
aristocracy admired most aspects of Greek culture, but it never openly
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accepted the celebration of homosexuality that had been espoused by the
nobility of some Greek cities. Those senators who took male lovers tended
to do so discreetly, but even so would often be held up to public ridicule by
political opponents. The dislike of homosexuality appears to have been
fairly widespread in most social classes at Rome, and it was seen as something
that weakened men. In the army homosexuality within the camp was a
capital offence from at least the second century BC. During the campaign
against the Cimbri, Marius awarded the corona civica to a soldier who had
killed an officer after the latter had tried to force his attentions on him. The
legionary’s conduct was held up as an example of virtue and courage, while
the officer’s death was seen as fitting punishment for his excessive passion
and abuse of authority. This was in spite of the fact that the dead man was
a relation to the consul. Senators were not subject to such rigid rules as
ordinary soldiers, but faced at the very least criticism and mockery if they
showed a fondness for male lovers. During his censorship Cato the Elder
expelled a senator because the man had ordered the execution of a prisoner
at a banquet merely to please the boy with whom he was then enamoured.
The man’s fault was his abuse of imperium, but his motives were felt to have
made the crime worse. Particular contempt was reserved for the boys or
young men who were the objects of passion, and the passive partners in sex.
Such a role implied extreme effeminacy and, if anything, was felt to be worse
than the behaviour of the older, more active lover. That Caesar was said to
have been submissive in this way made the rumours all the more damaging,
for this meant that the young aristocrat had acted in a way that was thought
unfitting even for a slave. The enthusiasm with which the stories claimed
he had taken on the role compounded the crime.10
Ultimately, it was a very good piece of gossip, playing on well-established
Roman stereotypes. The Romans were suspicious of easterners, seeing the
Asiatic Greeks as corrupt and decadent, in no way resembling the admired
Greeks of the Classical past. Kings were especially disliked, and royal courts
seen as places of political intrigue and sexual depravity. Thus the tale of the
ageing, lecherous old ruler deflowering the young, naive aristocrat on his
first trip abroad had a wide appeal. It helped that the story involved Caesar,
a youth whose unusual dress and massive self-esteem had doubtless made him
cordially disliked, since as yet neither he nor his family could boast sufficient
achievements to justify such vanity. It was deeply satisfying for others to
think that this overconfident young man had behaved so submissively to
gratify some decrepit old lover. Later in Caesar’s career, as he acquired more
and more political enemies, the affair with Nicomedes offered them plentiful
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ammunition to use against him. The story was widely repeated throughout
Caesar’s life, so that at times he was dubbed the ‘Queen of Bithynia’. Another
of his opponents styled him ‘every woman’s husband and every man’s wife’.
Whether or not men like Cicero, who joyfully repeated the charges, actually
believed them to be true is hard to say. Whatever they believed, they wanted
the allegations to be true and relished hurling them at a man that many
disliked, and some came to loathe. Political invective at Rome was often
extremely scurrilous, and the truth very rarely got in the way of a juicy story
of rampant or perverted desires. Yet it was not just his opponents who
mocked Caesar over this episode, for in later years his own soldiers also
enjoyed repeating the joke. Interestingly, this does not appear to have
diminished in any way from their respect for their commander, and their
mockery was affectionate, if characteristically crude.11
The story that Caesar became Nicomedes lover persisted, but it is now
impossible to say whether or not it was actually true. Caesar himself fervently
denied this, on one occasion offering to take a public oath that there was not
a fragment of truth in the allegation, although all this achieved was to
increase the ridicule. In later life he was extremely sensitive about the subject,
one of few that led him to lose his temper in public. At the time, his rapid
return to the royal court had fired the rumours. Was this an indication of his
infatuation, a sign of his naivety that such an action might be interpreted as
it was, or a conscious decision to ignore the gossips when there was no truth
in the rumours about him? The last is a distinct possibility given Caesar’s urge
not to be confined by some of the rules that bound others. In the end we
simply cannot know. Perhaps the nineteen-year-old did feel and succumb to
an attraction to an older man – ‘experimenting with his sexuality’ would
probably be the fashionable modern euphemism. If so, then this was the
only occasion on which this happened, for it is absolutely certain that
homosexuality did not play a part in the rest of Caesar’s life. Given the
nature of political debate at Rome, it was striking that the affair in Bithynia
was almost the only insult of this sort that others were ever to hurl at him.
Other rumours of a similar nature, including a scurrilous work by the poet
Catullus, did not win widespread belief, though they clearly bothered Caesar
himself. Caesar’s sexual exploits were a rich source of gossip and scandal,
and earned him an extremely dubious reputation, but his frequent affairs
were always with women. The lack of restraint he displayed in his relations
with his female lovers makes it all the more unlikely that he also slept with
men or boys, but that this was not commented upon by contemporaries.
Caesar’s appetite for women was almost insatiable and his conquests – who
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often came from the most distinguished families – very numerous. The
knowledge of this doubtless added further to the delight others took in
repeating the accusation that the great womaniser had once played the
woman himself for Nicomedes. Once again, whether or not the story was
true mattered far less than that it struck a raw nerve and embarrassed Caesar.
All in all, it is more than probable that there was no real truth in the story,
although of course absolute certainty is impossible.12
Caesar had married Cornelia when he was at most sixteen, but it is
extremely improbable that this resulted in his first sexual experience, even
if it most probably did for his bride. It was common for an engaged girl to
live in the house of her future husband until they were sufficiently old to wed,
so that Cossutia (whom Caesar forsook in order to marry Cornelia) may well
have been numbered amongst the household of the Caesars for a year or
two. However, it would have been most unusual for the couple to have
anticipated their wedding, and Cossutia was probably anyway some years
younger. Yet we should never forget that the Romans accepted slavery as a
normal aspect of life, and that in any aristocratic house there would be large
numbers of slaves who were literally the property of their owners. Household
slaves were often chosen for their physical appearance, for their duties ensured
that they would be highly visible to their masters and the latter’s friends.
Good-looking house slaves invariably fetched high prices at auctions. Should
a slave girl or woman – or indeed boy – attract the owner’s attention they
had no legal right to resist, for in the end they were property and not human
beings. It was assumed to be quite normal for aristocratic Romans to take
pleasure with their slaves in this way, and rarely warranted special comment.
That paragon of old-fashioned virtue, Cato the Elder, had regularly slept
with a slave girl after the death of his wife. During the civil war Marcus
Licinius Crassus had fled to Spain and was sheltered by one of his father’s
clients. Living in a cave to evade detection by Marian agents, his host regularly
sent him food and drink, but soon decided that such hospitality was
insufficient given the youth of his ‘guest’, who was in his late twenties.
Therefore he sent two pretty slave girls to live in the cave with Crassus and
cater to the natural requirements of a virile young man. An historian who
wrote much later in the century claimed to have met one of these slaves,
who even in her old age had fond memories of those days. Slaves had no
choice in such things, for the owner could use force if he chose and punish
them or sell them on a whim. Yet doubtless some female slaves welcomed the
attention of their master or their master’s sons and hoped to benefit from
a more privileged position. If so then it was a dangerous hope, for they were
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likely to incur the jealousy of other slaves, as well as, perhaps, the owner’s
wife if he were married. It was so normal for owners to make love to their
slaves that it seems very likely that Caesar’s first sexual experiences were
with female slaves owned by the family. Like many other young men he may
also have visited the more expensive brothels with which Rome was so
plentifully supplied, for again this was to a fair extent viewed as normal
and acceptable. It is tempting to read a note of incredulity into Caesar’s
statement in his Gallic War Commentaries that the German tribesmen
thought it ‘a most shameful thing to have carnal knowledge of a woman
before they were twenty years old’.13
The Student and the Pirates
Sometime after the fall of Mytilene, Caesar transferred to the staff of the
governor of Cilicia, Publius Servilius Vatia Isauricus, who was operating
primarily against the pirates that infested the area. However, in 78 BC the news
of Sulla’s death reached the eastern provinces and prompted Caesar to return
to Rome. The city was once again facing the threat of civil war, as the consul
Marcus Aemilius Lepidus came into conflict with the main body of the
Senate. Lepidus was soon engaged in raising an army to seize power by force
just as Sulla, Cinna and Marius had done. Caesar is said by Suetonius to have
contemplated joining the rebels, and even to have been offered great incentives
by Lepidus. However, he soon decided against siding with the consul,
doubting both the latter’s ability and ambition. This may simply be one of
a number of stories invented in later years under the assumption that Caesar
was always aiming at revolution. Yet in itself it does not seem unreasonable.
Caesar had suffered at Sulla’s hands and, although he had escaped execution
and in the end been pardoned, he had little reason to feel a great affection
for a Senate packed with the dictator’s supporters. We should also remember
that he had grown up in the years when Rome had been stormed three times
by legions supporting ambitious senators. It was a real possibility that this
might occur again, and if so, then it was better to be associated with the
winning side than the losers, so it may simply have been a question of
opportunism, deciding whether or not it was advantageous to join with
Lepidus.14
In the end Caesar chose a more conventional political path, appearing
for the first time as an advocate in Rome’s courts. The seven courts established
by Sulla in his codification of earlier practices were each presided over by a
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praetor and had a jury drawn from the Senate. Trials were very public affairs,
held either on raised platforms in the Forum or sometimes in one of the
grand basilicas, and in either case open to public view. Roman law had no
concept of the State prosecuting an individual, and charges had always to
be brought by an individual, though he might be acting on behalf of others
or indeed an entire community. During their term of office magistrates were
not subject to prosecution, but all were aware that they were vulnerable to
being attacked in the courts once they had laid down imperium. In theory
the fear of subsequent prosecution was intended to prevent their abusing
their office. There were no professional lawyers as such, for although a class
of prosecutors (accusatores) existed, they came from outside the aristocracy
and were not highly esteemed. Instead the parties would usually be
represented by one or more advocates who were normally men pursuing a
career in public life. Their status and auctoritas greatly added to the force
of the case they made. Appearing on someone’s behalf in court was an
important way of cementing political friendships or placing other men under
an obligation, and also of being seen by potential voters.
In 77 BC Caesar prosecuted Cnaeus Cornelius Dolabella for extortion
during his term as proconsul of Macedonia. Dolabella had gone out to his
province after his consulship in 81 BC and had won a triumph for his military
exploits. He was a supporter of Sulla, as is indicated by his electoral success
under the dictator, but it would be a mistake to understand the court case
as motivated by this connection. Caesar was not seeking to attack the Sullan
regime, but was simply choosing a prominent man to prosecute. The trial
of an ex-consul, and a man who had triumphed, was bound to attract more
public interest than that of someone more humble, and offered to place the
young prosecutor in the limelight, if only for a short time. The case was
most likely inspired by complaints made by some of the provincial
communities in Macedonia who had suffered under Dolabella’s rule. As
non-citizens they could not bring charges against him themselves, so instead
had to go to Rome and persuade a Roman to take the case on for them. Why
they chose Caesar is unknown, but it may have been the result of some tie
of friendship with the community leaders, perhaps inherited from his father
or an earlier ancestor. It is more than likely that Dolabella had abused his
power to enrich himself, for such behaviour was all too common amongst
Roman magistrates in this period. Men spent lavishly to win election at
Rome and frequently went to their province desperate to pay off their massive
debts. Governors were not salaried, although they received modest expenses,
but they were the supreme power in their province, able to bestow or withhold
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the rise to the consulship, 100–59 bc
favours to provincials or businessmen. The temptation to take bribes was
great, as was the urge to confiscate as plunder anything they desired. The
poet Catullus would later give ‘How much did you make?’ as the first question
a friend asked him after his return from a junior post on the staff of a
provincial governor. The difficulty for provincials of using the law against
their rulers, since they had to travel to Rome and find advocates, further
encouraged corruption on a massive scale. In 70 BC the orator Cicero
prosecuted a particularly notorious governor of Sicily, who is supposed to
have declared that a man needed three years in a post – the first year to steal
enough money to make himself rich, the second to provide the money to hire
the best legal defence team, and the third to accumulate the bribes for the
judge and jury to ensure that he escaped justice.15
Something of the odds usually stacked against the provincials were evident
at Dolabella’s trial. His prosecutor was Caesar, twenty-three years old, of
little achievement and from a poorly connected family. The proconsul was
defended by Rome’s leading orator, Quintus Hortensius, and the very
distinguished Caius Aurelius Cotta. The latter was a cousin of Caesar’s
mother, but it was not uncommon for relations to represent opposing parties
in court. This was considered to be entirely proper, allowing them both to
honour or create new obligations to other senators, and did not indicate
any bad blood between the advocates. Caius had been one of the men who
persuaded Sulla to pardon Caesar and was to win the consulship for 75 BC.
Cicero later recalled watching Hortensius and Cotta in action at this and
other trials:
In those days there were two orators who so surpassed all the rest that
I craved to emulate them – Cotta and Hortensius. One was relaxed
and gentle, phrasing his sentences readily and easily . . . the other
ornate and passionate . . . . I saw too in cases where both were on the
same side, as for Marcus Canuleius, and on behalf of Cnaeus Dolabella
the ex-consul, that although Cotta was the principal advocate, even
so Hortensius played the greater part. The bustle of the Forum needed
a powerful orator, a man of passion and skill, and with a voice that
carried.16
Caesar was therefore facing one of the most formidable teams then active
in the courts. This was not surprising since acting for the defence was
considered to be a more honourable role than prosecution. Prosecutors were
essential to allow the legal system to function, but their success often meant
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the ending of the career of another senator. A governor found guilty of
extortion in theory faced the death penalty, for Rome had few prisons and
tended to punish all serious crimes with execution. In practice the condemned
man was allowed to flee the city with all his movable possessions and go
into comfortable exile. Massilia (modern Marseilles), the old Greek colony
on the coast of Gaul and now part of the Roman province of Transalpine
Gaul, was one of the favourite locations for this. Yet for all its consolations
such exile was permanent, for the man could never return to Rome.
Prosecution was therefore an aggressive action and defence was held to be
more honourable. By the standards of the senatorial aristocracy it was better
to support a friend facing charges, even if he were guilty, than to seek to
end another man’s career. Almost always the defending counsels were older,
more experienced men who had long since proved their skills in the courts.
It was considered worthier for such men to demonstrate their loyalty to
political allies. Prosecution was usually left to the young and ambitious,
who hoped to win the fame that would assist them in climbing the political
ladder.
When the case came to trial Caesar delivered a speech that greatly
impressed onlookers. Caesar subsequently published a version of this speech
– a not uncommon practice, which Cicero was to follow throughout his
career. Although it has not survived, we know from ancient commentators
that it was widely admired. It may well have been this speech that showed
how much Caesar had been influenced by the rhetorical style of Caesar
Strabo – in another of his published speeches he actually copied a substantial
section of one of the latter’s orations. The words of a speech were only part
of the performance – for performance it was as Cicero admitted when he
compared the gifted orator to a famous actor (see the opening quote, page
61). How the orator stood, how he dressed and held himself, letting his toga
fall in just the right way, his expressions, the power and tone of his voice
were all vital aspects of an advocate’s job. During the trial Caesar impressed
the crowd watching proceedings as well as those taking part, while the
publication of the speech helped to build on the reputation he had won. His
voice was a little high pitched, but his delivery evidently gave it force and
power. He did well out of his first appearance as an advocate, even though
the prosecution ended in failure with Dolabella’s acquittal. The outcome
was probably not unexpected, since most governors charged with extortion
were exonerated. As usual the defence had been composed of men with far
greater experience and auctoritas than the prosecution with the almost
inevitable result. The fame won by Caesar was probably little consolation
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to the Macedonians who had persuaded him to undertake the case, but they
had at least demonstrated their capacity to bring a former governor to trial,
even if he had escaped conviction.17
Caesar did a little better in his next appearance in the same court, although
once again the accused evaded punishment. This was the trial of Caius
Antonius in 76 BC for his rapacity while serving in the war against
Mithridates. The court was presided over by the praetor Marcus Licinius
Lucullus, the brother of Lucius who had been the only senator to accompany
Sulla on his march on Rome in 88 BC. Caesar made a very good case against
a man whose guilt seems to have been patent, but Antonius appealed to the
tribunes of the plebs, prompting one or more of these to veto the proceedings.
As a result the trial broke up without delivering its verdict and Antonius
escaped, although his subsequent career proved extremely chequered – he was
expelled from the Senate by the censors in 70 BC, restored in 68 and even
managed to reach the consulship in 63, holding office jointly with Cicero.
Although once again the provincials had seen a corrupt Roman official go
unpunished, Caesar had further added to his reputation. However, Suetonius
claims that his activities had incurred the hostility of influential men, notably
the associates of Dolabella, prompting him to decide to go abroad in 75 BC,
ostensibly to study.18
Caesar travelled first to Rhodes, where he planned to study with Apollonius
Molo, the most distinguished teacher of oratory of his day. Apollonius had
been sent to Rome by the Rhodians as part of an embassy a few years before,
when he had been permitted to address the Senate in Greek – the first person
ever to be granted this privilege. By the early first century BC it was common
for young Roman aristocrats to round off their education by attending the
famous schools of philosophy and rhetoric in the Greek East. In rather a
similar way to Caesar, Cicero had left Rome for further study after being
active in the courts for a couple of years. In his case he spent time in Athens
and in several cities of Asia Minor in 78–77 BC, before also going to Rhodes
to learn from Apollonius. Cicero describes him as:
. . . famous as an advocate in important cases and as a speech writer
for others, and also skilled at dissecting and correcting mistakes and
very wise teaching. He focused in particular, as far as it was possible,
on cutting out the redundant and over florid aspects of my style, which
was then characterised by the over enthusiasm and lack of restraint of
youth, as if it were a river, to confine it within its banks.19
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It is not known in what specifics Caesar received tuition from the famous
teacher.
Before Caesar reached Rhodes his ship was intercepted by pirates near the
island of Pharmacussa off the coast of Asia Minor. Piracy was a major
problem throughout the Mediterranean in the early decades of the first
century BC. In part this was a legacy of the Romans’ own successes, which
had destroyed the Kingdom of Macedonia, crippled the Seleucid Empire
and helped the decline of Ptolemaic Egypt. All of these great Hellenistic
powers had once maintained powerful navies, but with their decay piracy
flourished in the Aegean and eventually became endemic throughout the
Mediterranean. Further encouragement and direct support came from
Mithridates of Pontus, who saw these freebooters as useful allies against
Rome. The rugged coastline of Cilicia in Asia Minor was home to many
pirate strongholds, and the campaigns of Servilius Isauricus, under whom
Caesar himself had served, and others had made little headway in controlling
the problem. The pirates were extremely numerous, at times operating in
large squadrons and even launching plundering raids on the coastal
communities of Italy itself. Although they were not united under a single
leader, but had many chieftains, there does seem to have been a considerable
degree of mutual co-operation between the different pirate communities.
At the height of their power in the late seventies BC the pirates were even able
to raid Ostia, and on another occasion kidnapped two Roman praetors
along with all their attendants. Although they did occasionally kill Roman
prisoners – allegedly telling one haughty aristocrat to disembark when they
were at sea, in a story to some extent anticipating the walking of the plank
so beloved of the fiction dealing with a later generation of pirates – their main
aim was to ransom them. 20
The young patrician was a valuable prize and his captors decided to
demand a payment of 20 talents of silver for his release. Caesar is supposed
to have laughed at the amount, declaring that he was worth far more than
that and pledging instead to pay them 50 talents. He then sent off most of
his travelling companions to the nearest cities in the provinces where they
could raise loans to obtain the necessary money. This left Caesar attended
only by his doctor and two slaves in the pirates’ camp. According to Plutarch
he was in no way overawed by his fierce captors, but:
. . . he held them in such disdain that whenever he lay down to sleep
he would send and order them to stop talking. For thirty-eight days, as
if the men were not his watchers, but his royal bodyguard, he shared
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in their sports and exercises with great unconcern. He also wrote poems
and sundry speeches which he read aloud to them, and those who did
not admire these he would call to their faces illiterate Barbarians, and
often laughingly threatened to crucify them all. The pirates were
delighted at this, and attributed this boldness of speech to a certain
simplicity and boyish mirth.21
After his friends returned with the ransom, which had been dutifully
provided by allied communities eager to oblige a man who might in time
become a useful connection at Rome, Caesar was released. The city of
Miletus on the western coast of Asia seems to have provided the bulk of the
money and Caesar immediately hurried there. He was twenty-five years old
and a private citizen who had never held elected office, but this did not
prevent him from persuading and cajoling the provincials to gather and crew
a number of warships. Taking charge of this force, he led it straight back to
Pharmacussa to attack his former captors. Complacently the pirates were still
in the camp on shore, their ships beached and in no position to resist. Caesar’s
improvised squadron took them prisoner and captured their amassed
plunder, including his own ransom. The 50 talents was presumably repaid
to the donor communities, while Caesar took the prisoners to Pergamum
where they were imprisoned. He then went to the Roman governor of Asia
to arrange for the pirates’ execution. However, the propraetor Marcus Iuncus
showed little interest in imposing the punishment that Caesar had repeatedly
promised to inflict. He was currently occupied in organising Bithynia into
the Roman province, for Nicomedes had recently died and bequeathed his
realm to Rome. Iuncus saw the opportunity to profit by selling the pirates
as slaves, and was also eager to appropriate some of their captured plunder
for himself. When it became clear that he would not act quickly at the behest
of some young patrician, Caesar hastened back to Pergamum and ordered
the prisoners to be crucified. He had no legal authority to do this, although
no one was likely to question the execution of a group of raiders. In this way
Caesar fulfilled his promise. However, he had clearly developed some regard
for the men during his time with them, and anyway wished to show his
merciful nature, so that he had each pirate’s throat cut before they were
crucified, sparing them a lingering and extremely painful death.22
Thus runs the story. In so many ways it encapsulates the legend of Caesar,
who was always in charge whatever the situation. Here is the young aristocrat
who mocked his captors, scorned the ransom they demanded, and never
once lost his poise. Once again we have the same self-confidence that had
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The Young Caesar
faced down Sulla the dictator, as the patrician failed to be cowed by
overwhelming force. There is also the charm, which could win over a band
of cut-throats as easily as Roman citizens or soldiers. After his release Caesar
acted swiftly, his force of character making others do his bidding even though
he had no power to command them, and won a sweeping victory. Caesar
had promised to capture and execute the pirates, and that is precisely what
Caesar had done, in spite of the reluctance to act of the propraetor who
actually governed the province. It was a display of his fearlessness,
determination, speed of action and ruthless skill, while the final act provided
an instance of the clemency he would later parade as one of his greatest
attributes. It is a very good story and one which doubtless leant itself to
embellishment with each retelling. Given that Caesar’s travelling companions
had left him and that only his slaves and doctor were present during his time
with the pirates, it is interesting to wonder who first told the tale. Was this
an early instance of Caesar’s skill in celebrating his own achievements?
Perhaps not, but even if the rumours only began in the communities after
his release or were spread by his friends, Caesar doubtless did little to
discourage this version of events. How much was true and how much
romantic invention is obviously impossible to say.
At the end of this adventure Caesar finally reached Rhodes and studied with
Apollonius. He proved an adept pupil, his rhetorical style fluent and
deceptively simple. Cicero and others considered him one of the best orators
of the period and suggested that he might even have achieved first place if he
had concentrated on oratory to the exclusion of other pursuits. Yet for Caesar
skill with words remained a means to the wider aim of political success. He
was exceptionally good at it, but then he was also proving himself very good
at other things, most notably soldiering. There was another opportunity to
demonstrate this during his time as a student on Rhodes. Open war had once
more broken out with Mithridates in 74 BC and a detachment of Pontic troops
had launched a raid into Asia, plundering the territory of peoples allied to
Rome. Caesar laid aside his studies and took a ship to the province, where
he raised troops from the local communities and with this hastily formed
force defeated the invaders. The action – once again so swift, confident and
competent – was believed to have prevented some allies from defecting to
Mithridates since the Romans had proved unable to defend them. Once again
it is worth emphasising that he was a private citizen without any legal
authority to act in this way. No one would have held him responsible for the
damage being done in Asia if he had simply sat quietly at Rhodes. Yet for
Caesar it was his duty to act since there was no properly constituted Roman
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officer available. It was also a splendid opportunity for him to make a name
for himself. Serving the Republic and winning personal glory in the process
were entirely proper ambitions for the senatorial aristocracy.23
In Rome Again
Towards the end of 74 or early in 73 BC Caesar was appointed to a priesthood,
but one that was far less restrictive than the office of Flamen Dialis. The
college of pontiffs, fifteen strong and headed by the Pontifex Maximus,
voted to admit him to the vacancy created when one of their number died.
This was Aurelia’s relation Caius Aurelius Cotta, who had in the past pleaded
for Caesar’s life with Sulla and then been on the opposing side at Dolabella’s
trial. Pontiffs were supposed to pass on their religious knowledge by word
of mouth, so that it was normal to have a broad age range within the college.
It is more than likely that the family connection was one of the reasons for
Caesar’s selection, but it is also an indication that the young man was already
displaying talent. One of the pontiffs was Servilius Isauricus under whom
he had served after winning the corona civica. Given that the majority of the
pontiffs were also very much Sulla’s appointees it is also an indication that
Caesar was not perceived as a dangerous radical. The appointment was a
great honour, marking the holder out as an up and coming man likely to do
well in public life. The fifteen pontiffs, along with the equal number of men
belonging to the other two important orders, the augurate and the
quindecemvirate, represented an elite within the senatorial class. In the main
only members of noble families, who included consuls amongst their
ancestors, were given these posts and the admission of anyone else was a great
distinction. If they lived long enough, the majority of these priests gained
the consulship.24
The news of his appointment prompted Caesar to abandon his studies and
immediately return to Rome to be formally admitted to the priesthood.
Travelling with only two friends and ten slaves in a small boat, he had once
again to pass through seas infested with pirates, who had been given little
cause to love him by his recent escapade. At one point during the voyage
the Romans thought that they had sighted a pirate vessel, prompting Caesar
to remove his fine outer clothes and strap a dagger to his thigh. Presumably
he hoped to blend with his attendants and the crew and escape at any
favourable opportunity. In the event it proved unnecessary, as he soon realised
that he had mistaken a wooded shoreline for the silhouette of a ship. Once
back in Rome, he was soon active in the courts again, and seems to have
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prosecuted Marcus Iuncus in the extortion court. Most probably he was
acting on behalf of the Bithynians, for he preserved his connection with
their royal family in particular. At some later date he represented Nicomedes’
daughter Nysa in a legal dispute, and gave a strong speech recounting his debt
to the Bithynian king. This is said to have prompted the retort from Cicero
of ‘No more of that please, when everyone knows what he gave to you and
what you gave to him.’ The scandal clung to Caesar, but does not seem to
have damaged him politically. The outcome of Iuncus’ trial is unknown, but
it is more than probable that he was acquitted, since so many obviously
guilty former governors managed to escape punishment. As with his earlier
appearances in court, the outcome of the case was in some ways less
important for his own career than his personal performance. 25
Sometime near the end of the decade he stood for his first public office
and was successfully elected as one of the twenty-four military tribunes.
This was probably for either 72 or 71 BC, although our sources are vague. The
military tribunes were very different from the tribunes of the plebs, for their
role was exclusively military. Each legion of the army had around six tribunes
and, since there were now many more than four legions in existence at any
one time, many of these officers were appointed. However, there was
considerable prestige attached to the elected posts and this was seen as often
the first opportunity to test a young aristocrat’s popularity with voters.
None of our sources mention a posting to a province at this time, which
suggests that Caesar served his time in Italy itself, for the great Slave War was
raging at that time. In 73 BC a small group of gladiators led by a Thracian
called Spartacus had escaped from their training school outside Capua,
sparking a huge slave rebellion throughout the Italian Peninsula. Spartacus
won a series of stunning victories, smashing one Roman army after another,
and it was not until 71 BC that he was finally defeated by Marcus Licinius
Crassus. Caesar may well have served under Crassus and if so it would mark
the first known connection between the two men.26
Crassus had won the praetorship for 73 BC and was given the command
against the slaves in the following year after both the consuls had been
defeated in battle. He was about forty, but had gained considerable experience
of high command during the civil war. Forced to flee Italy after the murder
of his father and brother by the Marians, Crassus at first sought refuge in
Spain. This was the occasion when he is supposed to have been hidden in a
cave, where one of his family’s clients provided him with food and two slave
girls as companions. Later he joined Sulla and fought with distinction for
him, saving the day at the battle of the Colline Gate outside Rome in 82 BC.
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Crassus became bitter because he believed that the dictator never gave him
sufficient credit for his achievements, but in other respects he did very well
out of Sulla’s rule, acquiring property on a massive scale from the victims
of the proscriptions. A shrewd and utterly ruthless businessman, he soon
became one of the richest men in Rome. His conduct of the campaign against
the slaves was similarly efficient. To restore the discipline of troops dismayed
by earlier disasters, he ordered the decimation of a number of units. One
soldier in ten was chosen by lot and beaten to death by his comrades, who
then underwent the symbolic humiliations of eating barley rather than wheat
and pitching their tents outside the rampart of the army’s camp. Cornering
the slaves in the toe of Italy, Crassus had a huge line of fortifications built
to trap them. Spartacus managed to break out, displaying once again the truly
remarkable skill and force of character that had allowed him to turn a
disparate horde of runaway slaves into a highly effective army. The Romans
pursued and in the end brought the slaves to battle and destroyed them.
Crassus ordered 6,000 male prisoners to be crucified at regular intervals all
along the Appian Way from Rome to Capua. There was no talk of slitting
their throats to be ‘merciful’, for the Slave War had terrified the Romans
and this ghastly spectacle was intended to show all slaves the folly of further
rebellion.27
So little is known about Caesar’s spell as military tribune that we cannot
know whether he actually took part in the Slave War, and if so what part he
played in the affair. Years later, when he led his legions against the German
tribes for the first time, Caesar would encourage his soldiers by recalling
that there had been many Germans amongst the defeated slave army, but
his own account makes no mention of personal service in the earlier conflict.
This is not necessarily a strong indication one way or the other, since the
Commentaries rarely include autobiographical detail. On balance it is more
probable than not that he did serve in the war, and presumably that he
displayed the competence he had shown in the past, though perhaps he did
nothing especially distinguished that might have earned mention in the
sources. It is known that during his time as military tribune he spoke in
favour of a proposal for some restoration of the powers of the tribunes of
the plebs, which Sulla had taken from them. There was clearly widespread
enthusiasm for this amongst the electorate and Caesar was most likely
wanting to gain popularity by associating himself with this cause. Such
opportunism was common amongst those seeking to climb the political
ladder and need not be taken as a sign of deep hostility to the Sullan regime
or to a Senate still packed with the dictator’s supporters. Caesar’s relation
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Caius Aurelius Cotta had brought in a bill during his consulship in 75 BC that
permitted former tribunes of the plebs to seek other magistracies, preventing
the office from being a political dead end as Sulla had intended.28
The possibility of an early connection with Crassus is intriguing, for the
latter was highly skilled in using his wealth to gain political influence by
assisting those whose ambitions outstripped their funds. In the next decade
Caesar certainly benefited from substantial loans from Crassus and it is
possible that he received some similar aid earlier on. Yet we should not
exaggerate Caesar’s importance, for he was one of many senators assisted
in this way by Crassus, and few could have guessed at his eventual success.
He was flamboyant, talented – as demonstrated by his military service and
activity in the courts – and had a gift for self-publicity which helped to
attract the attention of the electorate, while the scandal surrounding him at
least ensured that his name was widely known. Such things were assets for
a man aspiring to a career in public life, but to a greater or lesser degree
they were also displayed by many of his contemporaries. Nor were they
automatic guarantors of success. Personal talent did appeal to the voters, but
it was not the sole, nor even the most important factor in winning their
favour. Though he might dress distinctively and display an immensely high
opinion of his own worth, Caesar’s career so far had been conventional in
most important respects. His independent actions against the pirates and the
Pontic raiders in Asia had been exceptional, but were proper enough for a
dutiful citizen and, even more importantly, successful. Such behaviour was
a good indicator of virtus, a quality that lay at the heart of the Roman
aristocracy’s self-image. By the time that he was thirty Caesar had shown
considerable promise – something that his admission to the pontificate
indicated – and was in no way considered a revolutionary. It remained to be
seen how far up the political ladder he might climb, his talent balancing his
comparative poverty and the mediocre achievements of his recent ancestors.
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Caesar ‘ . . . spent money very freely, and some thought that he was only
buying brief and passing fame at massive cost, when in fact he was securing
things of enormous value at a knock-down price. . . . In this way the people
became so well disposed towards him that they all sought new offices and
honours as repayment for his generosity.’– Plutarch, early second century AD.1
In 70 BC Caesar was thirty years old. He was extremely well educated, even
by the standards of the Roman aristocracy, a gifted orator and a soldier of
proven courage. In the domestic sphere his life was also going well. He
and Cornelia had now been married for some fifteen years. The couple
had spent over a third of this time separated, when Caesar went abroad for
his education and military service, but the marriage was certainly a
successful one by the standards of the Roman nobility, and it may well
also have been a happy one. At some point Cornelia had given birth to a
daughter, who was of course named Julia. This was Caesar’s only legitimate
child, but despite her importance the date of her birth is not known.
Estimates have varied from as early as 83 to as late as 76 BC, but somewhere
near the end of this range seems most probable. Julia was married in 59
BC, by which time she was probably in her mid to late teens. Caesar’s
periods of absence overseas make it most likely that his daughter was
conceived between 78 BC after his return from the east and before he left
Rome again in 75 BC.2
Caesar treated Cornelia with great respect, most famously in his defiance
of Sulla’s order to divorce her. In Roman tradition wives were to be honoured,
but were not necessarily the objects of great passion for such emotions were
seen as irrational and even rather shameful. The marriage bed was the place
to produce the next generation of Roman children to continue the family
name, but physical pleasure for its own sake should be sought elsewhere.
This is not to say that some married couples – perhaps even the majority –
82
were more or less deeply in love and enjoyed an active sex life, but simply that
by the ideals of Roman aristocratic society this was not seen as an especially
important aspect of marriage. It was widely accepted that aristocratic
husbands would take sexual pleasure elsewhere and not require their wives
to cater for their more shameful desires. This was especially true in the case
of a younger man, what the Romans called an adulescens. Although this is
the root of our word adolescent, for the Romans it referred to any man not
yet fully matured and could well extend into the late thirties. Such ‘youths’
were granted a degree of leeway in their behaviour not extended to those who
had reached full manhood, who as leaders of the Republic were expected to
act more responsibly. Taking discreet pleasure with female slaves or with
prostitutes was rarely criticised.3
Many young aristocratic men also kept mistresses after they were married.
There was a distinct group of high-class prostitutes or courtesans who relied
on lovers to provide them with a house or apartment, attendants and wealth.
Such women were usually well educated, witty, charming, and perhaps skilled
in singing, dancing or playing a musical instrument, so that they provided
the lover with company as well as sexual gratification. These affairs were
never intended to be permanent and successful courtesans passed from one
lover-provider to the next. This added further spice to the affair for the lover
had to struggle to win the favour of the mistress and then keep devoting
sufficient attention and gifts to retain it. Famous courtesans were often
associated with some of the most important men in Rome, for it was not only
young senators who might choose to maintain a mistress. The nature of the
relationship between lover and courtesan was such that the woman could gain
considerable influence. In 74 BC it was widely believed that the consul Lucius
Licinius Lucullus gained an important provincial command through winning
over Praecia, the mistress of a prominent senator, with gifts and flattery.
This man was Publius Cornelius Cethegus, a useful illustration of a man
who held no formal office, but enjoyed massive, if temporary, influence in
the Senate through a mixture of auctoritas and shrewd knowledge and
exploitation of senatorial procedure. Concubines could also play a political
role in other ways, as was shown in the case of another famous individual
called Flora. At one time the young Pompey was deeply in love with her. In
later life she was said to have often boasted that she was always left with
scratch marks on her back after the two of them had made love. However,
when he discovered that a friend of his called Geminius was repeatedly
trying to seduce Flora, he willingly gave her up to him. Scrupulous in his
generosity to his friend, who thus became indebted to him and a useful
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the rise to the consulship, 100–59 bc
political supporter, Pompey never again visited Flora. This was held to be
a particularly great sacrifice for him as he was still greatly attracted to her.
For her part Flora was also supposed still to have been in love with Pompey,
and claimed that she was unwell for a long time afterwards. The concubine’s
position was at heart precarious, for even if at times some were able to win
great influence they had no legal status and were successful for only as long
as they could command their lovers’ affections.4
Courtesans and slave girls were generally acceptable as the objects of
male aristocrats’ affections, since this did not in any way threaten the
established social order or the integrity of family lines. Most courtesans
were of a low social status, prostitutes who had done well for themselves.
Often they were slaves or former slaves who had worked as entertainers of
various forms. For some time in the mid forties BC Mark Antony was deeply
enamoured of a mime actress and dancer called Cytheris, a former slave
who had been freed by her patron and given the name Volumnia. Antony
paraded her in public and gave her the place of honour at dinner parties,
treating her almost like a real wife, much to the private dismay of Cicero.
The same woman later became the mistress of Caesar’s assassin Brutus, as
well as other prominent senators. Any children born of such a union between
an aristocrat and his mistress were illegitimate and so did not take the father’s
name or have any legal claim to be supported by him – in the case of the
babies born to slaves these were literally the property of their owners. Yet
if an aristocratic husband might take lovers in this way, society did not grant
the same licence to his wife, for it was important that there should be no
question mark over the paternity of her offspring. Chastity, in the sense of
remaining faithful to her husband and only her husband, was one of the
central attributes of the ideal Roman matron. In earlier times a woman spent
her whole life under the power of – literally ‘in the hand of’ (sub manu) –
either her father or her husband, who had the power to execute her if they
chose. By the first century BC this traditional, strict form of marriage where
the husband gained all the rights of the woman’s father was rarely used.
Marriage had become looser and divorce more common, but a wife was still
expected to remain absolutely faithful to her husband, even if that husband
frequently took other lovers.5
Caesar may well have amused himself with courtesans, slave girls and
any other available women during his twenties and thirties. Our sources
make no explicit mention of this, but since such behaviour was common
this may not be especially significant. Suetonius does tell us that Caesar
frequently paid very high, even extravagant, prices to purchase physically
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attractive slaves, noting that even he was ashamed of the cost and so had
it concealed in his account books. Whether such servants were entirely
ornamental or also intended to provide their owner with sexual
entertainment is not stated. However, Suetonius does tell us that it was
the ‘fixed opinion’ that Caesar’s passions were ‘unrestrained and
extravagant’ and that he seduced ‘many distinguished women’. He lists
five by name, all of them wives of important senators, but implies that
there were others. One of the named women was Tertulla, the wife of
Crassus, under whose command Caesar may have served during the Slave
War. She had originally been married to one of Crassus’ older brothers,
but when the latter was killed during the civil war he had chosen to marry
the widow. She was probably a few years older than Caesar and her
marriage to Crassus was successful by aristocratic standards, producing
children. There is no indication of when the affair occurred or of how
long it lasted, a vagueness common for this side of Caesar’s life. Nor do
we know whether Crassus himself became aware of the liaison, although
the notoriety of Caesar’s amours make this distinctly possible. He certainly
took no action against his wife’s lover and readily employed Caesar as a
political ally.6
Caesar’s affairs with married women were numerous, but usually do not
appear to have lasted for very long before he sought out a new lover. One
definite exception to this pattern was his relationship with Servilia, which
seems to have endured for the greater part of Caesar’s life. Suetonius tells us
that he ‘loved her before all others’. Servilia’s first husband was Marcus
Junius Brutus, but he had supported Lepidus’ coup in 78 BC and been executed
when it failed. The widowed Servilia had already given birth to a son in 85
BC, who was also named Marcus Junius Brutus. This was Shakespeare’s
‘noblest Roman of them all’, the man who would be one of the leaders of the
conspiracy that would assassinate Caesar in 44 BC. The irony did not end
there, for Servilia was also half-sister to Cato the Younger, one of Caesar’s
bitterest opponents for over twenty years. Caesar was very fond of Brutus, an
affection which remained even after the latter had fought against him in
49–48 BC. This encouraged persistent rumours that he was in fact Brutus’
father, Plutarch even suggesting that Caesar himself believed this. Given that
he would only have been fifteen when Brutus was born, this must surely be
a myth, but the existence of these tales does suggest that the liaison between
Caesar and Servilia began at an early date, probably during the seventies. It
continued in spite of the fact that Servilia remarried, and did not prevent
Caesar from having numerous affairs with other women. The affair between
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Servilia and Caesar was evidently passionate on both sides and long lasting,
even if the intensity varied over the years. This does suggest more than mere
physical attraction. Servilia was an extremely intelligent woman, deeply
interested in politics and keen to promote the careers of her husband and
son. Her three daughters were each married off to prominent senators. After
Caesar’s death she was included in the councils held by Brutus to decide on
what the conspirators should do next, her opinion overriding that of
distinguished senators including Cicero. The orator was suitably disgusted
at a woman invading the male world of politics, but on other occasions had
been eager to seek her advice on topics seen as more within the female sphere.
He and his family had consulted her when they were seeking a suitable
husband for his daughter, Tullia. When the latter died in childbirth, Servilia
wrote in sympathy to the distraught Cicero. Although as a woman she could
hold no office or formal power, Servilia carefully maintained connections
and ties of friendship with many prominent families.7
Attractive, intelligent, well educated, sophisticated and ambitious – the
description could as easily be of either Caesar or Servilia, although in the
case of the latter the ambition was indirect and aimed at securing prominence
not for herself but for the male members of her close family. The pair do seem
very alike in many ways, which may in part explain the closeness and
longevity of the bond between them. The length of the affair in itself suggests
that Caesar felt a deeper love for Servilia than for any of his other lovers.
Apart from her affair with Caesar, Servilia appears otherwise to have
remained faithful to her second husband, Decimus Junius Silanus. This was
in contrast to her sister – as usual, confusingly also called Servilia – who was
divorced by her husband because of her frequent extramarital affairs. Caesar
was a serial seducer of married women. If he felt strong love for any or all
of these lovers, it rarely seems to have lasted, or at least was never exclusive.
The sheer scale of his activities stood out in Roman society, which at this time
did not lack adulterers or rakes. Therefore it is important to try to understand
why he behaved in this exceptional way. The obvious answer, that he enjoyed
having sex with lots of attractive women, should not be completely ignored
purely because it is so basic. Yet this in itself is inadequate, since sexual
pleasure could be taken less controversially with slaves or mistresses of lower
social status. The more distinguished courtesans offered witty companionship
in addition to satisfying more physical needs. Seducing married women
from senatorial families brought many risks, not least that of notoriety,
which could be used against you by political opponents. Tradition, though
not law at this date, permitted a husband to kill his wife’s lover if he caught
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them in the act. Such direct violence was unlikely, but a cuckolded husband
might well become a bitter political enemy.8
The risks involved may have added to the thrill. It is even possible to see
Caesar’s womanising as an extension of political competition, sleeping with
other senators’ wives to prove that he was the better man in the bedroom as
well as the Forum. Perhaps there was even a conscious desire to smother the
stories about his submission to Nicomedes by gaining notoriety for predatory
and blatantly heterosexual adventures? Yet none of these reasons seem
enough to explain why it was primarily with aristocratic women that Caesar
sought satisfaction. That such lovers were almost invariably married was
almost inevitable, since the daughters of senatorial families played such an
important role in creating and strengthening political bonds. Girls were
married young, and those who were divorced or widowed while still young
or middle-aged would tend to be swiftly placed into a new match. Only
women of mature years who had surviving children were normally permitted
to live on as widows without remarrying. Caesar’s mother Aurelia followed
this path, as did Servilia after the death of her second husband, but in most
respects there simply was no group of single aristocratic women at Rome
amongst whom Caesar might seek lovers. However, the very nature of Roman
public life, where senators held a series of posts many of which required
them to serve overseas for years on end, did mean that married women were
left on their own for long periods.
Aristocratic wives enjoyed considerable freedom in first-century-BC Rome.
Many had considerable means independent of their husbands, including the
dowry they had brought at the time of marriage, which was always supposed
to remain separate from, although complementary to, the income of the
household. As we have seen, by this era girls were educated in the same way
as their brothers, at least in the academic sense and during the early years.
Therefore they learned to be bilingual in both Latin and Greek and gained
a deep appreciation of literature and culture. Unlike their male siblings, girls
rarely had any opportunity to travel abroad to further their education by
studying in one of the great centres of Greek learning. Since many
philosophers and teachers visited Rome for long periods this was only in part
a disadvantage, and there were schools teaching a whole range of cultural
accomplishments. Sallust’s description of one senator’s wife is illuminating:
Amongst these was Sempronia, who had often committed many
outrages of masculine audacity. This woman was well blessed by fortune
in her birth and physical beauty, as well as her husband and children;
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well read in Greek and Latin literature, she played the lyre, danced
more artfully than any honest woman should, and had many other
gifts which fostered a luxurious life. Yet there was never anything she
prized so little as her honour and chastity; it was hard to say whether
she was less free with her money or her virtue; her lusts were so fierce
that she more often pursued men than was pursued by them.. . . She
had often broken her word, failed to pay her debts, been party to
murder; her lack of money but addiction to luxury set her on a wild
course. Even so, she was a remarkable woman; able to write poetry,
crack a joke, and converse modestly, tenderly or wantonly; all in all
she had great gifts and a good many charms.9
Sempronia was married to Decimus Junius Brutus, a cousin to Servilia’s
first husband. Her son was to become one of Caesar’s senior subordinates
in Gaul and during the Civil War, but would later turn against him and
become one of his assassins. Caesar doubtless knew her, although whether
he was one of the men who sought her favours – or was sought by her – is
unknown.
Sallust’s description of Sempronia is couched in terms of outrage at her
immorality and wildness, but many of her accomplishments were not seen
as bad in themselves. Plutarch wrote admiringly of another aristocratic
woman who was widowed at a young age and then remarried:
Even apart from her beauty, the young woman had plenty of attractive
qualities, in that she was well read, a good player of the lyre, skilled in
geometry, and capable of profiting from the philosophical lectures she
regularly attended. She also combined these qualities with a character
that was free from the unpleasant curiosity which these intellectual
interests tend to inflict on young women. . . 10
Sophistication, learning, wit and even some skill in music or dancing
were not in themselves seen as bad things in a woman, so long as they were
combined with chastity in the sense of remaining loyal to her husband. Yet
in Caesar’s day many women did not display this virtue. As a generation
they were better educated than their mothers and certainly than their
grandmothers, but were still expected to concern themselves with little more
than running the household. Given in an arranged marriage while little more
than a child, and then perhaps passed on from one husband to the next as
death or changing political alliances dictated, a woman was fortunate if she
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found happiness and fulfilment in this way. Unable to vote or seek office,
those like Servilia had to direct their deep interest in politics into promoting
the careers of male relations. Independently wealthy in a Rome where all the
spoils and profits of empire were available for sale, there was a temptation
for many women to compete in luxurious living. Some added spice to their
lives by taking a lover or lovers.
On balance it seems likely that Caesar looked for at least a measure of
companionship and witty, sophisticated conversation from his mistresses.
Some of the most distinguished courtesans may have offered this, but in
this respect very few could have competed with the daughters of Rome’s
great families. His affairs provided him not merely with sexual gratification,
but other forms of stimulation. Other thrills already mentioned – the
element of danger in carrying out an affair with a married woman, the
added pleasure of cuckolding men whom he would meet and compete with
in public life on a daily basis – doubtless contributed to his enjoyment. For
the women he loved there was his charm, which few people were ever able
to resist when in his company. He was Caesar, the one who dressed
distinctively, setting fashions that many younger men copied, who took
such care over his appearance and deportment, and always marked himself
out as special. To receive his full attention even for a while was doubtless
very flattering, something that the notoriety of his amorous exploits may
well have made even more attractive. Whatever its root, his repeated success
with so many women makes it clear that he was very good at seduction. The
urge to go from one affair to another was in part merely a reflection of the
great energy and ambition he showed in all other aspects of his life. It may
also be that he was always searching for someone who was enough of his
match to keep him interested over a long period. Servilia, so like him in
many ways, evidently came closest to his ideal than any other Roman
woman, hence the longevity of their relationship. Yet for all the passion
on both sides, each retained a measure of detachment and independence.
Though Servilia may well have mourned her lover after the Ides of March,
this in no way prevented her from seeking to promote her son’s cause in its
aftermath. Similarly, for all the enthusiasm and effort devoted to his
womanising, Caesar seems never to have allowed this to interfere with his
ambition for office and status. It is also possible that some of the stories
about him were false. Once he had gained this reputation, his simply being
seen with a woman was probably enough for the gossips to assume that
they were having an affair.
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Changing Times: The Rise of Pompey
The years after Sulla’s death were on the whole a successful time for Caesar,
as he gradually moved into public life. Although he had incurred the dictator’s
wrath, he had been accepted back into the fold and saw no reason for joining
those still choosing to fight against Sulla or the regime he created. He did
not join Lepidus’ rising in 78 BC, nor does it ever seem to have occurred to
him to go to Spain where many of Marius’ and Cinna’s supporters still
continued to fight the civil war. These men were led by Quintus Sertorius,
probably one of the greatest generals Rome ever produced, whose talent for
winning over the Spanish tribes allowed him to resist the Senate’s armies
for the greater part of a decade. Sertorius and his followers were exiles and
refugees from the proscriptions, barred by Sulla’s decrees from returning to
Rome or ever resuming a political career. There was little alternative for
them but to fight on, although on several occasions Sertorius expressed a deep
longing to return home, even to live as a private citizen. Despite crossing
Sulla, Caesar’s family connections had prevented him from facing a similar
ban on political activity. As a result there was no need for him to follow the
desperate path of open rebellion against the State.11
Sulla cast a long shadow over the Republic in these years. The Senate was
very much his creation, purged of all his opponents who had failed to defect
to him in time, and packed with his partisans. As a body he had strengthened
the Senate’s position, restoring the senatorial monopoly over juries in the
courts and severely limiting the power of the tribunate. Other legislation, for
instance a law restricting the behaviour of provincial governors, was intended
to prevent any other general from following the dictator’s own example and
turning his legions against the State. Making such actions formally illegal
was obviously of questionable practical value, as the continuing war in Spain
and the rebellion of Lepidus indicated. Sulla could undo neither the
precedents he had set nor the consequences of his actions. Italy was still in
a state of upheaval as a result of the Social and civil wars. Large areas had
been devastated by the rival armies, while the newly enfranchised Italians had
yet to be fully and fairly integrated into the wider citizen body. Great swathes
of land had also been confiscated so that Sulla could give his discharged
veteran soldiers farms of their own, dispossessing many peasants. The
problems faced by the Italian countryside had only been made worse by the
years of marauding by Spartacus’ slave army.12
Sulla’s Senate had not coped all that well with the series of crises it faced
after the dictator’s retirement. The Slave war had seen army after army led
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by duly elected magistrates routed and even destroyed by the enemy.
Unorthodox measures were employed to gain final victory, the two consuls
laying down their commands and being replaced by Crassus, who had only
been elected to the more junior magistracy of the praetorship. This was
somewhat unconventional, but paled in comparison to the rapid rise to
prominence of Cnaeus Pompey. The son of Pompeius Strabo, Pompey was
born in 106 BC and served under his father’s command during the Social War.
Following Strabo’s death, he spent some time in the camp of Cinna, but
was treated with suspicion and eventually retired to his family’s vast estates
in Picenum. When Sulla landed in Italy in 83 BC, Pompey decided to join him,
as did a growing number of others who had fallen from favour with the
current regime or who guessed the likely outcome of the war. Unlike these
other refugees, the twenty-three-year-old Pompey chose to appear not as a
suppliant, but as a useful ally. Using his own money and drawing
predominantly on the population of Picenum, he raised first one and then
two more legions of soldiers. This was illegal in every respect, since Pompey
had never held any office granting him imperium to raise or command
troops, and was merely a private citizen. He was not even a member of the
Senate, but through his family’s wealth and influence and his own force of
personality he was able to get away with it. Unlike his father, who had been
one of the most unpopular men of his generation, Pompey was adored by
his soldiers, who seem to have had no qualms about his lack of authority
to lead them. On their march south to join Sulla the young general and his
private army both soon proved that they knew how to fight with skill and
ferocity.
Sulla had no scruples about employing Pompey’s services and sent him in
succession to fight on his behalf in Italy, Sicily and Africa. In each campaign
the dashing young commander defeated the opposition with ease. Sulla –
perhaps partly ironically, though it is hard to tell with such a complex
character – hailed him as Pompey ‘the Great’ (Magnus) and permitted him
to celebrate a triumph, an unheard of honour for a man with no legal
imperium. For all the glory he won in these years, Pompey also acquired a
reputation for cruelty, stories being told of how he derived a sadistic pleasure
from executing the distinguished senators he had captured. For some he was
not ‘the Great’, but the ‘young executioner’. In marked contrast to Caesar,
Pompey obediently divorced his wife to marry the dictator’s own stepdaughter.
The latter was already married and heavily pregnant and died
soon after the wedding to Pompey, but it was nevertheless a mark of great
favour. For all the honours granted by the dictator, Pompey was not enrolled
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in the Senate and remained a private citizen, able to call upon his own private
army. He did, however, take a keen interest in politics and supported Lepidus’
campaign for the consulship for 78 BC, greatly assisting the latter’s victory.
Yet when Lepidus turned against the Senate Pompey quickly distanced
himself from him. Faced with rebellion, but lacking significant forces with
which to oppose it, Sulla’s Senate turned to Pompey and his legions. Acting
with all the vigour he had shown in earlier campaigns, the twenty-eightyear-
old general rapidly crushed Lepidus and his forces. His accustomed
cruelty was also again on display, most notably when he executed Servilia’s
first husband, Marcus Brutus.13
Following this success, Pompey encouraged the Senate to send him to
Spain to deal with Sertorius, supporting the army that was already operating
there under the command of a more conventionally appointed governor.
His cause was helped by the reluctance of the consuls of 77 BC to be sent to
the region. This time Pompey was invested with proconsular imperium,
legitimising his status. A senator who supported him quipped that he was
going not as a proconsul but pro consulibus – ‘instead of both consuls’. In
Spain Sertorius proved a much tougher opponent than the military
incompetents Pompey had faced in the past, and for the first time he suffered
some reverses. The experience was humiliating for one so accustomed to
success, but the young general had the capacity to learn from his mistakes,
developing a respect for his opponent without ever becoming overawed by
him. The war in Spain was bitter and protracted, but as the years passed
Pompey and the other senatorial armies gradually made headway against the
Marian forces. Even so, had Sertorius not been murdered by one of his own
subordinates in 72 BC, the war could easily have gone on for several years.
Instead, bereft of his genius and instead guided by his assassin, a man whose
ambition and pride greatly outstripped his talent, it was all over in a matter
of months. Pompey returned to Italy in the following year, arriving just in
time to intercept and destroy a few thousand slaves who had escaped the
defeat of Spartacus. This minor success soon prompted him to declare
publicly that it was he and not Crassus who had brought the Slave War to
an end.
The bad blood between Pompey and Crassus dated back to the civil
war when both had fought for Sulla. Crassus was six or seven years older
and resented the honours and attention lavished on the flamboyant younger
man. He was understandably bitter at an attempt to rob him of the credit
he had deserved for his victory over Spartacus. The incident also revealed
a rather petty streak in Pompey, which on other occasions moved him to
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try and steal the glory of others. There was no need for this, given that the
war in Spain had been a far more prestigious conflict than the suppression
of Spartacus, bringing him a second triumph compared to the lesser honour
of an ovation granted to Crassus. Yet Pompey revelled in the acclaim of the
Senate and citizens and was jealous of anyone else who distracted the
attention from him even for a moment. People tended to like Pompey, his
round face being considered open and attractive even if not classically
handsome. Those who knew him better were more cautious, knowing that
his public statements often did not match his actions and that he was not
always a reliable friend. In contrast Crassus was respected rather than
liked, but scrupulously honoured his obligations to others, while never
forgetting any debt or favour owed to him. In some ways Pompey was
rather immature, something that had been most clearly illustrated at the
time of his first triumph when he had planned to ride in a chariot pulled
by elephants. Only the discovery that an archway on the processional route
would not accommodate such a monstrous vehicle and team had dissuaded
him from such a bizarre display. He revelled in the name Magnus, as well
as the tendency of flatterers to compare him to Alexander the Great. At
times he could be extremely devious, which was no bad thing in a general
during a war, but he was not particularly good at playing the political
game at Rome. This was mainly through lack of experience, for he had
spent the greater part of his life in near constant military service. From the
age of twenty-three he had led his own army, for much of the time in
independent operations far from any superior. Pompey was used to
commanding rather than manipulating and persuading. Unlike other young
aristocrats he had spent little time watching the day-to-day business of
the Senate and Forum, learning from older senators just how public life was
conducted. However, on his return from Spain he decided that now was the
time to enter politics formally.
In 71 BC Pompey was thirty-five, but had never held any elected post and
was still numbered amongst the equestrian order, for he had never been
enrolled in the Senate. He now announced that he wished to stand for
election to the consulship for the following year. This was directly contrary
to Sulla’s regulation of the public career, which had confirmed earlier
legislation. According to this a man could not seek election to the consulship
until he was aged at least forty-two and had already held the posts of
quaestor and praetor. Crassus, who also declared his candidature around
the same time, met the age qualification, but Pompey’s entire career to this
date violated both the letter and spirit of Sulla’s rules. Both men were
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encamped with their armies outside Rome, entirely legitimately, since they
were waiting to celebrate their ovation and triumph respectively. Neither
made any overt threat, but ever since Sulla had turned his legions on the city
to deal with his political opponents the fear was very real that others might
do the same. When Pompey and Crassus put aside their personal differences
to launch a joint campaign for the consulship there was little desire to
oppose them. Crassus had clearly earned the office by his success against
the slaves, while Pompey was seen as a hero by a large part of the population.
It was irregular for someone outside the Senate to seek to join this body and
become consul simultaneously, but it would have seemed absurd for someone
who had already enjoyed a string of senior commands to have had to go
through all the junior magistracies. Exempted by the Senate from the age
and other qualifications – as both men needed permission to stand for
election without actually entering the city, since they could not do this
without laying down their imperium, which would have meant disbanding
their legions before the triumphal procession – he and Crassus were duly
elected by a landslide.
Sulla had permitted Pompey a somewhat anomalous position outside the
rules he laid down for a career in public life, something that the Senate
had felt unwilling or unable to challenge in subsequent years. A degree of
flexibility had always been important within the Republican system,
especially at times of military crisis. The extraordinary honours and
exemptions granted to Pompey were personal and did not mean that
regulations were abandoned and that everyone else could follow his
example. However, even before they were elected he and Crassus had
declared that they were intending to do away with key aspects of Sulla’s
system. The first thing that they did in their year of office was to restore
full traditional rights and powers to the tribunate. It was a popular measure,
hence Caesar’s desire to associate himself with this cause during his time
as military tribune. Another measure passed in 70 BC, doubtless with the
approval of Pompey and Crassus, was actually put into force by one of
Aurelia’s relations, Lucius Aurelius Cotta, who provided a solution to the
controversial question of composition of juries. From now on until the
end of the Republic juries were drawn in equal numbers from senators,
equestrians and the property class registered immediately below them, the
tribunii aerarii. Once again this measure carried a good deal of popular
support and was seen as a sensible compromise. Another long-running
problem was also to a great extent resolved in this year with the election
of two censors. These men were the consuls of 72 BC, both of whom had
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been defeated by Spartacus without this affecting their subsequent careers
too adversely. Although the census would not be complete for over a year,
it resulted in a massive increase in the number of male citizens properly
registered and able to vote. The last even partially complete census had
been carried out in 85 BC and included only 463,000 names, but in the new
list the total was almost doubled to 910,000. As part of the process, censors
were also required to examine and amend the senatorial roll, adding new
names and expelling from the House any whose actions or morals had
rendered them unfit to guide the Republic. No fewer than sixty-four men
were punished in this way.14
Although Pompey and Crassus had combined to seek office and cooperated
in the restoration of the tribunate, their mutual dislike and envy
swiftly resurfaced. The younger man had begun their year of office in
spectacular style. He became consul, joined the Senate and celebrated a
triumph all on the same day. Then the new censors decided – no doubt
with considerable encouragement from Pompey – to revive an old-fashioned
ceremony where the equestrian order paraded with horses and weapons to
demonstrate their willingness to perform their traditional role as
cavalrymen in the legions. In the middle of this Pompey arrived, proceeded
by the twelve lictors who attended him as consul and cleared a way through
the watching crowd for him to approach the censors. When asked in the
formal words of the ceremony whether he had fulfilled his duty to the
Republic, the consul replied in a loud voice that he had served wherever
Rome required and always under his own command. As the crowd cheered,
the censors accompanied him back to his house. It was a great piece of
political theatre, and this and his triumph with its celebratory games were
impossible for Crassus to match. Instead he decided to dedicate one-tenth
of his wealth to Hercules, paying for a huge public feast at which ten
thousand tables were laden down with food, as well as the allocation of
three months supply of grain to every citizen. Hercules, the great hero,
was closely associated with victory and triumph and the last man to
commemorate his military success in this way had been Sulla. As each
attempted to upstage the other, relations between the consular colleagues
became frigid in the extreme, until at the end of their term they made a
public gesture of reconciliation in response to the appeal of an otherwise
unknown Caius Aurelius. Both then retired to private life, neither wishing
to go out and govern a province as was usual after one of the senior
magistracies.15
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Caesar’s Quaestorship
Little is known of Caesar’s activities in 71–70 BC. During Pompey’s and
Crassus’ consulship he is known to have supported a bill put forward by
the tribune Plotius (or Plautius), which was intended to allow exiled
supporters of Sertorius and Lepidus to return home. He made a speech in
favour of this law, which had a personal dimension as it permitted the
return of his brother-in-law Lucius Cornelius Cinna. Only a single sentence
from this oration is preserved, Caesar declaring that ‘in my opinion, as
regards our relationship, I have lacked neither toil, nor deeds, nor diligence’.
The duty owed to the extended family as well as friends or clients was very
important. Some scholars have speculated that he played a larger role
behind the scenes, perhaps encouraging Pompey and Crassus to join forces
in their desire for the consulship. It has even been suggested that he
arranged the reconciliation between the two, under the assumption that
Aurelius was somehow related to his mother’s family. While none of this
is impossible, it remains pure speculation since none of our sources suggest
any involvement on his part.16
We do know that it was around this time that Caesar himself stood for
the quaestorship and it is probable that securing this was his main concern.
In 70 BC he was thirty, the minimum age Sulla had decreed for election to this
magistracy. It was an important point of pride for an aristocrat to win office
in ‘his year’ (suo anno), that is at the time when he first became eligible.
This, as well as other factors, make it most likely that Caesar was elected as
one of the twenty quaestors in the autumn of 70 BC and began his year of
office early in 69 BC. The consular elections were normally held near the
end of July, although there was no rigidly fixed date. There were around
150 days a year when it was permissible to hold an Assembly of the Roman
people, but this could be reduced by additional festivals or the declaration
of periods of public thanksgiving during which no State business could be
conducted. The more junior posts such as the quaestorship were decided in
a different assembly that was summoned fairly soon after the consular
elections. Canvassing could begin as much as a year before the election, but
was particularly intense in the last twenty-four days before actual voting. It
was during this time, after they had formally registered with the magistrate
overseeing the election, that those seeking office donned a specially whitened
toga – the toga candidus, hence our word candidate – intended to make
them stand out as they moved around the Forum. As they walked through
the crowded centre of the city candidates greeted their fellow citizens,
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especially those whose property and status made their vote most influential.
A specially trained slave known as a nomenclator usually stood behind the
candidate, ready to whisper the names of anyone they approached, so that
his master could greet them properly. Reliance on these slaves was almost
universal, but good politicians made sure that their dependence on this aid
to memory was never obvious. It was important for a candidate to be seen,
but in many ways it was even more important with whom he was seen. Other
senators who supported his candidature were expected to accompany a man
for some of his canvassing, and their auctoritas helped to sway the voters.
Less subtle propaganda took the form of signs painted on buildings
expressing support. Many of the tombs that stood along the sides of the
main roads into Rome included in their inscription a prohibition against
such marks of support being posted or painted on them.17
Quaestors were elected by the Comitia Tributa, the Assembly of the
thirty-five tribes of Roman citizens. When meeting to elect magistrates
rather than vote for or against pieces of legislation, the Comitia was
normally held in the Campus Martius, the mainly open area of parks and
exercise grounds outside the formal boundary of the city to the northwest.
This seems to have been because a higher turnout was expected for
an election, and it would have been impossible to squeeze so many voters
into the confines of the Forum. It is probable, though not certain, that
candidates were given a chance to address the Assembly before the presiding
magistrate gave the order ‘Divide, citizens’ (Discedite, Quirites). The
members of each tribe then went to their allocated section of the saepta,
a temporary complex of fenced enclosures. To vote, each member of the
tribe in turn would leave the tribe’s enclosure, walking across a narrow
raised gangway known as a ‘bridge’ to the rogator, the official appointed
to oversee the process for each tribe. The voter then placed his written
ballot into a basket, watched over by other officials known as the ‘guards’
(custodes), who would later count them and report the result to the
presiding magistrate. Each tribe voted as a unit, their decision being
announced in an order previously established by lot. The number of voters
in each tribe varied considerably, with even the poorest members of the four
urban tribes being able to attend without much difficulty. Given that the
majority of Roman citizens now lived far from Rome, only the wealthier
members of some of the other tribes were likely to be able and willing to
travel to Rome for an election. The vote of these men was very significant,
as was that of poorer men who now lived in Rome, but who were still
enrolled in one of the rural tribes. In spite of the disparity between the
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numbers present at the election, the vote of each tribe carried equal weight.
It was important for an aristocrat to carry the vote of his own tribe – in
Caesar’s case the Fabia tribe – and great effort was made to know and do
favours for fellow tribesmen. Elections were not decided by an overall
majority, but concluded as soon as enough candidates to fill the available
posts had each received the vote of eighteen tribes. It was literally a ‘first
past the post’ system.18
Caesar’s prospects were good. He had won acclaim in the courts and
served with distinction fighting in the East. Even the rumours about
Nicomedes and his own scandalous womanising at least helped to make his
name widely known, as did his distinctive style of dress. If his family was
not amongst the inner circle of nobles in the Senate, the Julii Caesares had
provided a number of magistrates in recent years. Some of these were from
the other branch of the family, but this still meant that the name had been
kept in the public eye. His mother’s relations were doing very well, with two
consulships in the last five years and another member holding the praetorship
in 70 BC. With twenty posts as quaestor available each year this was the
easiest elected magistracy to win. The enfranchisement of the Italians had
brought many sons of wealthy local families to Rome in search of a career,
but a member of an established Roman family and patrician had little to fear
from such competition. Caesar was duly elected. It was an important
moment, for Sulla’s political reforms ensured that all quaestors were
automatically enrolled in the Senate. Quaestors performed a range of
financial and administrative tasks, but the majority served as deputy to a
provincial governor, who was in turn either an ex-consul or ex-praetor.
Caesar was sent in this way to Further Spain (Hispania Ulterior), the
westernmost province of the Iberian Peninsula. 19
Before he left Rome some time in 69 BC, Caesar suffered two personal
blows with the death of his aunt Julia, followed shortly afterwards by the
death of his wife Cornelia. Aristocratic families held very public funerals for
their members, using the opportunity to celebrate the achievements of their
whole line, reminding voters of what they had done and hinting at the
promise for the future. Actors dressed in the regalia of office and wearing
the funeral masks of distinguished ancestors formed part of the procession,
which went first to the Forum, where an oration would be delivered from the
Rostra. Polybius tells us that
... who makes the oration over the man [or, in this case, woman] about
to be buried, when he has finished speaking of him recounts the
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successes and exploits of the rest whose images are present, beginning
from the most ancient. By this means, by this constant renewal of the
good report of brave men, the celebrity of those who performed noble
deeds is rendered immortal, while at the same time the fame of those
who did good service to their country becomes known to the people
and a heritage for future generations.20
At Julia’s funeral Caesar spoke from the Rostra about her distinguished
ancestry, of the Julii’s descent from the goddess Venus, and the royal
connections of her mother’s family. These were useful reminders to the
watching crowd of his own lineage. More controversially he included in the
procession symbols of Marius’ victories, and perhaps even an actor to
represent him. Sulla had banned the public honouring of his rival, but only
a few of the watchers protested, and they were swiftly shouted down by the
rest. Though Sulla had won the civil war, he had not won over many, even
of Rome’s elite, to accept all of his decisions, as had been indicated by the
widespread popularity of the restoration of the tribunate. For a lot of
Romans Marius remained a great hero, the man who had restored Rome’s
injured pride in Africa and then saved Italy from the Northern menace.
Cicero, who roundly condemned Marius’ role in the civil war, frequently
and enthusiastically praised his victories over Jugurtha and the Cimbri in his
speeches, knowing that his audience would warmly concur. Caesar’s gesture
was generally welcomed and this emphasis on his own close connection to
the great hero was very good for his own popularity.21
It was not uncommon for elderly women from the noble families to receive
a grand public funeral. Caesar’s decision to grant the same honour to Cornelia
was highly unusual, and Plutarch says that he was the first Roman to do this
for such a young woman. The gesture proved popular, as many people took
it as a sign of the genuine sorrow of a kind-hearted man. Although the
popular image of the Romans sees them as stern and phlegmatic, in truth they
were often a deeply sentimental people. Funerals, like so much of an
aristocrat’s life, were conducted in public and had an impact on politics. No
close male relative of Caesar had died during his young adulthood, and in one
sense the funerals of his aunt and wife provided great opportunities for selfpublicising.
Caesar seized the chance and exploited it to the best of his ability.
This does not necessarily mean that his sorrow was not genuine, for sentiment
and politics often co-existed happily at Rome. His marriage to Cornelia had
been successful, perhaps also happy and loving. However, none of our sources
suggest that it was the loss of his wife that sparked off his womanising and
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it is most probable that he had already had a number of affairs while married
to her. We do not know if he paraded the symbols of her father Cinna, as he
had so recently done with the latter’s ally Marius. Marius had far greater
emotional appeal to the wider population, so the connection with him was
far more important for Caesar.
Caesar left for Further Spain in the spring or early summer of 69 BC, quite
probably travelling out with the governor he was to serve, Antistius Vetus.
It was common for governors to select their own quaestor from those who
had been elected. It is possible that this had happened in Caesar’s case and
that the two already had a connection. Certainly, they seem to have got on
well, and Caesar would take Vetus’ son as his own quaestor when sent to
govern Further Spain after his praetorship seven years later. One of the
quaestor’s most important tasks was to oversee the accounts for the province,
but he could be called upon to act as the governor’s representative in a wide
range of activities. Much of a governor’s time was spent in touring the main
towns of the region, listening to petitions, resolving problems and dispensing
justice. Vetus sent Caesar to perform this function in some places. Caesar
performed all his tasks well, and over twenty years later would remind the
locals of his services to them. A quaestorship offered the chance to acquire
clients amongst the notable men of a provincial population.
We are told that Caesar was first subject to an epileptic fit while serving
in Spain, although it is not clear whether this was in 69 BC or during his own
spell as governor in 61–60 BC. Another incident probably dated to the
quaestorship, although Plutarch sets it later, and occurred when he was
visiting Gades (modern Cadiz) to hold court. Caesar is supposed to have
seen a statue of Alexander the Great in the Temple of Hercules and been
visibly distressed, because he had done so little at an age when the
Macedonian king had conquered half the world. More disturbing still was
a dream in which he raped his mother Aurelia. Understandably dismayed
by this, Caesar consulted a soothsayer whose interpretation was that ‘he was
destined to rule the world, since the mother whom he had ravished
represented Mother Earth, the parent of all’. Suetonius claims that this
explanation prompted him to leave the province early, so eager was he to
return to Rome and resume his career. If this is true, then it is likely that
he acted with the approval of Vetus, since there never seems to have been
any criticism or suggestion that he abandoned his post. His review of the
provincial accounts may well have already been complete and so his primary
duty fulfilled. On the whole he had done his job well, but the activities of
a quaestor rarely held much fascination to the electorate back in Rome.22
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Monuments and Gladiators : Caesar as Aedile
On his way back to Italy Caesar paused in Transpadane Gaul, the area of
the Po Valley. This was part of the province of Cisalpine Gaul, the only
province that formed part of the Italian Peninsula. It was populated by a
mixture of descendants of Roman and Italian colonists and the Gallic tribes,
the leading families of which were by now culturally very Roman. The grants
of citizenship that came in the aftermath of the Social War had stopped at
the line of the Po, and communities to the north possessed only Latin status.
This was deeply resented, especially by the rich and powerful who had most
to gain from full citizenship. Caesar encouraged these sentiments, for the
future votes of wealthy new citizens would have been well worth having.
The suggestion that his agitation was so strong as to push the Transpadanes
to the brink of rebellion, and that this was only prevented by the chance
presence of legions nearby, seems extremely improbable. It is most likely a
later invention based upon the assumption that Caesar was always aiming
at revolution. The man who had refused to join either Lepidus or Sertorius
seems unlikely to have wanted to start a rebellion on his own. At this stage
in his career, there was simply no need to take such a risk.23
On arrival back in Rome, one of Caesar’s first actions was to remarry. His
new bride was Pompeia, grandchild on her mother’s side of Sulla and on her
father’s side of the latter’s consular colleague in 88 BC, Quintus Pompeius.
Therefore, for all the parading of the connection with Marius and his support
for legislation aimed at dismantling Sulla’s regime, it would be far too
simplistic to see Caesar as fixedly pro-Marian or anti-Sullan. Roman politics
rarely, if ever, divided so starkly, even when civil war raged. When senators
married it was almost invariably with a view to the useful associations they
would gain as a result of the union. Not enough is known about Pompeia’s
relatives to understand precisely how Caesar thought the marriage would help
to foster his career – the web of inter-connections between aristocratic
families was complex in the extreme. Unlike his marriage to Cornelia, this
one would not have been through the confarreatio ceremony. A good deal
is known about the rituals associated with conventional marriages at Rome,
although we do not know whether all of these were followed at Caesar’s
wedding in 67 BC. As with most aspects of private and public life at Rome,
there were sacrificial offerings and taking of omens. Brides were traditionally
supposed to wear orange slippers and a home-woven dress, fastened with a
girdle tied in a complex ‘Herculean’ knot for the groom to undo on the
wedding night. If Pompeia followed the usual conventions she would have
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had her hair bound into six plaits and covered with the bright orange veil
(flammeum) – a reminder of Cornelia who would have had to wear such a
covering whenever she left the house if Caesar had actually been made
Flamen Dialis. In a torch-lit procession, she would then be escorted from her
family home to the groom’s house, where the latter would be waiting. On
arrival the door posts of the house would be decorated with wooden fillets,
and anointed with oil or animal fat. The bride was then carried over the
threshold, a gesture that was believed to go back to the rape of the Sabine
women, when the first Romans had only been able to find wives by
kidnapping the daughters of a neighbouring community. The first Roman
brides had therefore entered their new homes unwillingly. This ritual –
though without a general consciousness of its supposed origin – has survived
into the modern world, but Roman practice differed in that it was the bride’s
attendants rather than the groom who actually carried her.
The bridegroom was waiting with a torch and a vessel full of water,
symbolising his willingness to provide her with the essentials of life. There
rarely appears to have been a particularly long ceremony to formalise the
marriage. The traditional formual was simplicity itself, with the bride
declaring ‘Where you are Caius, I will be Caia’ (Ubi tu Caius, ego Caia),
the masculine and feminine forms of a common name symbolising the
joining of the couple. There was a symbolic bridal bed laid out and ornately
decorated in the reception hall of the house, although the couple would
obviously not actually occupy this but retire to a proper bedroom in due
course. (Some Greeks believed that a Roman groom had all the lights
extinguished so that the room was in complete darkness before he joined his
wife in the proper marriage bed. This was supposed to be a mark of respect
for an honourable woman, so that she would never seem like a prostitute,
only wanted for sexual pleasure. This may well have been no more than a
story told about the quaint Romans by the Greeks.) On the next morning
the new wife for the first time sacrificed to the household gods (the lares and
penates) of her new home. She and her husband would also entertain guests
to a special feast.24
Pompeia was only distantly related to Pompey the Great and there was little
love lost between the two branches of the family, so Caesar’s marriage gave
him no close link to Rome’s greatest and most popular living general. For
the first two years after his consulship Pompey seemed content, even though
his performance in the Senate was lacklustre. By 67 BC he was clearly missing
the adulation that his victories had brought him and began to manoeuvre for
a new command. The spectacular nature of his career so far ensured that
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this could not simply be a standard consular province, but needed to be far
grander. Piracy continued to plague the Mediterranean and a tribune called
Aulus Gabinius proposed a bill creating an extraordinary command to deal
with the problem once and for all. This was not entirely unprecedented, since
the Senate had sent one of the consuls of 74 BC, Marcus Antonius – the father
of Caesar’s subordinate Mark Antony – with a roving brief to combat pirates.
However, he had achieved little, suffering a serious defeat in 72 BC and dying
soon afterwards. The situation had deteriorated even further, threatening
the supply of foreign grain on which Rome depended. If its intention was
nothing new, the details of Gabinius’ law were extremely radical, granting the
new commander control of vast numbers of ships and troops, as well as
imperium that stretched throughout the Mediterranean and for a distance of
50 miles in from the shore. His power was at the very least equal to that of
all the governors whose provinces included land in this area, and it may
possibly have been superior. While Gabinius made no explicit mention of
Pompey in his initial proposal, it was clear to all that he was the obvious and
really the only choice. Many leading senators opposed the measure, declaring
that it was a mistake in a free Republic to give so much power to any one
man. As usual the forces of inertia within the Senate ensured that many
preferred letting a serious problem continue rather than allowing someone
else the credit for solving it.25
Caesar is said to have been the only senator to speak in favour of the bill,
doubtless being summoned by Gabinius to speak from the Rostra as the
tribune tried to persuade the crowd in the Forum to support his bill. When
the order was given for the people to reconvene as the Assembly of the tribes,
they enthusiastically passed it. It seems unlikely that no other senator
supported the law, but Caesar may well have been one of its more vocal
supporters. As in the past he was keen to associate himself with popular
causes, while his own experiences with pirates gave him a personal knowledge
of the threat they posed. When the law was passed the price of grain at
Rome is supposed to have dropped immediately to a more normal level as
the market expressed its confidence in Pompey. Many prominent senators
proved ready to assist him in his task, so that the twenty-four legates or
senior subordinates granted to him by the law were a very distinguished
group. This in itself does suggest that Caesar’s support for Gabinius was
probably not unique. The faith in Pompey proved entirely justified as he set
his organisational genius to the problem. Dividing the Mediterranean into
sectors, the seas west of Italy were swept free of pirates in a matter of weeks.
It took only slightly longer to defeat the raiders infesting the eastern half of
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the Mediterranean. One reason for the speed of this success was Pompey’s
willingness to accept the surrender of the pirates and their families, settling
them on good farmland and often in new communities where they could
support themselves without recourse to violence. Once again Pompey was
the adored hero of the Republic, although the pettiness in his character
surfaced as he tried to deny the proconsular governor of Crete credit for
defeating the pirates on that island. His success merely whetted his appetite
for further glory.26
In 66 BC another tribune, Caius Manilius, brought a bill before the Popular
Assembly, making use of the powers that Pompey and Crassus had restored
to this magistracy. Since 74 BC the command in the on-going conflict with
Mithridates had been held by Lucius Licinius Lucullus – a post, which as
already noted, he is supposed to have secured through the assistance of the
courtesan Praecia (see p. 83). Lucullus was one of Sulla’s men, probably the
only senator to stay with him when he first marched on Rome in 88 BC. He
was a bold and skilful general, but his strategic and tactical gifts were not
matched by comparable skill as a leader. During his campaigns, Lucullus
had achieved victory after victory over Mithridates and his ally King Tigranes
of Armenia. Yet he had never won the love of his officers and soldiers in
the way that commanders like Marius, Sulla and Pompey were able to do.
Even more dangerously, he closely regulated the activities of Roman
businessmen and the publicani tax collectors in Asia. This was bitterly
resented by these influential groups who had grown accustomed to exploiting
the locals under governors who demanded no more than a cut of the profits.
Lucullus had been anxious to avoid alienating the provincials for fear that
they might then come to see Mithridates as a potential liberator from Roman
oppression. Yet for many wealthy businessmen profits came before such
concerns, and from 69 BC onwards Lucullus’ command was steadily reduced
as regions were taken from him and given to other governors. His strength
eroded, much of the ground he had won earlier in the war was lost and final
victory began to seem ever more distant. Under such circumstances the idea
of sending Pompey out to take charge and settle the business once and for
all was very attractive. Caesar once again spoke in favour of the bill, which
was easily passed. Pompey replaced Lucullus, again giving the impression of
arriving at the last minute to take the credit for a war that had already been
virtually won.27
It is highly unlikely that Caesar’s support for the laws granting Pompey
extraordinary commands in 67 and 66 BC made much difference to the
outcome of the voting on these issues. There were plenty of former quaestors
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around, as well as several junior senators who flouted convention in their
dress and behaviour. It is still useful to remind ourselves that at this point
in his life Caesar was still not all that important. His record so far suggested
that he was an up and coming man, likely to have a reasonable career, but
once again he was not unique in this. Speaking out for both the Lex Gabinia
and the Lex Manilia was unlikely to win him the deep gratitude of Pompey,
for his had been a very minor role. Yet both laws had been controversial,
attracting great attention as a number of leading senators spoke out against
them in the Senate and in the Forum. Caesar seized the opportunity to be
noticed and to be associated with the success of the laws and of Pompey.
There was a chance that some small share of the latter’s popularity would
rub off on him. More importantly he had voiced opinions held by a broad
range of citizens, including many equestrians and other moderately
prosperous Romans whose vote counted for so much in the assemblies. To
espouse popular causes in this way was to be a popularis. Although often
portrayed in older studies as almost a well-defined political party or grouping,
this was no more than a style of politics that relied on winning the support
of the people. The Gracchi had been populares, as had Marius at times, as
well as Saturninus and Sulpicius. Although they raised many of the same
issues, these men did not hold a fixed set of common views. Caesar had
from early in his career inclined towards a popularis path, but in the same
way this did not automatically mean that he made common cause with
anyone else who acted in the same way, as many did. Politics remained
essentially an individual struggle, since everyone else was a competitor. It was
not just a question of winning popular acclaim, but of winning more than
anyone else.28
Another way in which Caesar sought to woo the electorate was by lavish
expenditure. He was appointed curator of the Appian Way, and spent a
good deal of his own money to pay for the renovations and improvements
he had made to the road and its associated structures. Potentially this offered
a good return for his money, for the Appian Way remained one of the most
important roads to Rome, so that voters travelling to the city by this route
would be given a reminder of what Caesar had done for them. The
willingness to spend his own wealth on his fellow citizens doubtless
contributed to his election to the post of curule aedile for 65 BC. There were
four aediles altogether, but two were exclusively plebian posts and therefore
could not be held by a patrician like Caesar. The curule aediles, who could
be either patrician or plebian, had the right to sit in a magistrate’s official
chair, just like praetors and consuls. Sulla had not made the aedileship a
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compulsory part of a public career if a man wanted to hold a more senior
magistracy, since there were so few posts available, but he had set thirtyseven
as the minimum age at which it could be held. Caesar was only thirtyfive
when he became aedile, and it is most probable that he had been granted
a special exemption by the Senate to allow him to stand two years earlier than
was normal. Such special favours seem to have been reasonably common, so
much so that in 67 BC a tribune had passed a law barring the Senate from
granting such dispensations unless a quorum of 200 senators were present.
The influence of his mother’s family, and his own distinction as a holder of
the corona civica and a pontiff probably explain Caesar’s own exemption.
(However, the date of his aedileship has been used by those scholars who
prefer to date Caesar’s birth to 102 BC. Yet this does not tie in with the little
evidence we have, for instance it would have been odd for him to have become
quaestor two years late.)29
The aediles were concerned almost exclusively with the running of Rome
itself, supervising the upkeep of temples, the cleaning and maintenance of
roads, aqueducts and sewers, and overseeing the grain supply, the markets
and even the brothels of the city. In addition they sometimes took on a
judicial role, but one of the main attractions to an ambitious politician was
the aediles’ responsibility for public entertainments and festivals. The two
curule aediles were specifically responsible for the seven days of games and
shows honouring the Mother goddess Cybele in April (the Ludi Megalenses)
and the ‘Roman Games’ (the Ludi Romani), a further fifteen days of
entertainment in September. Although the Treasury provided an allowance
to the magistrates to meet the costs of these productions, it had long become
customary for the aediles to supplement this from their own funds. Each
lavish spectacle staged by an aedile wanting to make a name for himself set
a new standard for his successors to match or surpass. Caesar threw himself
into the preparations for the games with all the panache of a natural
showman and a determination that no expense should be spared. Much of
his private art collection was displayed in the Forum and the basilicas
surrounding it, as well as temporary colonnades erected for the purpose.
At this time Rome still lacked the monumental theatres that were a feature
of Hellenic cities and it was necessary to rig up seating and a temporary
auditorium. The other curule aedile, Marcus Calpurnius Bibulus, joined
him in footing the bill, but complained that all the credit seemed to go to his
colleague as they jointly put on beast fights and dramatic productions.
Bibulus is supposed to have remarked that it was just like the Temple of
Castor and Pollux, the Heavenly Twins, which was invariably known as the
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Temple of Castor for brevity’s sake. In the same way it seemed people were
talking about the aedileship of Caesar, never of Caesar and Bibulus.30
Caesar decided during his aedileship to stage gladiatorial games in honour
of his father, who had died some twenty years before. The origin of
gladiatorial displays lay in funeral games. At first these had been private,
family affairs, but near the end of the third century BC they became public
spectacles, with rapid escalation in their scale and splendour. The tradition
that such fights could only be staged to commemorate a death of a family
member continued down to Caesar’s day, in contrast to beast fights, which
could be presented as part of a number of different celebrations. Yet it had
become little more than a pretext for this form of violent entertainment,
which had proved so popular in Rome and throughout Italy. Even so, it was
certainly a most unusual step for Caesar to declare funeral games after such
a long lapse of time. Yet in many ways the sheer scale of his plans was more
exceptional. He began to collect so many gladiators from the schools across
Italy that the Senate became nervous. Spartacus’ rebellion was still fresh in
everyone’s memory, while there may even have been fears of what an
ambitious man like Caesar could do with so many armed men at his
command in Rome itself. Probably as importantly, other senators were
reluctant to allow such lavish displays, which would raise the expectation of
the audience and so make it more expensive and difficult for everyone else
to woo the people in future. As a result, a law was passed limiting the number
of gladiators that could perform in any games staged by an individual. It is
still reported by our sources that 320 pairs of gladiators appeared in Caesar’s
games, and that all were equipped with ornate silvered armour. Similarly
lavish weapons were also used by the beast fighters in the entertainments
staged jointly with Bibulus.31
During his aedileship Caesar spent huge amounts of his own money,
supplemented by Bibulus’ cash in their joint projects. The people of Rome
revelled in the shows and games put on for free enjoyment. They disliked any
hint of stinginess in those staging the games and would hold this against a
man in his future career, just as they would gratefully remember someone
who was responsible for a truly impressive spectacle. Yet it was not simply
a question of throwing money at the projects, for even expensive games
could sometimes fall flat if they were not presented well. Caesar never lacked
style in anything he did and his games were a great success. From his point
of view, the money that had gone to produce this result had been very well
spent. It was his personal money only in the sense that he had borrowed it.
Even before he had held any elected office, Plutarch tells us that Caesar was
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said to have debts of over 1,300 talents – a total of over 31 million sestertii
in Roman currency. (To put this into proportion, the minimum property
qualification for a member of the equestrian order at a slightly later date,
and probably also at the time, was 400,000 sestertii.) This was a staggering
sum, which was then massively increased by his spending as curator of the
Appian Way and as aedile. Caesar was gambling on his political future being
bright and lucrative enough to cancel out his debts. His creditors were taking
the same risk, but presumably had confidence in Caesar to do well. The
greatest part of this money was most probably owed to Crassus. Caesar was
not the only rising senator he funded in this way, but it is unlikely that he gave
others as much leeway to keep on borrowing more and more.32
There was one last gesture during Caesar’s aedileship. At some point
during the year, most probably before one of the sets of games, he gave
orders for Marius’ trophies commemorating his victory over the Cimbri and
Teutones to be re-erected in the Forum. Sulla had ordered them to be torn
down and probably destroyed, so Caesar most likely had a facsimile set up.
As with Julia’s funeral, there was a warm response from much of the
population to this gesture. Enough people still remembered the fear that
the northern barbarians would spill south into Italy and sack Rome again.
Marius had saved Rome from this fate, and that was a deed most felt worthy
of celebration. One exception was Quintus Lutatius Catulus, consul in
78 BC and like Caesar a pontiff. His father had been consul with Marius in
102 BC and proconsul in 101 BC and had deeply resented the popular hero
receiving most of the credit for their joint success. Catalus was now probably
the most respected member of the Senate, even if he was not formally the
princeps senatus, the man whose name appeared first on the senatorial roll.
Emphasis on Marius diminished the glory of Catulus’ own family. He
resented this, but if the stories are true he was also beginning to see Caesar
as a reckless and potentially dangerous politician. In the Senate Catulus
declared that ‘No longer, Caesar, are you undermining the defences of the
Republic – now you are launching a direct assault.’ Yet for all the elder
statesman’s auctoritas, Caesar replied in a speech that was utterly reasonable
and convinced most senators of his innocence. They were probably right, for
his career was still in most respects conventional, if flamboyant. Yet revolution
was in the air.33
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VI
Conspiracy
‘As soon as riches came to be held in honour, and brought glory, imperium, and
power, virtue began to grow dull; poverty was seen as disgraceful, innocence
as malevolence. Therefore because of wealth, our youths were seized by
luxury, greed and pride; they stole and squandered; reckoning their own
property of little worth, they coveted other peoples’; contemptuous of modesty
and chastity, of everything divine or human, they were without thought or
restraint.’ – The senator and historian Sallust, writing in the late forties BC.1
Late in 66 BC the consular elections for the following year were won by
Publius Cornelius Sulla and Publius Autronius Paetus. Sulla was a nephew
of the dictator and had become very wealthy during the proscriptions.
Brother-in-law to Pompey, he may have enjoyed some popularity by
association with the great commander, but Sulla’s success owed far more to
his money in elections that were marked by widespread bribery and
intimidation. This in itself was nothing unusual.
Throughout the period a long succession of laws were passed to deal
with electoral malpractice, but the frequency of such legislation makes clear
its ineffectiveness. A recent bill had stipulated that candidates found guilty
of such crimes lost not only the office they had secured, but were expelled
from the Senate, denied the right to display the symbols of any public office
and barred from entering politics again. The two runners-up in the election,
Lucius Aurelius Cotta and Lucius Manlius Torquatus, promptly prosecuted
the victors under this bribery law. Cotta was the man who as praetor in 70 BC
had brought in the law altering the composition of juries in the courts. By
this time he was a year or two overdue for his consulship, which may well
have made his defeat rankle even more. Both of his brothers had also already
been consul, while Manlius came from a very distinguished patrician line,
in contrast to the two victors in the election. Autronius relied more for his
defence on using a gang of supporters to intimidate the members of the
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court, or, failing that, to break up proceedings. Sulla may or may not have
made use of similar tactics – years later Cicero defended him on another
charge and blamed all the earlier violence on Autronius. In spite of this the
prosecutions were successful, and both men were stripped of their office
and expelled from public life. Cotta and Torquatus became the consuls for
65 BC, either because they had gained the most votes after Sulla and Autronius
or perhaps following a second election.
The matter does not seem to have ended there. Autronius and Sulla were
reluctant to accept their permanent expulsion from politics. There was talk
of a plot to assassinate Cotta and Torquatus when they assumed the
consulship on 1 January 65 BC. Other leading senators were also to be
murdered and the conspirators were then to install themselves in the supreme
office. Forewarned of the planned coup, the new consuls were allowed an
armed guard by the Senate and the day passed without any violence. Officially
a veil of silence was cast over the whole affair, so that Cicero, a praetor in 66
BC, could claim a few years later that he had known nothing about it at the
time. In the absence of fact, rumour flourished, especially as the years went
by and it was useful to blacken rivals’ names by alleging their involvement in
these murky events. It was later alleged that Autronius’ chief ally was Lucius
Sergius Catiline, whom we shall encounter later in this chapter. He had just
returned from governing Africa as a propraetor and had wanted to become
a candidate for the consulship after the dismissal of Sulla and Autronius.
The refusal of the presiding magistrate to permit this is supposed to have
prompted him to join Autronius in planning to seize power by force. Another
man whose name was mentioned was Cnaeus Calpurnius Piso, who had been
elected to the quaestorship for 65 BC and was seen as a wild, intemperate
man. When the Senate decided soon afterwards to send him to Spain as a
propraetor – a most extraordinary appointment for such a young and junior
magistrate – this was seen as an indication of their fear of what he might do
if allowed to remain in Rome. The stories doubtless grew in the telling,
especially after Piso was murdered in his province by some of his own Spanish
soldiers. Some claimed these auxiliaries had been prompted by the governor’s
tyrannical rule. This was plausible enough, although it should be remembered
that of the many oppressive Roman governors only a handful managed to get
themselves assassinated. Yet others suggested that the Spanish soldiers were
loyal to Pompey, having served under him against Sertorius, and had either
been instructed – or decided on their own initiative – to dispose of a potential
rival. It was an indication of the nervous mood of these years that such wild
tales were circulating.2
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It is in this context that we need to place the version given by Suetonius,
in which Crassus and Caesar were in league with Autronius and Sulla. The
plan was to massacre their opponents in the Senate, give the consulship to
the convicted pair and make Crassus dictator, with Caesar as his deputy,
who bore the archaic title of Master of Horse (Magister Equitum). Caesar
was supposed to have given the signal for the onslaught by letting his toga
fall from his shoulder, but did not do so when Crassus failed to turn up,
moved by ‘conscience or fear’. The sources named by Suetonius for this
incident were all written later by authors hostile to Caesar. The same was
true of another tale he mentions, describing how Caesar planned an armed
rebellion in concert with Piso, but that this was thwarted by the latter’s
murder. As with other claims that he plotted to seize control of the Republic
by force from his earliest years, it is likely that these are no more than later
propaganda. Caesar, recently elected aedile for 65 BC, had no reason to wish
for revolution. He was certainly extremely unlikely to have joined any plot
aimed at assassinating his relative Lucius Aurelius Cotta. Similarly, Crassus,
who had just won the censorship with Catulus as a colleague, had little to
gain from armed rebellion. There was politically motivated rioting during
and after the consular elections, and there may even have been a plot of
some sort, but the involvement of Caesar or Crassus is surely a later
invention.3
There has been a tendency amongst historians ancient and modern to
see these years as dominated by rivalry between Crassus and Pompey. In 67
BC Catulus had argued that the command against the pirates gave too much
power to any one man. When Pompey was also given responsibility for the
war with Mithridates, he came to control far larger forces and could draw
on the resources of a far wider area than Sulla at the start of the civil war.
Men writing under the rule of the emperors expressed surprise when Pompey
chose to lay down this great power on his eventual return to Italy at the end
of 62 BC. It was assumed that anyone with the strength to make himself sole
ruler at Rome would inevitably crave such dominance. With hindsight we
know that this belief was wrong, for Pompey preferred to pursue his
ambitions by more conventional means. Cicero’s letters from these years
betray no hint that he was worried about the great general following Sulla’s
example. It seems unlikely that many other senators expected a fresh civil
war, but that is not to say that they considered it to be utterly impossible.
Anyone active in public life in these years was old enough to remember the
appalling violence of the eighties BC, of proscription lists marking famous
men for death and of severed heads decorating the Rostra. All this had
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happened in the very heart of Rome and who was to say that it could not
happen again? Pompey had been one of the bloodthirsty lieutenants of Sulla,
the ‘young executioner’. He appeared to have mellowed as he matured, but
he had still spent only a small part of his career in Rome, taking part in the
day-to-day business of public life. Everyone knew the figure of the dashing
commander, who was adding victories in Asia to those he had already won
in Africa, Spain, Sicily and Italy, but how many truly knew the real man and
so could be sure how he would behave? The circumstances were very different
to the situation that had faced Sulla and effectively backed him into a corner.
Yet if someone were to seize power in Rome by force, as the disgruntled
consul Cinna had done, who was to say that this would not be the reason,
or the pretext, for Pompey to return sword in hand at the head of his army.
Such a scenario was all the easier to imagine when elections and trials were
being disrupted, and competition between leading senators seemed more
desperate than in the past.4
In contrast to Pompey, people knew Crassus, who spent far more time in
Rome and was very active in public life. One of the richest men in the Republic
– his fortune probably second only to that of Pompey – Crassus was fond of
saying that no man could call himself rich unless he was able to afford to
raise his own army. In spite of his wealth, his lifestyle was remarkably frugal
in an age of luxury and indulgence. Men like Lucullus and Cicero’s great
rival the orator Hortensius paraded their riches in their magnificent houses,
villas and gardens, while dining in lavish style on exotic foods. They were
famous for the efforts they devoted to construct saltwater ponds, in which they
raised sea fish, often as much as pets as for food. Crassus did not waste his
money on such whims, and instead devoted great effort to augmenting his
already vast fortune. He had interests in many businesses, maintaining close
links with the publicani and other companies active in the provinces. Most
visibly he dealt in property, maintaining hundreds of skilled slaves to develop
buildings and increase their value. They included a force trained as a fire
brigade, something that did not at this time otherwise exist at Rome. Large
parts of the city consisted of narrow streets separating tall, densely packed
and often cheaply constructed insulae thrown up by landlords keen to profit
as much as possible from rents. Fires started easily and spread rapidly,
especially in the heat of the Italian summer. Crassus was able to buy up great
swathes of Rome at a knock-down price by waiting for a conflagration to
begin and then purchasing properties in the path of the fire. Once the deal
was done, he called in his fire brigade to fight the flames, usually by
demolishing buildings to create a fire-brake. Some of his new purchases were
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saved, while his slave artisans were ready to build afresh on the sites of the
demolished structures. He seems to have dealt particularly in grander houses
for the better off, although like other prominent Romans he may also have
owned many blocks of slum flats. The means of acquiring much of his
property displayed both determination and ruthlessness. At some point,
probably in 73 BC, he was known to have been spending much time with a
Vestal Virgin named Licinia. She was formally accused of unchastity, a crime
that in the case of the Vestals was punished by being entombed alive. The case
was dismissed when Crassus announced that he was intent on buying a house
from Licinia, whose name suggests she might well have been a relative. So
convinced was everyone of his enthusiasm for acquiring new properties that
this was accepted as far more probable than the idea that they were having
an affair. Licinia was acquitted, but Crassus is supposed to have kept hovering
around her until she finally sold him the house.5
Crassus was not just a property tycoon who owned great estates and silver
mines as well as housing, and his fortune did not exist purely for its own sake,
but to serve his political ambitions. As we have seen, it is probable that
Caesar benefited from loans to fund his grand attempts to buy popular
favour. Crassus loaned money readily to many men pursuing a public career.
He rarely charged them interest, although he was relentless in collecting the
loan as soon as the agreed date for its repayment had arrived. Instead he
concentrated on accumulating political capital, doing favours for other men
and so placing them in his debt. In these years a large proportion of the 600
or so senators, perhaps even the majority, either owed money to Crassus or
had benefited from one of his interest-free loans in the past. Few of these men
came from the greatest families, who usually had wealth enough of their
own. Many, like Caesar, were ambitious men from the fringes of the inner
circle of families, still more were minor senators who never held a magistracy,
but were members of the Senate and could vote even if they were rarely
called upon to speak. Amongst these men Crassus had great influence, from
the generosity with which he permitted others to draw upon his wealth. He
was equally willing to do favours in other ways if this placed other men in
his debt. Crassus was exceptionally active in the courts, even in comparison
with men like Cicero whose career relied primarily on his skills as an
advocate. The latter claimed that Crassus had:
with no more than a mediocre rhetorical training and even less natural
talent, still by effort and industry, and particularly by judicious use on
behalf of his clients of favours owed to him, he was for many years
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one of the leading advocates. His speeches were characterised by clear
Latin, carefully chosen and arranged words, free of too much
adornment, his ideas were clever, but his delivery and voice
undistinguished, so that he said everything in the same style.6
Plutarch also emphasised how careful Crassus was in preparing a speech
before each appearance in court. Effort then, rather than natural flair, best
characterised his advocacy, but it was still highly effective, and his willingness
to take on cases that others had refused placed many men under obligation
to him. Similarly, the readiness he showed to canvass on behalf of electoral
candidates was another way of doing favours that might be returned at a
future date. His enthusiasm to make new connections meant that at times
he appeared fickle, acting on behalf of a man one day in court or the Forum
and then siding with someone else opposed to him a little later. Crassus
worked hard at politics, in contrast to Pompey who, when in Rome, rarely
appeared in the Forum. Pompey’s wealth and auctoritas were greater than
those of anyone else, but he was seen as reluctant to use them, disliking
crowds and rarely appearing as an advocate. Crassus was always visible,
speaking for or supporting other men, and taking care to greet even the
humbler men by name whenever he met them. He never won the affection
of the crowd, but his influence ensured that he was treated with respect.
Prosecutions of prominent men were a normal and frequent part of public
life, but no one attacked Crassus in this way. Plutarch mentions one tribune
of the plebs who was notorious for his fierce attacks on leading men. When
asked why he had never targeted Crassus, he replied because ‘that one has
straw on his horns’, referring to an Italian practice of fixing straw to the
horns of dangerous bulls as warning for people to keep their distance. This
may have been a play on words, since the Latin word for hay has the same
root as the word for moneylender.7
Crassus clearly had grand plans for his censorship in 65 BC. He announced
plans to enrol as citizens many of the inhabitants of Cisalpine Gaul. Caesar
had already associated himself with the agitation for this in the region, and
Crassus was keen to earn gratitude and future support from so many new
voters. Other senators feared the influence that this would give him and his
colleague Catulus was resolute in his refusal to accept the new citizens.
Crassus also attempted to annex Egypt as a province and levy taxes – quite
how is unclear, because such matters were not normally dealt with by censors.
The country was in turmoil, plagued by dynastic disputes amongst the
decadent Ptolemies and internal rebellion. Suetonius tells us that Caesar,
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buoyed by the popularity won during his aedileship, also attempted to
persuade some popular tribunes to vote him an extraordinary command as
governor of Egypt. It is possible that he and Crassus were working in concert
in this matter. Equally they may both simply have seen the same opportunity
for enriching themselves by taking charge of this famously wealthy region.
In any case there was far too much opposition for either plan to be successful.
Crassus and Catulus were so bitterly at loggerheads that both men agreed
to resign as censors after only a few months in the magistracy. They had
failed to undertake their main role, carrying out a new census of citizens and
their property, and it would be decades before a new census was properly
carried out. A key institution was failing to cope with the changed
circumstances of public life.8
Cato, Catiline, and the Courts
In 64 BC Caesar for the first time served as a magistrate presiding over a
trial. This was a common duty for aediles and former aediles, who were
regularly called in to act as judges in the courts when there were too many
cases for the praetors to deal with. In 64 BC there was an overflow of trials
for the murder court (the quaestio de sicariis), prompted in part by the
activities of one of the quaestors, Marcus Porcius Cato. The latter is said to
have taken his duties far more seriously than most of the young men who
held this first post on the cursus. Appointed to oversee the Treasury, Cato
was not content to follow the usual practice and leave the day-to-day
administration to the clerks permanently employed to perform this. Instead,
he went into every aspect of business in detail, supposedly shocking the
professional staff with his rigour and knowledge. The clerks resisted strongly,
trying to use some of the other quaestors of the year to block him. Cato
replied by sacking the most senior member of staff, and prosecuting another
man on charges of fraud. During his year of office he also looked into several
anomalies from the time of the dictatorship. Sulla had allowed favoured
supporters to take ‘loans’ from the Republic’s funds. Cato chased these up
and made sure that the money was now repaid. A group he singled out for
particular attention were those who had taken the reward money of 12,000
denarii (equal to 48,000 sestertii) offered for killing the proscribed. These men
were publicly named, and made to return this ‘blood money’. The quaestor’s
actions met with general approval, for the horror of the proscriptions was
still fresh in people’s minds. Realising the mood of the times, prosecutors
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rapidly came forward to charge all of these men with murder. It was
questionable whether this was legal, since Sulla’s proscription law had
granted protection to those acting on his behalf against decreed enemies of
the Republic. These trials questioned the basis and legitimacy of the
dictatorship itself, in the same way that the widespread enthusiasm for the
restoration of the status and powers of the tribunate had reflected a desire
for things to return to the days before Sulla when there had been a ‘proper’
Republic. The Romans were struggling to come to terms with the violence
and turmoil of their recent past.9
Presiding over these trials was doubtless a welcome task for Caesar. His
own experiences during the years of dictatorship gave him little sympathy
for those who had taken part in and profited from the proscriptions.
Politically it was also no bad thing to be involved again in a popular cause.
Although a judge did not control the jury in his court, he could certainly
favour one side in the case and Caesar seems to have been enthusiastic in the
condemnation of men whose guilt was anyway attested by official Treasury
records. Amongst the condemned was Lucius Luscius, one of Sulla’s
centurions who had acquired a massive fortune of 10 million sestertii during
the proscriptions. Another was Catiline’s uncle, Lucius Annius Bellienus,
whose victims had included Quintus Lucretius Ofella, the man who had
tried to stand for the consulship in defiance of Sulla’s specific order. Catiline
himself was also put on trial and was clearly guilty, though Cicero’s later
invective may well have been exaggerated. This claimed that he had paraded
through the streets waving the head of his own brother-in-law, who had
been a close relative of Marius. Nevertheless he was acquitted. Whether this
was with the collusion of Caesar as the presiding magistrate is unclear, but
Catiline was far more important and had more influential friends than others
condemned in these trials. His connections may well have been enough to
sway the jury, especially if backed by bribes or favours. Catiline may not
have needed the assistance of Caesar, but the latter may well have felt it in
his interest not to show too much enthusiasm for this particular case. The
fact that the two were associated politically over the next years indicates
that the trial did not result in any personal enmity, but how much can be read
into this is harder to say. In spite of his association with Marius, Caesar
does seem to have avoided acting as an avenger of personal wrongs during
this affair. Suetonius notes that he pointedly refused to prosecute Cornelius
Phagites, the officer who had arrested him during his flight from Sulla’s
anger (see p.59) and only released him on payment of a generous bribe.
Cornelius had fulfilled his part of the bargain and Caesar, who stressed that
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he never neglected anyone who had aided him, may have felt that this was
more important than the original arrest.10
This was not the first prosecution Catiline had survived. His connections
amongst the senior members of the Senate had already allowed him to
survive a trial for mal-administration and corruption during his time as
propraetor of Africa. Again he was probably guilty, but the presence of men
like Catulus supporting him in court allowed him, like so many other
governors, to escape punishment. In this case even his prosecutor was most
obliging to the defence. Like Sulla and Caesar, Catiline came from an ancient
patrician family that had dwindled over the centuries until it was on the
margins of public life, struggling to compete with wealthier and more
recently distinguished rivals. The civil war had helped him to restore his
fortunes, as he became eventually an eager partisan of Sulla. In the following
years scandal dogged his career as he was accused of seducing a Vestal Virgin,
amongst other amorous exploits. He subsequently married Aurelia Orestilla
– as far as is known no relation to Caesar’s mother – who was wealthy but
of dubious reputation. Sallust acidly commented that ‘no good person ever
praised anything about her apart from her looks’. Wild rumours circulated
that in his passion for her he had murdered his own teenage son because
she did not care to live in the same house as this nearly adult heir. Catiline
was seen as disreputable, as a womaniser whose friends, both male and
female, tended to come from the wilder members of the aristocracy. Yet he
also possessed great charm, and had the knack of commanding ferocious
loyalty in his associates. The similarity to Caesar is striking, and it is tempting
to see Catiline almost as what Caesar might have become. For all the scandals,
Catiline’s career up to this point had been broadly conventional, with the
exception of the civil war years where the normal rules did not apply. There
was an eagerness and desperation about his will to succeed that is again
reminiscent of Caesar. Having been barred from standing for election to
the consulship in 66 BC, he did not stand again in the next year, probably
because he was still on trial in the provincial extortion court. Yet he again
became a candidate at the end of 64 BC. Both Crassus and Caesar seem to
have supported his campaign.11
In contrast to Catiline, Marcus Porcius Cato seems at first sight to have
been Caesar’s opposite in every respect. He was the great-grandson of
Cato the Elder, a ‘new man’ elevated to the Senate for distinguished service
in the Second Punic War, who had gone on to be both consul and censor.
His ancestor had always contrasted himself with the effete aristocrats of
the established families, disdaining their love of Greek language and
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culture, and living a simple life guided by the stern principles of duty. He
was the first to write a prose history of Rome in Latin, pointedly refusing
to name individual magistrates since he wished to celebrate the deeds of
the Roman people and not commemorate the achievements of the nobility.
It was an interesting illustration of the way senatorial families marketed
themselves that the great-grandson could make himself famous and highly
respected through emulating the manners and lifestyle of his famous
ancestor. Cato combined his personification of traditional Roman values
– which may or may not actually have reflected any historical reality in an
earlier generation, but were nevertheless widely admired if not emulated
– with a particularly rigorous adherence to the Stoic philosophy. This
doctrine emphasised the pursuit of virtue above all else, but in his case
was taken to an almost obsessional extreme. Cato was never touched by
scandal or accused of luxurious living. In contrast to Caesar’s fastidiousness
and unconventional fashions, Cato cared little about his appearance. It
was common for him to walk the streets of Rome barefoot, while he is
even supposed to have conducted official business as a magistrate wearing
a toga, but without the normal tunic beneath. On journeys he never rode
a horse, preferring to walk, and was supposedly easily able to keep up
with mounted companions. Again in contrast to Caesar, Plutarch noted that
Cato had never had sex with a woman until he slept with his bride. In this
case his self-control was not matched by his spouse, whom he later divorced
for infidelity. Nor was it to be found in his half-sister Servilia, who for so
long was Caesar’s lover.12
In behaviour Caesar and Cato often seem poles apart, but in some ways
they were both striving for much the same ends. Ambitious politicians needed
to be noticed so that they could stand out from the crowd of other men all
seeking the same offices. Here Cato had an advantage, for his family
connections were better than Caesar’s. When a man won a magistracy, he had
to outshine all the other men who were holding the same post. Ability
counted, but it was important to attract attention to one’s deeds. In his
quaestorship Cato made sure that everyone knew that he was doing things
differently, bringing to the job not simply talent but his particular brand of
rigid virtue. Pursuing those who had killed during the proscriptions and
profited from them was a popular move, drawing attention and winning
approval. In opposite ways – Caesar through his neatness and trend-setting,
Cato through his apparent careless scruffiness – these two advertised
themselves as distinct from their peers. The same was true of the former’s
taste for luxury and lavish spending on games as well as the latter’s thrift.
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Cato and Caesar were both recognised early on as men who already had
won wide recognition and fame and who were likely to go far. Though so
opposite in style, they were playing the same game.
Old Crimes and New Plots
At the end of 64 BC the elections were once again fiercely contested. Caesar
was not involved as a candidate, for he would not be eligible to stand for the
praetorship until the following year, but he was certainly present to support
the campaigns of others. This was an important way of earning support for
the future, and it was always a welcome thing to place the incoming
magistrates in your debt. The race for the consulship was especially tight.
Catiline was finally able to stand for this office, and he was associated with
the almost equally disreputable, but far less gifted Caius Antonius. The other
notable candidate was Marcus Tullius Cicero, the famous orator. Cicero was
a ‘new man’, relying on his own talent for success. He had won fame through
his appearances as a legal advocate, especially in celebrated cases where, for
instance, he had opposed one of Sulla’s minions in 80 BC, and prosecuted a
notoriously corrupt, but wealthy and well-connected governor in 70 BC. Like
Caesar he had supported the Manilian Law to give Pompey the eastern
command, and continually associated himself with the supporters of the
popular hero. He and Pompey had briefly served together under the command
of Pompeius Strabo during the Social War as, ironically, had Catiline. Cicero
also presented himself as the champion of the equestrian order and had been
careful to stage good entertainments during his time as aedile. Yet playing the
popularis in this way did not endear him to the leading aristocrats in the
Senate, the ‘good men’ (boni) as they liked to call themselves, and no ‘new
man’ had reached the consulship for a generation. In the event there was
enough suspicion of Catiline to make the orator seem a better choice. Cicero
won comfortably, while Antonius scraped into second place.13
When Cicero and Antonius formally took up office on 1 January 63 BC,
they were immediately confronted with a radical land bill proposed by the
tribune Publius Servilius Rullus. This involved a huge allocation of plots of
land to poor citizens, beginning with the State-owned territory in Campania
– almost all that was left of the ager publicus after the re-distributions
initiated by the Gracchi. Since this would be inadequate for the numbers
involved, the Republic was then to buy the extra land needed. The law
guaranteed a good price to sellers, declared that all sales should be voluntary
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and explicitly exempted the farms of Sullan veterans settled on confiscated
land after the civil war. It was clear that even property in the provinces might
be sold to raise the funding required. A commission of ten (decemviri) with
propraetorian imperium for five years were to oversee the implementation
of this programme, these being elected by the vote of a smaller assembly
consisting of seventeen instead of thirty-five tribes. The project was on a
massive scale, and the powers of the board of ten correspondingly great,
but the problem it addressed was very real. Rural Italy had suffered badly
in recent decades and there were clearly large numbers of poor citizens whose
situation was desperate in the extreme. Many of the dispossessed had drifted
to Rome, where they often struggled to find enough paid employment to
provide for themselves and their families. There were opportunities and
work in the city, but not all who went there found success. Rents were high,
living conditions could be extremely squalid in the crowded insulae and
debt was a terrible burden for many of the poor, who unlike the nobility
could not hope to make themselves rich through public office.
The Rullan land bill would not have solved all of these problems on its
own, but it would have done something to alleviate them. At first it was
supported by all ten of the year’s tribunes. It is also extremely likely that
Crassus and Caesar were enthusiastic backers of Rullus and probably both
hoped to win election to the board of ten. Pompey’s attitude is harder to
judge. On the one hand the bill would probably have provided farms for his
veterans when he brought them back from campaigns that were now nearly
complete. Yet if Crassus had played a key role in the programme then this
would also mean that they and many other citizens were indebted to his
great rival. Some of the tribunes were his keen supporters, which makes it
seem unlikely that he actively opposed the bill, but he may simply not have
had the time to develop too fixed an opinion as he was still so far from
Rome. Cicero was set against the proposal from the very start, and
throughout his life consistently disliked similar legislation. Many prominent
senators were also opposed to Rullus and the new consul may have felt that
this was a also a good chance to ingratiate himself with these men, whose
enthusiasm for him had so far been lukewarm at best. In a series of speeches
to the Senate and meetings of the People in the Forum, Cicero savaged the
proposed law. The ten commissioners were demonised as ‘kings’ for their
extraordinary powers, and dark motives alleged for the shadowy men who
were claimed to be really behind the bill. These sinister figures – never
named, but it is generally assumed that he meant Crassus and probably
Caesar as well – wished to set themselves up as rivals to Pompey. At least one
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of the tribunes had already broken the consensus and declared that he would
veto the bill. Cicero’s rhetoric won the day, and the land law was abandoned.14
In the coming months Caesar prosecuted Caius Calpurnius Piso, an exconsul
who had recently returned from governing Cisalpine Gaul. Amongst
the charges of extortion and maladministration was the accusation that he
had unjustly executed a Gaul from the Po Valley. Once again Caesar was
championing the cause of the inhabitants of this region, but with no more
success than his previous efforts. Piso was successfully defended by Cicero,
who added the auctoritas of his current office to his formidable oratory. Yet
the fact that Caesar had brought the case, and doubtless also the skill and
enthusiasm with which he pressed it, earned him the lasting enmity of Piso.
Later in the year Caesar appeared on behalf of a Numidian client, a young
nobleman who was trying to assert his independence from King Hiempsal.
The king’s son Juba was present in exchanges that became increasingly
heated. At one point Caesar grabbed Juba by the beard. It may have been the
deliberate gesture of an orator seeking to exploit most Romans’ latent
xenophobia, but is more likely to have been a genuine burst of anger. For all
Caesar’s impeccable manners and aristocratic poise – this was the guest who
graciously accepted even the humblest hospitality and criticised his
companions when they complained – throughout his life he was prone to
occasional bursts of temper. Whatever his motive, the dispute was settled in
favour of the king. Caesar did not abandon his client, but kept him hidden
in his own house until he was able to smuggle him out of Rome.15
On several occasions during 63 BC Caesar was associated with one of the
tribunes of the year, Titus Labienus. The two men were probably old
acquaintances, being of a similar age and both having served in Cilicia and
Asia under Servilius Isauricus in the seventies BC. Labienus seems to have
come from Picenum, an area dominated by the estates of Pompey’s family,
and it is likely that there was some connection. As tribune, he passed a bill
granting extraordinary honours to Pompey. The great commander was
granted the right to wear the laurel wreath and purple cloak of a triumphing
general whenever he went to the games and the full regalia if he attended a
chariot race. Caesar is said to have been the instigator and chief supporter
of these measures. Suetonius also credits him with having inspired the
prosecution brought by Labienus against Caius Rabirius, an ageing and
fairly undistinguished member of the Senate. The charge was an archaic
one of perduellio – something like high treason – and referred to events that
had occurred not long after Caesar’s birth thirty-seven years earlier. Rabirius
had been one of the men who followed the consuls to massacre the supporters
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of Saturninus and Glaucia. Labienus’ uncle was amongst those who died. A
very late, and quite probably unreliable, source claims that Rabirius actually
displayed Saturninus’ head at a dinner held soon afterwards. The prosecution
may well have charged him with killing the tribune, whose person was
sacrosanct by law, but since a slave was rewarded for this deed this must be
extremely unlikely. In 100 BC the Senate had passed its ultimate decree (the
senatus consultum ultimum), instructing Marius and his fellow consul to
protect the Republic by whatever means were necessary. Caesar and Labienus
do not seem to have been challenging the Senate’s right to pass this decree,
or of magistrates to obey it, but were concerned with how it should be
implemented. The belief that Marius had accepted the surrender of the
radicals, who were subsequently killed by a mob that had climbed onto the
roof of the Senate House, seems to have formed part of the case. The senatus
consultum ultimum gave magistrates the power to use force against citizens
who were threatening the Republic, but it was less clear whether these lost
all legal protection once they had given in and were no longer in a position
to do harm.16
Many of the details of the trial are obscure. This is especially true of the
prosecution’s case, which is known principally from the speech Cicero made
in Rabirius’ defence. Much the same is true of the Rullan land bill, which
again is largely known through Cicero’s detailed and extremely hostile
rhetoric. The whole affair was distinctly odd, in the first place simply because
of the enormous lapse of time. It seems doubtful that there were many
witnesses left alive, particularly considering the great loss of life amongst
Rome’s elite during the civil war. There was also no modern procedure for
conducting a trial on a perduellio charge. Sulla had established a permanent
court to deal with cases of a similar, but lesser crime of maiestas – effectively
an offence against the majesty of the Roman people, rather like the idea
found in some modern sports of ‘bringing the game into disrepute’. However,
Caesar and Labienus deliberately chose the older crime, the legislation
dealing with which was believed to date back over five hundred years to the
time of Rome’s kings. The archaic procedure included death by crucifixion,
a penalty no longer imposed on a citizen by any other law, and did not
appear to permit the normal voluntary exile for the guilty. A board of two
judges (duumviri) was appointed by lot to try the case. Caesar was one, and
his distant cousin Lucius Julius Caesar, who had been consul the year before,
the other. While this seems highly suspicious, there is no particular reason
to assume collusion with the praetor who oversaw the selection process and
it may simply have been coincidental.
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Rabirius was found guilty by both judges and condemned to death. He
was allowed to appeal to the Roman people, in the form of the Comitia
Centuriata. Not only Cicero but also the orator whom he had supplanted
as the greatest in Rome, Quintus Hortensius, defended the old man against
Labienus. This was most probably the occasion on which Cicero delivered
the speech that he subsequently published. In it he emphasised that
Saturninus richly deserved his fate, pointed out that Rabirius was not the man
who killed him, although repeatedly claiming that he wished his client could
boast of the deed. He attacked the cruelty inherent in the revival of this long
forgotten law, and, as was fairly standard in the Roman courts, blackened
Labienus’ name, hinting cryptically at his ‘well-known’ immorality. With
more justification the consul complained that he had only been given an
unusually short time in which to speak. His efforts do not seem to have
convinced the voters who had assembled for the Comitia, in spite of the fact
that some are supposed to have been moved to sympathy for the accused
because of Caesar’s blatant hostility as judge. Soon it was obvious that the
vote would condemn Rabirius, but then the whole unorthodox business
came to a fittingly bizarre conclusion. Its structure drawn from the early
Roman army, the Comitia Centuriata had always met on the Campus
Martius, outside the formal boundary of the city. In those days Rome had
still been small and its enemies nearby. The gathering for voting purposes of
all those obliged to do military service inevitably left the city vulnerable to
a surprise attack. Therefore, to guard against this threat, it was the practice
to station sentries on the vantage point offered by the Janiculum Hill. As long
as these men were in place and keeping watch, a red flag was flown from
the hilltop and the Comitia Centuriata could go about its business. If the flag
was lowered, it was a sign that Rome was in danger, and that her citizens must
immediately break up the Assembly and take up their arms. The custom
remained in Caesar’s day, and would continue for centuries afterwards, even
though its function had long become obsolete. Before the Comitia completed
its voting on Rabirius’ fate, the praetor Quintus Caecilius Metellus Celer gave
the order for the flag to be lowered. The Assembly was dissolved without
giving a verdict. No one ever made any effort to reconvene the trial.17
None of the sources explain why Metellus acted in this way. Was he acting
to protect Rabirius, or instead providing Labienus and Caesar with a facesaving
way of ending the whole affair without having to convict and punish
an elderly and unimportant senator? It is clear from the willingness with
which they abandoned the case afterwards that condemning him was never
their principal aim. They had questioned whether the senatus consultum
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ultimum overrode all other laws and citizens’ rights, but had provided no clear
answer or altered the law in any way. In practical terms the most that they
may have achieved was to inject a note of caution into the actions of any
future magistrate operating in response to such a decree. Personally the trial
was a success for both Labienus and Caesar. The Comitia that met to pass
judgement on Rabirius was most probably packed with their supporters
and with those who were stirred by the case and the broader issue, so should
probably not be seen as typical in its composition. Many citizens lacked the
time, interest or opportunity to attend – it would indeed have been physically
impossible to fit all those eligible to attend into the location where the
Comitia Centuriata met. Yet even so this Assembly more than any other
was weighted in favour of the better off. That it was clearly willing to
condemn Rabirius does indicate that many of these citizens sympathised
with the prosecution’s case. Once again, Caesar was making sure that he was
prominent in public life and associated with popular causes. His popularity
was demonstrated later in the year when another meeting of the Comitia
Centuriata elected him praetor for 62 BC, for which he was for the first time
eligible.
The praetorship was an important post, which brought with it the
certainty of receiving a provincial command after the year of office as long
as a man wanted such a post. Competition for it was fierce, and more than
half of former quaestors would never win the higher office. However, as
things turned out, this success was far less dramatic than another electoral
victory Caesar won during the last months of 63 BC. The post of Pontifex
Maximus, head of the college of fifteen pontiffs of which he was a member,
became vacant on the death of the current incumbent, Quintus Caecilius
Metellus Pius – yet another representative of the prolific Metelli whose
already considerable prominence had been further boosted by their support
for Sulla. The dictator had placed the selection of the appointments to this
and other senior priesthoods in the hands of the Senate. However, at some
point in the year Labienus had passed a bill reverting to the former practice
of appointment by popular election. A cut-down Tribal Assembly, with
seventeen tribes chosen by lot rather than the full thirty-five was given this
task. It is not clear when this law was passed, and whether Metellus’ death
was anticipated or the legislation rushed through in its aftermath. Three
market days, which effectively meant twenty-four days in total, had to elapse
between the publication of a bill and its being put to the vote of an assembly.
Caesar spoke in favour of the bill and soon after it became law announced
his candidature.18
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The Pontifex Maximus was an office of immense prestige, in many ways
the most important of all Roman priesthoods. As a result it was eagerly
sought by many of the Republic’s leading men. Catulus was standing for
the post, as was Publius Servilius Isauricus, Caesar’s old commander from
Cilicia. Both were older and far more distinguished than Caesar in terms of
the offices and honours they had held. Had the appointment still been
controlled by the Senate, it is virtually certain that Catulus would have been
appointed. In an election the outcome was far less certain, for the voters
remembered Caesar’s lavish spending as aedile, and his constant support
for popular causes. He also seems to have spent lavishly during the campaign,
giving gifts and doing favours to win over the key men in each tribe. His
rivals were doing the same, and in one sense the reliance on the vote of only
seventeen tribes instead of the full assembly made it easier to employ bribery.
As the campaign went on, Catulus became deeply concerned that the upstart
Caesar had turned into a serious challenger. Great though his auctoritas
was, it would certainly be dented by an electoral defeat, especially one
inflicted by a man so much his junior. Knowing that Caesar’s debts were
huge even before the campaign had begun, Catulus wrote to him offering him
a considerable sum of money on condition that he withdrew from the race
for the priesthood. Caesar interpreted this as a sign of weakness and
immediately took out new loans to have more to spend on wooing the tribes.
It was a desperate gamble. His creditors were relying on his prospects for the
future, chiefly the high office and the opportunities for profit that these
would bring. In itself the office of Pontifex Maximus brought no real
financial reward, but Caesar could not afford any electoral failure. If he
could no longer win over the voters, then he would begin to look like a very
poor risk for his creditors. These might well press him for repayment of his
debts, before his fortunes failed altogether and he was utterly ruined.
When the day of the election came – there is no record of when this was,
but it must have been near the end of 63 BC – Caesar knew that the result
would for him decide more than simply whether or not he won the post.
Aurelia was there, and kissed him in parting before he left. Caesar told her
that he would either return home as Pontifex Maximus or he would not
return at all. This is one of the rare mentions of Aurelia from these years,
but once again indicates the vital role she played in her son’s life. It is notable
that the story has Caesar speaking in this way to his mother rather than to
his wife Pompeia or to any of his lovers. Although we cannot be absolutely
certain, it does seem that Aurelia lived in her son’s household. Perhaps in
some way she symbolised the debt that Caesar owed to his family, making
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the rise to the consulship, 100–59 bc
every success not simply significant to him, but part of restoring its
importance and status. The contest for the priesthood was a gamble, and the
price of failure very serious, certainly sufficient to retard his public career
and possibly to terminate it. Yet before taking the gamble Caesar had done
everything that he could to promote his success. Backing down from the
challenge, as Catulus had tried to persuade him to do, was against Caesar’s
instincts, for he was a gambler at heart, though never a wild one. He had
raised the stakes by spending even more, but he had also judged that his
prospects of success were good and hence that the risk was justified. Failure
was a real possibility, but Caesar seems to have estimated that the odds on
his success were good. Given Catulus’ hostility to him in the past, most
recently following the erection of Marius’ trophies, his offer suggested that
his main rival had reached a similar conclusion.19
In the event Caesar prevailed. Plutarch describes the voting as very close,
but Suetonius suggests a landslide victory, where more votes were cast for
Caesar in Catulus’ and Servilius’ own tribes than they received in the entire
Assembly. It was a great victory for him, particularly since he had overcome
such strong rivals. As Pontifex Maximus he would in future take a central
role in many aspects of State religion and ritual. He could not command the
other pontiffs, for a majority of the other members of the college could
overrule the Pontifex Maximus, but nevertheless his prestige and auctoritas
were immense. Also, unlike the office of Flamen Dialis, there were no
restrictions that hindered a political and military career. Physically it marked
an important change, for the post came with a house, the domus publica,
on the edge of the Sacra Via. Caesar had moved from the relative obscurity
of the Subura to a place close to the heart of the Republic. The domus
publica lay at the eastern end of the Forum and adjoined the Temple of
Vesta and the Regia, where the records and texts of the pontiffs were housed
and where they assembled as a college. The name Regia or ‘palace’ suggests
a connection with Rome’s monarchy, and excavations have shown that there
was certainly a building on the site from a very early period and that
subsequent phases and rebuildings all broadly conformed to the same,
unusual design. There is a fierce debate over the precise nature of the early
buildings and whether it had ever been a royal residence or palace as such,
but this need not concern us. In the Late Republic the domus publica and
the Regia were hallowed for their great antiquity and long association with
the sacred.20
The contest for the priesthood was critical for Caesar, but in spite of its
surprising result, its significance was far less than the consular elections.
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Catiline was once again a candidate, as was Servilia’s husband Decimus
Junius Silanus. This was Silanus’ second attempt – a few years before Cicero
had dismissed him as a nonentity. As consul, Cicero was now in charge of
overseeing the election. Encouraged by one of the other candidates, he had
himself created and ensured the passage of a new, even harsher law against
electoral bribery, which carried the penalty of ten years’ exile. It did nothing
to stop the already rampant bribery, perhaps begun by Catiline, but soon
copied by all of the other candidates. Cato announced that he would
prosecute whoever won the election, on the basis that no one could have
prevailed in such a contest honestly. He did make an exception of his brotherin-
law Silanus. While this may seem hypocritical to the modern eye, the
Roman aristocracy placed huge importance on family connections and fully
understood. Catiline’s fortunes were at a dangerously low ebb and he was
clearly desperate, presenting himself as a champion of the poor, whose plight
he could well understand because of his own poverty. He openly talked of
the domination of the Republic by a clique of unworthy and vulgar
individuals who looked only to their own interests. When challenged in the
Senate by the consul, he spoke of two Republics – the great mass of the
population were a powerful body without a head to guide them, while his
opponents were a head without a body, since there was no real substance to
their support. He declared that he would become the head that the mass of
the population so urgently longed for. It was clear that many were rallying
to him, and his agents were especially active in the rural areas. He does seem
to have been slowly losing the friendship of the many leading men who had
in the past supported him in court. Crassus and Caesar probably continued
to back him throughout the campaign. Cicero postponed the elections once,
and when they were finally held in late September he arrived accompanied
by a bodyguard of equites voted to him by the Senate. He also made sure that
everyone could see that he was ‘secretly’ wearing a breastplate under his
toga. The successful candidates were Silanus and Lucius Licinius Murena,
who had served as one of Lucullus’ senior subordinates in the Mithridatic
War.21
Catiline had clearly considered using force even before the election, but
had presumably hoped to succeed by conventional means. His failure left him
with little choice other than facing political extinction and exile, for, like
Caesar, his debts were massive and many were due by 13 November, when
he would face bankruptcy. Unlike Caesar his gamble was very much a
longshot and he seems to have been undecided as to how to put his plan
into operation. One of his followers, Caius Manlius, was busy raising an
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army in Etruria, but Catiline remained in Rome, attending the Senate as if
nothing was happening. Manlius was a former centurion who had served
with Sulla, but since the dictatorship had lost the fortune he had made in the
civil war. He appears to have been a capable man, but was from outside the
senatorial class and so could never be more than a subordinate. Catiline
had a number of aristocratic followers, but these were chiefly characterised
by their dubious reputations and conspicuous lack of ability. It was hard
for many to take such incompetents seriously, and this, combined with
Catiline’s continued presence in Rome, helped to foster uncertainty amongst
the Senate. There were rumours of plots and rebellion, but as yet nothing
had happened to suggest that there was any substance behind them. Cicero
was better informed, for he had assembled a network of spies who observed
the conspirators. One of the most important sources was Quintus Curius,
who had boasted of the plans in an effort to impress his mistress Fulvia.
She was a member of an aristocratic family and married to a senator, and
Cicero was able to persuade her to convince her lover to betray his fellow
conspirators. As a result the consul knew much of what was going on, and
was able to safeguard himself against a murder attempt. The ability to
thwart the conspirators was all very well, but it did not permit the consul
to stand up in the Senate and publicly prove that a plot was underway. As yet,
they had not actually done anything to warrant his acting against them.
Catiline was clearly exploiting this public uncertainty, but it may also be
that he had not quite made up his mind when and how to act.22
On the night of 18 October, Crassus and several other senators received
anonymous letters, which warned them to flee because a massacre of leading
men was going to occur on the 28th. They took the letters straight to Cicero,
who had them read in the Senate. More reports of Manlius’ activities in
Etruria reached the city, and on the 21st Cicero brought this information
before the Senate, which passed the senatus consultum ultimum. He claimed
that the rebel army would openly declare itself on 27 October. This occurred,
although the threatened massacre did not. Various forces, including a number
of armies who had been waiting outside Rome until their commanders were
allowed to celebrate triumphs, were despatched to deal with the rebels. On
8 November the Senate met once again and Cicero harangued Catiline to his
face, accusing him of past crimes and declaring that he knew all about his
current plans. Although at the time he returned the invective, dismissing the
consul as a ‘naturalised alien’ with all the contempt a patrician could show
for a ‘new man’, this meeting finally stirred him into action. He left Rome
that night, claiming that he was going into voluntary exile to spare the
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Republic from internal conflict. In a letter sent to Catulus, he complained
of the wrongs done to him by his enemies and how he had been robbed of
the proper rewards for his efforts and ability. In a properly Roman way, he
commended his wife and daughter to Catulus’ protection. It was soon
discovered that Catiline had not in fact fled abroad, but had instead joined
Manlius and the army. Both men were declared public enemies. He left
behind in Rome a number of supporters, who began to negotiate with some
ambassadors from the Allobroges, a Gallic people who were in the city to
complain of their desperate plight. The conspirators hoped to persuade the
tribe to rebel and open a second front to distract forces loyal to the Senate.
Instead the Gauls went to Cicero and betrayed them. One man was caught
when the Allobroges led him into an ambush, and the four other key figures
arrested shortly afterwards. Confronted with damning evidence, the initial
declarations of innocence were soon replaced by admissions of guilt. It was
now a question of what to do with them.23
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VII
Scandal
‘The Republic, citizens, the lives of you all, your property, your fortunes,
your wives and your children, together with this heart of our glorious
empire, this most blessed and beautiful of cities, have, as you see, on this
very day been snatched from fire and the sword. The great love that the
immortal gods hold for you has combined with the toil and the vigilance
that I have undertaken, and with the perils that I have undergone, to bring
them out of the very jaws of destruction and restore them to you safe and
sound.’ – Cicero, 3 December 63 BC.1
Caesar’s attitude throughout these months seemed to many to be deeply
ambiguous. Along with Crassus, he had backed Catiline’s candidacy. He
probably knew Catiline quite well, but then the world of Rome’s aristocracy
was so small that most senators knew each other. Although Cicero’s speeches
from 63 BC and afterwards painted Catiline as an irredeemable monster, he
had not always thought of him in this way. As recently as 65 BC, he had
considered defending him in court, ‘hoping that this will encourage them to
join forces in our canvassing’ for the consulship in 63 BC.2 Caesar had
persisted in his open support for Catiline for much longer and, as previously
noted, the similarities between them were striking. Both men were inclined
to support ‘popular’ causes and keen to associate themselves with Marius.
When he reached Manlius’ army, Catiline paraded an eagle that had been
the standard of one of Marius’ legions. Caesar would also have seemed a
likely man to join a conspiracy of debtors, for his lifestyle was similar in
many ways. When Cicero addressed the crowd in the Forum, he described
many of the conspirators as: ‘the men you see with their carefully combed
hair, dripping with oil, some smooth as girls, others with shaggy beards,
with tunics down to their ankles and wrists, and wearing frocks not togas’.3
This image could almost be an exaggerated portrait of Caesar himself, who
had probably set the fashion for wearing long sleeves and whose loose girdled
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scandal
tunic hung low. In later years Cicero was suspicious of almost everything
Caesar did, but even then is supposed to have said that: ‘On the other hand,
when I look at his hair, which is arranged with so much nicety, and see him
scratching his head with one finger, I cannot think that this man would ever
conceive of so great a crime as the overthrow of the Roman constitution.’4
Like many of the conspirators Caesar was a dandy, a man whose sexual
exploits and massive debts were equally notorious, but unlike them he was
also very successful. He had gained each office in the cursus as soon as he
was eligible, and had just had the spectacular success in the competition for
the post of Pontifex Maximus. Caesar had no need for revolution, which is
not to say that he might not have joined the rebels if he had thought it likely
that they would succeed.
Crassus was in a similar position, for he had openly backed Catiline in
the elections. Probably, like Caesar, Crassus would have made sure that he
was on the winning side, whichever it might be, but the uncertainty of the
situation made this a nervous time for anyone suspected of involvement in
the plot. Even while his agents were openly raising an army, Catiline remained
in Rome. After he left, it was known that other conspirators had remained
behind to cause mischief in the city. With the consul announcing almost on
a daily basis that he had uncovered new plans for assassinations and arson
attacks, it was unsurprising that senators looked at many of their fellows with
suspicion. Both Caesar and Crassus had to be very careful in their behaviour.
Therefore Crassus immediately took the anonymous letter to Cicero as soon
as he had received it. Even so, following the arrest of the conspirators, an
informer was brought into the Senate who claimed that he had been sent by
Crassus with a message to Catiline, telling him not be worried by the arrests,
but to press on with his enterprise. According to Sallust:
But when Tarquinius named Crassus, a man of enormous wealth and
great influence, some found the accusation incredible, while others
thought it was true, but reckoned that at a time of crisis it was better
to win over than to alienate such a powerful man; a good number of
them were in Crassus’ debt from private deals, and they all loudly
called out that the accusation was false. . . 5
A vote was taken declaring the statement false and placing the informer
in custody, pending investigation. The historian Sallust says that he himself
later heard Crassus say that the informer had acted on the instructions of
Cicero, who had wanted to force him to make an open breach with Catiline
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and the rebels instead of sitting on the fence. Certainly, the whole incident
seems to have worsened the already poor relations between the two men.6
Cicero was under great pressure in these weeks. Even at the time he was
aware that this was his finest hour, the moment when the ‘new man’ from
Arpinum would save the Republic. Throughout his life he would revel in
recounting his great success, but it was not a victory that came easily. From
the beginning it had been difficult to persuade all senators that the threat
of rebellion was real, especially since for a long time there were few hard
facts that he could report openly. Eventually, the arrest and interrogation
of the key conspirators in Rome convinced the entire Senate that the threat
was real and serious. It was now a question of dealing with it, but Cicero
was hindered by the fact that his own year of office as consul had only a
few more weeks to run. Like any Roman magistrate he was eager to ensure
that the main threat was defeated in that time, both to ensure that it was
done properly and because he wanted to gain the credit for this achievement.
It was extremely inconvenient when Cato fulfilled his promise and
prosecuted Murena, consul elect for 62 BC. Murena was clearly guilty of
electoral bribery, but Cato was displaying his characteristic lack of timing.
At a time of crisis it would obviously have been dangerous to have removed
one of the two senior magistrates due to begin guiding the Republic in just
a few weeks. Therefore, Cicero took the time off to defend Murena,
emphasising the dire threat faced by the State and the valuable service that
his client, as an experienced military man, could do for the threatened
Republic. His speech was later published, and although it was said at the
time that fatigue made his delivery less perfect than his normal standard,
Murena was acquitted. Largely ignoring the charges, he mocked the motives
of the prosecutors, depicting Cato as a naive idealist, trying to impose
impractical philosophical principles in the real world. Cato is supposed to
have responded by grimly saying ‘what a witty chap our consul is’. Cicero
always preferred to speak last after the other defence counsels, in this case
Hortensius and Crassus. It was an indication of the complex web of
obligations and friendships in Roman politics that Crassus and Cicero
found themselves working together in court on this and other occasions.
Both men liked to defend, gaining the gratitude this brought from the client,
his family and his close associates.7
The trial had been an added burden to the consul’s load in these desperate
weeks. Soon after the accusation against Crassus, there was an attempt to
persuade Cicero to implicate Caesar in the conspiracy. The men behind this
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were Catulus, still indignant at his defeat in the race for the senior priesthood,
and Caius Calpurnius Piso, whom Caesar had unsuccessfully prosecuted
earlier in the year. Cicero refused to go along with this. He may simply not
have believed it, for he probably knew Caesar fairly well, most likely having
seen a lot of him in the seventies BC when he was close to the Cotta brothers.
Alternatively it could have been expediency, reckoning that it was dangerous
to force a man like Caesar into a corner and make him join the
revolutionaries. Later, in a work not published until after both Crassus and
Caesar were dead, Cicero would write that both had been closely involved
with Catiline, but it is not at all clear that this is what he believed at the
time, or that he was right. In the dying months of 63 BC, he decided anyway
that he would openly trust the loyalty to the Republic of both men, whatever
his personal view. After the interrogation of the five key conspirators in the
Senate each man was given into the charge of a prominent senator who was
to keep him in custody until the Senate had decided their fate. Crassus and
Caesar were amongst those selected to perform this task, Cicero very
deliberately showing his faith in them in this way. None of this prevented Piso
and Catulus from continuing to spread rumours about their personal enemy
Caesar.8
The captives were a motley crew. Two, Publius Cornelius Lentulus Sura
and Caius Cornelius Cethegus, were amongst the sixty-four senators expelled
from the Senate by the censors of 70 BC. Lentulus had been consul in 71 BC
and had been steadily rebuilding his public career since his expulsion. In
63 BC he had won the praetorship for the second time, but was stripped of
the post following his arrest. He was not the only man to claw his way back
to prominence through standing for election again. Cicero’s consular
colleague Antonius had also been expelled by the same censors. So had
Curius, the man whose mistress Fulvia had persuaded to turn informant
(p.128). Lentulus believed firmly in his destiny, continually citing a prophecy
that proclaimed that three Cornelii would rule Rome – Sulla, Cinna and
soon himself. His wife was a Julia, sister of Lucius Julius Caesar, who had
been consul in 64 BC. Her son from an earlier marriage was Mark Antony,
then around ten years old. Catiline throughout the rising refused to recruit
slaves, preferring to rely on citizens. Lentulus not only argued against this,
but did so in writing, in a letter that was subsequently captured and read out
in the Senate. All of the conspirators seem to have done their best to
incriminate themselves. Most at first met the interrogation with simple
denial – Cethegus claiming that the large cache of weapons discovered in his
house was simply his collection of antique militaria – but soon caved in
133
when confronted with damning letters sealed with their own seals and written
in their own hands. Their guilt was firmly established when they were brought
before the Senate on 3 December. Two days later, on the 5th, the House met
again to decide on their fate.9
The Great Debate
The Senate assembled in the Temple of Concord rather than in the Senate
House. This was not unusual, for the House met in a range of temples as well
as the Curia itself. The choice of the deity Concordia may have seemed
especially appropriate, or even ironic, in the circumstances, but may also
have been based on its position at the western edge of the Forum near the
slope of the Capitol Hill. This was an easier area to defend for the large
numbers of armed men, many of them young equestrians, who attended
the consul and took up positions to guard the meeting. Cicero as presiding
magistrate would have begun the session with a formal prayer, before
addressing the House and asking that it decide what should done to the
prisoners. In the past, consuls acting under the senatus consultum ultimum
had taken it upon themselves to execute those seen as enemies of the Republic
without consulting the Senate. Yet in the main such killings had occurred in
the heat of the fighting, when the ‘rebels’ could be seen as posing an active
threat. The five conspirators were already under guard, unlike the earlier
occasions when the decree had been passed. There were rumours that
Cethegus had attempted to communicate with his slaves and arrange for an
armed gang to free the prisoners, but even so this could not be presented as
a lynching in the heat of the moment. The trial of Rabirius had recently
called into question just what actions could be justified by the ultimate
decree, and this may have made Cicero particularly cautious. The Senate
was not a court, but if a clear consensus of its members approved a course
of action then this would add moral force to what the consul did. Cicero
declared himself willing to conform to whatever was the Senate’s decision,
but clearly believed that the prisoners both deserved and needed to be
executed.
There was no fixed order of speaking in the Senate, but there was a
hierarchy in the sense that it was customary to call first upon the consuls,
then the praetors and so on to the lesser magistrates. The order in which
individuals from each group would speak was decided by the presiding
magistrate, who called upon them by name. Junior members of the House,
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scandal
especially those who had never held a magistracy, were rarely asked to speak.
However, every senator present could vote and, uniquely in Roman voting
systems, each vote carried equal weight. When the division was called,
senators walked to opposite sides of the house to signify whether they were
approving or rejecting the motion. It was common during a debate for those
supporting a speaker to move over and sit next to him. The backbenchers,
who rarely spoke, but could still vote, were sometimes referred to as pedarii,
which roughly translates as ‘walkers’. It had been very noticeable at the
meeting on 8 November that when Catiline had taken his seat the senators
had quickly moved away, leaving him isolated physically as well as politically.10
On 5 December Cicero began the debate by calling upon Servilia’s
husband Silanus to give his opinion. It was usual to seek the opinion of the
consuls elect before the former consuls or ‘consulars’, since these men might
well have to put into effect measures decided by the House. Silanus declared
that the prisoners should suffer ‘the ultimate punishment’, which was
interpreted – and clearly intended to mean – execution. Murena was called
next and concurred, as did all fourteen ex-consuls present on the day. Crassus
was notable by his absence, continuing his somewhat ambiguous behaviour.
In contrast Caesar was there and boldly gave his opinion when called upon
as praetor elect. Up until now all the speakers had opted for the death
penalty, and the murmurs – perhaps louder cries as we do not know how
raucous or dignified and sedate meetings of the Senate were – of approval
from the rest of the House suggested that this was the near universal view.
Caesar, given the doubts expressed about him in recent days, might have been
expected to give his vigorous assent as proof of his loyalty to the Republic.
Yet not long before he had attacked Rabirius for the illegal killing of Roman
citizens, and throughout his career had championed popular causes,
criticising the arbitrary use of power by Senate or magistrates. It would
have been inconsistent now to express a contrary view, but it seems unlikely
that Caesar ever considered this. Standing alone had never bothered him
since the days when he had defied Sulla. The aristocracy celebrated men who
single-handedly had persuaded the Senate to change its mind. One of the
most famous was Appius Claudius Caecus in 278 BC, who was supposed to
have convinced the Senate not to negotiate with the victorious Pyrrhus, but
to keep fighting. When it was a choice between merging with the crowd
and playing a conspicuous role, Caesar always chose the latter. In this case
it may well also have been a matter of conscience and genuine belief.
Winning fame and doing what he believed to be right were not mutually
exclusive.11
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The text of Caesar’s speech has not survived, but Sallust gives a version that
appears to reflect the key arguments, even if it does so in Sallustian style and
probably at rather shorter length. As with any written speech, it is hard now
to conjure up the full impact of the orator speaking these words before an
audience. Caesar was praised for gestures, the elegance and forcefulness of
his stance and bearing, and the tones of his slightly high-pitched voice. In
Sallust’s version the great performance began with these words:
Chosen fathers of the Senate, all men who decide on difficult issues
ought to free themselves from the influence of hatred, friendship, anger
and pity. For when these intervene the mind cannot readily judge the
truth, and no one has ever served his emotions and his best interests
simultaneously. When you set your mind to a task, it prevails; if passion
holds sway, it consumes you, and the mind can do nothing.12
Throughout the speech he was calm and sweetly reasonable, and he gently
mocked the previous speakers who had tried to outdo each other with graphic
descriptions of the slaughter, rape and pillage that would have followed
Catiline’s victory. There was never a trace of the man who had grabbed
Juba’s beard in his rage. The guilt of the accused was unquestioned, and no
punishment could possibly be too harsh for them. Yet, returning to his
opening theme, the Senate held too responsible a position to permit its
members to give in to their emotions. They must decide what was best for
the future of the Republic, knowing that they would set a precedent today.
Caesar carefully paid tribute to Cicero by declaring that no one could ever
suspect that the current consul would abuse his position. What they could
not guarantee was that all future office holders would always be so restrained.
He reminded them of how Sulla’s proscriptions had begun with a few deaths
of men who were generally thought guilty. Soon the slaughter had escalated
into an appalling bloodbath, with victims being killed for ‘their town houses
or villas’.13
For Caesar the death penalty was unRoman (although, of course, the
recent perduellio trial with its archaic procedure had threatened its use). He
gently chided Silanus, praising him for his patriotism, but suggesting that he
had become carried away by the enormity of the prisoners’ crimes. Under
normal circumstances Roman citizens – at least well to do citizens – were
always permitted to go into exile if found guilty of a serious offence, making
the death penalty effectively a theoretical punishment unknown in practice.
Caesar wondered why Silanus had not also suggested that the men be flogged
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before they were killed, answering his own question by saying that of course
such a thing was illegal. He praised the wisdom of their ancestors, the past
generations of senators who had systematically removed the death penalty
and other brutal punishments in regard to citizens. Anyway, death was
‘release from woes, rather than a punishment . . . it brings an end to the ill
fortune of life and leaves no place for worry or joy’.14 Caesar’s solution was
different. It would obviously have been absurd to let the men go so that they
could join Catiline. Rome had no real prison intended to keep prisoners for
long periods of time, for most laws carried either fines or exile as punishment.
Caesar proposed that the prisoners be given into the hands of different
Italian towns, who would be bound to hold them in captivity for the rest of
their lives. Any town failing in its charge was to suffer a heavy penalty. The
men’s property was to be confiscated by the State, effectively blocking their
children from going into public life and seeking revenge. It was also to be
decreed that neither the Senate nor People should ever consider permitting
the conspirators to be recalled, in the way that Caesar himself had
campaigned for the return of Lepidus’ supporters. This, according to him,
was a far harsher penalty than death, since it would make the conspirators
live with the consequences of their crimes.15
During the speech Caesar appealed to the example of past generations.
This was conventional, for the Roman aristocracy had a great reverence for
their ancestors, children listening from an early age to stories of their great
deeds on behalf of the Republic. Yet the proposal he was making was both
radical and innovative. Never before had the Romans held citizens in
permanent captivity – hence the need to create a new method to do this.
Although he stipulated that it should be unlawful for anyone to seek the
release and restoration of the condemned, it was questionable that such a
provision could be enforced. The Gracchi and other tribunes had repeatedly
asserted the right of the Popular Assembly to vote on any issue. Whether
anyone was ever likely to espouse the cause of the conspirators was
questionable, but this could certainly not be ruled out altogether. The
problem facing the Senate was a new one, for never in the history of the
ultimate decree had it been a question of using its powers calmly against men
already held in custody. Caesar had spoken about the precedent that the
Senate would set by its decision and he now proposed a new solution to
what was in many ways a new problem. It was intended to avoid the
recriminations that had followed the suppression of the Gracchi and of
Saturninus. The conspirators were guilty of planning appalling crimes, but
even so they should not be stripped of all the rights of citizens. They were
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no longer in a position to harm the Republic and imprisonment would ensure
that they would never be able to do so in the future.16
Throughout his speech Caesar was calm and measured, always rational
as he appealed to the senators not to let their emotions overrule their duty
to the Republic. Such a call to place Rome before their own feelings was
bound to appeal to men raised with such a strong sense of the obligations
inherent in belonging to one of the great families. The certainty that had
marked the start of the meeting began to crack, and then crumble away.
Quintus Tullius Cicero, the consul’s younger brother, was another of the
praetor designates and spoke after Caesar, fully agreeing with his viewpoint.
He may well, in the conventions of the Senate, have moved to sit with Caesar
as an indication of this. Another of the praetors for 62 BC, Tiberius Claudius
Nero – the grandfather of Emperor Tiberius – took a slightly different tack,
suggesting that it was too early to decide on the prisoners’ fate while Catiline
was still at large with an army. Instead, they should be held in custody and
a future date fixed for another debate, which would decide their fate.17 Many
others were wavering. At some point Silanus spoke up claiming that he had
been misinterpreted and had not advocated the death penalty at all, but the
‘ultimate punishment’ permitted by the law. Such vacillation seems to have
been typical of a man who clearly did not want to be seen as responsible for
anything controversial.
Cicero, seeing the earlier consensus slipping away, decided to act, and
at this point delivered a long speech, the text of which he subsequently
published as the Fourth Catilinarian Oration. Given that the original must
have been at least partially composed during the debate itself, it was
probably a little less polished than the version we have today. However, it
would be a mistake to underestimate the rhetorical training and skill of
the great orator, and it is likely that even speaking off the cuff, Cicero’s use
of language, rhythm and structure were of an exceptionally high order. He
made sure from the beginning that everyone was reminded that he was
consul, the man leading the Republic at this time of crisis and also,
ultimately, the one who would carry the responsibility for whatever action
they decided to take. Reviving the tone of the earlier debate, before Caesar’s
restrained and reasonable intervention, he spoke of slaughter, rape and the
sacking of temples:
Take thought for yourselves, therefore, gentlemen; look to the
preservation of your fatherland, save yourselves, your wives, your
children and your fortunes, defend the name of the Roman people and
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their very existence; stop protecting me and cease your concern for
me. Firstly, I am bound to hope that all the gods which watch over this
city will recompense me as I deserve; and secondly, if anything happens
to me, I shall die calm and resigned.18
He turned to the two proposals, that of Silanus, which he continued to
interpret as meaning execution, and that of Caesar. The first punishment
accorded with tradition – Cicero mentioning the Gracchi and Saturninus
whom he claimed had been killed for far lesser crimes – the second was
unprecedented and impractical. How, Cicero asked, were the towns tasked
with guarding the prisoners to be chosen? It seemed unfair for the Senate to
choose them, but could communities be expected to come forward of their
own free will? Yet he did not challenge the severity of Caesar’s proposal,
emphasising that life imprisonment and confiscation of all property were in
many ways more savage punishments than a swift death.
Cicero was also studiously polite to Caesar himself, who had demonstrated
by his speech and actions his ‘devotion to the Republic’. He contrasted him,
a genuine ‘popularis with the good of the people at heart’, with other rabblerousing
demagogues. At this point there was a sly dig at Crassus, when he
noted that ‘one who posed as a popularis’ was absent, ‘presumably so he did
not have to vote on whether or not to kill Roman citizens’. Crassus – still
unnamed, but there could be no doubt over his identity – had in the last two
days taken charge of one of the prisoners, voted a public thanksgiving to
Cicero and approved the rewards granted to informers. Then he tried to use
Caesar’s very presence to weaken his argument. If he accepted that it was
proper for the Senate to pass judgement on the conspirators at all, then he
must have acknowledged that they had in fact ceased to be citizens, and so
lost all protection of law. If the Senate chose his proposal, Cicero knew that
Caesar’s personal popularity would make it easier for them to persuade the
crowd gathered in the Forum that this was just. Yet he also claimed to be
convinced that the wisdom of the people would allow them to accept the
necessity of executing the prisoners. This led him back to the enormity of
their crimes and ‘how he trembled at the vision of mothers crying, girls and
boys fleeing, and the rape of Vestal Virgins’.19 He reassured them of the
precautions he had taken to protect this meeting and defend the city, making
it clear that they were free to do what they thought right. As consul, he was
willing to take on himself the consequences of their decision and any stigma
or hatred that the executions might bring in the future. He would personally
pay any price to serve the Republic.
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The consul’s speech rekindled the emotions of some senators, but the
meeting remained divided and uncertain. More opinions were called for,
and Cato’s view was sought as one of the tribunes elect. Once again we have
to rely principally on Sallust’s account for its content, but Plutarch tells us
that the speech itself was written down and subsequently published by clerks
working for Cicero who followed the whole debate. In his version the thirtytwo
year old began by stating that his fellow senators seemed to be forgetting
that Catiline was still at large and the conspirators still potentially a threat
to the Republic. The State’s very survival was in doubt, and they would be
foolish if ‘in sparing the lives of a few villains, they brought destruction on
all good men’.20 He disdained Caesar’s view that death was a merciful end
to suffering, recalling instead traditional tales of the punishment meted out
to evildoers in the afterlife. He was equally critical of the suggestion of
sending the prisoners into captivity in different towns. Why should they be
any more secure there than in Rome, and what was to prevent them being
freed by Catiline’s rebels? On this occasion, as throughout his life, Cato
advocated the same stern, unyielding and severe course. Mercy was out of
place and dangerous until the threat to the Republic had been averted:
Be assured . . . that when you decide the fate of Publius Lentulus and
the rest, you will at the same time be passing judgement on Catiline’s
army and all the conspirators. The more vigorous your action, the less
will be their courage; but if they detect the slightest weakness on your
part, they will be here immediately, filled with reckless daring. . .
Citizens of the highest rank have conspired to fire their native city,
they stir up to war the Gauls, bitterest enemies of the Roman people.
The leader of the enemy with his army is upon us. Do you even now
hesitate and doubtfully ask yourselves what is to be done with foemen
taken within your walls?21
Just like Caesar, Cato spoke of the example of Rome’s history, in an effort
to bolster his view with the support – in each case rather spurious – of
tradition. It was not unusual for men arguing opposite courses of action to
claim that Rome’s long-standing customs supported them. At Rome
innovations almost invariably arrived wrapped in a cloak of tradition. Sallust
portrays the debate as essentially a struggle between Caesar and Cato. Thus
it foreshadowed the Civil War, when Cato would be Caesar’s bitterest and
most implacable opponent. This was a common view, especially as the years
went on. Cicero was deeply annoyed when Brutus wrote an account which
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minimised his own role, while stressing that of Cato. This version had great
attraction, becoming one of those incidents where one man had swayed the
whole Senate and shown it the path of duty. Cato was clearly conscious of
playing this role at the time, just as Caesar had been, and he certainly had
a considerable impact on the debate. All of the former consuls and many
other senators applauded Cato’s proposal as soon as he finished speaking
and sat down. Caesar was undaunted and continued to argue his own case.
The two men were sitting not far from each other and Cato’s replies became
increasingly bitter, though he failed to provoke his opponent. Unlike Cicero,
he freely cast aspersions on Caesar’s conduct in recent months, demonising
him and claiming that his unwillingness to support the death penalty showed
his sympathy for, and perhaps complicity in, the conspiracy. While this was
going on, a note was brought in and quietly given to Caesar, presumably by
one of his slaves. Cato saw this as an opportunity, declaring that his opponent
was obviously in secret communication with the enemy. Caesar, who had
quietly read the note, did not respond, but demurred when Cato demanded
that he read the message aloud. Cato sensed a guilty conscience and became
even more forceful, encouraged by approving shouts from all sides. Finally,
Caesar simply handed the note to Cato, who was staggered to see that it
was in fact a very passionate love letter from Servilia. With a despairing cry
of ‘Have it back, you drunk!’, he hurled the message back to Caesar, whose
patrician dignity and calm, self-confident style had not wavered throughout
the exchange. It was a slightly odd form of abuse, for Caesar was renowned
as abstemious when it came to alcohol, whereas Cato himself was a heavy
drinker.22
The incident provides an interesting sideline on the relationship between
Caesar and Servilia. Clearly it is indicative of great ardour, and the need for
contact and communication when they were apart. Sending a love note to
a meeting of the Senate, where Caesar would be sitting close alongside both
her husband and her half-brother, was an act of considerable boldness on
Servilia’s part. Perhaps she, or both of them, were thrilled by the danger of
such an act. Silanus’ attitude is very hard to gauge and it is unclear whether
or not he knew that his wife was having an affair with Caesar. If he did find
out, then he made no attempt to act against his rival. Caesar’s political
friendship was worth having, particularly for a man who had only managed
to gain the consulship at the second attempt and who did not have a great
reputation for ability. It has even been speculated that he may have encouraged
his wife in an effort to gain Caesar’s support. Deep though their love evidently
was, neither of the lovers were likely to miss an opportunity for personal gain.
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In the end the vote – taken on Cato’s proposal rather than that of his
brother-in-law Silanus’ because it was felt to be better worded – was
overwhelmingly in favour of executing the prisoners. Lucius Caesar, Lentulus’
brother-in-law, supported this resolution, as it seems did Cethegus’ actual
brother, who was himself a senator. Caesar did not change his position, and
was mobbed by an angry crowd as he left the Temple of Concord. As was
usual during a debate, the doors had been left open and it was clear that
much of what was going on was being reported to the many who had
gathered outside and in the rest of the Forum. Fear of the conspiracy, and
particularly the stories of plans to set fire to Rome – a dire threat to the
many who lived in its crowded, densely packed and readily flammable insulae
– had created a deeply hostile mood. Cicero continued to give his open
support for Caesar, ensuring that he was not harmed. The final act was
played out in the nearby Tullianum, the small cave-like prison where prisoners
were held for short priods, pending punishment. The conspirators were
taken there. Lentulus had been stripped of his praetorship, but even so was
granted the distinction of being led by the consul in person. The five were
taken inside and then strangled out of public view. Cicero emerged shortly
afterwards and announced simply, ‘They have lived.’ (vixerunt). In spite of
the Senate’s vote, he was one who could be held accountable for this action.23
The Aftermath: Caesar’s Praetorship, 62 BC
It did not take long for the first attacks to be made against Cicero over this
issue. The new tribunes took up office on 10 December 63 BC, and amongst
them was Quintus Metellus Nepos, a man whose reckless reputation is
supposed to have prompted Cato to stand for the tribunate in this year as
soon as his candidature was announced. He soon began to denounce Cicero’s
‘illegal’ punishment of the conspirators. On the last day of December, the
consuls formally laid down their office, and it was customary for them to
make a speech recounting their achievements. Nepos and one of his
colleagues, Lucius Bestia, used their tribunician veto to stop Cicero from
doing this, an almost unheard of insult. He could not prevent the outgoing
consul from taking the customary oath and Cicero employed this chance
to state that he had saved the Republic. Nepos was Pompey’s brother-inlaw
and had served for some time as one of his legates in the East, but had
returned to Rome and was seen as representing the general’s interests. The
war was over and Pompey’s return imminent, but there was a question of how
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he would return. Already there was talk of summoning back the Republic’s
most famous and successful commander to crush Catiline’s rebel army.24
On 1 January, Caesar took up office as praetor and immediately launched
an attack on Catulus. The Temple of Jupiter on the Capitoline Hill had
been burnt down in 83 BC, and five years later Catulus as consul had been
allotted the task of overseeing its restoration. The project had not yet been
completed and the praetor summoned Catulus before a meeting of the people
in the Forum to account for this dereliction, accusing him of embezzling
the funds allocated by the Senate. In a studied insult, he stopped the exconsul
from mounting the Rostra and made him speak from ground level.
Caesar proposed to bring in a bill that would transfer the task to someone
else, most probably Pompey, for Caesar continued to seek popularity through
vocal support for the great hero. However, enough supporters of Catulus
arrived to pressure the praetor into backing down. As was often the case in
Caesar’s career up to this point, actually succeeding in his projects was less
important that publicly becoming associated with a cause.25
Caesar then actively supported Nepos, who was proposing a bill to recall
Pompey and his army and give them the task of restoring order in Italy.
Cato, his fellow tribune, violently opposed them, lambasting them in the
Senate and swearing that, while he was still breathing, Pompey would never
enter the city with soldiers under command. On the day of voting on this
bill, Nepos in the normal way held an informal meeting of the Roman people.
He took his seat on the podium of the Temple of Castor and Pollux. This
high platform was often used as an alternative to the Rostra, for there was
more room for a crowd at this eastern end of the Forum. Caesar had his
chair of office placed beside the tribune to show his support. Amongst the
crowd were numbers of burly men, including some gladiators, stationed to
defend the tribunes if there was trouble. This soon arrived in the shape of
Cato and his fellow tribune Quintus Minucius Thermus, who were there to
veto proceedings and had come supported by their followers. Cato strode up
to the podium and he and Minucius climbed the steps. Cato took a seat
between Nepos and Caesar, momentarily disconcerting them by his boldness.
A fair proportion of the crowd was now cheering him on, but others were
still loyal to Nepos and the tension grew. Recovering, Nepos ordered a clerk
to read the bill aloud. Cato used his veto to forbid this, and when Nepos
himself took up the document and started to read, he snatched it from his
hands. Knowing the text by heart, the tribune then began to recite it, until
Thermus slapped his hand over his mouth to stop him. Nepos then signalled
to his armed supporters and a riot ensued, beginning with sticks and stones,
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but culminating in some fighting with edged weapons. Cato and Thermus
were both roughly handled, but the former was physically protected by
Murena, the consul whom he had so recently prosecuted. In the end Nepos’
partisans and supporters were dispersed. That same afternoon the Senate
convened and passed the senatus consultum ultimum. A proposal to strip
Nepos of his tribunate was, however, abandoned on the recommendation of
Cato himself. However, after summoning another public meeting in the
Forum and accusing Cato and the Senate of a plot against Pompey, but
saying that they would soon pay the price for this, Nepos fled from Rome.
A tribune was not supposed to leave the city during his year of office, but
he went even further and sailed from Italy altogether to join Pompey in
Rhodes. In the relief at his departure, no one chose to question its legality.26
Caesar had badly misjudged the situation. All our accounts portray Nepos
as the prime mover behind the violence in this episode, and as a dangerously
impulsive and volatile individual, but Caesar had enthusiastically supported
him, at least in the beginning. Nepos was a supporter of Pompey because
his half-sister Mucia was married to the general, and because he hoped to
benefit from his return. Caesar was no relation to Pompey, and had never had
any direct connection with him – although he had been sleeping with Mucia
during her husband’s absence on campaign – but was continuing his policy
of praising and supporting Rome’s great hero as a means to increase his
own popularity. This time it had gone too far and the Senate decreed that
he be expelled from the praetorship, which he had only held for a matter of
weeks. At first Caesar tried to brazen it out, continuing to appear in public
with the trappings of office and carrying out his duties. Again he had failed
to understand the general mood, and the deep anger that the recent events
had caused. Hearing that some senators were ready to oppose him with
force, he dismissed the six lictors who attended him. These men carried the
fasces, the bundles of rods and an axe that symbolised a holder of imperium,
and his power to inflict corporal and capital punishment. He then removed
his toga praetexta, worn on official occasions by senators, and quietly slipped
off to his house, the domus publica, making it known that he intended to
retire from public life. On the next day a crowd gathered in the Forum outside
his house, loudly proclaiming that they were ready to help him restore his
fortunes. Caesar went out and spoke to them, calming their mood and
persuading them to disperse. Orchestrated or spontaneous – or quite possibly
a mixture of both – it was a dignified and responsible performance which
persuaded the Senate to restore him. Although his political instincts had
failed him a few times during these days, Caesar had shown his ability to
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realise that he had made a mistake and the skill of recovering from it.27
By now Catiline had been defeated by an army nominally under the
command of Cicero’s former colleague Antonius, but in fact led by one of
his subordinates. Cato’s claim that strong action would terrify the rebels
had proved ill-founded, for the majority stayed loyal to Catiline and died
with him. Whatever they may have thought of him in life, there was grudging
acknowledgement that Catiline had died well, showing all the courage
expected of a member of the aristocracy. Yet although he was gone and the
rebels defeated, there was still a climate of suspicion and recrimination at
Rome. Rewards were available to those providing valuable evidence to the
authorities, and this may in part explain the spate of denunciations. Quintus
Curius, the man whose mistress had persuaded him to betray the rebels and
who had been rewarded with restoration to the Senate, now named Caesar
amongst a list of men said to have been part of the conspiracy. Another
informer, Lucius Vettius, repeated the charge, claiming that he possessed a
letter written by Caesar to Catiline. In the Senate the restored praetor
answered Curius by appealing to Cicero, who testified that Caesar had
provided him with some information and throughout proved his loyalty. As
a result, Curius lost his informer’s bounty. Vettius, an equestrian of little
importance and questionable reputation, could be dealt with more easily.
Caesar as praetor commanded him to appear before the Rostra, then had him
beaten up and thrown into prison. He was most probably released soon
afterwards, but no more public accusations were levelled at Caesar.28
The ‘Good Goddess’
Little else is recorded of Caesar’s praetorship, and it is more than probable
that, at least by his standards, he kept a low profile and simply went about
his main task of acting as a judge. Near the end of the year he became
embroiled in a scandal of illicit and adulterous love, but just for once he
was the innocent party. Every year the festival of the Bona Dea, or Good
Goddess, was celebrated in the house of one of the senior magistrates. In
62 BC Caesar’s residence was chosen, probably because he was the senior
pontiff as well as a praetor. Although the celebration occurred in a
magistrate’s house, neither he nor any other man was permitted to be present,
for the ceremonies were performed exclusively by women, chiefly the
aristocratic matrons of Rome and their female attendants. After performing
sacrifices and other rituals, music and feasting continued throughout the
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night. The Vestal Virgins presided over the rites, and according to Plutarch
the magistrate’s wife did much of the organising of the celebrations. In this
case Aurelia may have played more of a role than Pompeia, and Caesar’s
sister Julia was also present.
Pompeia had a lover, the thirty-year old quaestor-elect Publius Clodius
Pulcher, and the couple had decided that the celebrations offered a perfect
cover for an assignation. Clodius disguised himself as a girl harp-player, one
of the many professional entertainers, mostly slaves, who took part in the
festival. During the night he was let into the house by Habra, one of
Pompeia’s personal maids, who was in on the secret. She then ran off to
fetch her mistress, leaving Clodius to wait for some time. Growing impatient,
he began to wander and bumped into one of Aurelia’s slaves, who promptly
tried to persuade the young, and apparently shy, musician to join the rest of
the company. Unable to shake off her persistent attentions, Clodius at last
said that he could not come as ‘she’ was waiting for ‘her’ friend Habra.
Betrayed by his voice, which was obviously masculine, the slave ran off
screaming that there was a man in the house, causing instant confusion.
Clodius fled into the darkness. Aurelia reacted with the calm efficiency that
it seems was a hallmark of her own character as well as her son’s. She
immediately halted the ceremony and had the sacred implements used in
the rites covered up, lest they suffer pollution by being seen by a man. Slaves
were sent to lock all the doors of the house, to prevent the intruder from
escaping. Caesar’s mother then led them as they searched the house by
torchlight, eventually finding Clodius hiding in Habra’s room. The woman
took a good look at him to make sure who he was – the world of the Roman
aristocracy was small and most members of it recognisable to each other,
before driving him from the house. Aurelia then sent the women back to
their own homes to tell their husbands about Clodius’ sacrilege.29
In the following days, Caesar divorced Pompeia. There was no provision
for divorce in Rome’s earliest law code, the Twelve Tables still memorised by
aristocratic children in Caesar’s day, but it was nevertheless hallowed by
long tradition. Like so many other aspects of Roman society, it was seen as
a matter for individual families. By the Late Republic it seems that either the
husband or wife could unilaterally divorce the other. In its simplest form a
husband would simply say ‘Take your things for yourself!’ (tuas res tibi
habeto). Caesar may or may not have used this traditional phrase, or he
may have sent a letter to Pompeia, but in any case the marriage was quickly
broken. No reason was publicly given for the divorce, but this was nothing
unusual even if the preceding circumstances were. The union seems never to
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have been as close as his marriage to Cornelia and, although the couple had
spent most of their marriage together, had failed to produce any children.
There is no record of either of Caesar’s other wives taking a lover, but in this
case Caesar’s charm had not been sufficient to keep Pompeia faithful. Perhaps
he had spent too much time in these years with Servilia and his other
mistresses, or it may be that his substantially younger wife resented living
in a household that seems to have been dominated by her mother-in-law.
Nor should we underestimate the attractions of Clodius, who was intelligent,
handsome – his family were renowned for their looks – and charming, with
a rakish reputation that made him even more intriguing. The description
could as easily apply to Caesar, as could the willingness to seduce other
men’s wives. Whatever the reason for Pompeia’s unfaithfulness, Caesar was
unwilling to grant his wife the same licence he gave himself. Such an attitude
was common for a man of his class and era.30
The ending of a marriage was important for the individuals concerned,
but the scale of the shock that this episode sent through the Republic should
not be underestimated. Never before had the Bona Dea festival been polluted
in this way. Some senators, Cicero and Caesar amongst them, were privately
sceptical about the gods, or at least many aspects of traditional religion, but
publicly none doubted the importance of the rituals that pervaded so many
aspects of public life. Rome’s success was said to be based on the favour of
the gods, and no ceremony necessary to continue to assure this blessing
could be seen to be neglected or improperly performed. The Senate
established a special commission to investigate the affair and decide what
action needed to be taken. The festival itself was restaged on another night
and properly conducted. After seeking advice from the Vestals and the
college of pontiffs, it was decided to place Clodius on trial. Caesar seems
from the beginning to have wished to brush the whole affair under the
carpet, but although head of the college, the Pontifex Maximus had more
of a chairman’s than a controlling role. In the subsequent tribunal he
declined to give evidence against Clodius, claiming ignorance of the whole
affair. When publicly challenged as to why he had divorced his wife if he
thought that she had not been caught in an adulterous liaison, he replied
with the famous phrase that he had done so because ‘Caesar’s wife must be
above suspicion.’ Clodius was an up and coming man, with powerful friends,
who were doing their best to ensure that the court would exonerate him.
Caesar may have felt that it was an unnecessary risk to gain the personal
enmity of such a man, or perhaps he even felt that Clodius might be a useful
ally in the future. With hindsight we know that this is what in fact happened,
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but it may not have been so obvious at the time. For all his frequent
prosecutions and attacks on men like Catulus, Caesar’s whole career was
based on trying to win friends rather than destroy enemies. It was for his
favours and generosity that he was famous, unlike Cato who was known
more for his unflinching severity – he was one of those pressing for strong
punishment of Clodius.
Political concerns were never far from a senator’s mind, but we should not
forget the personal element. Throughout much of history, being held up as
a cuckold has been deeply embarrassing. It would also have been most unlike
a Roman defence counsel not to have thrown Caesar’s own philandering
reputation against him had he appeared as a witness in the case. Perhaps he
genuinely felt that it would have been hypocritical of him to attack another
man for something that he had so often done himself, if in less bizarre and
sacrilegious circumstances. However, in spite of his own reluctance, both
Aurelia and Julia appeared as witnesses, testifying to Clodius’ guilt. Cicero
also appeared, stating that he had met Clodius on the day of the ceremony
in Rome, hence destroying the defendant’s claim that he had been far from
the City at the time when the offence was committed. In spite of his obvious
guilt, Clodius was acquitted after he and his friends mounted a concerted
campaign of intimidation and bribery. For the final session the jurors
requested and were granted guards for their protection. When they voted
thirty-one to twenty-five for acquittal, it prompted the scornful Catulus to
say, ‘Why did you ask us for a guard? Were you afraid of being robbed?’ It
is the last anecdote recorded about the old senator, who died not long
afterwards.31
Spain
Long before the trial was over, Caesar had left Rome as propraetor to govern
Further Spain (Hispania Ulterior). Smuggled out in his entourage was the
Numidian client he had unsuccessfully defended against King Hiempsal,
who for months had remained concealed in Caesar’s house. Also
accompanying him were his quaestor Vetus, the son of the man for whom
Caesar had performed the same role. Another member of his staff, holding
the title of praefectus fabrum, a sort of general staff appointment, was a
Lucius Cornelius Balbus, a Spaniard from a well-to-do family that had
gained citizenship through Pompey’s gratitude. The new governor had
doubtless left the city and the scandal behind with some relief, but at one
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point it had looked as if Caesar would be prevented from going. A number
of his creditors had become impatient, perhaps simply because payment
was due, but his temporary expulsion from the praetorship earlier in the
year may have made them question his long-term prospects. Moves were
made to prevent his leaving, but Caesar turned to Crassus who stood surety
for 830 talents, a massive sum but only a fraction of his total debt. This is
the first occasion when it is explicitly recorded in our sources that he had
taken out a loan from Crassus, but it is more than probable that Caesar had
often drawn on his massive wealth in the past. Even so it was a near thing,
and he ended up leaving the city before the Senate had formally announced
the provinces for the year. This was a mere formality, since these had already
been allocated, but it was a breach of convention. Ironically, one of the first
problems he had to deal with when he reached Spain was widespread debt,
which may have been forcing many to swell the numbers of bandits that
infested the region. Caesar decreed that a debtor should pay two-thirds of
his income to his creditors until the debts had been made up, but were to be
left the remaining third to support themselves and their families.32
A provincial posting was a chance for enrichment. Caesar had on a number
of occasions prosecuted returning governors for corruption and extortion.
It was soon claimed by his senatorial opponents that he had needlessly
provoked a war in Spain, even attacking allied communities simply so that
he could plunder them. The charges were fairly conventional, and plenty of
Roman governors acted in this way, but there is not enough evidence to
decide whether or not Caesar was guilty of such behaviour. In 61 BC large
tracts of Spain were still showing the scars of the war against Sertorius.
Raiding and banditry had for generations been ways of life in the Iberian
Peninsula, especially amongst communities in the more mountainous regions
who struggled to support themselves by farming. North Western Lusitania,
where Caesar principally operated, was not a wealthy region at this time, and
it is doubtful that any commander could have made himself rich through
plunder by campaigning there. Nor is it likely that he lacked opportunities
for mounting a military operation, for all of our sources emphasise the
lawlessness of much of the area. What is clear is that Caesar eagerly took
up these opportunities, responding in an extremely robust manner. Almost
as soon as he arrived he raised ten new cohorts of troops, augmenting the
existing garrison by 50 per cent. Marching into the mountainous area
between the rivers Tagus and Duero, he summoned one of the fortified
hilltop communities to surrender and be resettled on the plains. They refused,
as he had expected, so Caesar took the place by storm. He then moved
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against the neighbouring towns, avoiding an attempted ambush when the
Lusitanians tried to lure him into a trap by using their herds as bait. Caesar
ignored these and instead attacked and defeated their main army. Ambush
was a common tactic for the hill peoples of Spain, and his forces avoided
another ambush by not following the obvious route through the difficult
country. Later Caesar returned, fought on ground of his own choosing, and
won. Following up his success, he pursued the Lusitanians to the Atlantic
coast, where they took refuge on a small island. The first attempt to take this
failed, but Caesar summoned warships from Gades (Cadiz) and forced the
defenders to surrender. He then sailed along the coast, and the sight of his
forces – oared warships were largely unknown in the area – was enough to
overawe at least one community into instant capitulation.33
There were many traces of the Caesar so familiar from his own
Commentaries on the later campaigns in Gaul and the Civil War. Swift but
calculated action, refusal to be daunted by natural obstacles or initial reverses
and the ruthless exploitation of success. Also there was the willingness to
accept surrender and treat the conquered generously in the hope of turning
them into productive, tax-paying members of the province. His victory had
not in itself completed this process, but did mark an important stage in it.
Caesar was hailed as Imperator, the formal acclamation which entitled a
governor to request a triumph on his return to Rome. Yet his term of office
was not solely devoted to war, and he did much to reorganise the civil
administration of the province, arbitrating in disputes between the local
communities. He also appears to have suppressed the practice of human
sacrifice in some of the local cults. How effective he was in the long term is
harder to say, for other governors of the province had acted against this in
the past. Such offerings were known – perhaps even fairly common –
throughout much of Iron Age Europe and elsewhere. The last occasion the
Romans had made such an offering had been only a few years before Caesar’s
birth, when the threat of the Cimbri and Teutones had seemed very real. It
was, however, one of the few religious practices that the Romans actively
suppressed in the provinces. Caesar’s governorship of Spain is not well
documented, but seems to have been marked by his usual frenetic activity.
He probably profited from his time there, though certainly on nothing like
the scale to do much more than dent his massive debts, won accolades from
the locals and had the prospect of triumph on his return. This posting had
given Caesar what he wanted, but he was always looking to the future, and
left his province to return to Rome before his successor had actually arrived.
This was a little unusual, but certainly not unique – Cicero would do the same
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when he finally went out to his province over a decade after being consul.
His quaestor was probably left in charge.34
On the way out to Spain Plutarch claims that Caesar and his party passed
through a small Alpine village. His friends jokingly asked whether even in
such a squalid setting men still scrabbled for power and office. Caesar
declared quite seriously that he would rather be the foremost man in a place
like that, than the second in Rome. The story may or may be apocryphal,
but as Plutarch realised it says much about Caesar’s character. He had already
done well politically, and could by now almost count on having a good
career. This was no less that he had always expected of himself, but being
successful was not in itself enough and Caesar was aiming for the very top.
He craved to achieve more than anyone else had ever done.35
There was room at the top, for as the decade drew to a close only Crassus
could be seen as a serious rival to Pompey. Some of the wealthiest men in the
Republic, notably Lucullus, had largely withdrawn from public life into
luxurious retirement. The Senate of these years contained some 600 members,
but was scarcely crammed with talent. The legacy of the civil war, which had
culled the ranks of the prominent and capable, was still very obvious. It is
striking that only fourteen former consuls were present at the Catilinarian
debate, an occasion of such importance that a strong turnout would be
anticipated. Crassus deliberately avoided the meeting, while Pompey and
several other consulars were away on campaign. Assuming as a very rough
guide that a man might expect to live for at least twenty years after being
consul, the total is still less than half the number that we might expect.
Compared to earlier periods, there were far fewer distinguished senators
whose auctoritas allowed them to guide the Senate’s debates. This was one
reason why men like Caesar and Cato were able to assume such prominence
while still in their thirties.
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‘Caesar had accustomed himself to great effort and little rest; to concentrate
on his friends’ business at the expense of his own, and never to neglect
anything which was worth doing as a favour. He craved great imperium,
an army, and a new war so that he could show his talent.’ – Sallust, late forties
BC.1
‘Yet what would history say of me in six hundred years time?For that is a
thing which I fear more than the idle chatter of men alive today.’ – Cicero,
April 59 BC.2
On 28 and 29 September 61 BC Pompey the Great celebrated his third
triumph, which commemorated his victories over the pirates and Mithridates.
The festivities coincided with his forty-fifth birthday and included displays
and processions of unprecedented scale and magnificence. His first triumph
had been twenty years before, but this time there was no ridiculous plan for
riding in a chariot pulled by elephants. Pompey was older, more mature and
had no need for such theatrics, for the splendour of his victories dwarfed the
achievements of the great generals of the past. Even so, triumphs were never
occasions for restraint or modesty. Like any Roman aristocrat, Pompey took
care to quantify his success and the processions included placards declaring
that he had killed, captured or defeated 12,183,000 people, taken or sunk 846
warships, and accepted the surrender of 1,538 towns or fortified places.
Each kingdom, people or place he had overcome was listed in turn on the
great floats carrying the spoils he had taken from them. Then there were
paintings showing famous episodes from the wars. Other signs told of how
every soldier in the army had been given 1,500 denarii – equivalent to more
than ten years’ pay – and proclaimed that the vast sum of 20,000 talents of
gold and silver had been added to the State Treasury. Pompey boasted that
as a result of his efforts, the annual revenue of the Republic had more than
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doubled, from 50 million to 135 million denarii. At the end of the procession
was an enormous float presented as a trophy of victory over the known
world. People were saying that Pompey had triumphed over all three
continents: Africa as part of his first triumph, Europe and specifically Spain
in his second, and now Asia in his third. Ahead of Pompey walked over 300
senior hostages, including kings, queens, princesses, chieftains and generals,
all wearing their national costume. The general himself rode in a chariot
decorated with gemstones and wore a cloak captured from Mithridates,
which he claimed had once been owned and worn by Alexander the Great.
Appian, writing over a century and a half later, thought this unlikely, but
Pompey revelled in the parallels often drawn between himself and the greatest
conqueror in history.3
There is no doubting the scale of Pompey’s achievement. The suppression
of the pirates had been a dazzling display of meticulous planning and rapid
action, but proved to be merely a prelude to even greater successes.
Mithridates of Pontus had proven one of Rome’s most resilient enemies.
Sulla had expelled him from Greece and recovered the province of Asia, but
the need to return to Italy had prevented him from achieving total victory.
Lucullus had done more in the seven years he held command in the region,
savaging the king and his allies in a series of battles. In the process he became
fabulously rich from the spoils of war, but alienated the publicani operating
in Asia as tax collectors, as well as many of his own soldiers. A successful
general never lacked for opponents in the Senate, for senators were
instinctively nervous of anyone else gaining too much glory, wealth and
auctoritas. There were growing complaints that the war was going on too
long, and even that Lucullus was deliberately prolonging it to enrich himself
still more. His large province was broken up, and sections given to new
governors, starving him of the men and material with which to wage war.
With Lucullus weakened, Mithridates was given a chance to win back some
of the ground he had lost. Everything changed when Pompey arrived in 66
BC. Backed by resources on a scale of which his predecessor could only have
dreamed, he had irrevocably smashed the king’s power by the end of the
year. It would be going a little far to say that Lucullus had already won the
war – unlike the Slave War, which had certainly been decided by Crassus
before Pompey arrived and tried to steal the credit – but he had certainly
contributed a great deal to the eventual Roman victory.
His assigned task complete, Pompey showed no desire to go back to Rome
straightaway, but instead sought new opportunities to win glory with the
forces under his command. Over the next two years he took advantage of any
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opportunity to lead his legions further than any Roman army had gone in
the past. They marched against the Iberians and Albanians, round the eastern
shore of the Black Sea and into what would become southern Russia.
Intervening in a civil war between rival members of the Judaean royal family,
Pompey laid siege to Jerusalem and took it after three months. All of these
spectacular achievements were celebrated in his triumphal procession.
Pompey had throughout these campaigns given abundant evidence of his
abilities as a commander, and may also, as in earlier campaigns, have
occasionally led charges in person, emulating Alexander’s heroic style of
leadership. In Jerusalem he and his commanders had gone into the Holy of
Holies in the Great Temple, something forbidden to all save the high priests.
As a mark of respect, none of the treasures were removed, but the gesture,
as was intended, provided a new tale to tell at Rome of the unprecedented
deeds of Rome’s great general. For the Romans, the spectacular was often
combined with the practical, and Pompey spent much of his time organising
the administration of Rome’s old provinces in the region and the new ones
he had created. Active campaigning largely ceased when news arrived in 63 BC
that Mithridates was dead – killed by a bodyguard after he had tried to
poison himself but discovered that the antidotes he had taken throughout
his life rendered him immune. Even so Pompey remained in the east for over
a year settling the region. His organisational talents were considerable and
many of the regulations he established would remain in force for centuries.4
The wild activities of Metellus Nepos during his tribunate increased the
apprehension over what Pompey would do on his return to Italy. Nepos was
his brother-in-law, had served under him as a legate, and so his readiness to
use violence and intimidation in his effort to allow Pompey to retain
command of his army was deeply worrying. Crassus is said to have exploited
the mood by taking his family abroad. It is difficult to know how far Nepos
had been acting under instructions, but clearly Pompey cannot have been
pleased with a result that raised many senators’ suspicion of him without
achieving any benefit. In the spring of 62 BC he wrote to the Senate as a
whole and privately to leading senators assuring them of his desire for
peaceful retirement. Another of his legates, Marcus Pupius Piso, was already
in Rome canvassing for the consulship for 61 BC. Pompey asked the Senate
to postpone the elections till the end of the year so that he could be present
and support his friend. Opinions were divided, but Cato prevented any vote
by manipulating the procedure of the House. When asked his opinion in
the debate, he kept on talking until the day ended and the meeting closed
without a result. No one attempted to discuss the issue again. In the event
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Piso won the consulship anyway, but this was the first of a series of snubs
that Pompey was to suffer. It did not prevent him from continuing his efforts
to reassure the Senate of his good intentions. When he finally landed at
Brundisium in December 62 BC he immediately demobilised his legions,
instructing the soldiers to gather again only when it was time for them to
march in his triumph.5
Until he had celebrated his triumph, Pompey could not actually cross the
pomerium, the sacred boundary of the city, so he took up residence in his
villa in the Alban Hills outside Rome. By the middle of the first century BC,
substantial parts of Rome were actually outside the pomerium. On several
occasions the Senate chose to meet, or public meetings were called, at
locations in these areas to permit Pompey to attend. When he had become
consul in 70 BC Pompey had the experienced senator and prolific author
Marcus Terentius Varro write him a pamphlet explaining senatorial
procedure. His return to political life showed that he still had much to learn
after almost six years away on campaign. The first speech he made fell flat,
pleasing no one. It was especially unfortunate that he had arrived at the
height of the controversy over the trial of Clodius for sacrilege, with fierce
debate over the procedure to be used and in particular the selection of jurors.
Piso, Pompey’s former legate, was a friend and supporter of Clodius, while
his consular colleague was an equally determined opponent. Not a well
trained or especially gifted orator, Pompey attempted to show his firm
support and respect for the Senate when his opinion was asked on such
issues, but his speeches met with little enthusiasm. Cicero, smarting over
Pompey’s refusal to praise him with sufficient enthusiasm for his suppression
of Catiline, was scathing in his judgement of the man he had so often
supported in the past. On 25 January 61 BC he wrote to his friend Atticus
that Pompey ‘is now openly and ostentatiously trumpeting his friendship
for me, but secretly he is jealous and does not conceal it very well. In him
there is no real courtesy, straightforwardness, statesmanlike talent, or indeed
a sense of honour, constancy, or generosity.’6 Cicero was delighted when
Crassus began eulogising him in the Senate, probably largely because Pompey
had failed to do so.7
In the domestic sphere things were little better. Pompey had divorced his
wife Mucia almost as soon as he had returned to Italy. She and Caesar had
had an affair in her husband’s absence, but he had not been her only lover
and her infidelities were a matter of public scandal. Politically this had
unfortunate consequences, alienating Pompey from her half-brothers
Metellus Nepos and Quintus Caecilius Metellus Celer, for the Metelli as a
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family were never slow to respond to real or apparent slights. After he had
been attacked by Nepos, Cicero had had to go to great lengths to placate
Metellus Celer even though it had been his brother who had begun the
dispute. Celer was a strong candidate for the consulship in 60 BC, making
him an especially dangerous enemy. Nevertheless, the divorce gave Pompey
the opportunity for making a new political alliance, and he clearly wished
to demonstrate again his commitment to the senatorial elite and show that
he was no revolutionary. He approached Cato and asked that he and his son
be allowed to marry his nieces, the daughters of Servilia. To the dismay of
both the girls and their ambitious mother, Cato rejected the proposal, a
gesture that added to his reputation for placing the stern dictates of virtue
ahead of political advantage. Although he lost the prospect of an alliance
with the wealthiest man and most successful commander in the Senate, the
incident added to the legend that Cato was consciously building by his
actions and behaviour.8
Pompey had two main objectives in these years. The first was to secure
grants of land to the discharged veterans of his armies. In 70 BC a law had
been passed to provide for the men who had fought under him in Spain, but
had failed to achieve much as the Senate had not provided the resources to
make an adequate distribution of land possible. His second aim was to
secure the ratification of his Eastern Settlement, the scheme of laws and
regulations that he had established after his victory over Mithridates. It was
normal for such things to be done by a senatorial committee, but Pompey
had gone ahead without this authority. The fact that he had done the job
extremely well did not prevent considerable criticism. Lucullus, who had
been forced to wait years for his own triumph and was still deeply bitter of
his replacement in the command by Pompey, came out of his self-imposed
retirement from public life to oppose him. He was especially critical of
anything that had altered his own rulings. Pompey wanted his entire Eastern
Settlement to be ratified in a single law. Lucullus, Cato and many other
leading senators demanded instead that each individual ruling be discussed
and dealt with on its own. During Piso’s consulship in 61 BC nothing was
achieved, in part because of his preoccupation with the trial of Clodius.
Realising that Metellus Celer was practically certain to win the consulship
for 60 BC, Pompey indulged in massive bribery to ensure that he was given
a more amenable colleague. The man chosen was another of his former
legates, a ‘new man’ called Lucius Afranius. Although he may have been a
capable officer, Afranius was better known as a dancer than for his skill as
a politician. As consul he proved an abject failure, his fellow ‘new man’
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Cicero viewing him as little more than a joke in the poorest taste. More
talented was Lucius Flavius, one of the tribunes of the year who was eager
to do Pompey’s bidding. He proposed a land law, which was intended to
provide farms for the veterans and a substantial number of the urban poor.
Metellus Celer led the opposition, and was so bitter in his invective that the
tribune ordered him led off to prison. The consul was a shrewd enough
player of the political game to know how to exploit the situation and
promptly convened a meeting of the Senate in the prison itself. Flavius
responded by placing his tribunician bench of office in front of the entrance
to stop anyone from getting in. Undaunted, Metellus ordered his attendants
to knock a hole in the prison’s wall to admit the senators. Pompey realised
that Flavius was losing the contest and instructed him to release the consul.
The episode showed the same almost farcical respect for convention as the
confrontation between Cato and Nepos in 62 BC on the podium of the
Temple of Castor and Pollux. In this case, things stopped short of actual
violence. Further attempts to intimidate Metellus by denying him the right
to go to a province failed and the bill was eventually dropped.9
After two years Pompey had achieved neither of his key objectives. The
confirmation of the Eastern Settlement and the provision of land for veteran
soldiers were both sensible measures, that would have been of benefit to the
Republic. Metellus opposed the land bill primarily because he resented doing
anything for the man who had divorced his half-sister Mucia, but also because
of the prestige of standing alone and out of his innate stubbornness. His
grandfather had won fame through being the only senator to refuse to take
an oath to obey one of Saturninus’ laws, suffering a period of exile as a
result. Lucullus was motivated by memory of the wrong he felt that Pompey
had once done to him in 66 BC. Cato and others were more inclined to thwart
Pompey as a means of cutting him down to size and preventing him from
dominating the Republic through his great wealth and fame. Pompey was
not the only senator to feel frustration in these years. Crassus, who had at
first enjoyed his rival’s discomfort, found that many of the same senatorial
clique were as willing to block a measure of great importance to him. Early
in 60 BC a dispute erupted between the Senate and the equestrians who
headed the great companies of the publicani. These had bought the rights
to collecting taxes in Asia and the other eastern provinces only to discover
that in the aftermath of so many years of warfare they were unable to raise
sufficient revenue to cover the sum they had pledged to the State Treasury.
Faced with the prospect of making a loss, rather than the usual handsome
profit derived from tax collecting, the dismayed publicani wanted to
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renegotiate the terms of their contract, reducing the amount that was due
to the Treasury. Crassus, who was closely associated with the leading
publicani and probably had a stake in a number of companies, was an
enthusiastic supporter. Cicero thought that the demand was outrageous,
but nevertheless was willing to go along with it since the wealthy equestrian
order ought to be placated and kept on the side of the Senate. A new bribery
law had just imposed severe fines on equestrian as well as senatorial jurors,
causing deep offence amongst the order. Cato was never one to restrain his
own outrage and vigorously opposed the publicani, persuading the Senate
to reject their appeal. Cicero despairingly commented that Cato ‘in the best
spirit and with unquestionable honesty . . . does harm to the State: the
resolutions he puts forward are more fitting for Plato’s ideal Republic, than
the cess-pit of Romulus’.10
Pompey and Crassus, the two wealthiest and in some ways most influential
men in the Republic, were both finding themselves thwarted by members of
the handful of noble families that dominated the Senate. Pompey, in
particular, had been rejected when he attempted to become part of this inner
elite. Necessary, sensible and popular reforms, along with more questionable
measures that may have been politically expedient, were all being blocked
by a small minority of aristocrats. The inertia at the heart of the Republic
was alienating many citizens at all levels of society. Decades later, one of
Caesar’s former commanders would begin his history of the Civil War in the
year when Metellus Celer and Afranius were consuls. With hindsight many
would see 60 BC as the year when the disease infecting the Republic became
terminal.11
Coming Home
In the summer of 60 BC Caesar returned from Spain. He was forty and –
presumably with the same dispensation he had enjoyed to hold earlier offices
two years before the normal time – now eligible to stand for the consulship
for 59 BC. He had clearly been preparing the way for his candidature for
some time. Unable to canvass in person he seems to have written to leading
senators, including Cicero. Caesar was a prolific letter writer, making it all
the more unfortunate that so little of his correspondence has been preserved.
He is said to have been able to dictate to several scribes at the same time, while
it was noted that he was the first man who while in Rome regularly wrote
to friends and political allies who were also in the city. It may well be that
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he had divorced Pompeia in a written note. It was probably also by letter that
he reached an agreement with another of the candidates to run a joint
campaign. This was Lucius Lucceius, a man of considerable wealth but little
reputation or charisma. The combination of his money and Caesar’s
popularity was a strong one. In early June 60 BC, before he had even reached
Rome, Caesar was seen as the favourite in the race for the consulship, Cicero
commenting that he had a ‘following wind’. Caesar’s letters to Cicero had
evidently pleased the orator, for he wrote to Atticus that he hoped to ‘make
Caesar better’, which he saw as a good service to the Republic.12
Caesar, just like Pompey two years before, arrived outside Rome, but
could not cross the pomerium until he had celebrated the triumph awarded
for his campaigns in Spain. A triumph, with its spectacular procession and
accompanying celebrations, would further enhance his election prospects.
The Roman electorate and society in general admired military glory above
almost everything else, and in practical terms a consul was very likely to
find himself placed in command of an important war, so that proof of
martial talent was obviously a good thing. Cicero at times liked to claim
that a great record as an advocate in the courts was almost as highly valued
as martial exploits, but evidently knew in his heart that this was not the
view of most voters. However, by law, candidates for office had to present
themselves in person at a meeting in the Forum. It took time to prepare
properly for the triumphal celebration, which could then only be held on a
day allotted by the Senate. The date for the election had already been set,
and Caesar would be unable to stand unless he crossed the pomerium and
so gave up the right to his triumph. He requested an exemption to the rule
to allow him to become a candidate without appearing in person. Presumably
this was done by a letter to the Senate, or through an intermediary, since
there is no record of the Senate convening at one of the temples outside the
pomerium to permit him to attend. Suetonius tells us that there was
widespread opposition to this petition. Our other sources unsurprisingly
single out Cato as the main focus of this. He once again used the tactic of
simply continuing to speak until time for the debate ran out and the meeting
had to close without voting on the issue. The Senate would not assemble
again until after the list of candidates had been formally announced – the
House was only permitted to meet on certain days and could not, for
instance, convene on the same day as any of the Popular Assemblies. Cato’s
tactic of ‘talking out’ a proposition had worked in the past and this time
ensured that Caesar could not celebrate his triumph and stand for the
consulship for the next year.13
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Cato’s filibuster worked, but not in the way that he had intended. When
Caesar realised what was happening he immediately gave up his triumph
and entered the city, crossing the pomerium so that he could present himself
as a candidate. It is difficult to understate the importance of this decision.
A triumph was one of the greatest honours a Roman aristocrat could win,
something permanently commemorated by the display of its symbols on
the porch of his house. Pompey, whose whole career had been deeply
unorthodox, had triumphed three times, but this was exceptional, and in this
period it was very rare for a man to win the honour more than once. Not
only that, but triumphs were awarded to no more than a tiny minority of
propraetors in the first century BC and were fairly rare even for proconsuls.
It was the clearest indication that Caesar was looking ahead, absolutely
convinced that far greater deeds and opportunities lay ahead of him. A
triumph for his victories in Spain would have been very welcome and he did
his best to secure it, but the consulship was a far greater prize.
Cato’s motives are also worth consideration, for at first glance his action
seems to have been pointless, while with hindsight it was also highly illjudged.
At best he would have delayed Caesar’s candidature for a year. Caesar
would have held his triumph, which could only have increased his already
good electoral prospects. Perhaps Cato hoped that during the next twelve
months, Caesar’s debts would finally overwhelm him and his career implode.
Yet he had just returned from his province and, like all Roman governors and
especially those who fought a successful war, had doubtless profited. His
debts were too huge to have been paid off, and Caesar obviously felt the
need for Lucceius’ finances in his election campaign, but all in all he must
have been in a more secure financial position on his return to Rome compared
with when he had left. As a private citizen Caesar would be open to
prosecution, so perhaps it was hoped that he might be charged in the extortion
court. Yet, most former governors faced with such charges were acquitted
and, as we have seen, Caesar may well genuinely not have been guilty – not
that that was necessarily the key factor in many legal cases. There was a
more personal reason for delaying Caesar’s candidature for a year. Cato’s
son-in-law, Marcus Calpurnius Bibulus, was also standing for the consulship.
This was the man who had been so overshadowed by Caesar during their
aedileship in 65 BC. Bibulus’ talents were modest, and made to seem all the
more so by comparison with the flamboyant and extremely capable Caesar.
Yet the system, with the minimum ages for each office, ensured that a man
was likely to compete and hold office with the same men throughout his
career. Both Caesar and Bibulus had been praetors in 62 BC, although there
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is no record of any conflict between them. Postponing Caesar’s bid for the
consulship would mean that for once Bibulus would have a chance of taking
the limelight himself. It also avoided the danger that the ‘new man’ Lucceius,
boosted by his ally’s popularity, would actually beat Bibulus into third place.
Losing an election was a humiliating blow to a member of a noble family.
Therefore, there were certainly advantages to be gained for Cato’s family
in blocking Caesar’s request. The conflict between their personalities should
also not be ignored. It is no exaggeration to say that Cato loathed Caesar,
believing that he had seen past his outward charm. Servilia’s continuing
affair with this man exacerbated her half-brother’s feelings. The Roman
aristocracy saw nothing wrong in senators pursuing personal hatreds, as
long as their actions did not become excessive. Viewed in this light, Cato was
simply taking an opportunity to do one of his enemies a bad turn.
Furthermore, every time that he changed the Senate’s mind or stopped it
from doing something added to Cato’s reputation. He was still only thirtyfive
and had held no magistracy higher than the tribunate, but was already
well established as one of the dominant voices in the Senate. This was because
he was Cato, paragon of old-fashioned virtue as exemplified by his famous
ancestor, and never to be dissuaded from his views or afraid to state them
even if they were contrary to the mood of the majority. It does seem unlikely
that in 60 BC he represented Caesar as a danger to the Republic. Cicero’s
letters make it clear that such a view was not widespread before the elections.
The only hint that there was some suspicion came when the Senate allocated
the provinces that the consuls of 59 BC would receive after their year of
office, something that a law of Caius Gracchus had stipulated that they
must do before the election. In this case the Senate decided that both men
would be sent to deal with ‘woodland and country lanes of Italy’ (silvae
callesque). It was true that rural Italy had suffered much in recent decades,
but even so such a task was pitifully beneath the dignity of one, let alone both,
consuls. The suggestion that this was intended merely to keep the consuls
in reserve, in case a major war erupted in Gaul, is unconvincing, since this
was not normal Roman practice. Instead it was an insult and, the sources
maintain, one aimed at Caesar, although it should be noted that Bibulus
was as likely to suffer as a result of it.14
Consuls were elected by the Comitia Centuriata, whose structure differed
markedly from the Tribal Assemblies. Caesar had already been successful in
the Comitia when he was elected praetor, but competition was inevitably
stronger for the two consulships than for the eight praetorships for each
year. Consular elections were usually held at the end of July, so that Caesar
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had only a few weeks to canvass in person. The Comitia Centuriata met on
the Campus Martius, amidst rituals that had strong associations with the
military system of Rome’s early history – for instance, the raising of a red
flag on the Janiculum Hill already mentioned in connection with the trial
of Rabirius (see p.123). The presiding magistrate, one of the consuls of the
current year, also gave his instructions to the Assembly in a traditional form,
which made them sound much like military orders. First there was an
informal meeting or contio before proceedings began, although it is not
known specifically whether or not the candidates were given the chance to
make a speech as one last plea to the electorate. The consul would open the
business with a prayer, followed by a set formula that ordered the people to
choose the two new consuls. The voters were divided into centuries based
upon their property as recorded in the last census. Individual centuries were
composed of men from the same tribes, but only to this extent was there a
tribal element. Voting began with the seventy centuries of the First Class,
followed by the eighteen equestrian centuries. Each century chose two names
from the list of candidates to fill the two vacancies for consul. There were
193 centuries altogether, and the outcome of elections could be, and often
was, decided during the voting of the Second Class. Members of the First
Class, had to have significant property, although just how much is unclear
for this period. It would be a mistake to see all of them as very wealthy.
Some were almost as well off as equestrians, but others had relatively modest
means. There is no real trace of the members of this class having a strong
sense of their corporate identity or forming a social class in the modern
sense. The decision of the centuries voting first influenced subsequent voting,
since there seems often to have been an urge to choose the men who were
expected to win. Especially influential was the decision of one century from
the First Class chosen by lot to speak first. This was the centuria praerogativa,
and it was generally believed that the man whose name was placed first in
the vote of this century was bound to win the election.15
Like other elections, the voting of the Comitia Centuriata took place in
the saepta or ‘sheep-pens’ on the Campus Martius. Sometimes known also
as the oviles, this temporary structure of wooden enclosures for each of the
voting units was open to the elements and covered a wide area. We do not
know how many citizens normally chose to participate. Over 900,000 male
citizens were listed in the census, and at least several hundred thousand of
these lived in Rome itself, at least for some parts of the year. Yet it seems
extremely unlikely that the majority even of these residents could all have
voted even if they had wanted to, given the size of the saepta. Estimates
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have been made of the number of voters who could have been accommodated
within the voting enclosures, usually modified by entirely conjectural notions
of how long the voting would have taken, for the whole process had to be
complete by sunset. These vary from as many as 70,000, to 55,000, or as
few as 30,000. Each commentator has tended to suggest that these are
maximum figures and that the real numbers would usually have been much
lower. Although it would be unwise to place any real reliance on such
guesswork, it is safe to assume that only a minority of those eligible actually
did vote. Yet it is hard to say whether it was always substantially the same
voters who did assemble – this tends to be assumed, but we really do not
know. A consular election was certainly a great event, and significant numbers
of citizens deliberately travelled to Rome from all over Italy to take part.
Inevitably these tended to be the better off, but since the wishes of the
equestrian order and First Class carried such weight this made them all the
more important. It is very clear that election results were unpredictable and
that it was exceptionally rare for there to be two candidates for the consulship
both of whom were seen as certainties. The praerogativa century was selected
by lot on the day of the election, adding an additional element of uncertainty
to proceedings.16
During his own campaign Cicero had thought about visiting Cisalpine
Gaul to canvass amongst the wealthy citizens there and throughout his life
tried to maintain links with many parts of Italy. Where past favours and
friendship did not suffice, money might win the day. There were men in each
tribe who were recognised as able to sway the vote of their fellow tribesmen,
whether they voted as a whole or each in their own century. In 61 BC it was
widely reported that many of these men had visited the garden of Pompey’s
house to receive payment for their support for his candidate Afranius. In
60 BC the bribery was less blatant, but still employed by all candidates.
Lucceius’ money acted for himself and Caesar, while Bibulus drew not only
on his own resources, but was aided by a number of prominent senators. Cato
approved, just as he had refrained from prosecuting his brother-in-law from
electoral bribery in 63 BC when he had attacked Murena for the same thing.
Like any senator, he wanted his family to succeed. Suetonius claims that he
and Bibulus’ other backers were also motivated by fear of what Caesar might
do if as consul he had a colleague who was closely tied to him politically. This
may well simply be the view of hindsight – the connections and status of
Bibulus’ family probably were far more important factors.17
On the day of the election Caesar came first by a very comfortable margin.
Bibulus secured the second place, so that Lucceius ended up with little return
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the rise to the consulship, 100–59 bc
for his expenditure. Many of the voters must have named Caesar and Bibulus
on their ballots. Having reached the most senior magistracy, it was now a
question of what Caesar would do and how he would behave in his twelve
months of office.
The Land Law
In December 60 BC, just a few weeks before Caesar would take up the
consulship on 1 January 59 BC, Cicero received a visitor in his country villa.
The caller was Lucius Cornelius Balbus, the Roman citizen from Gades in
Spain who had recently served on Caesar’s staff and was now starting to
act as his political agent. Balbus spoke mainly of the agrarian law that
Caesar was planning to introduce in his consulship. Throughout his life
Cicero had a landowner’s aversion to any redistribution, and his opposition
had done much to block Rullus’ bill three years before. This time he had a
choice between opposing the new law, absenting himself for a while to avoid
committing himself, or supporting it. As Cicero wrote to Atticus, Caesar
expected him to back the bill. Balbus had ‘assured me that Caesar will follow
my own and Pompey’s opinion in every issue, and that he will strive to
reconcile Crassus to Pompey’. If Cicero followed this course he had the
prospect of ‘a very close alliance with Pompey, and, if I want, with Caesar
as well, and a reconciliation with my enemies, peace with the mob, and
security in old age’. Caesar was preparing carefully for his year of office
and trying to gain as many political allies as possible. Cicero, in spite of his
successes as consul, remained a ‘new man’, never entirely accepted by the
established families of the Senate, and his execution of the conspirators in
63 BC left him vulnerable to attack for overstepping his powers. For the last
decade he had consistently presented himself as Pompey’s loyal supporter.
Now Pompey was clearly associated with Caesar’s land bill and both men
wanted to secure Cicero’s oratory to help their cause. 18
After some thought, Cicero refused to commit himself. This was certainly
a disappointment for Caesar, but not a critical one, since he had already
secured two allies who were far more powerful. Balbus had hinted to Cicero
of the prospect of an alliance between Pompey and his arch-rival Crassus.
At some point during these months, Caesar was able to achieve just that,
bonding himself to both men so that, as Suetonius put it, ‘nothing could be
done in the Republic, which displeased any one of the three’.19 This political
alliance is known to scholars as the First Triumvirate – the Second
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Triumvirate being formed between Mark Antony, Octavian and Lepidus in
November 43 BC to oppose Caesar’s murderers. Triumvirate simply means
board of three, but unlike the latter alliance, which was formally instituted
by law with the three men receiving dictatorial powers, the association
between Crassus, Pompey and Caesar was informal. At first it was also
secret. The fact that in December 60 BC Balbus spoke only of the possibility
of reconciliation between Pompey and Crassus should not be taken as an
indication that the triumvirate had not yet been formed, merely that it had
not yet become public knowledge. Caesar had been closely associated with
Crassus for some time, and the latter had invested heavily in him when he
chose to act as surety for the debts that nearly prevented Caesar from leaving
to govern Further Spain. Caesar had time and again been a vocal supporter
of measures favouring Pompey. He had doubtless also met him – the world
of the Roman aristocracy was a small one, and the two had both been in
Rome for much of 70–67 BC – although there is no record of any particular
intimacy. Caesar had seduced Pompey’s wife during his absence overseas,
which had surely not endeared him to her husband, but then he had also
slept with Crassus’ wife without it preventing their political collaboration.
Both Pompey and Crassus had been frustrated in the last few years,
discovering that their wealth and influence were not sufficient to get
everything that they wanted. Pompey needed a more gifted and determined
consul than Piso or Afranius to do his bidding. Caesar had sacrificed a
triumph to reach the consulship immediately. For this to have been
worthwhile, he needed an opportunity for far greater military adventures
after his year of office was over, something that the ‘woods and paths’ of Italy
would certainly not provide. To make this possible he wanted influential
supporters. If he had joined with either Pompey or Crassus individually, it
was likely that the mutual antipathy of these two would have ensured that
the other opposed him. With Cato, Bibulus and their associates certain to
resist his every move, he simply could not afford another powerful enemy.
Therefore, the elegantly simple answer was to unite Pompey and Crassus,
knowing that their combined weight ought to be irresistible. Cato and the
other nobles who had blocked and embittered the two greatest men in the
Republic had created the opportunity to do this. Even so, it doubtless took
all of Caesar’s persuasiveness and charm to convince the old enemies that
he could deliver what they wanted if only they combined to support him.20
The negotiations to create the triumvirate may have begun by letter, but
it is unlikely that any real decision was made until Caesar returned to Italy
in the summer of 60 BC. Agreement may not have come until after the
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consular elections, when Caesar’s success strengthened his bargaining
position. It is not clear whether Pompey and Crassus openly joined forces
to canvass on his behalf. Even had they done so, this might not have been seen
as especially significant, since it was quite normal for personal enemies both
to support the same candidate if each had individual ties of friendship with
him. Co-operation between the three men was not widely suspected until
January 59 BC at the earliest. Later, it became even more obvious and
provoked outrage and the usual cries of the end of the Republic. Varro, the
polymath who had in 70 BC advised Pompey on senatorial procedure and later
served as his legate, wrote a pamphlet decrying the ‘three-headed beast’.
Over a century and a half later, Plutarch was adamant that the friendship
between the triumvirs, especially between Caesar and Pompey, was the root
cause of civil war and the end of the Roman Republic. It was the way in
which Caesar could gain so much power that in the end he could overcome
even Pompey. It was a judgement based on hindsight, but certainly not a
unique one, though it suggests an inevitability about future events that is
questionable. Yet in one sense Plutarch had understood that the triumvirate
was not at heart a union of those with the same political ideals and
ambitions. Pompey, Crassus and Caesar were all seeking personal advantage.
Pompey wanted land for his veterans and the ratification of his Eastern
Settlement, and Crassus relief for the tax collectors of Asia. Caesar was
very much the junior member, who needed powerful backers if he was to
achieve anything in the face of a recalcitrant consular colleague and gain an
important provincial command afterwards. He was effectively the tool of the
other two, for they needed a magistrate to introduce and force through the
legislation they needed. For this he would be rewarded. Each of the three
knew that the others would benefit from the arrangement, but were content
for this to happen so long as they achieved their own aims. It was ultimately
a marriage of convenience, to be broken by any of the members as soon as
it ceased to be to his advantage. To see it as anything more solid or permanent
risks misunderstanding the events of this and subsequent years. Dio speaks
of the three men taking solemn oaths, but this is most probably just later
propaganda. The secret swearing of oaths was always viewed as a sinister
act by the Romans. Catiline was supposed to have done this with his
followers. In later centuries this would also be one of the accusations against
the early Christians.21
The two consuls were equal in power, but each took precedence over his
colleague on alternate months. Caesar had come first in the polls on election
day, and so when he and Bibulus took up office on 1 January 59 BC, it was
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he who held precedence and so began the Republic’s year with prayers and
sacrifices. Each consul was accompanied by twelve lictors carrying the fasces
which symbolised a magistrate’s power. The consul with precedence in that
month was said to hold the fasces. Normally the lictors went ahead of a
magistrate, clearing a path through the crowd if this was necessary. As a
mark of respect to his colleague, Caesar stated at the beginning of the year
that whenever Bibulus held the fasces, his own lictors would follow behind
him. Instead only a single lesser official, the clerk or accensus, would precede
him. It was just one of a number of reasonable gestures that Caesar made
at the very beginning of the year. He also wanted his deeds and words, as
well as those of everyone else, to be a matter of public knowledge. Therefore,
speeches in the Senate and at public meetings were to be recorded by scribes
and published in the Forum. In the past this had only been done occasionally,
for instance, for some of the debates during Cicero’s consulship.22
Yet his immediate priority was the land bill, and it is probable that this
was read in the Senate and debated on either 1 or 2 January. Haste was
necessary, for a bill needed to be published twenty-four days before the Tribal
Assembly was called to vote upon it. If Caesar was to have this vote in
January while he himself held the fasces, then every day was precious, for
the Senate could not meet on the 3rd or 4th. Considerable effort had already
been devoted to preparing the bill and securing its passage before the end of
the previous year. We have already seen that Balbus had been sent to canvass
for Cicero’s active support. Caesar had been careful to learn from the failed
land bills of Rullus and Flavius. The publicly owned land in Campania –
the ager Campanus, which supplied the Treasury with a healthy revenue –
was formally exempted. Clauses also made it clear that private property
was to be respected. A commission would oversee the purchase and
distribution of the land to both Pompey’s veteran soldiers and large numbers
of the urban poor. The commissioners were only permitted to purchase land
from owners willing to sell, and would do so at the value recorded in the last
census. The funding for this was to come from the vast surplus provided by
Pompey’s victories. Other clauses of the law expressly recognised all existing
land occupation, lest fears grow up that there would be investigations into
whether or not it was legally owned. It also barred the new settlers from
selling their land for twenty years, to emphasise that it wanted to set up
stable and permanent new communities. There were to be twenty
commissioners, so that no one or two men should have overwhelming
patronage in their hands, although there does appear to have been an inner
council of five members to take some decisions. The commissioners would
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the rise to the consulship, 100–59 bc
be elected, and the law expressly excluded Caesar from being amongst their
number, so there would be no question of his proposing legislation from
which he would derive tangible benefit. Roman laws tended to be long and
complex – one of Rome’s most enduring legacies to the world is cumbersome
and tortuous legal prose. Before Caesar read the entire text to the Senate,
he announced that he would alter or remove any clause to which an objection
was raised.23
The bill was well crafted and sensible. There was little or nothing within
it that could be reasonably criticised, and the senators were aware that
anything they said in the debate was to be published. It was most probably
on 2 January that Caesar began to ask individual senators their opinion.
Crassus was the first of the ex-consuls and presumably gave his approval, as
did Pompey who would have been asked second. The others were somewhat
sullen, but unwilling to go on record as opponents of the bill. The same was
true of the former praetors. It was only when Caesar reached the ex-tribunes
and called upon Cato to speak that there was anything other than
unenthusiastic support or equivocation. Even Cato was forced to
acknowledge that the bill was a good one, but he felt that it was badly timed
and claimed that it would be a mistake to bring in any innovation during this
year. Some of the earlier speakers had managed to delay proceedings by
introducing tangential matters, but Cato was the true master of manipulating
the conventions of the House. Having been asked his view he gave it, and
then continued to give it, speaking without interruption as the minutes
stretched into hours. It was obvious that he planned once again to keep on
talking until the Senate had to end its session for the day and so prevent a
vote from being taken. He had employed the same tactic in the past and
always succeeded.
This time Caesar’s temper snapped and he ordered his attendants to arrest
Cato and lead him off to prison. Extreme though this action seems, there
was no other way of stopping a member of the House from continuing to
speak once he had been asked his opinion, since someone like Cato could
not simply be shouted down. It was a sign of Caesar’s frustration and rapidly
proved to be a mistake. Cato knew how to milk the situation by playing the
part of the righteous defender of the Republic who refused to bow to
‘tyranny’. In the Senate at least, there was widespread sympathy for him, even
though for a while the debate continued. One senator, Marcus Petreius, the
man who had defeated Catiline in battle in 62 BC and had already undergone
thirty years of military service, got up and left the House. Caesar demanded
to know why he was leaving before the session had ended and received the
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tart reply from the grizzled veteran that he would rather be in prison with
Cato than here with Caesar. The consul was already realising that he had
misjudged the situation. He is supposed to have hoped that Cato would call
upon one of the tribunes of the plebs to veto his arrest. However, the prisoner
was enjoying the moment too much to provide Caesar with an easy way
out. In the end the consul had to order his release. The day had been spent
without the Senate ever voting on a motion supporting the bill.24
Cato had won a victory and added once again to his reputation. Yet, like
many of the successes of his career, it was a hollow triumph that in the long
run made things worse. This time he was not facing a Piso or Afranius who
could easily be diverted or blocked. Caesar, who had done so much to appear
conciliatory, now declared that since the Senate would do nothing, he would
go directly to the Roman people. Probably the next day he held a meeting
in the Forum, and once again made every effort to be reasonable. He
summoned his colleague Bibulus to the Rostra and asked him his opinion of
the land bill in full view of the crowd. It is always difficult to know precisely
who attended these public gatherings and whether they were genuine
reflections of the views of the wider population or more like modern party
rallies. On the one hand there was little to stop any citizen – or indeed noncitizen
– who was in Rome from turning up and watching proceedings. On
the other hand the space in the Forum was limited and could not possibly
have contained more than a small fraction of the city’s vast population. It
seems doubtful that more than 5,000 people could actually have heard a
speech being made, although parts of the Forum could probably have
contained bigger crowds than this. Most scholars assume that the magistrate
calling the meeting would ensure that the gathering was packed with his
supporters. This is quite possibly true, although there is no real evidence
for how this was organised, and we should probably be a little cautious
about making their control of such gatherings absolute. In this case, the
mood of the crowd was certainly favourable to Caesar. Nevertheless, Bibulus
repeated Cato’s argument that whatever the merits of the bill, there should
be no innovations in his year of office. Caesar kept trying to persuade his
colleague, and told the crowd that they could have the law if only Bibulus
would consent. He lead the chant that called upon his fellow consul to agree,
but the pressured Bibulus only shouted out that, ‘You shall not have this
law this year, even if you all want it.’ After this crass comment, Bibulus
stormed off.25
Roman magistrates were not elected to represent anyone, and neither they
nor senators were answerable to any sort of constituency. In this way Roman
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politics differed markedly from the theory – if not necessarily the practice
– of modern democracies. Yet in the end the will of the Roman people was
supposed to be sovereign and for a consul to express such disdain for the
voters was a serious error. Caesar had pressured him into making the mistake
and now built upon this success. He summoned no more magistrates to his
meeting – or meetings, as there may well have been more than one – but
instead called upon distinguished senior senators. This was entirely normal
practice, and Caesar began with Crassus and Pompey. Both enthusiastically
supported the bill, for the first time giving a clear public indication of their
association with the consul. Pompey spoke of the need to reward with land
the soldiers who under his own command had fought so well for Rome. He
also reminded them that the spoils won by his armies had given the Republic
ample funds to make the distribution practical. Caesar worked on the crowd
once again, getting them to beg Pompey to ensure that the bill became law.
Always susceptible to adulation, he announced in reply to Caesar’s
questioning that if anyone ‘took up the sword’ to stop the bill, then he was
‘ready with his shield’ (or in another version ‘with his sword and shield’).
The threat was more than a little clumsy. It delighted the cheering crowds,
but made many senators nervous. Cato and Bibulus had blocked Caesar in
the Senate, but raising the stakes in the struggle had not deterred him or his
backers. In the end, Caesar was at least as stubborn and determined as they
were. Like Tiberius Gracchus in 133 BC, having failed to gain the Senate’s
approval, Caesar took his law directly to the voters. A date was set in the last
days of January for a Tribal Assembly to vote on the land bill. Caesar had
handled his public meetings well and all indications suggested that it would
be approved. Although they presented themselves as the true defenders of the
Republic, it is doubtful that Cato and Bibulus spoke for more than a small
minority of citizens. In fact, their views were probably only shared by a
minority, if perhaps a larger one, of the Senate, but in that case it included
many of the most distinguished and influential nobles.26
The Consulship of Julius and Caesar
In the early hours of the day when the Tribal Assembly was to vote on the
bill, supporters of Caesar, Pompey and Crassus began to position themselves
in key places around the Forum. Amongst them were probably some of the
veterans from Pompey’s army, who had a vested interest in the passage of the
bill. Some carried arms, which were at least partially concealed. It is doubtful
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that there were enough of them to control all access to the Forum, and as
the sun rose many other citizens came to join the crowd gathering in front
of the Temple of Castor and Pollux. The choice of this location for a public
meeting before the Assembly suggests that large numbers were anticipated,
as there was more space in this end of the Forum than around the Rostra
itself. It should be remembered that the proposed distribution of land does
seem to have had widespread support and, even more, that those actively
opposed to it, rather than simply unconcerned, were very few. Pompey’s
open support had convinced many who might have been less sure of Caesar’s
motives. Whether those present felt intimidated – or even protected – by the
burly men standing in groups around the Forum, is harder to say. Caesar
made a speech from the podium of the temple, once again explaining the need
for his law. In the middle of this, his consular colleague arrived. Bibulus was
accompanied by his attendants and lictors, and with him were Cato, three
of the year’s tribunes and a band of supporters. The crowd parted in front
of them as the consul made his way to join Caesar. Dio says that this was
in part out of natural respect for the supreme magistracy, but also because
they thought that he had come round and would no longer oppose the law.
Once he had reached Caesar on the platform of the temple – and perhaps
remembered his own grim joke about their joint aedileship – Bibulus made
it clear that his attitude had not wavered in the slightest. The presence of the
tribunes suggests that he and Cato planned to veto proceedings and prevent
an assembly from being held. He may also have considered announcing that
he had seen unfavourable omens, which would also have broken up the
meeting. However, matters may already have gone too far for this, since such
pronouncements were supposed to precede the order for the citizens to
separate into their tribes, which Caesar may already have given.27
The response of the crowd was immediately hostile. Doubtless the ensuing
violence was led by the armed supporters. Bibulus was pushed off the steps
of the temple as he tried to speak against Caesar. His lictors were
overpowered and the fasces they carried smashed – an important symbolic
humiliation for a magistrate. According to Appian, Bibulus bared his neck
and shouted out that he would rather stain proceedings with his death since
he could not stop Caesar. His attempt at heroism ended in farce, when a
basket full of dung was dumped over his head. Missiles were flung and
several attendants wounded, as were one or more of the tribunes in some
versions.
Several of the attendants were injured by missiles. No one was killed,
which may suggest that the violence was tightly controlled by Caesar and his
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allies. Covering the consul in manure rather than actually injuring him rather
adds to the impression of well-orchestrated and restrained use of force. This
was in marked contrast to most of the other periodic outbursts of violence
since 133 BC. Cato was unhurt and was the last to leave, all the while shouting
at his fellow citizens to persuade or intimidate them to his own point of
view. Appian claims that he was actually carried out by some of Caesar’s
supporters, but later sneaked back in and only gave up when he realised
that no one would listen to anything he said. The Assembly then convened
and approved the bill by a comfortable majority. The new law included a
clause requiring every senator to take an oath to abide by its clauses and
not to seek its repeal. Failure to do so would result in exile. Within a short
period – perhaps five days, which was the period for a similar clause in
another law – all had taken the oath. Metellus Celer, the consul who had
summoned the Senate to join him in his prison cell a year before, was
reluctant, but finally relented. Cato is said to have been persuaded by Cicero
that he was of more value to Rome in the city than as an exile. Bibulus had
summoned the Senate as soon as was possible after the day of the vote to
protest at Caesar’s behaviour. The meeting was most likely held on 1 February
when he assumed the fasces. However, Bibulus’ hope that the Senate would
condemn Caesar, perhaps pass the senatus consultum ultimum and strip
him of his office as had been done to Lepidus in 78 BC, proved unfounded.
No senator was willing to oppose Caesar or his law, given the enthusiasm
shown for both by so many of the people. Many of the members of the
House were anyway closely attached to his backers, Pompey and Crassus.28
Bibulus retired to his house and did not again appear in public as consul
for the rest of the year. He busied himself writing scurrilous pamphlets and
denunciations of Caesar, Pompey and their supporters, which he ordered
posted up in the Forum. Yet he remained out of sight. Soon it was common
to speak of the ‘consulship of Julius and Caesar’, rather than Bibulus and
Caesar. Suetonius repeats verses popular at the time:
Not long ago an act was passed during Caesar’s year, not that of
Bibulus.
I don’t remember anything done in Bibulus’ consulate.
Yet Bibulus was not entirely inactive, and still attempting to block Caesar.
The consuls had the task of fixing dates for those festivals that did not have
to be celebrated on a certain day. Bibulus chose to place these on days when
the Popular Assemblies were allowed to meet, preventing this from
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happening. However, his colleague was not obliged to acknowledge this,
and Caesar routinely ignored him. He could not prevent Bibulus from
declaring the celebration of periods of thanksgiving already voted by the
Senate to successful commanders. No public business could be conducted
during such periods, and some of the year was lost to Caesar and his allies
in this way. Yet these methods were not sufficient to block all activity in the
year, and so Bibulus routinely sent messengers to every meeting and assembly
held by Caesar to announce that he had seen unfavourable omens and that
therefore business had to be suspended. This practice of ‘watching the skies’
was hallowed by antiquity, but lacked the force of such an announcement
made in person. In this case it was a sham, and everyone realised this, but
archaic ritual could still have an impact in public life, as with the lowering
of the flag on the Janiculum, which ended the trial of Rabirius. It did raise
the question of whether or not any of Caesar’s laws were valid, although the
Romans themselves seem to have been unsure of the answer. Caesar himself
was Pontifex Maximus, and Pompey an augur, the college of priests with
particular responsibility for interpreting omens.29
Caesar refused to accept Bibulus’ declarations, for there were too many
measures that he needed to get through. For all the obstructions his year of
office was crammed with new legislation, the precise chronology of which
is uncertain. The land law had helped to achieve one of Pompey’s goals,
and at some point his Eastern Settlement was also finally ratified by a vote
of the Tribal Assembly. It may have been in a meeting to discuss this that
Lucullus spoke out against Caesar. The consul replied with such a fierce
tirade and with threats of prosecution that the senior senator flung himself
on the ground to beg for mercy. For Crassus there was a one-third reduction
in the sum due from the publicani for the right to collect the Asian taxes.
However, Caesar did formally warn the companies not to bid in such a
reckless way in future. He may have benefited directly from this relief, for
Cicero later claimed that Caesar was able to reward his agents with shares
from the major companies. He had long taken an interest in how Rome’s
provinces were governed, with most of his famous appearances in court
being prosecutions of oppressive governors. Now he framed a law that closely
regulated the behaviour of provincial governors, clarifying and improving
a law passed by Sulla as dictator. This proved highly successful and would
remain in force for centuries. Cicero later described it as an ‘excellent law’.
Both Caesar and Crassus had in earlier years tried to secure special
commissions to Egypt. Pompey, who had personally reorganised great
swathes of the eastern Mediterranean, also took a deep interest in the area.
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In 59 BC they ensured that the Roman Republic formally recognised the rule
of Ptolemy XII, an illegitimate son of Ptolemy XI. Ptolemy XII, who was
nicknamed Auletes or ‘the flute-player’, was deeply unpopular with the
Egyptians, but had paid a massive bribe to Pompey and Crassus. Suetonius
claimed that this amounted to 6,000 talents, or a staggering 36 million
denarii. Some of these laws were presented in Caesar’s own name, so that
each was a Julian law (lex Julia) on whatever the subject happened to be.
Others were put forward by sympathetic tribunes. The most notable of these
was Publius Vatinius, who comes across as a charming rogue in our sources.
On one occasion he led a crowd to Bibulus’ house and tried to make him
come out and announce his unfavourable omens in public. There was even
talk of arresting him. Vatinius supported Caesar, but it would be wrong to
see him merely as the consul’s tool, for like any senator he had ambitions of
his own. He helped Caesar because this brought him personal benefits,
including some of the shares in the tax-gathering companies mentioned
above. Cicero claims that in later years Caesar would wryly comment that
Vatinius had done nothing ‘for free’ during his tribunate.30
For all his legislative activity, Caesar had time for other things during 59
BC. He remained deeply in love with Servilia, and in these months presented
her with a pearl worth 1.5 million denarii – perhaps paid for from Ptolemy’s
bribe. Caesar had now been single since the divorce of Pompeia in 62 BC.
None of our sources tell us whether Caesar and Servilia felt any desire to
marry. Since both the divorce from Silanus and any union with Caesar would
have required Cato’s approval, it was obviously not a realistic possibility.
Julia, Caesar’s only child, was also now of marriageable age. In late April
or early May 59 BC two weddings were announced. Caesar took as his wife
Calpurnia, the daughter of Lucius Calpurnius Piso, who was obviously
favoured for the next year’s consulship and would win this easily with the
backing of the triumvirs. It was a move that secured a sympathetic successor
to protect Caesar’s interests. This marriage was politically successful and,
as far as we can tell, reasonably happy, although the couple spent the vast
majority of their time apart, since Caesar was to spend the bulk of the
remainder of his life on campaign overseas. The second marriage was
between Julia and her father’s political ally, Pompey the Great. Pompey was
six years older than Caesar, and the age difference between husband and
wife was great even by Roman standards. He had also divorced his last wife
for infidelity with, amongst others, his new father-in-law. The marriage
clearly had a political motivation and was announced suddenly. Julia was
already engaged to Quintus Servilius Caepio, the marriage scheduled for
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just a few days later. Caepio was understandably upset when the betrothal
was broken, prompting Pompey to give him his own daughter Pompeia as
a wife, a move which in turn involved the severing of her engagement to
Faustus Sulla, the dictator’s son. The creation of such a close family link
between Caesar and Pompey is usually seen as an indication that the consul
was becoming worried over the loyalty of his ally. Dio and our other sources
certainly felt that the initiative came from Caesar. He had taken a lot of
chances to force through the legislation Pompey wanted and would need
powerful friends in Rome when he himself set out for a province. Caesar
also needed Pompey’s support in order to secure an appropriate province for
himself. Yet the marriage may equally have been an indication of the
triumvirate’s success. Caesar had proved himself and a more permanent tie
was now worthwhile. Pompey’s new wife was young, attractive, intelligent
and seems to have had much of her father’s charm. The forty-seven-year-old
husband rapidly fell deeply in love with his teenage bride. His affection
appears to have been returned and the marriage was undoubtedly a happy
one. Pompey had always thrived on adoration, and willingly returned
devotion with devotion.31
The Backlash
From the middle of April to well into May, most senators tended to leave
Rome and visit their rural estates. As a result, there were rarely any meetings
of the Senate or assemblies during these weeks. Probably before this unofficial
recess began, Caesar had already put forward another agrarian law. This
time it dealt specifically with the publicly owned land in Campania, which
had been exempted from his first law. The commissioners for the first law
had already been elected and begun their work, and it may be that they had
found too little other land available for immediate purchase. Perhaps Caesar
had always thought that its distribution would also be necessary at some
point, or maybe the realisation that his first law was on its own inadequate
came more gradually. If we knew this, we would certainly have a clearer
idea of whether he had genuinely hoped to win over the Senate to support
his first land law, or had merely wanted to put them in the wrong in the eyes
of the electorate. Now 20,000 citizens – or rather 20,000 families since only
married men with three or more children were eligible – were selected from
Rome’s poor and settled on farms in Campania. The same commissioners
who oversaw the first law were probably placed in charge of this. The
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the rise to the consulship, 100–59 bc
emphasis on men with families is very interesting, for it was a consistent
feature of similar colonisation plans under the emperors, and was evidently
believed to encourage more serious and deserving colonists. Senators were
once again bound by a solemn oath to uphold this law and not seek its
repeal.32
Around the same time as this new land bill, the tribune Vatinius also put
forward a proposal to give Caesar a special five-year command, combining
the provinces of Illyricum and Cisalpine Gaul into one. These provinces
were garrisoned by three legions and were also conveniently close to Italy.
He was given the privilege of choosing his own legates, at least one of whom
would be granted propraetorian imperium. Both laws were passed, probably
at the end of May. By a vote of the Senate, Caesar’s province was increased
to include Transalpine Gaul, which had become vacant on the death of its
current governor, Metellus Celer, who had not actually reached his province
when he fell ill and died. A five-year command, with powerful armies – there
was an additional legion in Transalpine Gaul – and opportunities for military
adventure in the Balkans, or in Gaul itself, where trouble had been simmering
for some years, was just what Caesar had wanted. Bibulus could be left to
cope with the ‘woods and country paths’, although in fact he does not seem
to have taken up this post and did not actually take command in any province
for nearly a decade. Yet, although each of the triumvirs had achieved his
objective, their success was as yet unsecured, and the danger remained that
the hostility against them could produce opposition in the future. In the
worst possible scenario, a magistrate in the next or subsequent years would
move to have all the acts of Caesar’s consulship declared invalid. As a result
the triumvirs remained nervous and inclined to react strongly to any open
criticism.
In early April Cicero’s old consular colleague, Caius Antonius, was accused
of extortion during his governorship of Macedonia. In 63 BC this wealthy
province had actually been voted to Cicero himself, but he had voluntarily
given it to Antonius to keep the latter on his and the Republic’s side during
Catiline’s conspiracy. Although he had no high opinion of Antonius, and
probably guessed at his obvious guilt, the orator chose to defend him. The
prosecution was backed by Caesar and probably Crassus as well. The
prosecution carried the day and Antonius went into luxurious exile. During
his defence, Cicero made the mistake of openly criticising the triumvirs and
lamenting the poor state of the Republic. That was in the morning. In the
afternoon his personal enemy Clodius – the same man who had invaded the
Bona Dea festival to seduce Caesar’s wife Pompeia – was transferred from
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patrician to plebian status. Caesar as Pontifex Maximus presided over the
ceremony, with Pompey officiating as augur, which involved Clodius’
adoption by a plebian. Clodius had been angling unsuccessfully for this for
several years, wanting to stand for the tribunate, an office from which
patricians were banned. He had already taken to spelling his name in the
more vulgar form of Clodius rather than Claudius. As if to emphasise the
farcical nature of this ceremony, the plebian adopting Clodius was younger
than he was.33
Cicero spent much of the remainder of the year swinging between
nervousness and sudden optimism. For much of the rest of April he was at
his villa in Antium, ‘lying low’, as he put it. He was not alone, and attendance
in the Senate apparently slumped as many members of the House simply
stayed away. On one occasion, Caesar is supposed to have asked an elderly
senator why so few were present at a meeting. The old man, a certain
Considius, apparently replied that the others were afraid of Caesar’s armed
followers. When the consul asked why Considius himself continued to attend,
he was told that as an old man he was past fear, given that he had very little
future ahead of him anyway. Cicero welcomed the Campanian Law, because
he thought that it might alienate many senators from the triumvirs. He
pointed out that this redistribution would take away a significant source of
revenue. This was certainly true of taxation levied in Italy, but Pompey’s
conquests had more than compensated for this. Once more there were
attempts to win him over to join the triumvirs. Caesar offered him a post as
a legate with him in Gaul, but neither this nor any alternative quite swayed
him from his belief that they had acted wrongly. There was also mild
bitterness at Cato, whom he felt had only made things worse by his actions
earlier in the year, and at the principal nobles whose support for him could
not be relied on if he took a stand. By late April he began to hope that the
balance in public affairs was changing and wrote to Atticus, saying that ‘if
the power of the Senate was hateful, you can guess what will happen now
control has passed not to the people, but to three immoderate men. In a
short time you will see not only those of us who made no mistakes praised,
and even Cato, for all his errors.’34 On 18 April Cicero had heard that Clodius
planned to stand for the tribunate, but was publicly declaring that he would
annul all of Caesar’s laws. This was probably because he had been denied
a lucrative posting to Egypt and been offered a less attractive one to Armenia
instead. Gossip claimed that Caesar and Pompey were now denying that
they had ever performed the adoption ceremony. This was encouraging but
in May he wrote with some despair of Pompey, even suggesting that he was
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planning to establish a tyrannical rule. Later in the year a young senator
accused Pompey of this openly in the Forum and came close to being lynched,
although whether by the triumvirs’ partisans or the wider crowd is unclear.
Cicero’s description of this man, Caius Cato, as ‘a youth of little political
sense, yet still . . . a Cato’, provides a clear indication of the power of a
famous name at Rome.35
As the summer drew on, Cicero reported that the most vocal opponent
of the triumvirs was Caius Scribonius Curio, son of the consul of 76 BC.
Like Caius Cato, Curio was still a young man, and it is striking that the
triumvirs faced little open criticism from distinguished senators and former
magistrates. It was another indication of the weakness of the senior ranks
of the Senate in these years, largely as a result of the civil war and more
recent disturbances. Sometimes, however, it was a crowd of ordinary citizens
who chose to protest. Pompey was hissed when he took his seat in a place
of honour at games held by Gabinius, the man who as tribune had secured
him the command against the pirates and subsequently served as his legate.
At a play an actor was cheered when he emphasised the line ‘You are great
through our misery’, which was evidently meant to be taken as an attack on
Pompey the Great. According to Cicero:
When Caesar came in the cheering died away; but then young Curio
followed him and there was applause of the kind Pompey used to get
in the days when the Republic was still secure. Caesar was very irritated.
They say that a letter flew to Pompey at Capua. They are upset with
the equites who rose and cheered Curio – they [the triumvirate] are
now enemies of everyone.36
Bibulus’ vitriolic and often filthy edicts were read with glee by many
citizens, and Cicero spoke of the crowd that was usually clustered around
them in the Forum. Their enjoyment need not have been a sign of particular
sympathy for the housebound consul – throughout the ages political satire
has often amused even those who disagreed with it. The Romans had a
robust sense of humour and enjoyed such crude invective. Caesar was the
target for much of his colleague’s insults, but seems not to have been bothered
by it. Pompey never coped well with criticism and on 25 July was moved to
make a speech in the Forum defending himself against these slurs. Cicero
found the sight pathetic, for he continued to hope for a renewal of friendship
with the man he had praised so often, but noted that all Pompey achieved
was to attract even more attention to Bibulus’ pamphlets. Pompey was by
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this time continually assuring Cicero that he need have no fears of Clodius.
The latter had evidently dropped his plans to attack Caesar’s laws – if indeed
he had ever seriously considered this and was not aiming at the tribunate all
along. By the autumn Cicero felt, or perhaps wanted to believe, that Pompey
regretted the disturbances of earlier in the year and his alienation from the
nobles in the Senate.37
In late summer or early autumn a strange episode occurred, which is still
not fully understood. Vettius, the man who in 62 BC had accused Caesar of
complicity in Catiline’s conspiracy and been beaten and imprisoned for his
pains (see p.145), was brought before the Senate and declared that he knew
of another ‘plot’. He had become friendly with Curio and eventually told
him that he planned to murder Pompey – or both Pompey and Caesar in
another version. Curio told his father, who promptly told Pompey, and the
Senate was summoned and called Vettius in for questioning. Now he accused
Bibulus of inciting Curio to murder Pompey, and perhaps Caesar as well. He
named several other conspirators, among them Servilia’s son Brutus, now in
his mid twenties. He, and at least one of the other men named, could perhaps
be seen to possess a motive, since Pompey had executed their fathers during
the civil war. One of Bibulus’ servants was supposed to have supplied the
dagger that the young conspirators were to use. At the time Cicero believed
that Caesar was behind Vettius, and that he had wanted to neutralise Curio
for criticising the triumvirs. Yet it seems extremely unlikely that he would
have wanted his lover’s son implicated. Curio defended himself well against
the attack, while Pompey had already thanked Bibulus some months before
for warning him against assassins. Vettius’ story was treated with great
suspicion and he was placed into custody, for having by his own admission
been discovered with a concealed dagger in the Forum. On the following
day Caesar and Vatinius called him to the Rostra at a public meeting. This
time Vettius made no mention of Brutus. Cicero, doubtless hinting at Caesar’s
relationship with Servilia, noted slyly that ‘it was obvious a night, and a
night-time plea had intervened’.38 Instead he claimed that Lucullus and a
number of other men were involved, one of them Cicero’s own son-in-law.
No one was inclined to believe him and he was to be put on trial, but was
found dead in his cell before this could begin.
How Vettius died is unclear. Plutarch says that it was called suicide, but
that marks of strangulation were visible on his neck. Suetonius, who claimed
that Caesar was behind the whole affair, says that he had Vettius poisoned
A few years later Cicero shifted the blame for this episode onto Vatinius
rather than Caesar. More recently, scholars have varied in their opinions as
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to who was really behind it. Some have blamed Caesar, but others have
speculated about Clodius, and even Pompey himself. On the one hand, the
business may have helped to make Pompey nervous, for he had always had
a morbid fear of assassination, and confirm him in his loyalty to the
triumvirate in spite of the barrage of abuse from Bibulus and his
unaccustomed popularity. Yet the naming of Brutus makes it very unlikely
that Caesar inspired the whole thing. More probably he simply sought to
profit from the affair once it had been revealed. The omission of Brutus’
name on the second day indicates that the informer had come under pressure.
Vettius may have been acting on his own account, craving a return to the
limelight or hoping to restore his fortunes with the reward an informer might
win. Caesar obviously did try to use him, but quickly realised that there
was little to be gained and that Vettius could not be relied upon. It is plausible
enough that he gave the orders to kill the prisoner, who was after all a man
who had attacked him in the past, but this cannot be proven.39
Bibulus did manage to delay the consular elections from July to October.
However, in spite of the fact that he had the right to preside over these, he
remained at home and the task was left to Caesar. The consuls elected for
58 BC were Caesar’s new father-in-law Calpurnius Piso and Gabinius, both
of them favourable to the triumvirs. How things went in the next months
would be critical for Caesar’s fortunes, for the longer that his legislation was
respected then the harder it would be for anyone to raise serious questions
over its validity. At the end of his year as consul, Caesar lingered for some
months in or near Rome to see how events were likely to take shape. Clodius
had been elected to the tribunate and, since his own transferral to plebian
status was bound up with the legality of Caesar’s actions as consul, was now
clearly going to devote much effort to confirming their validity. Dio says that
he forbade Bibulus from delivering a speech when he finally emerged on
the last day of his consulship – just as Metellus Nepos had stopped Cicero
at the end of 63 BC. Two of the new praetors attacked Caesar, and he
answered their criticisms in a meeting of the Senate. Three speeches he
delivered in these debates were published to present a lasting defence of
his actions in 59 BC. Sadly these have not survived. However, after three
days the House had come to no decision. An attempt by one of the new
tribunes to prosecute him was blocked by the majority of the college. It was
not until March 58 BC that Caesar finally left for Gaul, where a situation
had arisen that required his immediate attention.40
Caesar had achieved a great deal during his consulship. An extensive
programme of land resettlement was now under way and would continue
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throughout the decade. Pompey had secured his Eastern Settlement and
Crassus had gained relief for the tax farmers. Caesar, through allying himself
with the other two, had been able to do all this in the face of opposition
that his initially conciliatory actions had not been able to win over. It had
been a turbulent year, with tensions running high on a number of occasions.
Cicero wrote in his letters of his fears of tyranny and impending civil war.
Neither had happened, but many of the conventions and precedents that
regulated public life had come under great strain and been further eroded.
Bibulus’ and Cato’s determination to block Caesar at all costs had done as
much damage as his own determination to push on at all costs. Yet for the
moment Caesar had won, and had gained the chance to win military glory
on a grand scale. Now he had a long and important provincial command it
was a question of winning victories for the Republic. If his military successes
were grand enough – and Caesar was determined that they would be – then
surely even his bitterest opponents would have to accept him as a great,
perhaps the greatest, servant of the Republic, and the more dubious acts of
his consulship could be forgotten or pardoned. The passage of the Lex
Vatinia giving him Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum, and the subsequent addition
to his province of Transalpine Gaul, had delighted Caesar. Elated by this
success, he declared in the Senate that, since ‘he had gained his greatest
desire to the great grief of his enemies, he would now mount on their heads’.
Whether this was an intentional double entendre or not, one senator retorted
that that would be a hard thing for a woman to do, referring to the old story
of Caesar and Nicomedes, which Bibulus’ edicts had revived. Caesar quipped
cheerfully back that it should not be difficult, since ‘Semiramis . . . had been
queen of Syria and the Amazons in days of old had held sway over a great
part of Asia.’ It seems fitting to end the account of this year with a crude
joke, as well as an episode that shows Caesar’s confidence and selfsatisfaction.
41
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Pa rt two

PROCONSUL
58–50 BC
IX
Gaul
Caesar ‘also fought fifty pitched battles, the only commander to surpass
Marcus Marcellus, who fought thirty-nine.’ – Pliny the Elder, mid first
century AD.1
‘Caesar possessed the highest skill and elegance of style, but also the most
perfect knack of explaining his plans.’ – Aulus Hirtius, 44 BC2
Caesar was forty-one when he set out from Rome for his province. He would
not return to the city for nine years. The remainder of his life was dominated
by warfare to a degree that it is difficult to exaggerate. From this moment on,
there were only two years in which he was not involved in major military
operations. In 50 BC this was because Gaul was conquered and he was busily
engaged in settling the region. In 44 BC he was murdered just days before
setting out for grand new campaigns against first Dacia and then Parthia. In
most years he fought at least one, and often several, major battles or sieges.
Pliny claimed that altogether Caesar led his army in fifty battles, while Appian
says that thirty of these engagements occurred during the campaigns in Gaul.
It is impossible to confirm or deny the precision of these numbers, since in any
period of history there is rarely agreement as to just what constitutes a battle
and what is merely an engagement or skirmish. The fact remains that these
authors reflected the widespread belief that Caesar had fought more often
and with more consistent success than any other Roman general. Alexander,
with whom he was frequently compared, took part in only five pitched battles
and three major sieges, although he was in many smaller encounters. Hannibal,
who was up against a very different opponent, fought more big battles, but
probably did not surpass, or perhaps even equal, Caesar’s total of major
engagements. It was not until the era of Napoleon, with the increased intensity
of warfare, that a few army leaders began to see more days of serious combat
than Caesar and the other great commanders of the ancient world.3
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The contrast between Caesar’s life before and after 58 BC could not be more
marked. Up until then, he had spent at the very most some nine years outside
Italy, and perhaps half that time in some sort of military service. This was
fairly typical for a Roman senator, if anything perhaps slightly below the
average, although not in comparison with men like Cicero who relied on
constant appearances in the courts to keep themselves in the public eye.
Once again, it is worth emphasising that for all his flamboyance, association
with dubious characters and the controversial nature of some of his actions
during the consulship, the overall pattern of Caesar’s career had been broadly
conventional. Having reached the consulship two years before the normal age,
he was just marginally younger than the average proconsul. Compared to
Alexander the Great, Hannibal or Pompey his opportunity came very late
in life. Alexander was dead by the age of thirty-three, and Hannibal fought
his last battle at forty-five. Napoleon and Wellington were just a year older
than Hannibal when they clashed at Waterloo, though Blücher was seventythree.
In contrast Robert E. Lee was in his fifties when the American Civil
War broke out, as was Patton when America entered the Second World War.
Neither by Roman nor modern standards could Caesar have been considered
elderly in 58 BC, but neither would it have been obvious to any of his
contemporaries that he was about to prove himself as one of the greatest
commanders of all time. In the past he had shown talent, courage, and selfconfidence
during his spells of military service, but plenty of other ambitious
men had displayed similar ability. As always in Caesar’s story, we need to be
very careful not to allow hindsight to impose a sense of inevitability on
events. The scale of Caesar’s successes in Gaul was startling, even in a Rome
so recently dazzled by Pompey’s achievements. Yet the balance between
success and failure was often narrow, and he might easily have been killed,
or have died from accident or disease before he could return. That he would
eventually come back as a rebel to fight against his former ally and son-inlaw
Pompey was unlikely to have occurred to anyone. When Caesar went to
Gaul he had plans and ambitions, and doubtless considered many possible
outcomes, but in the end he was trusting to fortune for his future.
The War Commentaries
Caesar had worked hard to win the opportunity for such a great command,
running up huge debts, taking great political risks and making many enemies.
He needed colossal victories if all this was to become worthwhile, but he also
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proconsul 58–50 BC
had to make sure that people knew about his achievements if he was to gain
real advantage from them. Pompey’s campaigns against the pirates and
Mithridates had been recorded by Theophanes of Mytilene, a Greek scholar
who had accompanied his staff. Caesar had no need of the literary services
of other men and would record his victories in his own words. He had
already published a number of his speeches as well as several now lost works,
some of which he had written as a youth. The Emperor Augustus later
suppressed these immature works, including a tragedy entitled Oedipus,
and also his Praises of Hercules and A Collection of Maxims, and none of
the speeches have survived other than in fragments. There was a tradition for
Roman generals to celebrate their achievements by writing commentaries –
a genre that was seen as distinct from history, and was often viewed as the
material for subsequent historians to use. Caesar eventually produced ten
books of War Commentaries, with seven covering the operations in Gaul
from 58–52 BC, and three more dealing with the Civil War against Pompey
from 49–48 BC. After his death, several of his own officers added four more
books covering the operations in Gaul in 51 BC, the campaigns in Egypt and
the East in 48–47 BC, Africa in 46 BC, and Spain in 45 BC. No other
commentaries have survived in anything other than the tiniest fragments,
making it difficult to know whether or not Caesar’s books conformed to
the established style.4
Caesar’s Commentaries on the Gallic War was from the beginning
acknowledged as one of the greatest works of Latin literature. Cicero had
great respect for Caesar’s oratory and was similarly generous in his praise
of the Commentaries:
They are admirable indeed . . . like naked forms, upright and beautiful,
pared of all ornamentation as if they had removed a robe. Yet while he
wished to provide other authors with the means for writing history,
he may only have succeeded in pleasing the incompetent, who might
like to apply their ‘gifts’ to his material, for he has deterred all sane men
from writing; for there is nothing better in the writing of history than
clear and distinguished brevity.5
These words were written in 46 BC, when Cicero was becoming
increasingly uncomfortable with Caesar’s dictatorship, so it may be that
there was just a hint of double meaning when he said that ‘men of sound
judgement’ had been put off from writing their own narratives of his
achievements. Nevertheless, it is clear that his praise for the literary quality
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of the books was entirely genuine, perhaps especially because the stark
simplicity of their narrative contrasted so much with his own style of rhetoric.
On one occasion Caesar declared that an orator should ‘avoid an unusual
word as the helmsman of a ship avoided a reef’. Apart from necessary
technical or foreign terms, he adhered staunchly to this principle and
produced a narrative that was clear and fast-paced. Rarely, if ever, is it
emotional or melodramatic, for he allowed the drama and importance of the
events to speak for themselves. Referring to himself always in the third
person, while his soldiers are nostri or ‘our men’, he tells the story of the army
of the Roman people under their properly appointed commander, as they
struggle against ferocious enemies and even nature itself. At every stage
Caesar presents his actions as entirely in the interest of the Republic.
Although the modern reader may sometimes balk at the catalogue of
unabashed imperialism, massacre, mass execution and enslavement contained
in the Commentaries, a contemporary Roman would not have found these
things shocking. Indeed, it must have been hard, even for one of Caesar’s
political opponents, not to get carried along with the excitement of the
narrative.6
Many political and military leaders have written their own versions of
the events in which they were involved, but few have matched the literary
standard of Caesar’s Commentaries. In recent times Churchill probably
comes closest, in the sheer power of his words and the speed with which he
produced his account so soon after the Second World War. Yet there is one
major difference, both from Churchill and the vast majority of other famous
generals, for all of them wrote for posterity, knowing that their own careers
were substantially over and wishing to imprint their chosen version of events
on future opinion. In contrast Caesar was far more concerned with the
contemporary audience, and wrote to help further his career and gain even
more opportunities for glory (which had also been true of Churchill with his
earlier writings). It is not absolutely clear when the seven books of
Commentaries on the Gallic War were written and released, but it is often
asserted that they came out altogether in 51–50 BC. The conjecture – and
it is no more than this in spite of the certainty with which it is often asserted
– is that in the months of tension that would eventually culminate in the Civil
War, Caesar was hoping to win as much support as possible in Rome. Yet
this had been true from the moment he left for Gaul in 58 BC, for neither he,
nor any other man pursuing a public career, could afford to be forgotten by
the electorate and the influential groups in the city. It would have been strange
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proconsul 58–50 BC
for him to wait so long. Moreover, differences in the treatment of some
individuals and apparent contradictions of detail between the various books
make it more than likely that each was published separately.
A better case can actually be made for each book having been produced
after the year of campaigning it describes, in the winter months before
operations could resume. Even the advocates of the later collective release
assume that Caesar sent an annual report to the Senate and that this was
widely circulated, and sometimes suggest that this was similar to the form
of the Commentaries as we have them. There is no reason to believe that in
most cases Caesar lacked the time during the winters in Gaul to produce a
book. Hirtius, one of his own senior subordinates who later added the eighth
book of Gallic Commentaries, reflected Cicero’s praise for Caesar as a stylist,
but also noted the great speed with which he wrote these books. Another
officer, Asinius Pollio, believed Caesar intended eventually to rewrite them,
which could also be an indication that they were rapidly produced to fulfil
an immediate political need. Neither comment proves that each book was
published individually – it would obviously have been a considerable task to
compose all seven books in the months at the end of the Gallic campaigns
– but on the whole it does seem extremely probable.7
Another widespread assumption is that the Commentaries were aimed first
and foremost at the senatorial and equestrian classes, but once again this may
be questioned. In his consulship he had ordered the publication of all
senatorial proceedings, which was evidently not for the benefit of senators.
Levels of literacy in the Roman world are very difficult to judge, so that we
do not know how many readers there were outside the wealthy elite. However,
more practically we can judge that any system where each copy of a book
had to be written out by hand did mean that books were a rare and expensive
luxury. Yet Cicero noted the enthusiasm with which men of humble station,
such as artisans, devoured history books. There are hints in our sources that
the public reading of books was common and could be very well attended.
It does seem probable that Caesar, the man who had always been a popularis
and reliant on the support of a wide section of the community, was keen to
engage this audience. It is striking that senatorial and equestrian officers
do not figure very prominently in the Commentaries, and at times are shown
in an unflattering light. In contrast, the ordinary soldiers of the legions
consistently show courage and prowess. In most cases even when they are
criticised, it is usually for excessive enthusiasm that leads the legionaries to
forget their proper discipline. Even more than the ordinary rank and file
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soldiers, the centurions who lead them are most often painted in heroic
colours. Only a few of these officers are named, but generally it is the
centurions as a group who keep calm at times of crisis and fight and die for
the approval of their commander. This favourable portrayal of centurions
and soldiers may well have pleased patriotic aristocrats and equestrians, but
it was surely even more appealing to the wider population. Caesar cultivated
these Romans and did not simply speak to the elite. It is probable that some
groups mattered to him more than others, for instance those citizens enrolled
to vote in the First Class in the Comitia Centuriata, but we know so little
of life outside the circles of the elite that it is hard to be sure.8
From the start of the campaigns in Gaul, until the very end of the Civil
War, we know far more about Caesar’s activities, but the overwhelming
majority of this information comes from his own account in the
Commentaries. For the campaigns in Gaul in particular, there is scarcely
any information in other sources that does not seem to have been derived
from Caesar’s version. If we have reason to doubt the basic truthfulness of
the Commentaries then we have nothing with which to replace them.
Napoleon was a great admirer of Caesar as a commander, placing him
on the list of Great Captains whose campaigns should be studied by any
aspiring general, but even so he doubted the truthfulness of some aspects of
his account, and spent some time during his exile criticising them. However,
given the flexible attitude to the truth in his own bulletins and memoirs, he
may simply have seen this as natural. Caesar wrote for a political purpose,
to build up his reputation as a great servant of the Republic and show that
he deserved his pre-eminence. Therefore, the Commentaries were works of
propaganda and showed everything he did in the most favourable light.
According to Suetonius: ‘Asinius Pollio believes that they were composed
without too much diligence or absolute concern for truth, since often Caesar
was too willing to believe the versions which others gave of their actions, or
gave a twisted version of his own, whether on purpose or merely from
genuine forgetfulness. . ..’9
Pollio served under Caesar in the Civil War, but was not with him in Gaul,
and it is more than likely that his comments were mainly aimed at Caesar’s
account of that later conflict. The claim that Caesar was too ready to accept
the accounts others gave of their actions, may well have had a bitterly
personal note, since Pollio was one of the few survivors from a disastrous
landing in Africa led by a man given favourable treatment in the
Commentaries. Yet if he was right that Caesar also distorted some of his own
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actions, then to what extent could this have occurred? Archaeology has
confirmed some of his account of operations at Gaul, but it is a clumsy tool
with which to reconstruct the details of military operations, still less the
motivation and thought behind them. More importantly it is clear that
throughout the conflict in Gaul, the many senators and equestrians serving
with Caesar’s army regularly wrote to their family and friends. In later years
Cicero’s brother Quintus became one of Caesar’s legates. The surviving
correspondence includes little military detail, but it is striking that Quintus
was even able to send a letter to his brother while the army was in Britain
for a few months in 54 BC. There was clearly a constant flood of information
going back to Rome from the army. In 56 BC Cicero attacked Caesar’s fatherin-
law Lucius Calpurnius Piso’s record as proconsul of Macedonia in the
Senate. Piso had flouted convention by not sending regular dispatches to
the Senate, but nevertheless Cicero claims that he and everyone else in the
House was well informed about the proconsul’s activities and failures.
Most of the critics of Caesar’s truthfulness employ details from his own
narrative against him. Defeats are mentioned, as are a number of
controversial actions. Ultimately, Caesar could not risk widespread invention
or blatant distortion because these would readily have been spotted by his
audience. He could, and clearly did, present everything in the most favourable
light possible, passing the blame for defeats onto others, justifying his actions
with apparently calm reason, and not highlighting operations that achieved
little. Yet in the end he had to stick closely to facts – particularly those facts
that were of most concern to a Roman audience – if the Commentaries were
to achieve their aim of winning over public opinion. Caution must be used
in dealing with Caesar’s narrative, as with any other source, but there is
good reason to believe that, at the very least, his account recounts the basic
events accurately.10
Caesar’s Army
The army garrisoning Caesar’s province in 58 BC was twice the size of the
force that he had taken over in Spain, and in due course it would double
and then treble in size. He had had about five years of military service, with
no prior experience of warfare in this region, but, as we have seen, neither
of these things were especially unusual for a Roman commander. Caesar
coped well with the challenge, but it is a mistake to assume that from the very
beginning he showed the sureness of touch that has led to his universal
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gaul
recognition as one of the greatest commanders of all time. He had to get to
know his new army and learn best how to use it, and this process was not
instant. However, his most senior officers were all men whom he had selected
himself and brought with him to the province.
The most important were the legates – the name legatus meant
representative and was used both for ambassadors and senior officers who
‘acted on behalf of’ a governor – who were invariably senators. As far as we
can tell none of these men had any more experience of soldiering than
Caesar himself. He had asked Cicero to accompany him in this role, which
is a good indication that useful political connections were often of greater
importance than head-hunting military talent. The orator had turned Caesar
down, but from the beginning of the campaigns he had at least five, and
possibly six or even ten, legates on his staff. The most senior was Labienus,
who was actually granted propraetorian imperium of his own and not merely
delegated power. The man who as tribune in 63 BC had co-operated with
Caesar and brought the prosecution against Rabirius receives more attention
in the Commentaries than any other legate, and proved himself to be an
exceptionally gifted soldier. However, in 58 BC he may well have had no more
prior experience of warfare than Caesar, and his talent blossomed and
flourished only on arrival in Gaul. Labienus had served in Asia back in the
seventies under the command of Publius Servilius Vatia Isauricus. He and
Caesar may have crossed paths during these years, although it is equally
possible that Labienus did not arrive in the province until after Caesar had
returned to Rome. Extensive service under Pompey has been conjectured, but
there is no actual evidence to support this. Similarly, many scholars have
assumed that Labienus had held the praetorship in 60 or 59 BC, but again this
is plausible rather than actually attested.11
Balbus was another old associate of Caesar’s and was once again his
praefectus fabrum, but it seems that he did not spend too long in Gaul before
returning to Rome to act as one of Caesar’s key agents. Another man who
served Caesar in the same role was Mamurra, who came from Formiae and
made himself notorious for the massive fortune he acquired by dubious
methods during his time in Gaul. The tribune Vatinius, who had secured
the five-year command for him, seems to have been in Gaul for a while, but
this may have been later in the decade. Quintus Pedius seems to have been
with Caesar from the start. The identity of Caesar’s other legates in 58 BC
is unclear, but if they were not already with him, then several men were soon
to join him. One was Aulus Hirtius, the man who would eventually add the
eighth book to the Commentaries. Another was Servius Suplicius Galba,
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proconsul 58–50 BC
who had served under Pomptinus during the rebellion of the Allobroges and
so had recent experience of warfare in Gaul. Quintus Titurius Sabinus and
Lucius Aurunculeius Cotta were probably also both there from the start.
(In spite of the cognomen Cotta, he is unlikely to have been a relation on
Caesar’s mother’s side, since their nomen was Aurelius.) Cotta had written
a treatise on the Roman constitution, and there was a pronounced literary
feel to Caesar’s staff. From 58 to 56 BC, this also included Crassus’ younger
son Publius, who was a keen student of literature and philosophy and an
intimate of Cicero for that reason. This was an indication of the continuing
closeness between Caesar and Crassus, which had not needed cementing
with a marriage alliance. In his mid twenties, Publius Crassus was to prove
a bold and gifted commander, but began the campaign as the commander
of the army’s cavalry (praefectus equitum), before being promoted to legate
in the following year. Another young man of talent who served with Caesar
probably from the start of the campaign was Decimus Junius Brutus, son of
Sempronia who had notoriously been closely involved in Catiline’s conspiracy.
Finally Caesar also had the assistance of a quaestor, but his identity is
unknown.12
The most striking thing about Caesar’s legates is their comparative
obscurity. Crassus, and to a slightly lesser extent Brutus, belonged to
distinguished families, and both their fathers had become consul. Labienus
was a ‘new man’ and had not yet held a magistracy more senior than the
tribunate, as had Vatinius. Cotta’s family seem not to have been prominent
for many generations, while even less is known of the background of Sabinus
and several other officers. On the whole the great noble families, especially
those who had done well under Sulla and afterwards, chose not to accept
employment with Caesar. This is in marked contrast to the very distinguished
list of legates who had served under Pompey in the command against the
pirates. Most of the legates in Gaul seem to have been looking to restore or
improve their family’s situation, and not a few were to do so. This was
probably also true of many of the less senior officers. In his account of 58 BC
Caesar talked of ‘the military tribunes, prefects, and others who had
accompanied Caesar from the city to earn his friendship, but had no great
military experience’. Men who were already well established did not need
to tie themselves to Caesar in 58 BC. No one knew that he would prove to
be such a great commander and that he would not march to defeat or his own
death on some Gaulish hillside. They might guess that he would prove
generous with whatever success he did have, for his reputation was already
established in this respect. Seeking a closer link with Caesar was a gamble
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more likely to appeal to those unable to succeed any other way. As far as we
can tell Caesar seems to have welcomed almost anyone, eager as he always
was to do as many favours as possible and so place more men under
obligation to him.13
Caesar chose his own senior officers, but the army he was to command
was already in existence. Altogether, Illyricum, Transalpine and Cisalpine
Gaul contained a garrison of four legions – the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and
Tenth. It is not known when and by whom these had been raised, but it is
quite likely that they had been formed several years before and had already
seen active service. On paper a legion in this period consisted of a little
under 5,000 men, but as in all armies in all periods of history, units on
campaign were often seriously under strength. We hear of one of Caesar’s
legions during the Civil War that was only able to muster just under 1,000
effectives. A legion had no permanent commander, but its most senior officers
were the six tribunes, who were usually equestrians. Some were young
aristocrats who had not yet been enrolled in the Senate, while others were
semi-professional officers, who sought continued appointments in successive
legions. Twenty-four tribunes were elected by the Roman people each year,
this traditional number being intended to supply the army of two legions,
which was allocated to each consul in earlier centuries. Caesar had himself
been elected in this way, but there were now usually too many legions in
service at any one time to rely on this method. Most, if not all, of Caesar’s
tribunes were appointed by him, although some may already have been with
the four legions. The Commentaries never mention a tribune actually
commanding a legion, and Caesar normally gave this task to his legates and
his quaestor. However, the tribunes clearly had important staff and
administrative roles, and could command sizeable detachments.14
Beneath a tribune was a centurion, which is better thought of as a grade
rather than a specific rank. There were sixty centurions in a legion. Each
commanded a century of eighty men – the title had probably never meant
anything more specific than around one hundred men – and six centuries
combined to form a cohort of 480, which was the basic tactical unit of the
army. Our sources are silent on the matter, but it is highly probable that the
most senior of the six centurions commanded the cohort in battle. There
were ten cohorts in a legion, and the first cohort had greater prestige than
the rest for it protected the silver or gilded eagle that was the standard of the
entire legion. The centurions of the first cohort had immense prestige and
they, probably along with centurions who commanded the other cohorts,
formed the ‘centurions of the first grade’ (primi ordines), who were often
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included in the commander’s briefings. Centurions have sometimes been
portrayed as ‘sergeant-major’ types, grizzled veterans promoted only after
long service in the ranks, but there is actually very little evidence to support
this view. Never in the entire Commentaries does Caesar mention promoting
an ordinary legionary into the centurionate, but then he says nothing at all
about their origins, presumably because he assumed that his audience would
know this. Many men may have been directly commissioned as centurions,
something that we know was common under Rome’s emperors, when we
even hear of equestrians serving in this way. The administrative role that
was an important part of the job evidently required a good standard of
literacy and numeracy, neither of which may have been common amongst
the ordinary soldiers. Once in the rank it is certain that centurions were
socially and economically very distant from the ordinary legionaries, for
their pay was several – perhaps as much as ten – times greater. Probably
most centurions already came from the more prosperous classes and not
the very poor who formed the bulk of the rank and file. If so, then the
prominence they receive in the Commentaries becomes all the more
interesting. It may well be that they were drawn from amongst the First
Class, which played such a decisive part in the voting in the Comitia
Centuriata. Appointments to this grade, and subsequent promotions, would
then have taken on an importance beyond the purely military for a
commander like Caesar, fitting in with the wider networks of patronage
that underlay so much of Roman society. Yet unlike the more senior officers,
centurions do seem to have stayed with the army for long periods, and it
would not be a mistake to see them as essentially professional officers.15
The legions of earlier centuries, which had been drawn from a crosssection
of society and had excluded all those with insufficient property to
afford their own equipment, were now a distant memory. Marius had openly
recruited from the capite censi, those so poor that they were counted simply
as numbers in the census, but he had probably just acknowledged a trend that
was already well established. There was now little to attract the better off
and well educated to the legions. Discipline could be brutal, with floggings
common, and execution the penalty for more serious dereliction of duty. A
legionary received an annual salary of 125 denarii (500 sestertii) – a figure
that helps to put Caesar’s staggering debts into perspective – which compared
unfavourably with the money that could be earned as a farm labourer,
although it did have the advantage of being regular. Poorer citizens saw the
army as either a viable career, or as a pathway to a better life. A general
who was generous with the rewards or promised to secure grants of land for
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his veteran soldiers could win an intense loyalty from his legionaries, as
Marius, Sulla and Pompey had already demonstrated. Centurions often
transferred from one legion to another, but there is no mention of ordinary
soldiers doing the same. Legionaries were long service professional soldiers,
although it is unclear just how long men normally spent in the army. Augustus
would later set the term of service at sixteen years, later extending it to
twenty with another five as a veteran, which meant being exempted from
some duties and fatigues. The legion was their home, and the better units
developed a fierce pride in their corporate identity. Each legion also contained
many men with technical skills, who would in turn train others. There were
no special units or cohorts of engineers or artillerymen, specialists simply
being detached from their cohorts whenever they were required to build a
bridge or besiege a town. The engineering skill of the Roman army in this
period was extremely high.
The legionary was a heavy infantryman who fought in close order, but in
Caesar’s day he looked rather different to the classic image perpetuated by
Hollywood and the rather loose use of images by re-enactors in television
documentaries. The famous banded or segmented armour had probably
not yet been invented, for the earliest known fragment of such a cuirass
dates to AD 9. (However, since until this was discovered it was generally
assumed that this armour was not introduced till the middle of the first
century AD it is just possible that it was known in Caesar’s day.) Instead the
legionary wore mail armour and a bronze or sometimes iron helmet. Roman
helmets left the wearer’s eyes and ears uncovered, although some protection
was provided for the rest of the face by the wide cheek pieces. Enclosed
helmets of the type sometimes used in earlier centuries by Greek armies
offered better protection, but a legionary needed to be able to hear and see
so that he could respond to orders. Further protection was provided by the
large semi-cylindrical shield or scutum. This was some 4 feet in height and
from 2–2 feet 6 inches in width and probably oval in shape, although the
rectangular tile shape of the classic ‘Hollywood’ legionary may already have
been adopted. It is highly likely, although unproven, that legions already
carried distinctive insignia on their shields, either painted or in raised
decoration. The shields themselves were made from three layers of plywood
glued together, covered in calfskin, and with the edges protected by bronze
binding. The shield was flexible and offered good protection, but was heavy
at some 22 lb. It was held in battle by a single horizontal hand-grip behind
the central boss, and could be used offensively, the soldier punching the boss
forward to overbalance his enemy.
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proconsul 58–50 BC
The legionary’s main weapons were the pilum (javelin), and the gladius
sword. The pilum had a 4-foot wooden shaft, topped by a narrow 2–3-foot
iron shank, which ended in a small pyramidal point. When thrown all the
weight of the weapon concentrated behind the small head, allowing this to
punch through an opponent’s shield, while the long slim shank gave it the
reach to keep going and wound or kill the man himself. Contrary to deeply
entrenched myth, the metal was not intended to bend. By the first century
AD the gladius sword used by the Roman legionary was short, with a blade
usually under 2 feet in length. However, in Caesar’s day a longer blade – at
least 2 feet 6 inches in length and sometimes longer – was in use. Made of
high quality steel, the heavy blade was well adapted to both cutting and
thrusting, its long point being well suited to penetrating armour and flesh.
The legionary was well equipped and trained as an individual fighter, but the
greatest strength of the Roman army lay in the discipline and command
structure that made them so effective collectively.16
For support troops, the legions relied on foreign soldiers, who were known
collectively as the auxilia. Many of these were locally recruited allies –
Caesar would draw heavily on the tribes of Gaul, especially for contingents
of cavalry. In most cases these men were led by their own chieftains, but at
least some Gauls do seem to have served in units led by Roman officers, and
may have been drilled and equipped by the army. In his account of the Civil
War Caesar mentions that in 49 BC he had ‘3,000 cavalry, which he had had
with him in all his past campaigns’. He also tells us that he had 5,000
auxiliary infantry, although it is unclear if these had also served with him
from 58 BC onwards. Neither group is specifically mentioned in his account
of the campaigns in Gaul, and they may have been allies, mercenaries or
regular soldiers foreshadowing the organised and permanent regiments of
auxiliaries of the Imperial period. He does make a few references to units
of specialists, including Cretan and Numidian archers, and slingers from
the Balearic Islands. The Cretans and Balearics were famous for their skill
with their respective weapons and had appeared as mercenaries in many
armies for several centuries. The Numidians were more famous for their
light cavalry and it is quite possible that Caesar also had some of these with
him. It is only through a single comment that we know that there were some
Spanish cavalry with the army. The number of allied soldiers varied from year
to year, while the total force of professional mercenaries and auxiliaries is
likely to have been more static. Allied contingents were on occasions
substantially larger, but even so it was always the legions that remained the
heart of Caesar’s army.17
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‘The whole of Gaul is divided’
In 58 BC it was not obvious where Caesar’s campaigns would lead him. He
had first been granted Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum as his province, and
Transalpine Gaul was only added after the sudden death of its governor.
Caesar’s original intention may well have been a Balkan campaign, probably
to curb the growing power of the Dacian King Burebista, who was carving
out a powerful empire around his heartland in what is now Transylvania. The
region was wealthy, and scarcely explored by Roman armies, offering the
glory attached to defeating a people never before encountered. He may well
have been planning to advance in that direction, both in 58 BC and in later
years, but events continued to provide him with ready opportunities for
military adventures in Gaul, and the Balkan expedition never took place.
Even so, it never left Caesar’s mind, for he was planning to move against
Dacia in 44 BC when he was assassinated.18
In the first century BC Gaul comprised the area of modern France,
Belgium and part of Holland, running from the Rhine to the Atlantic coast.
In no sense was Gaul a nation. As Caesar famously said in the opening
sentence of the Commentaries on the Gallic War its population was divided
into three ethnic and linguistic groups. In the south-west, bordering on the
Pyrenees, were the Aquitanians, whom he believed had much in common
with the Iberians of Spain. In the north, especially the north-east, were the
Belgians, while central Gaul was the home of the peoples whom the Romans
referred to as Gauls (Galli), but who named themselves Celts. Each of these
groups was in turn subdivided into numerous individual peoples, who for
all their similarity in language and culture were often mutually hostile. The
basic political unit was the clan (pagus), and several of these usually made
up a tribe (civitas). (Neither English word is entirely appropriate, and some
scholars would prefer state to tribe, but no one has really come up with
anything better.) The importance of the tribe seems to have increased
markedly in the century before Caesar’s arrival in Gaul, and some scholars
would like to see them as comparatively recent inventions. More probably,
the changing political and economic climate in Gaul had simply given new
importance to loose ties of kinship and ritual that were very long established.
Even so, the degree of unity between the clans of one tribe varied
considerably, and there were a number of cases during the Gallic Wars when
individual pagi acted independently. Kings appear in some tribes, and
perhaps also at the clan level, but not in others and the majority seem to have
been governed by councils or senates, with the day-to-day running of affairs
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proconsul 58–50 BC
being placed in the hands of elected magistrates. Rome’s oldest ally, the
Aedui, had a supreme magistrate called the Vergobret who held office for
a single year. No man could be elected twice to this post, nor could any
member of his family hold the office during his lifetime, thus preventing any
individual or group from monopolising power. The similarity of this ideal
to the Roman Republican system is striking, and in many ways the tribes
of Gaul resembled the city-states of the Mediterranean world, though
perhaps at an earlier stage of development.19
There is an on-going academic debate over the extent to which we can see
the Gauls and other peoples who spoke ‘Celtic’ languages as part of one
198
0 100 miles
0 100 km
O C E N US BR I T A N I CU S (E N G L I S H C HANNE L )
M A R E I N T E R N U M
( M ED I T E R R AN E A N S EA)
Rhenus (Rhine)
Rhodanus (Rhône)
Sequana (Seine)
Liger (Loire)
Garunna (Garonne)
MARE
CANTABRICUM
( B AY O F B I S C AY )
Caesar’s campaigns in Gaul
58 – 50 BC
Site of battle
Major Gallic settlement
Major Roman city
MORINI M E N A P I I
EBURONES
ATUATUC
UBII
ATREBATES
NERV I
TREVERI
CALET I B E L G A E REMI
BELLOVACI
SUESSIONES
LEXOVII
AULERCI
LINGONES
PARISII
SENONES
CORIOSOLITES
VENETI
CARNUTES
SEQUANI
HELVETII
BITURIGES
PICTONES
LEMOVICES
AEDUI
ARVERNI
AQUITANI
V E N E L L I
57 BC: Belgic tribes
defeated after heavy
fighting near the Sambre
52 BC: rebellion by Gallic
confederacy under Vercingetorix
is crushed at Alesia
approximate site of
defeat of Arovistus
58 BC: Caesar supports
allied Aedui and defeats
Helvetii migrating west
51–50 BC: Caesar
suppresses rebellion
and forces surrender
of stronghold at
Uxellodunum
56 BC: after crossing the Rhine
Caesar campaigns against
the Germans
56 BC: Veneti
defeated by
Caesar’s fleet in
sea battle
Samarobriva
(Amiens)
Durocortorum
(Reims)
Cenabum
(Orléans) Alesia
Avaricum
(Bourges)
Bibracte
(Mont Beuvray)
Lemonum
(Poitiers)
Matisco
(Macon)
Uxellodunum Gergovia
Tolosa
(Toulouse)
Aquae Sextiae
(Aix-en-Provence)
Antipolis
(Antibes)
Narbo
(Narbonne)
Massillia
(Marseille)
Genova
(Genoa)
G a l l i a
C i s a l p i n a
G a l l i a
Tr a n s a l p i n a
Lake
Geneva
Gaul and its tribes
gaul
people with broadly uniform customs and culture, but this need not concern
us here. Caesar notes both similarities and differences between the various
tribes, but did maintain a very clear distinction between the peoples of Gaul
and the German tribes. The River Rhine was presented as the dividing line
between them, although he concedes that the picture was a little less clear
than this and that some Germanic groups were well established in lands on
the west bank. Archaeology does not support such a clear division, suggesting
strong similarities in settlement patterns and material culture – pottery,
metalwork, etc. – between Gaul and central Germany. There was more of a
difference between the southern/central regions and the northern areas of
Germany, where there were few substantial fortified settlements. Yet it would
be a mistake on this basis to reject the testimony of Caesar and other ancient
authors, for archaeology is often a clumsy tool for revealing ethnic or political
boundaries. There were distinct Germanic and Celtic languages, and
doubtless huge numbers of dialects and regional variations within each
broad group. Some tribes that spoke a Germanic language may well have lived
in similarly sized and laid out settlements to peoples living in Gaul, as well
as using objects of a shape and style that were much alike. This does not
mean that either group would have perceived the other as fundamentally
like themselves and not as foreigners. They were more likely to see peoples
who spoke the same or a similar language, who revered the same deities in
much the same way, and who had lived around them for a long time as
kindred. This would not in itself have prevented hostility and warfare between
the two groups, nor ruled out peaceful relations with a more ‘foreign’ people.
Neither the Gauls nor the Germans were nations in any meaningful sense,
and personal identity and loyalty had far more to do with tribe and clan, and
within these, family, neighbour or chieftain.20
Contact between Gallic tribes and the Mediterranean world had a long
history and was often marked by warfare. A band of Gauls had sacked Rome
in 390 BC, while other tribes had overrun and settled in the Po Valley. Later,
the Romans began to colonise the same region, resulting in a series of wars
that ended in the early second century BC with the subjugation and
absorption of the Gallic tribes. Around 125 BC the Romans began the
conquest of Transalpine Gaul to create a secure land route to their provinces
in Spain. One of the proconsuls involved in these campaigns was Cnaeus
Domitius Ahenobarbus, the great-great-great-grandfather of Emperor Nero.
Described by a contemporary as having ‘a face of iron and a heart of lead’,
he is said to have impressed the tribes by riding on an elephant, but his most
enduring legacy was the Via Domitia, a great strategic road running to
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Spain. The region was the scene of much fighting during the migration of
the Cimbri and Teutones, but there was no more concerted Roman expansion
before Caesar’s arrival. There was considerable consolidation, with the
establishment of fortified outposts and a colony at Narbo (modern
Narbonne) in 118 BC. The latter soon became an important trade centre as
goods produced by the great latifundia estates of Italy flooded over the Alps.
Wine was the main product, and the trade can be traced by the discovery of
sherds from the amphorae used to transport it. The sheer quantity involved
is staggering, and one scholar has estimated that during the first century BC
some 40 million wine amphorae were traded in Gaul. If anything this figure
is probably too low. Each vessel was usually around 3–3 feet 6 inches high
and contained 35–45 pints. The main trade routes followed the Rhône-Saône
valleys, or went west to the Atlantic coast via the Aude and Garonne. In
return for wine and other luxury goods, traders sought raw materials,
including tin from south-western Britain, and most of all, slaves. One source
claims that a Gaulish chieftain would exchange a slave for a single amphora
of wine. This may have been a misunderstanding of the social obligation on
a host to demonstrate his wealth and power by giving a guest something of
far greater value than his gift, but nevertheless illustrates the importance of
wine to the Gaulish nobility. Some of this trade may have been undertaken
by local middlemen, but Roman merchants were evidently a familiar sight
in much of Gaul. This was a time of great commercial opportunity for
Romans, and enterprising businessmen penetrated deep into lands that had
never yet seen a Roman army. At one site in Noricum there was a Roman
trading community with its own small forum established outside a native
town by the start of the first century BC.21
Trade with the Roman world encouraged a trend towards centralisation
in many of the tribes of Gaul. The late second and first centuries BC saw the
growth in large walled towns, which Caesar calls by the somewhat vague
term oppida. Many tribes were minting coinage of a standard size and
weight based on Hellenistic models, which suggests that long-distance trade
was common. Some sites show traces of large-scale manufacturing activity,
and were laid out to an organised plan. Entremont, a hill town stormed by
the Romans around 124 BC during the conquest of Transalpine Gaul, was
built in stone in a very Greek style. The cultural influence was not
overwhelming though, for a Hellenistic-style shrine also had niches built
into the walls to take the severed heads of enemies. Those communities
lying on the main trade routes benefited most from this and their towns
were corresponding large. The Arverni lay on the western route, while the
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gaul
Rhône-Saône valleys were contested between the Aedui and Sequani. The
principal town of the Aedui at Bibracte (modern Mont Beuvray) enclosed
an area of 135 hectares within its walls, and excavations there have revealed
vast quantities of wine amphorae. Towns like this tended to be the focus of
tribal government, but never quite acquired the central role of Greek and
Roman cities. Leaders whose power was based on rural areas were still able
to dominate their tribe.22
In the end it was the aristocracy which dominated all the tribes of Gaul
to a greater or lesser extent. Caesar dismissed the ordinary people as little
more than slaves, so closely were they tied to powerful chieftains. The
nobility he divided into the knights (equites) and the priests, known as
druids. Neither group was drawn from a set caste, and families could
contain both druids and knights. The druids did not fight and their power
rested on their long years of training, which made them experts in matters
of religion, law and tribal custom. Caesar says that they deliberately wrote
none of their beliefs down, since they felt that reliance on the written word
weakened the power of memory and also might diminish their own
authority. As a result, very little is known with certainty of druidic beliefs
– something that has given plenty of scope over the centuries for the vacuum
to be filled with romantic invention. At the time Greek philosophers liked
to see the druids as primitive Stoics, and Caesar does say that they believed
in the immortality of the soul, something that he claimed encouraged
warriors to disdain death in battle. Once a year the druids of much of
Gaul met at a shrine in the territory of the Carnutes, but their ability to
act as a force to unify the tribes was extremely limited. They also presided
over sacrifices and could punish a man by barring him from such rituals.
The type of offering varied, but Caesar and our other ancient sources are
adamant that the Gauls practised human sacrifice on certain occasions. He
speaks of large wicker figures that were filled with people – usually
criminals or enemies, but if there were none of these then others had to take
their place – and set on fire. Some scholars dismiss such stories as Greek
and Roman propaganda, but we should not forget that the Romans
themselves had offered human victims to the gods at the time when the
Cimbri threatened Italy, and the Senate only outlawed the practice in 97 BC.
Roman society remained quite content to watch people being killed for
entertainment in the arena, but balked at killing them for the sake of
religion. The archaeological record does not provide incontrovertible
evidence for widespread human sacrifice by the Gallic tribes, although
such practices are clearly attested amongst the Germanic and British
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peoples. However, it is certain that many Gaulish rituals certainly made
use of human body parts, and it is in most cases impossible to tell whether
or not these were acquired through ritual killings. In addition head-hunting
was certainly common amongst Gaulish warriors and probably amongst
many north European peoples. The shrine at Entremont, and a similar
one at nearby Rocquepertuse, provide graphic illustration of this.23 Strabo
tells us that:
when they [the Gauls] depart from the battle they hang the heads of
their enemies from the necks of their horses, and, when they have
brought them home, nail the spectacle to the entrances of their houses.
Poseidonius says that he himself saw this spectacle in many places,
and that, although at first he loathed it, afterwards, through his
familiarity with it, he could bear it calmly. The heads of enemies of high
repute, however, they used to embalm in cedar-oil and exhibit to
strangers, and they would not deign to give them back even for a ransom
of an equal weight in gold.24
Poseidonius was a Greek philosopher who travelled in southern Gaul in
the early years of the first century BC, gathering material for his
ethnographic study. He later settled in Rome and it is quite possible that
Caesar met him. A Gallic coin from the middle of the century actually
depicts a warrior holding a severed head in one hand. Archaeologists have
also discovered a gruesome trophy at Ribemont-sur-Ancre, where the
corpses of many armed warriors and some horses had been fixed to a
wooden structure, so that they stood upright. The heads of all these men
were missing, and it is now unclear whether they were defeated enemies or
some form of sacrificial offering. Caesar mentions that mounds of spoils
taken from an enemy were often dedicated to the gods and could be seen
in many places, for the Gauls respected the rituals and would not dare to
steal anything from them. He also states that before his arrival the tribes
would go to war ‘well-nigh every year, in the sense that they would either
make wanton attacks themselves or repelling such’. Strabo described the
whole Gallic race as ‘war-mad’, and it is clear that the knights were a
warrior aristocracy. A man’s status was judged by the number of warriors
he maintained at his own expense and who were personally bound to him
by solemn oaths. The strength and fame of their retinues acted as deterrents
against anyone inside or outside the tribe from attacking them, or the
communities loyal to and protected by them.25
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gaul
Much of the military activity in Gaul seems to have taken the form of
raiding, but at times warfare between the tribes could be on a very large
scale, as in the struggle between the Aedui and Sequani for control of the
trade route along the Rhône-Saône valleys. It is very unlikely that the growth
in trade with the Mediterranean world caused the tribes of Gaul to become
warlike, but it certainly acted as a spur to war-making. The goods that
flooded into Gaul were primarily aimed at the aristocratic market. Wine
played an important role in the feasting that bonded chieftain and warrior
together, and luxury goods helped to increase a man’s status or could provide
spectacular gifts for loyal followers. The tribes along the trade routes had best
access to such goods, and could also levy tolls on trade, and the bulk of the
profits went to the aristocracy, giving them the wealth to support bigger
and bigger bands of warriors. Leaders needed not just riches, but a high
martial reputation if they were to encourage to join and then retain famous
warriors in their train. Successful raiding was one of the best ways to achieve
this, and also win plunder, some of which could be given to followers to
confirm their loyalty. Individual leaders and whole tribes were willing to
use force to control the trade routes. In addition the slaves, which seem to
have been traded so freely for wine, had to come from somewhere,
encouraging raiding to take captives. An aristocrat with a strong following
of warriors might often turn this against enemies of his tribe, but there was
also the temptation to use force in a bid for power inside the tribe. Kings had
largely disappeared amongst the tribes of central Gaul, and even elsewhere
their powers were limited, but the dream of monarchic or tyrannical power
still fired the imagination of many powerful leaders. The institutions of the
tribe, the magistrates and senatorial council, were not always strong enough
to control such men.26
In contrast to the Roman legions, Gallic armies were clumsy forces, which
rarely had the logistical ability to remain in the field for a long campaign and
were difficult for their commanders to manoeuvre. Warriors were individually
brave, but, apart from the retinues of great men, rarely drilled or trained
collectively, and the emphasis was generally on individual prowess. The
semi-professional warriors who followed powerful chieftains were
comparatively few in numbers, sufficient for a raiding expedition, but never
more than a small inner core in a tribal army, which consisted mainly of all
those men able to provide themselves with weapons. The Romans may well
have copied mail armour as well as their commonest helmet designs from
Gallic originals, but they were able to manufacture them in far greater
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quantities. Every legionary had a sword, shield, cuirass and helmet, but only
the wealthy and some of the semi-professional warriors were likely to have
had all of these things. The vast majority of warriors fought without any
protection apart from a shield. Swords do seem to have been fairly common,
but tended to be longer than the Roman style – itself a copy of a Spanish
design – and used more for slashing than thrusting. Most of the tribes raised
horses for riding, which were of a smaller size than most modern mounts but
of good quality. Gallic cavalry were famous, and the mounted arm of the
professional Roman army would subsequently copy many aspects of
equipment, training and terminology from them. However, while very
effective in a charge, the cavalry of the tribes, which inevitably consisted of
the wealthier warriors, often showed little enthusiasm or aptitude for such
important roles as patrolling.27
Gaul was not in the most stable of conditions when Caesar arrived. The
Roman province of Transalpine Gaul was still recovering from the rebellion
of the Allobroges, who had received no reward for aiding Cicero in 63 BC and
had felt no alternative but to revolt. This had been suppressed by 60 BC, but
the on-going struggle between the Aedui and the Sequani was a serious
matter, since it affected the security of the province and the continuance of
profitable trade. Both tribes were allied to Rome, but also displayed a
willingness to seek outside help in winning the conflict. Around 71 BC the
Sequani had summoned the Germanic King Ariovistus to bring his warriors
to their aid. About ten years later he inflicted a serious defeat on the Aedui,
many of whose principal noblemen were killed in the fighting. In return he
was granted land on which his followers could settle. Soon afterwards the
Aedui were also raided by the Helvetii from what is now Switzerland. Around
the same time Diviciacus, a druid who had held the office of Vergobret,
came to Rome seeking assistance. The Senate sent a delegation of envoys to
the region, but took no direct action. In 59 BC, during Caesar’s own
consulship, Ariovistus was recognised as both king and a ‘friend of the
Roman people’. For the moment this diplomatic activity had brought a
measure of stability to the frontiers around Transalpine Gaul, but it is worth
emphasising that Caesar was entering a dynamic situation. The balance of
power between – and often within – the tribes was frequently changing. By
no stretch of the imagination were the tribes of Gaul mere victims, passively
awaiting the onslaught of Roman imperialism. Yet they were certainly
disunited and divided, and these weaknesses would be ruthlessly exploited
by Caesar.28
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X
Migrants and
mercenaries: The First
Campaigns, 58 bc
‘At the moment fear of a war in Gaul is the main topic of conversation [in
Rome]; for “our brothers” the Aedui have just fought and lost a battle, and
the Helvetii are without doubt armed for war and launching raids into
our province.’ – Cicero, 15 March 60 BC.1
On 28 March 58 BC a people known as the Helvetii began to gather on the
banks of the River Rhône near Lake Geneva. Some 368,000 people were
said to be on the move, about a quarter of them men of fighting age, and
the remainder women, children and the elderly. They wished to leave their
homes in what is now Switzerland and cross to the western coast of Gaul,
where they planned to settle on new, more extensive and fertile lands. Their
route lead directly through the Roman province of Transalpine Gaul. News
had reached Caesar of the impending migration earlier in the month, and
immediately prompted him to hasten to his province. Until then he had been
waiting just outside Rome, keeping a close eye on the struggles in the Senate
and in the Forum. The Helvetii wished to move through Transalpine Gaul,
taking the easiest route to their destination. The northernmost frontier of
Caesar’s great province was under threat, and public opinion would not be
kind to a proconsul who dallied outside Rome while there was a crisis in
the region placed under his command. After the chances he had taken to
secure himself this command, Caesar could not afford failure of any kind.
He hurried north, travelling with that phenomenal speed that so often
amazed contemporaries. Covering on average 90 miles a day, he was on the
Rhône eight days later. A crisis could also be an opportunity.2
The migration was not the result of a sudden impulse, but the outcome
of years of planning. It had first been conceived by Orgetorix, described by
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Caesar as by far the ‘noblest and wealthiest’ man in the tribe, but he seems
to have played upon existing frustrations. The Helvetii were a numerous
and martial people who found their homeland increasingly restrictive,
hemmed in by mountains, the Roman province beyond the Rhône, and the
Rhine to the east. ‘With things as they were their freedom to range was
restricted, and there were few opportunities of waging war on their
neighbours; since they were men who craved war, they were greatly
frustrated.’3 Raiding was endemic in Gaul, and it was the capacity to launch
plundering forays with greater ease that the Helvetii desired. However, Caesar
claims that Orgetorix had an ulterior motive, believing that uniting the tribe
to this purpose would help him to make himself king. The Helvetii, like
many of the other tribes, had ceased to be a monarchy and appear to have
been ruled by a council of chieftains and by elected leaders or magistrates.
Orgetorix had won over many other nobles and evidently possessed
considerable power and support, for coins were minted at this time which
carried his name in the form ORCIITIRIX. With the approval of the tribal
leaders he was sent on a diplomatic mission to visit other tribes and prepare
the way for the migration. Finding it easier to deal with individual chieftains
rather than magistrates or tribal councils, he won over Casticus of the
Sequani and Dumnorix of the Aedui. These two tribes dominated central
Gaul, and the Helvetii would pass through or near their territory on the
journey to the west. Their support, or even their non-intervention, would
make the migration easier and help the Helvetii to establish themselves once
they had arrived. Orgetorix encouraged both Casticus and Dumnorix to
hope for supreme kingship in their own tribes, most likely promising them
support from Helvetian warriors in the aftermath of the migration. Casticus’
father had in fact been sole ruler of the Sequani, and been formally
acknowledged as a ‘friend of the Roman people’ by the Senate. Dumnorix
was the younger brother of the druid Diviciacus, and had built up a
considerable following in the tribe. The three leaders secretly took a solemn
oath – always a sinister thing in Roman eyes – binding themselves to aid the
others in their enterprises. Dumnorix also married the daughter of Orgetorix,
continuing his fondness for marriage alliances – his mother had already
been married off to the leading man amongst the Bituriges, his half-sister
and other female relatives to various chieftains in the neighbouring tribes.
Allied together, the three leaders of what would be the strongest tribes in
central Gaul, felt that no one would be able to oppose them.4
The preparations of the Helvetii were thorough. Their leaders judged
that at least two years – 60 and 59 BC – were needed to make themselves
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ready to move. Draught cattle were gathered, some apparently bought or
taken from their neighbours, and the greatest amount of cereal crops planted
to produce a surplus that would feed them on their journey. Worrying reports
of the plan came to the notice of the Senate in Rome, no doubt forwarded
on by friendly leaders in the tribes as well as the governor of Transalpine
Gaul. In 60 BC it was decided to send a delegation to Gaul, including a
number of men with experience in the area and family connections amongst
the tribes. Contact seems to have been made with the German King
Ariovistus, who had been brought into Gaul to aid the Sequani against their
rivals, but who had now settled with his warriors and their families on a
large tract of tribal land. Otherwise we know little of the Roman delegation’s
activities, but the situation did soon appear to be turning in Rome’s favour.
In spite of the diplomatic success of Orgetorix, word reached the other
Helvetian nobleman of his wider ambitions and he was placed on trial for
aspiring to tyranny. The penalty for this crime was to be burned alive, and
Orgetorix decided to intimidate the other leaders. On the day appointed
for his trial he arrived accompanied by his warriors, dependants and all
tribesmen bound to him by social obligation or debt, which gave him a force
of over 10,000 men – perhaps an eighth of the entire military strength of
the Helvetii. It was to be a contest between the budding institutions of a
state and traditional patterns of aristocratic leadership. No actual trial could
occur under such circumstances, but the other leaders were not permanently
overawed and soon began to muster a full levy of the tribe with which to
crush him once and for all. However, before civil war could actually break
out, Orgetorix died amidst rumours of suicide. Preparations for the
migration continued in spite of this, and his death did not in any way alter
the tribe’s determination to go through with its plans. The Romans may not
have fully appreciated that the momentum was still there even after the
removal of the leader behind the plan. By May 60 BC Cicero felt that the
prospect of a major war in Gaul had been averted, much to the displeasure
of the consul Metellus Celer, who had been granted Transalpine Gaul as
his province.5
This is Caesar’s explanation for the migration, a product of the tribe’s
desire for greater opportunity to raid and the personal ambition of Orgetorix.
Not all scholars have been willing to accept this at face value and have
suggested that he concealed the truth in order to justify his own subsequent
actions. They note, for instance, that the Commentaries make no mention
of Ariovistus, the Germanic king who had fought for the Sequani and
subsequently settled in their lands. This leads to the suggestion that the
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proconsul 58–50 BC
main intention of the Helvetii was to assist the other tribes in defeating
Ariovistus and his Germans. In Caesar’s own consulship the German leader
was named a ‘friend of the Roman people’ by the Senate and those fond of
conspiracies suggest that he needed the neutrality or even complicity of
Ariovistus to deal with the Helvetii in 58 BC. Once they had been defeated,
he cynically turned on the German and drove him from Gaul. In this version,
Caesar did not want the Helvetii to evict Ariovistus and so deny him the
excuse for intervention in Gaul.6
None of this is convincing, for it is mainly reliant on hindsight. In the
first place it is inherently unlikely that Caesar could have got away with
such a massive distortion of the facts in his account, given that this was
subject to hostile – and often informed – criticism. It is also unlikely that
Rome would have viewed the expulsion of Ariovistus by the Helvetii entirely
favourably. Their province of Transalpine Gaul was at present bordered by
the Aedui and Sequani, both of whom had allied status. Ariovistus had
recently been brought into the system. The province itself had just suffered
a major rebellion on the part of the Allobroges and ideally required a period
of stability if trade and revenue were not to suffer. The arrival of a strong
tribe threatened to disturb this existing network of alliances. There was also
the question of what would happen to the Helvetii’s own homeland once they
left. If the abandoned land were then settled by newcomers, perhaps from
one of the German tribes, then this might pose a new threat to the Roman
province. On the whole the Romans were suspicious of the movements of
peoples, so common in Iron Age Europe, and sought to prevent these from
occurring in the lands near to their own provinces. Nor was it in their interest
for the tribes of Gaul to unite independently of Rome.
Therefore Caesar would have had ample justification for intervention
even if the Helvetii had intended to fight Ariovistus, and did not need to
conceal this. On balance, his own account is far more plausible. Casticus and
Dumnorix clearly both believed that they would gain from the arrival of
the migrants, and doubtless expected support from Orgetorix against all
their opponents, whether foreign or within their own tribe. Those leaders
of the Sequani who had invited Ariovistus into Gaul in the first place, and
the many chieftains who would appeal to Caesar for aid over the coming
years, acted with the same motives. Association with a strong external force
boosted a chieftain’s prestige, and might well be converted into direct military
assistance. It is misleading to speak of pro- or anti-Roman factions within
the tribes – or for that matter pro- or anti-German or Helvetian groups.
Each individual leader sought whatever aid he believed would be of most
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benefit to him, and all were engaged in the struggle for dominance within
the tribe. Some leaders, and indeed the ruling councils of some tribes, decided
that they were better off allied to Caesar and Rome, while other men and
peoples who were their rivals acted differently.7
Yet in the spring of 58 BC there is every sign that Caesar was wrong-footed
by the Helvetii. Perhaps he had been surprised by the timing of the migration,
or maybe its sheer scale. He had four legions at his command, but only one
of these was in Transalpine Gaul. The remaining three were camped near
Aquileia on the border of Cisalpine Gaul nearest to Illyricum. It is not
known who stationed the troops there, but even if it had not been Caesar,
then he had made no effort to alter this disposition. Even when he hastened
to the Rhône he made no effort to send new orders to these troops. It is
hard to avoid the conclusion that he was still thinking very much in terms
of a Balkan campaign. Perhaps it was only when he arrived near Geneva
that he appreciated the full scale of the problem. The Helvetii and the allied
clans who joined them in the migration had piled their possessions into
wagons and set off with great purpose. Behind them they left the smouldering
ruins of their towns and villages, deliberately put to the torch to discourage
anyone from wavering if the journey became difficult. Caesar may have
exaggerated when he claimed that every single settlement was burned, and
indeed in the implication that not a single tribesman remained behind, but
the upheaval was clearly a massive one.
The figure of 368,000 migrants was said by Caesar to have been taken
from captured records that the Helvetii themselves had made using Greek
characters – Gallo-Greek inscriptions using the Celtic language but Greek
alphabet are fairly common finds from southern Gaul and attest to the
long presence and influence of Massilia. Any numbers found in an ancient
text must always be treated with a degree of caution, since it is so easy for
them to become distorted over the centuries as manuscripts were copied
and recopied. In cases of this sort, the Roman desire to quantify military
victory in the numbers of enemies killed and cities captured encouraged
deliberate exaggeration. It is certainly a very high figure, suggesting a
density of population considerably higher than would be expected, even
in a region so overcrowded as to produce a migration. Yet in the end we
know so little about ancient levels of population that it is unwise to be too
dogmatic, and if we reject Caesar’s figure then we have nothing with which
to replace it. Modern suggestions of more ‘plausible’ totals can never be
anything more than conjectural. In the end, even if Caesar did exaggerate,
or was genuinely mistaken, a substantial number of people and animals
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were on the move, probably in many separate parties rather than one
immensely long column, which would have presented huge practical and
logistical problems. However, at certain points, such as river crossings and
mountain passes, there would have been a tendency for the different groups
to cluster closer to each other.8
Caesar is unlikely to have known precisely how many migrants were
waiting to cross the river into his province, but they certainly far outnumbered
the single legion he had at his disposal. One of his first orders instructed the
legionaries to break down the bridge crossing the river at Geneva. He also
levied as many troops as he could find in the province, the tribes there
providing him with contingents of cavalry. Soon after his arrival he was
visited by a delegation of Helvetian leaders who asked permission for their
people to move through the Roman province, promising that they would
not plunder as they went. Caesar was unwilling to grant the request. In the
Commentaries he takes this opportunity to remind his audience of a battle
some fifty years earlier, when one of the clans of the Helvetii had defeated
a Roman army. From a Roman viewpoint this had been an unprovoked
attack, made worse when the survivors were forced to undergo the
humiliation of passing under a yoke of spears, symbolising their loss of
warrior status. This had been in 107 BC, in the midst of a series of disasters
inflicted on Roman armies by the Cimbri and Teutones. Caesar wished to
revive the fear of those years – something which was still just within living
memory – amongst his Roman audience. They could then be reassured that
Marius’ nephew was there to defend them.
Yet at the beginning Caesar did not have the means to do this. Instead he
played for time, telling the Helvetian representatives that he would consider
the matter, and inform them of his decision if they returned on the Ides –
the 13th – of April, which was probably in one or two weeks time. During
the interval he set the legion to constructing a line of defences running along
the Roman bank of the Rhône from Lake Geneva to the edge of the Jura
Mountains. It was the first of many engineering feats that his army would
perform and was swiftly accomplished. For 19 Roman miles (each somewhat
shorter than the modern mile at 1,6181⁄2 yards or 1.48 km) they raised an
earth rampart some 16 feet high. This was strengthened at key points where
the river could be forded by forts garrisoned by detachments of the legion
and the other troops Caesar had raised. It is possible that the rampart was
not absolutely continuous, having gaps whenever natural features ensured
that it was impossible to cross, but there is insufficient evidence to confim
this suggestion. Such a line was not a novel concept for a Roman army in this
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period. Crassus had made use of a similar fortified barrier in the campaign
against Spartacus, and Pompey had done the same in the Mithridatic War.
Such lines were practical, presenting an obstacle that would at the very least
slow down an enemy, but also were a strong visible statement of intent and
determination.9
When the Helvetii returned for Caesar’s decision, he bluntly informed
them that ‘according to the custom and precedent of the Roman People,
he could not permit anyone to journey through the province, and that he
would stop them if they tried to force their way through’.10 The new
fortifications were there to demonstrate that he meant what he said.
However, it was difficult for such a great mass of people suddenly to
change direction and purpose. The period of waiting by the river had also
probably been very frustrating and many of the Helvetii were determined
to keep going, especially after the years of preparation and the willing
destruction of their old homes. Small groups began to cross the Rhône,
either using the fords or rigging up rafts to carry themselves, their animals
and vehicles. It is possible that these were deliberate probes sent by the
chieftains to test the strength of Caesar’s defences, but more likely that
they reflected the loose central authority and individual independence
that seems to have been characteristic of many of the tribes of Gaul. They
were certainly not full-fledged assaults on the line of fortifications. Most
of the crossings took place under cover of darkness, but a few parties
were bold enough to risk the attempt in daylight. None succeeded, for
Caesar’s men were able to concentrate and meet each group in turn,
overwhelming many of them with missiles as they struggled to cross.
Eventually the Helvetii admitted defeat, but by this time some of their
leaders had decided on another course, taking the alternative, more
difficult route out of their lands. This meant taking the passes through the
Jura Mountains into the lands of the Sequani. It would not have been
practical if the latter had decided to resist them, but the tribe was
persuaded by Dumnorix the Aeduan to let the Helvetii through. He was
presumably able to do this through his own reputation and some of his
many marriage connections with powerful men. Orgetorix was dead, but
it would still be useful for Dumnorix to be able to call on the support of
the powerful Helvetii once they were established in their own lands. Even
before they began to lumber off in this new direction, Caesar received
reports of their plans.11
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‘A New War’
It was probably at this point that Caesar finally resolved on a full campaign
in Gaul against the Helvetii. The reason he gave in the Commentaries was
that the Helvetii planned to settle ‘on the borders of the Santones, who lived
not far away from the borders of the Tolosates, a tribe within the province.
He understood that if this occurred, it would put the province in great
danger, with many warriors, hostile to the Roman people, living close by a
region which produced a rich harvest of grain, but was undefended.’ His
own recent actions had ensured the hostility of the Helvetii, but from a
Roman standpoint his reasoning was sound. As we have seen, at the very least
the incursion of the new settlers would have upset the existing balance
system where a combination of Roman diplomacy and military strength
had ensured the security of the province. Leaving his senior legate Labienus
in charge of the defences on the Rhône – probably another indication that
the Helvetii were travelling in lots of separate groups, and that it took time
for such a sprawling mass of people, animals and vehicles to move off in a
new direction – Caesar hastened to Aquileia and his main army. Two new
legions, the Eleventh and Twelfth, were enrolled to add to the three already
stationed there and the one left behind on the Rhône.
The Commentaries give the impression that this was only done on Caesar’s
arrival, but the practicalities of recruitment and organisation make it more
likely that he had already given the order for this some time before. The
troops may originally have been intended to strengthen the army for
operations in the Balkans, but the immediate threat of the Helvetii provided
a better pretext for his audience. He had no authority to raise new legions,
for only the Senate was supposed to instruct a governor to do this, but lack
of specific power had never stopped Caesar in the past. As a youth and a
private citizen he had raised allied troops to combat the pirates and oppose
the Pontic invasion of Asia, while he had also raised ten cohorts – equivalent
in numbers to a legion – during his term as propraetor in Spain. Never
doubting that he knew what was in the interest of Rome and the provinces,
Caesar simply acted and then trusted in his own ability to make things work.
Since it had not authorised their existence, the Senate would not provide
money from the Treasury to pay and supply the new legions, which meant
that the proconsul would have to find the funds to do this from the revenue
he raised in his province and any profits to come from victories. The bulk
of the soldiers in the new formations were almost certainly from Cisalpine
Gaul and so not actually Roman citizens and therefore legally ineligible for
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service in a legion. In the past Caesar had championed the desire of the
population of the region for enfranchisement, and as governor he consistently
treated them as if they were in fact citizens. This was the first major example
of this deliberate policy.12
Soon, Caesar was ready to lead all five legions back to Transalpine Gaul.
The quickest route was through the Alps, which although largely surrounded
by Roman provinces was still unconquered. In a week the Roman column
crossed the mountains, beating off successive ambushes from the fiercely
independent tribes who resented this incursion and doubtless also saw the
welcome opportunity for gaining some plunder. It was a harsh introduction
to campaigning for the raw recruits, but the march seems to have been made
without serious loss. Once over the mountains Caesar moved into the
territory of the Allobroges, joining up with the troops he had left in the
province. He now had six legions at his disposal, with a total of something
like 25,000–30,000 men, and a force of allied cavalry that would soon muster
about 4,000 men, along with some light infantry. Added to this were the
slaves who accompanied each legion to care for the baggage train, doubtless
some also owned by the officers, and quite possibly also some camp followers.
All of these needed to be fed, as did the thousands of cavalry mounts and
draught and pack animals. Keeping his army supplied has always been one
of the first concerns of any army commander. The operations against the
Helvetii had developed so unexpectedly that Caesar had had little
opportunity to prepare for this task by massing all that he needed in
conveniently placed supply dumps in Transalpine Gaul. The main force is
unlikely to have brought substantial supplies of food with it in its rapid
march from Aquileia. It was still only spring, and the harvest would not
become available for some months – Caesar notes in the Commentaries that
it occurred late in these northern climes – so that the army could not expect
to gather too much of what it needed from the land it marched through.
Therefore messages went to Rome’s allies, particularly the large and powerful
Aedui, to gather stocks of grain and make them available for his troops.
In the meantime the Helvetii had crossed through the Pas de l’Ecluse into
the lands of the Sequani and were entering the borderland of the Aedui.
Representatives of the tribe came to Caesar complaining of plundering
attacks by the migrants. ‘The Aedui had always deserved well and that it is
not right for our lands to be devastated, our children carried off into bondage,
and our towns to be sacked almost under the eyes of a Roman army.’ Similar
complaints also came in from the Ambarri, a tribe allied to the Aedui, and
the Allobroges, who had not that long before rebelled and been defeated. It
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is unknown whether or not the leaders of the Helvetii had consciously
decided to launch these plundering attacks. Even if they had not, it would
have been extremely difficult to control such a large and disparate group
broken up into many individual parties. Given the delays imposed on their
journey, some of the migrants may have been running short of supplies.
Equally the hostility could have begun with the local peoples, nervous of
the incursion of so many strangers. That violence resulted was unsurprising,
but the need to defend or gain revenge for attacks on an ally was for the
Romans a classic justification for aggressive warfare. It should also be said
that this made practical sense. If Rome was unwilling or unable to guard its
friends, then why should any tribe, especially the so recently discontented
Allobroges, feel that it was worth maintaining the alliance? As consul, Caesar
had passed a law regulating the behaviour of provincial governors and
restricting their freedom to lead their army outside their province. In the
Commentaries he demonstrated that it was entirely right for him to do just
that.13
Caesar caught up with the migrants near the Saône. For twenty days the
tribesmen had been ferrying themselves across the river on rafts and small
boats lashed together, and three-quarters of them were already on the far
bank. It was another indication that we should not think of the Helvetii as
moving in one ordered column, but in many separate groups spread over
the landscape and only bunching when the path became narrow. Still on the
same side of the river as the Romans were the Tigurini, the clan that had been
responsible for the humiliating defeat of the Romans in 107 BC. Caesar makes
sure that he reminds his readers of this defeat once again, and adds that he
had a personal stake in avenging it, since the grandfather of his father-inlaw
Calpurnius Piso had died in the battle. After his scouts had reported
this to Caesar, he decided on a surprise attack, leading his army out before
dawn. The result was not a battle, but a massacre, as the Romans fell upon
the scattered and unsuspecting groups of tribesmen and their families. Many
were killed and the rest dispersed, abandoning their wagons and possessions.
The Romans then bridged the Saône and crossed it in a single day.14
As the Roman army closed with the rest of the Helvetii, their chieftains
sent another delegation to the proconsul. To further emphasise the
connection with 107 BC, Caesar claims that it was headed by the same man
who had been their war-leader in that year, a certain Divico, who by this
time must have been very elderly. The tribe offered to settle on whatever
land Caesar suggested and promised to keep the peace with Rome. Yet they
also showed that they were not dismayed by the surprise attack on the
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Tigurini, and warned the Romans not to despise their military strength,
reminding them of the battle half a century before. They had learnt ‘from
their parents and ancestors, to win battles through courage, not by guile or
stealth’.15 A Roman audience would have seen this as dangerous pride which
refused to acknowledge and submit to Roman might. Caesar told them that
the defeat of Cassius’ army in 107 BC had only occurred because the Helvetii
had attacked without warning, when they were not even at war with the
Romans. Apart from this old wrong, he reminded them of their recent attacks
on Rome’s allies. He advised them against overconfidence, declaring that
the immortal gods often granted short spells of success to criminals before
they met with terrible punishment. (Caesar was Pontifex Maximus, yet this
is one of very few references to the gods in his writings.) Only if they gave
him hostages for their good behaviour and made restitution to the Aedui and
others who had suffered from their depredations would he be willing to
grant them peace. Retorting that the Helvetii ‘took, but never gave’ hostages,
Divico and his delegation stormed off. It is difficult to see how Caesar could
reasonably have granted the request for land, since Gaul was already densely
inhabited. He had no right to allocate them any territory outside his own
province, and it would have been unthinkable to settle them inside. Wherever
they went the Helvetii would inevitably cause disruption and this was not
in the interest of the Romans.16
The convoys of the Helvetii moved onwards, and Caesar followed them,
sending his 4,000 cavalry out in advance. Amongst them was a sizeable force
of Aedui led by Dumnorix, the same chieftain who had allied with Orgetorix
and then aided the Helvetii. Advancing too carelessly, the allied cavalry were
ambushed and beaten by a force of Helvetian cavalry a fraction of their
size. The rout began with Dumnorix and the Aedui. Encouraged by this
easy success, the enemy rearguard started to move more slowly and offered
to fight more often. Caesar was unwilling to risk too many skirmishes with
them, but kept the enemy under observation and stopped any parties from
breaking away and plundering the landscape. His army followed the Helvetii,
shadowing their every move so that his advance guard was never more than
5 or 6 miles from their rearguard. By this time he was some distance out of
his province, and growing more worried about the supply situation. When
he was near the Saône this had been less of a problem as he had been able
to have food brought to him in the many barges plying this trade route.
However, the Helvetii had moved away from the river, and so he had had to
do the same. The Aedui had promised him grain – he was after all fighting
against an enemy who had invaded and plundered their lands – but as yet
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nothing had arrived and repeated requests brought no results, in spite of
frequent promises that it was on the way. In a few days time the soldiers
were due to be issued with grain that Caesar did not at present possess. For
short periods of time, soldiers on campaign have sometimes been persuaded
to keep going on minimal rations, but usually only strong leadership made
this possible. Caesar and his men were still relative strangers, while onethird
of the army was very inexperienced.17
Eager to avert a disaster, Caesar summoned the leading men of the Aedui,
headed by the druid Diviciacus and Liscus, the man who currently held the
post of Vergobret, the annually elected supreme magistrate of the tribe.
Berated by Caesar over their failure to fulfil their obligations to an army
that was fighting to protect them, Liscus blamed powerful men within the
tribe who had deliberately held up the collection and transport of the grain,
claiming that they thought it better to be dominated by their fellow Gauls
the Helvetii, rather than the Romans. These chieftains were passing
information to the enemy and intimidating anyone who dared to oppose
them. Liscus had named no names, but Caesar was clearly already suspicious
about Dumnorix and guessed that he was the man behind this. He dismissed
the other chieftains and spoke privately with the Vergobret, who was now
willing to talk more freely and readily confirmed the proconsul’s suspicions.
Dumnorix was aiming at kingship – coins dating to this period and carrying
the name DUBNOREIX were probably minted by him – backed by a large force
of warriors maintained with the profits from controlling the tolls on trade
along the Saône. His complicity with the Helvetii was now fully revealed
and Caesar felt that he had sufficient evidence to warrant stern punishment,
but was hesitant since he valued the loyalty of Diviciacus. Therefore, he
summoned the druid to an even more closed conference in his headquarters
tent. He dismissed the interpreters he normally used and relied on Caius
Valerius Procillus, an aristocrat from Transalpine Gaul whose father had
won Roman citizenship for the family. Caesar, who had spent enough time
in the courts at Rome, presented the facts and the case against Dumnorix,
and suggested that either his brother or the Aedui needed to try him for
these offences. Diviciacus told how his younger brother had depended on him
for his success in public life, but had since turned against him as a rival.
Some of Dumnorix’s frustration is understandable, for the druid had recently
held the office of Vergobret and the rule was that no other member of his
family could win the post during his lifetime. Nevertheless, Diviciacus
pleaded with Caesar not to punish his ambitious sibling, in part through
affection, but mainly because he thought that it would be very damaging to
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him personally if he was seen to back the Romans against his own brother.
His appeal was tearful and persistent. Dumnorix was summoned to the tent
and in front of his brother presented with his crimes. The proconsul informed
him that he was to be given another opportunity for the sake of his older
brother, but that in future he must avoid even the hint of suspicion. Such faceto-
face diplomacy was to be a common feature of Caesar’s time in Gaul. As
in Roman public life, much of what a governor did was at a very personal
level. Caesar was famous at Rome for his readiness to forgive and his
willingness to do favours. In Gaul he would sometimes follow the same
principles. Yet nowhere was he ever naively trusting. After the meeting he gave
orders that Dumnorix be kept under constant observation and everything
he did reported to him.18
Although the hindrance to the grain supply had been removed, it was not
an instant solution to his problems, and it would still take time for the Aedui
to bring the grain to his army. Caesar needed to force a quick outcome to
the campaign, and on the same day as he had held these meetings he believed
that he had spotted the opportunity. His scouting patrols came back to
report that the Helvetii had camped some 8 Roman miles away, next to some
high ground. Caesar sent out another patrol to carry out a detailed
reconnaissance of the position, looking in particular at how readily the
slopes of the hill might be climbed from each side, especially that furthest
from the enemy. This party returned to report that the ascent was
straightforward. Caesar decided to launch a full-scale attack on the enemy
camp, hoping to achieve the same sort of surprise he had gained against the
Tigurini. Labienus was given command of two legions – persumably two of
the experienced ones – and would march out in the small hours of the
morning to seize the hill. Two hours later Caesar would lead out the rest of
the army and march the 8 miles to the enemy camp. When Labienus saw
him beginning his assault, he was to attack with his legion from the high
ground. Both forces were to follow the same route for most of the way, being
guided by men who had taken part in the previous day’s patrol and seen the
ground in daylight.
It was a bold plan, but a perfectly feasible one, using a method of
preparation that in its essence would not be unfamiliar to a modern army.
Caesar had plenty of experience of raids and surprise attacks, rather more
than he had of pitched battles, for warfare in the Spanish Peninsula tended
to be of this type. Marius had similarly managed to secrete a strong
detachment of men in dead ground behind the Teutones at Aquae Sextiae
in 102 BC. Operations at night have always been risky, for the potential for
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confusion and units getting lost is always there. In this case things began very
smoothly. Labienus moved out and disappeared into the darkness. After the
appointed interval Caesar followed with the main force. The cavalry led the
column, and sent out patrols to screen the advance. These scouts were placed
under the command of one Publius Considius, an experienced officer with
a fine military reputation. He had served under Sulla and Crassus and was
therefore probably at least in his forties. Caesar does not give his rank but
he was probably a tribune or prefect, although it has sometimes been
suggested that he was a centurion. It is possible that he was a relation of
the senator Considius, who the year before had declared that, unlike many
others, he was too old to worry about danger (see p.177).19
By dawn the main force was only a mile and a half from the enemy camp,
and Labienus was waiting in position, but was out of contact with Caesar.
The Helvetii, like many tribal armies somewhat careless in scouting, were
completely oblivious to the presence of either force. At this point Considius
galloped in to report that the hill was not in fact held by the Romans, but by
the Gauls. He was absolutely positive about this, saying that he had clearly
seen their weaponry, crests and insignia. The news meant that Labienus had
either got lost and never reached his destination or that he had been defeated.
In either case the Helvetii were obviously well prepared and waiting for them.
Caesar immediately halted the column. He had four legions, two of which
were most likely the raw Eleventh and Twelfth. His men were also tired after
the night march, still doubtless fresh enough to attack surprised and scattered
opponents encumbered by baggage and families, but not necessarily up to a
long drawn-out pitched battle. To attack under these circumstances would
have meant fighting at a serious numerical disadvantage on ground chosen
by the enemy. He ordered the column to withdraw to a nearby ridge and
there formed them into a battle line to await any attack. Time passed. The
Helvetii roused themselves and set off to continue their journey, still
completely unaware that the shadowing Roman army had now come so close
and had divided. Labienus followed his orders to the letter, not engaging
until he saw Caesar’s men beginning their attack. In any case, there was little
that he could have done with just two legions at his disposal. It was only late
in the day that scouts from the main force established contact with Labienus’
detachment and confirmed that they, and not the enemy, held the key position.
In what was left of the day Caesar took the army after the Helvetii, setting
camp that night 3 miles away from them.20
It had been an embarrassing failure, but could so easily have proved
disastrous if the Helvetii had fully appreciated the situation and turned on
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either section of the Roman army. Labienus’ men had been especially
vulnerable on the hill. Caesar had learned that he could trust the judgement
and sense of his senior legate, but not that of other officers, however great
their reputation. It was a lesson in the risks inherent in complex operations
and the role in warfare played by chance. Caesar makes no mention of
whether or not he punished Considius for losing his head, but the publication
of the Commentaries ensured that his shame was widely known. In his
account Caesar passed the blame for the failure onto his subordinate. This
was not entirely unreasonable, but his soldiers may not have seen it that way
at the time. Caesar had given the orders, and it was he who had halted the
main force on a false report and taken a very long time before checking its
accuracy. During this period their comrades in the two legions with Labienus
had been left very much out on a limb. The pursuit of the Helvetii continued,
but the situation was not good. The wheat ration was due for issue in two
days, but there were no supplies for this. On the following morning Caesar
decided that things could not continue as they were and gave orders to
abandon their cautious chase of the Helvetii for the moment. The army
turned away and marched to Bibracte, some 18 miles away. He planned to
replenish his supplies there and then move against the Helvetii once more.
Given the latter’s plodding progress, it should not prove too difficult to catch
up with them again.21
With hindsight this proved the turning point in the campaign. Some
warriors serving amongst Caesar’s Gaulish allies quickly deserted and rode
over to the enemy, reporting the Roman withdrawal. The Helvetii decided
to pursue, presumably interpreting the move as a sign of weakness. Caesar
also wondered if they hoped to cut him off from Bibracte and his supplies.
The Roman rearguard was soon under attack. Caesar reinforced it with all
of his cavalry and used them to cover the deployment of his army. Occupying
a nearby hill, he placed the experienced Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth
legions in the main line. If he followed his later practice, then the Tenth was
probably in the place of honour on the right of the line. Each legion was
deployed in the normal formation, the triple line (triplex acies) with four
cohorts in the front line, and three each in the second and third. The
legionaries laid down their packs – normally carried suspended from a staff
that was then rested on the shoulder – so that they could fight unencumbered.
Shields were removed from their protective leather covers to expose the
insignia of each unit, and crests fixed to helmets. Behind them, further up
the slope, he stationed the inexperienced Eleventh and Twelfth legions along
with his auxiliary infantry. They were to guard the packs and the baggage
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train, and began to dig out a small trench and rampart to surround them,
but it is very unlikely that there was time to construct a fully fledged marching
camp of the type normally built by any Roman army at the end of a day’s
march. It was important for the soldiers in the battle line to know that their
possessions were safe, and clearly Caesar was still reluctant to trust these
inexperienced soldiers. Probably the four experienced legions formed a line
covering most of the slope, but as with most of Caesar’s battles it has proved
impossible to locate the site of this encounter, so that we cannot talk about
the topography with any certainty. Caesar does tell us that the slope ensured
that the two legions and the auxiliaries were clearly visible to the enemy,
covering the hillside in men and creating a strong impression of the Romans’
numerical strength.
The deployment of the army took time – probably several hours – and was
covered by the cavalry, but the Helvetii also needed a good deal of time to
advance and prepare themselves for battle. They had been travelling for
some weeks now, and had through necessity developed a degree of coordination,
but even so it was a major task concentrating enough of their
warriors in one place to overcome the Romans. With the fighting men came
their families and dependants, along with the baggage, and the Helvetii
formed the wagons into a rough laager behind their line. Gradually their
army began to form up, but the fighting would begin before some contingents
had arrived. Caesar does not supply any figure for the number of warriors
he faced at the start of the battle, but the willingness of the Helvetii to
attack would suggest that the two sides had at the very least a rough parity
of numbers – that is unless the tribesmen were utterly disdainful of the
Romans’ fighting prowess. Long delays before a battle were common in this
period, which inevitably must have been a nervous time as men had little to
do save wait. Caesar decided that a grand gesture was called for and very
openly dismounted and sent his own horse to the rear, along with those of
all his senior officers, in order to ‘make the danger equal for all, and remove
the temptation of flight’. Catiline had done the same thing in 62 BC before
the battle when his outnumbered followers had been cornered by an army
loyal to the Senate. The gladiator Spartacus had gone a step further in his
last battle, slitting the throat of the expensive horse he had captured from
a Roman general in an earlier encounter. A general on foot was a lot less
mobile and therefore could see less of the battle as it developed, so Caesar
had sacrificed a number of practical advantages to encourage the men in
this way. He would never again do this in any of his later battles, and it does
suggest that he was aware that his legionaries did not yet know him that
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well, and that the campaign had not been going especially well in the last few
days. Perhaps it was also an indication that he was not yet entirely sure of
himself as a commander. For further encouragement he addressed the men,
probably walking along and talking to each cohort in turn since it is unlikely
that all four legions could have heard him at the same time.22
The battle began in the middle of the afternoon, when the Helvetii
advanced up the slope against the Roman line. They came on in good order,
keeping a close formation. Armies tried to intimidate their opponents before
they reached them, frightening them with their battle cries, the noise of their
trumpets and their ferocious appearance. It was not uncommon for one side
to be so overawed that they would break and flee before ever a blow had
been struck. This was one of the main reasons why it would have been risky
to expose the recently raised legions to the pressure of battle. In this case,
the experienced legionaries waited, their normal tactic in this period was
to keep silent, intimidating the enemy by their apparent calmness. When
the Helvetii came close – probably within 10–15 yards – the legions threw
their pila, the heavy javelins punching through shields and in some cases
even pinning two overlapping shields together. Some warriors were killed
or wounded, others forced to drop their encumbered shields. The momentum
had gone from the attack and the Romans followed up their advantage by
cheering, drawing their swords and then charging into contact. They had the
advantage of ground and the enthusiasm and impetus of the charge, but
even so the Helvetii fought on for some time before they began to give way
and retreated down into the plain. The Romans followed, but seem to have
221
CAVALRY
AND LIGHT
INFANTRY
CAVALRY
AND LIGHT
INFANTRY
VIII IX
XI XII
VII X
WAGGON
LAAGER
HELVETII
BAGGAGE
Phase one
CAVALRY
AND LIGHT
INFANTRY
CAVALRY
AND LIGHT
INFANTRY
XI XII
VII VIII IX X
WAGGON
LAAGER
BAGGAGE
Boii Tulingi
HELVETII
THIRD LINE
Phase two
Battle of Bibracte
proconsul 58–50 BC
done so in an orderly manner and soon lost contact with the fugitives, who
ran back to the high ground on the other side of the valley, about a mile
away. However, at this point the Romans faced a new threat, as a fresh
contingent of 15,000 warriors arrived on their open right flank. These were
the Boii and the Tulingi, two allied peoples who had been further back in
the Helvetian column. It is unlikely that this was a planned manoeuvre and
that the first attack had been no more than a feint to draw the Romans down
onto the level ground – it was probably just a happy coincidence for the
Helvetii. A tribal army – even a Hellenistic army where the doctrine was to
mass the infantry in a single dense line without significant reserves – would
have been in serious trouble in this situation, in danger of its whole line
being rolled up by the fresh enemy. In contrast the Roman military system
emphasised the importance of a reserve, normally keeping at least twothirds
of their force back from the fighting line at the start of a battle. The
third line of cohorts was peeled away and formed into a new line to face
the Boii and Tulingi. The first and second lines dealt with the Helvetii, who
had rallied at the appearance of their allies and returned to the fray. The
Eleventh and Twelfth do not seem to have been brought up from the extra
reserve Caesar had in this battle and appear to have remained mere observers
of the action.23
The battle was hard-fought and continued until well after nightfall, but
after the initial shock of the arrival of these new forces, the Romans made
steady headway. The struggle for the wagon laager was especially bitter, as
the warriors fought to defend their possessions and families. Caesar makes
no mention in his account of what he did during the battle, it is simply ‘the
Romans’ who wheeled and formed fighting lines facing in two directions.
Presumably he was doing what every Roman commander should do, staying
close behind the fighting line, encouraging the men and committing reserve
troops as necessary. In the end the victory was complete, but the Roman
losses were comparatively heavy and the army was to remain where it was
for three days to look after the wounded and bury the dead. Numbers of
prisoners had been taken, including both a son and daughter of Orgetorix,
but Caesar says that 130,000 people escaped from the battle and fled north
east towards the territory of the Lingones. In the circumstances it must have
been hard for him to make an accurate count, but clearly sizeable numbers
of the migrants survived the battle. Many may not have reached it at all,
but those who had been involved had lost most of the baggage. Caesar did
not pursue immediately. He had still not sorted out his supply situation,
and the care he showed for his casualties was important in adding to the
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growing trust between army and commander. Instead he sent messages to
the chieftains of the Lingones, ordering them not to aid the Helvetii, unless
they wanted to be treated as enemies.
After three days he set out after the enemy, but was soon met by a
delegation offering to surrender. Caesar instructed them to tell the tribesmen
to halt and wait for him to reach them and give a decision. That they did
so was an indication that they were not simply playing for time. When
Caesar arrived he demanded and received hostages, as well as getting the
Helvetii to return the slaves who had fled to or been taken by them during
their migration. The warriors were also disarmed. On the first night some
6,000 men from one clan broke away from the camp, heading eastwards
towards the Rhine. Caesar sent messengers to the communities in their
path with the same stark warning as he had given to the Lingones. The
fugitives were brought back and sold into slavery, being denied the terms that
he extended to everyone else. The Helvetii and most of their allies were
then ordered to return to their homelands and settle there once more.
Instructions were sent to the Allobroges in his province to supply the
returning tribes with grain until they had re-established themselves once
more, rebuilding their burnt settlements and cultivating their farms again.
After an appeal from the Aedui, Caesar allowed them to settle the Boii on
lands within their tribal territory. Stability was restored to the lands
surrounding Transalpine Gaul, but the cost in human lives had been very
high. In conclusion, Caesar states that of the 368,000 people listed in the
records captured from the Helvetii, only some 110,000 returned home; the
32,000 Boii – minus their casualties from the battle – settled in Gaul, while
6,000 fugitives were sold into slavery, leaving a massive deficit of 220,000.
As always we cannot know how accurate these figures were, and presumably
very large numbers of people had simply dispersed in the face of Roman
attacks, just as the Tigurini had done at the Saône. Nevertheless, many –
perhaps tens of thousands – must have been killed, but we should not let
the modern horror at such huge loss of life blind us to the response of
Caesar’s Roman audience to such statistics. For them, a dangerous
movement of hostile peoples had been stopped and their province, which
was not far from Italy itself, secured for the future. In the Commentaries
Caesar often makes use of the verb parcere which meant ‘to pacify’ and
was used for the defeat of any people, anywhere, who had refused when
challenged to submit to Roman authority. Pax or ‘peace’ was the outcome
of a Roman victory. From the Roman perspective, peace had returned to the
northern frontier.24
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The Friend of the Roman People
By this time it was summer. Several months of the campaigning season
remained, but there would not have been enough time to shift the forces
back to the Balkan frontier and begin operations there. Caesar had already
won a great victory, but was hungry for more and reluctant to stand idle
even for a short time. He was soon presented with an opportunity for a
further military adventure. Delegations had come in from most of the
Gallic/Celtic tribes of central Gaul congratulating him on his defeat of the
Helvetii. The praise may in part have been genuine, but it was obviously
wise to establish good relations with any new power that had moved into the
region. These envoys requested permission to summon a meeting of all the
tribes at which they could meet him and present petitions. In another tearful
scene, chieftains threw themselves at the proconsul’s feet and, with the druid
Diviciacus as their spokesman, begged Caesar to protect them from the
German King Ariovistus. They claimed that the man who had been invited
in to aid the Sequani had since then brought in and settled 120,000 of his
people on their lands and taken hostages from all the tribes. They complained
of his tyranny, calling him a ‘wild, uncontrolled barbarian’. More Germans
were said to be coming to join their war-leader and Caesar was asked ‘to
defend the whole of Gaul from the onslaught of Ariovistus’. Representatives
from the Sequani silently supported the plea, Diviciacus answering Caesar’s
enquiry by saying that they were too afraid to speak lest word be carried to
the Germans. Caesar then assured the gathered chieftains that he would
take care of the matter and use his auctoritas to persuade Ariovistus to
moderate his behaviour. Privately he took the matter very seriously, feeling
that he must support the Aedui because of their long and loyal alliance with
Rome. Apart from that, he also claims that he was concerned about the
Germans getting into the habit of migrating across the Rhine, lest this
happen too frequently and cause folk movements on the scale of the
migrations of the Cimbri and Teutones.25
Envoys were sent to Ariovistus asking him to meet with Caesar at some
point midway between them. The king declined, saying that Caesar must
come to him if he wanted to talk, and also asking why the Roman felt he
needed to intervene in this part of Gaul. In response Caesar sent a new
message, reminding the king of the obligation he ought to feel because during
his own consulship the Roman people had acknowledged him as ‘king and
friend’. This time the demands were clearly expressed. Ariovistus was not to
bring any more Germans across the Rhine to settle in Gaul. Secondly, he
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must restore the hostages to the Aedui and refrain in future from raiding or
threatening them. Compliance would ensure continued good relations with
Rome, but refusal would force Caesar to take firm steps to safeguard the
Aedui and other allies of the Republic. Ariovistus’ reply showed a similar
unwillingness to compromise. He was a conqueror and, just like the Romans,
saw no reason to be dictated to by others in his treatment of the conquered.
The Romans were free to run their provinces as they wished and he claimed
the same right in the lands he and his warriors had taken. He had beaten the
Aedui, and their hostages had nothing to fear from him as long as the tribe
delivered their annual tribute to him. He and his warriors had never been
defeated since they came to Gaul and feared no enemy. Having established
Ariovistus’ overweening pride to his audience, Caesar claims that within an
hour of receiving this message, envoys came from the Aedui reporting that
their lands had been raided by the Germans. In addition, the Treveri from
further north sent word that huge numbers of Seubi – the Germanic people
to which Ariovistus and his men belonged – were at the Rhine and trying to
cross into Gaul. There were supposed to be one hundred clans making this
attempt, a migration that would have dwarfed that of the Helvetii.26
Caesar decided to act, but this time made sure that his grain supply was
secure before he began to move. He drove the army on at a quick pace, for
they were no longer following the sluggish Helvetii, and after three days
received a message informing him that Ariovistus and the German army
were advancing on Vesontio (modern Besançon), the main town of the
Sequani. Clearly by this time the tribe had broken with its former ally. As the
tribal centre it was an important place, sited in a naturally strong position
and with large food stores that would be very useful for any army. Not
willing for this to fall into enemy hands Caesar drove his men on, forcemarching
both day and night with only brief rests until he reached the town,
into which he put a garrison. With the race won, he gave the troops several
days of rest to recover from their exertions, and also to allow his supplies
to catch up. Discontent has always tended to flourish more when armies
have time on their hands, rather than when they are busy. Rumours were
rife in the town and:
a panic spread after conversations with the Gauls and the traders, who
said that the Germans were a race of huge stature, incredible courage
and skill with weapons – they claimed that often when they met them
they had not been able to sustain even their glance and keen expressions.
Then very suddenly a great panic seized the entire army, dismaying the
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minds and spirits of all ranks. The thing started with the military
tribunes and prefects, and the rest of the men lacking military
experience who had followed Caesar from the City in an effort to win
his friendship: some put forward some excuse obliging them to depart,
others asked permission to leave, and a few were shamed into staying
. . . they were unable to conceal their depression, or at times hide their
tears; they cowered in their tents to bemoan their fates, or gathered
with friends to lament the common danger. Throughout the entire
camp men started drawing up their wills. With these voices of despair,
even men with long experience of campaigning, soldiers, centurions,
and cavalry officers were affected.27
Some men claimed that they were more worried about the difficult terrain
through which the army would have to pass in the next stage of the advance.
Others said that they were nervous about the grain supply – a plausible
enough concern in the light of the recent operations against the Helvetii. A
few officers even declared that there would be an open mutiny and that the
soldiers would not obey Caesar’s order to advance. The episode provides
another indication that the fanatical loyalty which Caesar’s officers and
soldiers displayed in later campaigns, especially during the Civil War, did not
spring up instantly on Caesar’s arrival in Gaul, but took time to grow. It is
interesting that Caesar portrayed the tribunes and other officers as the source
of the discontent, for these men were usually equestrians and often the sons
of senators. This reinforces the view that these classes were not the sole,
nor even necessarily the main target audience for the Commentaries. Dio
claims that some of these men complained that the war against Ariovistus
had not been authorised by the Senate, so that they were risking their lives
purely because of Caesar’s personal ambition.28
The proconsul summoned a consilium (a council or briefing). All of the
centurions – some 360 men if all of these posts were filled in the six legions
– were instructed to attend, along presumably with the other senior officers.
It was time for Caesar the orator to use reason and charm his army as he had
often in the past worked a crowd in the Forum. He began sternly, as befitted
a general given imperium by the Senate and People of Rome, and told them
off for daring to question the plans of their legally appointed commander.
After giving them this shock and reminder of discipline, Caesar switched to
argument. Their nervousness might well prove unnecessary, since there was
every chance that Ariovistus would remember his obligation to Caesar
because of his recognition by Rome in the previous year and see reason.
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Even if fighting became necessary, Roman legions had met and defeated
German warriors in the past, when Marius smashed the Cimbri and
Teutones, and more recently when there were many Germans amongst the
slave army of Spartacus. Ariovistus had beaten the Aedui and other Gauls
by outwitting and surprising them, not in a fair fight. Such crude strategems
would not work against a Roman army. Those who openly worried about
the grain supply insulted him by doubting his care and competence, while
ignoring the convoys already coming from allied tribes and the ripe harvest
now visible in the fields. He was not worried by the claim that his soldiers
would refuse an order to advance:
. . . at any time when an army has not listened to its commander, either
fortune has failed them or bad mistake been discovered . . .. My own
integrity has been shown in my life, and my good luck in the war
against the Helvetii. Therefore I intend to carry out what I had planned
to postpone till a later date, and to break camp in the fourth watch of
this coming night, so that I may see once and for all if duty and honour
prevails in your hearts over fear. Anyway, even if no one else follows, I
shall set out with just the Tenth Legion, for I have no doubt of its
loyalty, and it will act as if it were my own guard.
Caesar had favoured this legion, and had the greatest confidence in its
courage.29
The whole speech was a challenge to the centurions’ pride in themselves
and their units. Caesar’s tone displayed disappointment in them, since only
cowardice and lack of faith in his leadership could explain their threatened
refusal to obey orders. The Tenth was flattered, and its tribunes immediately
reported the legion’s readiness to obey Caesar’s every order and prove that
his trust was not misplaced. The other units were each determined not to be
outshone by any other legion, and their centurions asked the tribunes and
senior officers to assure Caesar that there had never been any real question
of disobedience.30
As he had promised, Caesar marched the army out of camp before dawn
of the next day. He did change his plans in one way, which may suggest that
he had seen some justification in a little of the criticism. Rather than continue
as he had originally planned, through the hills, he sought advice from
Diviciacus and took the column through open country. This meant a detour
of 50 miles, but prevented a fresh outbreak of croaking amongst his officers.
After a week, his scouts reported that the German army was only 24 miles
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proconsul 58–50 BC
away. Envoys soon arrived from Ariovistus, saying that he was now willing
to have the face-to-face meeting that he had previously declined. In the
Commentaries Caesar claims that he still hoped for a peaceful resolution of
the problem, and this may not simply have been intended to emphasise his
reasonableness to his audience. Many Roman commanders, Sulla included,
had celebrated the occasions when, surrounded by the full pomp and
ceremony of a Roman magistrate and surrounded by the serried ranks of the
legions, they had confronted a foreign king and dictated terms to him. There
was almost as much glory in such a deed as there was in defeating the enemy
in battle, although the potential profits were less, with no prospect of plunder
or slaves.31
Five days later the meeting took place on the neutral ground of a plain
roughly equal in distance between the two camps. Only one large mound
interrupted the flat land. The details of how this would take place had been
hammered out in long negotiations during the preceding days. Ariovistus
insisted that each of them should only have horsemen in his entourage. Not
fully trusting his allied horsemen, Caesar borrowed their mounts and gave
them to legionaries from the Tenth so that these provided his escort. Once
again delighted to be singled out from the entire army, the soldiers joked
that the proconsul was making them knights (equites), punning on the
ancient role of the wealthy equestrian order. The two parties stopped 200
paces apart. In accordance with Ariovistus’ wishes, each leader then rode
forward with only ten men as escort. The language used was Gallic, which
Ariovistus had learned during his time west of the Rhine. Caesar presumably
used one of his usual interpreters. He began by reminding Ariovistus of the
favour done to him by the Republic and the obligations that this implied. The
Aedui were very long-standing allies of Rome, and the German’s treatment
of them was unacceptable and must stop. Caesar’s demands were the same
as before. No more Germans must be allowed across the Rhine into Gaul and
the Aedui must have their hostages returned. Ariovistus’ attitude had not
changed. What he had won, he had won through right of conquest. Why was
Caesar interfering in a place where no Roman army had ever ventured before?
This was his ‘province’, just as Transalpine Gaul was Caesar’s, and neither
of them should interfere in the other man’s territory. The German wondered
whether ‘despite Caesar’s pretence of friendship, he had brought the army
into Gaul to destroy him’. Until the Romans withdrew, Ariovistus would
treat them as enemies. In the Commentaries he makes the barbed comment
that if he killed Caesar, the news would be welcomed by ‘many of the
principal men and nobles’ back in Rome. This may well have been true, but
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none of his opponents would have liked to be depicted as men so lacking in
patriotism that they would be pleased by the defeat of a Roman army as
long as it meant Caesar’s death. Having made the threat, Ariovistus then
offered to support Caesar in every future operation if he withdrew now.32
Caesar responded with more justification of the Roman position, but the
parley broke up when some of the German warriors began throwing javelins
or slinging stones at the mounted legionaries. He decided against fighting,
since he did not wish to give the impression that the Romans had broken
faith. After two days, Ariovistus sent word asking for another meeting, or
alternatively for the Romans to send envoys to his camp. Reluctant to risk
any of his senior officers on this mission, Caesar again showed his trust in
Valerius Procillus by selecting him for the task. With him went Caius Mettius,
a merchant who in the past had visited Ariovistus and received his hospitality.
This time the welcome was less warm and both envoys were denounced as
spies and thrown into chains by the Germans.33
Ariovistus had evidently decided on a military solution to the dispute.
Yet he was an experienced war-leader who had welded his warriors into a
more cohesive force than most tribal armies and he still acted cautiously. On
the same day as he arrested the Roman envoys, he advanced to camp on
high ground 6 miles from the Roman position. Probably remaining on high
ground, he led his army out again on the following morning and marched
past Caesar’s camp to establish a new base 2 miles behind the Romans.
This cut Caesar off from his supply lines to the allied tribes. For five days
the proconsul ordered his army out of camp and formed a battle line. The
Germans refused to come down and Caesar clearly felt it unwise to risk a
direct attack on Ariovistus’ camp, which suggests that it was in a strong
position. There were skirmishes on these days, mostly between the cavalry,
but no full-scale fighting developed. Ariovistus’ horsemen worked closely
with picked light infantry – who in later centuries were known to the
Germans as the ‘hundred’ (centeni) – capable over short distances of keeping
pace with the horses by grabbing onto their manes. The warriors on foot
acted as a solid support, behind which the cavalry could retreat if worsted,
and rest and re-form before advancing again. The tactics and the quality of
the Germanic warriors usually gave them the edge over Gaulish cavalry.34
Caesar could not afford to remain where he was, for he was achieving
nothing and each day his army consumed a significant part of the supplies
he had with him. A direct attack was too risky, so instead he decided to
reopen his supply lines. The army formed into three columns, each of which
could be readily converted into a fighting line to make up the normal triplex
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acies. The baggage train and presumably some guards remained in the main
camp, for Caesar only intended to create an outpost beyond the German
position. The Romans marched past the German camp to a spot just under
1,000 yards away from it. Once there the legions faced towards the enemy.
The German cavalry along with 16,000 infantry came out to oppose them.
This was only a part of Ariovistus’ foot, but it is unlikely that he was able
to get more of them armed and ready for battle quickly enough to intervene.
Caesar ordered the cohorts in the third line to begin laying out and
constructing a new camp to accommodate two legions, while the first and
second lines met any German attack. These probably took the form more
of probes and feints rather than an all-out assault. If most of the six legions
took part in this manoeuvre then two-thirds of their strength plus the cavalry
and light troops would at the very least have matched the German numbers.
After several hours of this, the camp defences were ready. Two legions were
installed, while the rest of the army marched back in the same order to the
main camp. The smaller fort would now make it easier to protect supply
convoys coming from the allied tribes. The pressure on Caesar for a quick
victory or an ignominious retreat was removed, and he could afford to wait
for the moment and situation of his choice before engaging the enemy army.35
On the next day Caesar ordered the legions out of both camps to form
up in the standard triplex acies facing the enemy. It was a gesture of
confidence, intended to encourage his own men and impress the enemy,
and he says that this was his normal practice during these days. Ariovistus
declined the offer of battle and at noon the Roman commander sent his
men back. Later in the afternoon the Germans did become aggressive,
sending out troops to attack the smaller camp, but the troops there were able
to repulse the onslaught. That evening Caesar personally questioned some
of the prisoners who had been taken. These men claimed that Ariovistus
was reluctant to risk a full-scale battle because the women who acted as
diviners for the German army had declared that he would only win a victory
if he waited until the full moon. Ceremonies and sacrifices were normal in
most armies before battles, but Caesar, the Pontifex Maximus, makes no
mention throughout the Commentaries of the rituals that were a very
important aspect of the legions’ routine. In this case, he decided to exploit
the superstition of the enemy. On the next day he stripped the camps of all
but the barest minimum of guards and formed the rest of the army into a
triplex acies, with the cavalry probably on the wings. He then led the army
straight up the slope against the Germans, going far closer to their camp
than he had ever done on the previous days. This challenge was too bold
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to ignore without humiliation, and the risk that his warriors would become
daunted by the enemy. Ariovistus led out his men, who formed in units
according to their clans and tribes – mention is made of seven distinct
contingents. Behind the line were the warriors’ wives, perched on wagons
and cheering on their men folk, begging them to protect them from slavery
at the hands of the enemy.36
In this battle all six legions took their place in the battle line, so that Caesar
clearly felt that the Eleventh and Twelfth now had sufficient experience of
campaigning to cope with the stress of battle. Probably they were both
sandwiched between more experienced units and it is very likely that a veteran
legion was stationed on each flank. Caesar’s five legates and his quaestor
were each given command of a legion ‘so that every man should have a witness
231
SMALL
ROMAN
CAMP
GERMAN
CAMP
MAIN
ROMAN
CAMP
HARUDES
MARCOMANI
TRIBOCES
VANGIONES
NEMETES
SEDUSII
SUEBI
1 Caesar advances to
provoke battle
3 Crassus commits
third line
2 German right
outflanks Roman left
CRASSUS
CAESAR
Legio X
Battle against Ariovistus
proconsul 58–50 BC
of his courage’. He stationed himself on the right flank, where he thought the
enemy line was weakest and most likely to be broken. The battle began
suddenly, both sides charging into contact without the normal exchange of
missiles. Caesar managed to break through the enemy left, but was too closely
involved to keep much control of the other sectors of the battle. The German
right began to drive back the Roman left, and it was only the prompt action
of the young Publius Crassus, who as commander of the cavalry ‘could move
around more easily than the officers in the main line’, which saved the day.
Crassus ordered up the cohorts of the third line and they restored the situation.
Soon afterwards the breakthrough on the far wing spread panic throughout
the entire German army, which collapsed into flight. Caesar himself led his
cavalry at the head of a pursuit that was both determined and utterly ruthless.
One later source that probably refers to this battle claims that he deliberately
gave an escape route to a group of Germans who were desperately resisting
so that he could slaughter them more easily in flight. Ariovistus himself
escaped, and from then on disappears from history. Two of his wives – one
the sister of a Norican king – and one of his daughters were less fortunate
and were killed amidst the general massacre. Another daughter was captured.
Even some of those fugitives who escaped across the Rhine were then attacked
by other tribes. The Seubi, who were supposed to have been waiting to join
their kinsmen in Gaul, returned to their own homes. Much to Caesar’s delight,
the troops he was actually with came across Valerius Procillus and were able
to rescue him from his captors. The proconsul claimed that the reunion gave
him ‘as much pleasure as the victory itself’. The emotion was surely genuine,
though of course it also helped to confirm Caesar’s reputation for loyalty to
his friends. Procillus was doubtless even more relived, for he told them that
the Germans had three times asked the diviners whether he should be burnt
to death, but that thrice he had been saved by the lot. The other captured
envoy, the trader Mettius, was also released unharmed.37
The campaigning season was at an end and Caesar had completed – in
his own words – ‘two very great wars in a single summer’. Neither had
probably been anticipated by him before his arrival in the province, but he
had seized the opportunities offered to him. For the moment at least his
attention had switched to Gaul and would remain there in the immediate
future. Caesar spent much of the winter in Cisalpine Gaul, carrying out the
administrative and judicial tasks required of a Roman governor, and also
keeping an eye on Rome. His army remained and went into winter quarters
in the territory of the Sequani. Come the spring they would be ready for
further operations deeper into Gaul.38
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XI
‘The Bravest of the
Gaulish Peoples’:
The Belgae, 57 BC
‘They did not allow traders to come amongst them; they permitted no
wine or any other luxuries to be imported, because they believed that
these weakened the spirit and reduced courage.’ – Caesar.1
‘The whole race which is now called both Gallic and Galatic is war-mad
. . . although not otherwise simple . . .. And therefore, if roused, they come
together all at once for the struggle, both openly and without
circumspection, so that for those who wish to defeat them by stratagem
they become easy to deal with . . . .’ – Strabo, early first century AD.2
During the winter months of 58–57 BC Caesar raised two more legions, the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth. Once again he acted entirely on his own initiative
and paid for the troops and their equipment with the funds he controlled as
governor. Thus within twelve months he had doubled the size of the army
allocated to him with his province. Centurions from the experienced legions
were given steps in promotion and transferred to the new units. This made
good military sense, providing the raw recruits with a leaven of veteran
officers, and seems to have been Caesar’s standard practice throughout his
campaigns. The transfers created vacancies in the established legions, which
must then have been filled by internal promotions or appointments from
outside. In the Commentaries conspicuous gallantry is always given as the
reason for advancing or rewarding centurions. Suetonius says that Caesar did
not care about his men’s ‘lifestyle or wealth, but only their courage’. His
tribunes and prefects, many of whom were appointed on the basis of
recommendation or favour, had proved disappointing in the previous summer.
We do not know whether the discontent at Vesontio resulted in any
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proconsul 58–50 BC
dismissals. Patronage was everywhere in Roman society, so that it is unlikely
that it never played a role in Caesar’s appointment of centurions, but it is
clear that individual ability was his main concern. His centurions certainly
came to believe that talent would always be rewarded. Caesar carefully
cultivated them, learning their names, in much the same way that he and
other senators took the trouble to greet passers-by by name in the Forum.
The bond that was created between the proconsul and these officers was
intensely personal. Centurions led from the front and suffered
disproportionately high casualties as a result. This, combined with the
continued expansion of Caesar’s army, helped to ensure that there were
always more posts to fill, and more brave junior officers to reward. By the
end of the Gallic campaigns the vast majority of the centurions in his legions
owed their initial appointment, promotion to senior grades, or both, to
Caesar himself. This was an important part of the process whereby his
legions became not simply the army in the province he happened to control,
but Caesar’s army.3
The winter months were also a time for training. Caesar was not a
martinet in the old Roman tradition of stern commanders who flogged and
executed their men to instil rigid discipline. He seems rarely to have employed
either punishment, considering only desertion and mutiny as serious crimes.
Off-duty and in the quiet months his men were allowed considerable leeway
in their behaviour. Caesar is once supposed to have said that his men would
fight as well even if they ‘stank of perfume’. Marius had led his armies in
the same way, and Caesar may deliberately have copied his famous relative,
and perhaps felt that this was an appropriately popularis way of doing
things. Yet for all their leniency in peaceful times, both Marius and Caesar
had high standards of conduct for their legions during actual operations.
Then it was a question of tight discipline, instant obedience and proficient
manoeuvres, and to ensure that he received this Caesar trained his army
hard. In this respect he conformed with the aristocratic ideal of a commander,
for all the best generals were seen as men who carefully prepared their armies
for battle through rigorous training. Caesar ‘often stood his men to, even
when there was no cause, and especially on festival days or when it was
raining. Sometimes he would tell them to keep an eye on him, and then slip
away suddenly by day or night, and lead them on an especially long march,
designed to wear out those who failed to keep up.’4 His personal example
was vital in encouraging the soldiers to meet his standards. Caesar led the
column on training marches and in the field, sometimes on horseback, but
more often on foot, just like the ordinary legionaries. It was a gesture intended
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‘The Bravest of the Gaulish Peoples’: The Belgae, 57 bc
to show them that he was not expecting them to do anything he would not
do himself. According to Plutarch the soldiers were astonished:
that he should undergo toils beyond his body’s apparent power of
endurance . . . because he was of a spare habit, had soft and white skin,
suffered from epileptic fits . . .. Nevertheless, he did not make his feeble
health an excuse for soft living, but rather his military service a cure for
his feeble health, since by wearisome journeys, simple diet, continuously
sleeping in the open air, and enduring hardships he fought off his trouble
and kept his body strong against its attacks. Most of his sleep, at least,
he got in cars or litters, making his rest conduce to action, and in the daytime
he would have himself conveyed to garrisons, cities, or camps, one
slave who was accustomed to write from dictation as he travelled sitting
by his side and one soldier standing behind him with a sword.5
When Caesar addressed his troops it was always as ‘comrades’
(commilitones), never ‘men’ or ‘soldiers’. He and they were all good Romans,
serving the Republic by fighting against its enemies, and also winning glory
and plunder along the way, which he took care to share with them most
generously. Already they had won two great victories. Mutual trust grew
up gradually between the commander, his officers, and soldiers as they came
to know and rely on each other. Pride in themselves and their units was also
carefully fostered. Decorated weapons, some inlaid with silver or gold, were
issued, most probably as rewards for valour, marking the recipients out as
exceptional soldiers and making them feel special. The Roman military
system had always sought to encourage boldness in its soldiers, but in
Caesar’s legions this ideal was taken to an extreme.6
Caesar spent much of the winter south of the Alps, so that presumably
a good deal of training must have been supervised by his legates, tribunes
and centurions. In the past he had championed the rights of the residents of
Cisalpine Gaul, and during his time as governor he did his best to win the
lasting support of the people of the area, especially the aristocracy. He
employed many citizens of Gallic extraction on his staff, a good number of
them aristocrats from the tribes of the Transalpine province. Apart from
Valerius Procillus, who had played such a prominent role in the first
campaigns, other men are mentioned later in the Commentaries. The father
of the Gallic historian Pompeius Trogus also served on Caesar’s staff, and
was given responsibility for some of his letters. Caesar never mentions him,
and it may be that he was one of a number of clerks who helped to cope with
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the proconsul’s voluminous correspondence. Even while mounted and riding
out to inspect the lines of his army, Caesar was said to have been able to
dictate to two secretaries at a time. Letters went often to influential men in
Rome, and on many occasions were reinforced by personal visits made by
his agent Balbus. Much correspondence also went the other way, and Plutarch
tells us that from the beginning many men travelled north to petition Caesar
for favours such as appointments to his staff. Always eager to do favours
and so place more men under obligation to him, he was almost always
willing to grant any request. Yet in the main it still seems to have been the
failures or those without good connection who approached him.7
Socially Caesar entertained and was entertained by the local aristocracy,
many of whom had only possessed citizenship for a generation or so.
Suetonius says that he regularly filled two dining halls, one with his officers
and Greek members of his staff and the other for civilian citizens. On one
occasion in Mediolanum (modern Milan), he dined at the house of one
Valerius Meto, and the party was served with asparagus accidentally dressed
in bitter myrrh rather than the normal olive oil. Caesar ate it without
comment or change of expression, and rebuked his companions when they
loudly complained. The patrician from one of Rome’s oldest families was
the perfect guest and as always a lively companion. Whether or not many
of the local nobility were able to provide him with the witty, often
philosophical or literary conversation that was so popular amongst Rome’s
elite is unknown. Even if they could not match the standards of sophisticated
dinners at Rome, the pronounced literary interests of so many of his officers
doubtless provided him with such diversions. Caesar was also friendly with
the father of the poet Catullus, whose family came from the Po Valley. The
son had gone to Rome, but after taking a few steps on a public career, had
abandoned this and devoted himself to his verses. Many dealt with love,
but not a few were bitter attacks on leading men of the day, including both
Cato and Caesar. In one he styled Caesar a ‘ravenous, shameless gambler’,
but another was even more scurrilous, alleging – amongst other things – a
homosexual affair between the general and one of his prefects, Mamurra:8
Well agreed are the abominable profligates, Mamurra the effeminate,
and Caesar; no wonder either. Like stains, one from the city and one
from Formiae, are deeply impressed on each, and will never be washed
out. Diseased alike, very twins, both on one sofa, dilettante writers
both, one as greedy in adultery as the other, rivals and partners in love.
Well agreed are these abominable profligates.9
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‘The Bravest of the Gaulish Peoples’: The Belgae, 57 bc
Caesar was outraged, but did not break his friendship with the poet’s father,
and when Catullus himself apologised, immediately invited him to dinner.10
No one seems to have actually believed that Caesar and Mamurra were
lovers, but the latter was not a popular figure and attracted Catullus’ spleen
in other poems. After the stories about Nicomedes, Caesar remained sensitive
about such things. However, the suggestion that the proconsul continued
his womanising ways while in Gaul was widely – and certainly correctly –
credited. Years later at his triumph Caesar’s legionaries would sing about him
frittering away the money he borrowed in Rome on his Gaulish women. In
Tacitus’ account of a rebellion in the Rhineland in AD 70, we read of one
Gallic nobleman who claimed that he was descended from Caesar. The latter
was supposed to have taken the man’s great-grandmother as his mistress at
some point during the campaigns in Gaul. It is difficult to know who Caesar’s
lovers were in these years, but probably most were from the aristocratic
families inside his provinces and perhaps amongst the tribes elsewhere.
Some, especially those with Roman citizenship, may have been educated
and able to provide him with the witty and stimulating companionship that
he had sought so often amongst the married women of Rome. In other cases
it may simply have been a question of physical pleasure.11
The Belgae
Leaving his army to winter in the lands of the Sequani had shown that
Caesar did not intend his intervention in the affairs of Gaul to be temporary.
Even he admits that this caused disquiet amongst certain tribal leaders, who
wondered whether they had truly gained from the expulsion of Ariovistus,
if they were now to be dominated by a Roman proconsul. During the winter
rumours and reports reached the proconsul south of the Alps that the Belgae,
the tribes of northern Gaul, were even more disturbed and had formed a
‘conspiracy’ against Rome. They were encouraged by chieftains in some of
the Gallic/Celtic peoples – men whom Caesar claims aspired to kingship –
but judged that such revolutions would be harder to achieve in a region
dominated by Rome. The Belgae also felt that once the Romans had secured
control – ‘pacified’ is the word used in the Commentaries – of Celtic central
Gaul, then the legions might soon march against them. In the light of
subsequent events this was not an unreasonable concern, for Caesar was
about to do precisely that. By taking his army outside Transalpine Gaul in
the previous year, driving out first the Helvetii and then Ariovistus, he had
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shown that Rome was willing to intervene on behalf of its allies. In the past,
the Roman province had maintained a ring of friendly states around its
borders. Caesar had decided to push the Roman sphere of influence further
north, claiming that this was necessary to prevent other forces from
dominating the region, and ultimately threatening the security of the
province. These motives were entirely appropriate for a Roman governor, and
even if Caesar’s actions interpreted his duty in an extremely aggressive way,
he still remained within the boundaries of proper action for a magistrate of
the Republic. Pompey had behaved in a similar fashion during his eastern
campaigns, but his and Caesar’s campaigns differed only in scale from the
actions of many earlier Roman generals. Few of these men had subsequently
been challenged because of their actions, and even fewer actually punished.
In the Commentaries Caesar claims that the Belgae planned and began a preemptive
attack to challenge Roman power. He was effectively acting in the
same way. By the standards of the time, neither of them were acting
unreasonably.12
Caesar uses the term Belgae or Belgians fairly vaguely to refer to all the
peoples living to the north of the Celtic tribes. The area was much wider than
modern Belgium, and included not only parts of Holland, but much of
northern France. The ‘true’ Belgae appear to have been the tribes living in
what is now the Pas de Calais and upper Normandy. Caesar considered all
of the Belgae were Gauls, but also claims that many of them were descended
from German settlers. As we have already seen, the distinction between Gaul
and German was not always as clear as our ancient sources suggest but there
may well have been some truth in this. At the end of the first century AD
Tacitus also believed that the Nervii and Treveri were both Germanic. In
Caesar’s case his mention of the Germanic connection may well have been
intended to make the Belgae seem more threatening, and therefore more
deserving of Roman ‘pacification’. He also takes care to report that one
tribe boasted that they were the only people who had resisted the migrating
Cimbri and Teutones, while another was descended from these great enemies
of Rome. The Belgae were more warlike than the Celtic tribes, in part because
they were further away from Roman influence. Ancient authors believed
that access to the luxuries of civilisation softened a people, while a simple
life preserved natural virtue and courage. The archaeological record confirms
that Roman wine was far less common in northern Gaul than amongst those
peoples who lay nearer the trade routes. The Nervii are supposed to have
forbidden all imports, but elsewhere the tribal aristocracies did value wine,
and possessing it even in small quantities helped to confirm their status.
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‘The Bravest of the Gaulish Peoples’: The Belgae, 57 bc
Less is known about the walled towns of northern Gaul than the oppida of
the Celtic tribes, but in general they seem to have been somewhat smaller and
less developed. Some of the tribes still had kings, a few of whom were
powerful, although aristocratic councils were more important in other tribes.
Only a generation or so before, one monarch is supposed to have controlled
much of the region and also part of Britain.13
Such political unity under a single strong leader no longer existed, but the
Belgic tribes did show a willingness to join together to meet what they
perceived as the threat posed by the Romans. During the winter they had
exchanged hostages and agreed to form a combined army, to which each
was to provide a set number of warriors. The whole force was to be led by
Galba, King of the Suessiones, not by any right, but because the other leaders
acknowledged his ability. Caesar began to concentrate his own forces before
the campaigning season began, sending the two new legions under the
command of the legate Quintus Pedius to join the rest of the army. The
proconsul remained in Cisalpine Gaul, only travelling north to take charge
when the spring was sufficiently advanced to provide forage for the army’s
animals. He immediately requested the allied tribes to inform him of events
further north and received reports of the Belgic preparations. The Roman
army marched north, the proconsul pushing on at his usual rapid pace, so
that within two weeks they were approaching the Remi, the first of the tribes
considered to be Belgae rather than Celts. Envoys arrived assuring him that
they had never been hostile to Rome, immediately agreeing to Caesar’s
demands for hostages and supplies of grain. He questioned them about the
numbers of warriors he was likely to face and was given a precise list of the
tribal contingents. The Bellovaci had promised 60,000 men, the Suessiones
and Nervii both 50,000, the Morini 25,000, the Atuatuci 19,000, the Atrebates
15,000, the Ambiani and Caleti each 10,000, while another six tribes
altogether offered 50,000, producing a total of 289,000 warriors. These were
the figures reported by the Remi and dutifully recorded by Caesar in the
Commentaries. He never troubles to say whether or not he believed their
estimates were accurate. The narrative of the campaign does suggest that the
combined army was an exceptionally large and rather clumsy force, which
may well have been significantly bigger than the Roman army. Caesar himself
made sure that the full strength of the tribes was never united, by arranging
with Diviciacus for the Aedui to attack the Bellovaci and keep their warriors
busy defending their own lands.14
The Remi were closely related to the Suessiones, following the same
customs and laws, and at times ruled by the same leaders. It is hard to know
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whether their readiness to join the Romans was a pragmatic
acknowledgement of their inability to resist the sudden appearance of Caesar,
or was based on rivalry with and fear of the other tribes. Certainly, the Remi
were the first target of the Belgic coalition, whose army advanced to assault
Bibrax, one of the Remi’s main towns (probably modern Vieux-Laon).
Caesar had advanced across the Aisne, which lay on the tribe’s borders, and
camped on the far bank. He left a detachment under the legate Sabinus on
the other side of the river to build a fort protecting the bridge. Bibrax was
about 8 miles away, and its leader – one of the chieftains who had led the
delegation to Caesar – now sent word that he could not hold out much
longer unless he received help. Guided by the men who had brought this
message, the proconsul sent his Numidian, Cretan and Balearic light troops
to slip into the town under cover of darkness. The method used by the
Belgians for attacking a fortification was simple – a barrage of sling stones
and other missiles pinned the defenders down, while other warriors advanced
holding their shields over their heads and undermined the wall. The skilled
archers and slingers sent by Caesar would have made this extremely difficult,
and the Belgians abandoned the attempt, contenting themselves with ravaging
the surrounding area, setting fire to the small villages and farms dotted
about the countryside. They then moved to confront Caesar, camping 2
miles from the Roman position, with a valley between them. Caesar claims
that the fires in the Belgians’ sprawling encampment covered an area of
some 8 miles.15
For days both sides then watched each other. There were cavalry
skirmishes, by which Caesar gauged the quality of this new enemy and
judged that his own men would be more than a match for them in most
situations. His camp was on high ground with the River Aisne to the rear.
On the slope in front he deployed his six legions with battle experience,
leaving the two recently recruited formations to guard his camp – an echo
of the deployment against the Helvetii. With no natural feature to protect
the flanks, the legionaries dug a 400-pace (roughly 130 yards) ditch on
each side, running back at right angles from the main line. Each ditch led
up to a small fort, in which were emplaced light artillery pieces or
scorpions, capable of firing heavy bolts with tremendous force and accuracy
over distances far greater than any missile weapon the Belgians possessed.
Sulla had once entrenched his position in much the same way to secure
his flanks against an enemy army that was markedly superior in numbers.
The Belgians would have to advance up the gentle slope before attacking
the Roman position from the front, and the advantage of such a position
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had been clearly demonstrated the year before near Bibracte. To make
matters worse for the Belgians, in the bottom of the valley between the
two positions was a stream and an area of marsh. These were not
impassable obstacles, but would have slowed an attack down and caused
a line to fall into disorder. It was unlikely that the opposition would give
the attacker the opportunity to stop and redress the line before continuing
the advance.16
Caesar’s position was a strong one and he could be confident of beating
off even the heaviest of attacks. However, the Belgic host showed no sign of
charging to its doom and was content to form up on the far side of the valley,
waiting for the Romans to cross the boggy ground and fight at a
disadvantage. This was always the risk for a commander who took up a very
strong position, for if the advantages it gave were obvious, then there was
little incentive for the enemy to engage. Both sides sent forward their cavalry,
and the allied horsemen gained a slight advantage over the Belgian horse
before Caesar withdrew them. Realising that a full-scale battle was not going
to develop, the legions were ordered back to camp to rest. Reaching the same
conclusion, the Belgic commanders sent a part of the army to ford the River
Aisne and either threaten the Roman supply line by capturing the fort
protecting the bridge, or draw Caesar off by ravaging the lands of his newfound
allies, the Remi. The outpost at the bridge reported this new threat
and Caesar responded by personally leading his cavalry, Numidians, and
the other light troops back across to the far side of the river. They managed
to catch the Belgic warriors when only a few had got across. The latter were
surrounded and dealt with by the cavalry, while the missile troops shot down
the other warriors as they waded through the water. After suffering heavy
losses, the Belgians withdrew.
It was a difficult task to keep any tribal army in the field for any length
of time, since their logistical arrangements tended to be extremely basic.
Only a certain amount of food would have been carried by the warriors,
or the wives and servants who in many tribes accompanied them to battle.
In the summer months it was often possible to find food and forage from
the countryside, but the quantities to be seized in this way were limited,
and soon exhausted if the army remained in one place for any length of
time. The Belgian army in 57 BC was exceptionally large, even if we must
treat the figures given with some caution, and so the problems of supply
were made considerably worse. The attack on Bibrax had failed, as had
the attempt to cross the river and get behind the Romans. Caesar had
shown himself willing to fight only if the Belgians put themselves at a
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severe disadvantage. He had doubtless told his men that the reluctance of
the enemy to attack the Roman position showed that they were frightened.
Galba and the Belgian chieftains could equally have assured their warriors
that the Roman refusal to come down from their hilltop and trenches was
proof that they feared the might of the tribes. The campaign had not
been especially successful for them so far, but they had shown their
numbers and confidence to this new enemy, and Caesar had not risked
attacking their main force. It is possible that Galba and the other leaders
felt that they had demonstrated their strength and that this might be
enough to deter further invasion. There often seems to have been strong
elements of display and gesture in inter-tribal warfare, so we do not
necessarily need to follow Caesar and see the Belgians’ next action in
purely pragmatic terms. Yet the practical factors were undeniable, for the
army had almost run out of food and could not stay where it was for
much longer. In addition, news had arrived that the Aedui were advancing
to the border with the Bellovaci in accordance with Caesar’s arrangement
with Diviciacus. At a council of the senior chieftains present with the
army, the Belgians resolved to disperse and go home, each tribal contingent
returning to its own lands, where they could easily be fed. Pledging
themselves to come to the aid of any tribe that Caesar might attack over
the coming months, the great army broke up. It did not do this in any
ordered manner, individual leaders and groups simply packing up and
walking off during the night.17
The Roman outposts reported the noisy departure of the Belgian army,
but Caesar was suspicious that it might be a trap. The failure of the surprise
attack against the Helvetii in the previous year may well have made him
rather cautious about operations at night. At dawn he sent out patrols that
confirmed that the enemy really were simply drifting away without any
serious attempt to cover their retreat. The cavalry rode out under Pedius and
Cotta, while Labienus followed them with three legions to provide close
support. There was little resistance, and large numbers of Belgic warriors
were killed and captured as they fled from the Roman pursuit. For the
moment the great army had dispersed – it would take some time before the
tribes were able concentrate their forces again. Caesar made sure that they
did not have that time. On the following day he marched against the
Suessiones, whose lands bordered on those of the Remi. By a forced march
he reached one of their main towns at Noviodunum. (Like most of the
other Belgic oppida mentioned by Caesar, its precise location is unknown,
but it was most probably fairly near modern Soissons.) Believing from
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reports that the town had no defenders, Caesar sent his men straight into
the attack. There were indeed few warriors to resist him, but the Romans
had no ladders or other siege equipment and those few were able to repulse
the attack. After this failure, Caesar made sure that the business was done
properly and set the legionaries to making a ramp, siege towers and mantlets
to take his men up to and over the wall. The town was not yet blockaded,
and numbers of warriors from the dispersing army took refuge within it.
Their morale was shaky, however, and the sight of the Roman siege machines
caused dismay. The Suessiones surrendered, winning favourable terms
because the Remi interceded on their behalf. They gave up hostages from
their leading families, including two of King Galba’s sons, and handed
over quantities of weapons – perhaps a token amount as a symbol of
disarmament.18
Caesar needed to move on while the advantage was still with him and
now attacked the Bellovaci. These similarly put up little resistance and
swiftly surrendered. This time it was Diviciacus of the Aedui who spoke
for them, pleading long-standing friendship between their two tribes. The
recent hostility of the Bellovaci was blamed on a few chieftains who saw
the Aedui’s alliance with Rome as slavery. These men had now fled to
Britain and could no longer influence tribal policy. Caesar happily granted
the pleas and accepted the surrender on similarly lenient terms, although
he did demand and receive 600 hostages, which was clearly far more than
normal. In part this was because he wanted to honour Diviciacus and the
Aedui, but it was also important to weaken the coalition facing him by
removing as many members as possible. The high total of hostages makes
it likely that most of the Suessiones’ aristocratic families sent someone to
Caesar’s camp and this was clearly intended to ensure that they did not risk
renewing the war. Throughout the Commentaries on the Gallic War there
are frequent references to hostages, but never once does Caesar say what
happened to any who came from tribes that broke their treaties with him.
It would be surprising if most of these were not executed on such occasions.
After thus dealing with two powerful tribes individually, Caesar next
attacked the smaller Ambiani, who swiftly capitulated. Well over a third
of the force that it was claimed the Belgians had mustered earlier in the year
had now been defeated and the odds were turning in Caesar’s favour.
However, the easy victories of the last days were over and resistance was
hardening.19
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proconsul 58–50 BC
The Battle of the Sambre
Caesar now drove north-west against the Nervii, the largest tribe still willing
to fight.
After three days the Roman column was about 10 miles away from the
River Sambre, and captives revealed under interrogation that the tribal army
was waiting on the far side. They had been joined by the Atrebates and
Viromandui, and another tribe, the Atuatuci, were on their way. According
to the Remi’s estimates, the Nervii, Atrebates and Viromandui had contributed
75,000 men to the coalition army raised earlier in the summer, and Caesar
gives the first tribe 10,000 more men in this battle. As we have seen, the
reliability of theses figure is questionable, and their contingents had probably
anyway been weakened by the earlier operations and further reduced by
warriors who had not yet been able to join the army. Caesar’s eight legions
probably mustered somewhere in the region of 30–40,000 men, backed by
several thousand cavalry and as many light troops. It seems likely that the
Nervii and their allies had at the very least parity of numbers with Caesar’s
men, and probably a significant numerical advantage, although probably not
as much as double the Roman numbers. The Belgians were determined to
fight, and had evacuated their women, children and other non-combatants
to places of sanctuary deep in inaccessible marshland. They also had
information sent secretly by some of the Gauls and Belgians marching with
Caesar as allies or hostages. These had reported that Caesar’s normal order
of march was for each legion to form up separately, guarding its own baggage
train. This meant that the fighting troops were split up into eight main
sections, with cumbersome lines of servants, carts and pack animals between
them, which would have made it difficult to form a battle line.20
Such a formation made the Romans vulnerable, and the Nervii had picked
their ground carefully. As usual there can be no certainty as to the precise
location of the battle, but a site within a few miles of Maubeuge seems quite
probable. It is possible that the tribe had repelled invaders at this spot before.
They evidently knew where Caesar would cross the river, which makes it
probable that he was following a well-trodden route, used by the tribes for
the movement of trade as well as armies. Low hills rose on either side of
the river, which at this time of year was only about 3 feet deep and easily
forded. On the far bank, the valley side was open for about 200 paces, but
was then heavily wooded, allowing the warriors to wait in concealment. On
the side from which the Romans were approaching, the ground was broken
by lines of thick, high hedges, made deliberately by the Nervii to hinder
244
‘The Bravest of the Gaulish Peoples’: The Belgae, 57 bc
245
Woodland Phase one
CAVALRY LIGHT
INFANTRY
R I V E R S A M B R E
X
IX
XI VIII XII
VII
BELGIANS
Woodland Phase two
R I V E R S A M B R E
X
IX
XI VIII
XII
VII
XIII
XIV
Battle of the Sambre
proconsul 58–50 BC
raids by enemy horsemen. These were an obstacle both to movement and
visibility, and were intended to send a clear message to raiders that once
they crossed this point their attack would be resisted by a tribe proud of its
martial reputation. Now they intended to give Caesar a demonstration of
this and would launch an all-out attack as soon as the baggage behind the
leading legion came into view.21
The captives – presumably men brought in by the cavalry patrols and
scouts that preceded the main army – had warned Caesar that the river
crossing would be contested. As a result he changed the march formation,
adopting what he claims was his standard deployment when there was a
risk of encountering the enemy. After the screen of cavalry and light troops,
the six experienced legions marched unencumbered by baggage, all of which
was massed together and guarded by the two new legions who followed at
the rear. On this particular day the Tenth was in the lead, followed by the
Ninth, then the Eleventh, Eighth, Twelfth and Seventh. A party of centurions
accompanied the forward scouting patrols and had the task of selecting and
marking out the camp site for the night. The construction of a marching
camp protected by a ditch and an earth wall formed from the spoil was
standard practice for any Roman army in the field, and was the equivalent
of modern infantrymen digging in at the end of a move. A camp took several
hours to construct, but then offered security against sudden attack, and was
laid out to a regular design, so that each unit knew its place. The centurions
marked out a site on the hill on the near side of the river. When the main force
began to arrive, the cavalry and light troops splashed through the water and
formed a screen on the enemy-held bank. The bulk of the tribal army was
hidden amongst the trees, but a few small groups darted forward and
skirmished with the Romans. The Nervii had very few cavalrymen, and the
auxiliaries easily held their own in the resulting combats, but took care not
to pursue too far and enter the woods. As the legions arrived, they began the
task of building the camp, packs were laid down, helmets, shields and pila
piled, but it was normal for legionaries to keep their armour on while they
dug. Each legate supervised the legion under his command, for Caesar had
instructed them – probably as a permanent standing order – to remain with
their men until the camp was complete. Small detachments of armed
legionaries may well have been sent out as piquets, but there was no real
effort to protect the labourers from a full-scale attack.
In the previous year Caesar had covered the construction of a camp close
to Ariovistus’ army by keeping the first and second lines of the legions in
battle order facing the enemy, while the cohorts of the third line dug.
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‘The Bravest of the Gaulish Peoples’: The Belgae, 57 bc
Napoleon and many other commentators have justifiably criticised him for
not adopting a similar practice here. Caesar already knew that the enemy
were massed somewhere across the river, and would have seen his cavalry and
light troops skirmishing with them on the far bank. The Nervii and their
allies were close and therefore an attack possible, but he may have judged it
unlikely. The day was considerably advanced and the enemy had done no
more than harass his outposts. Weeks before, when he had faced an even
larger army, it had refused to attack across some difficult ground and the river
felt like a secure barrier. Keeping a substantial part of his army under arms
would slow the building of the camp – in 58 BC the cohorts of the third line
had had to construct a camp for only two legions, not the entire army.
Whether through a conscious decision or simple omission, perhaps brought
on by complacency after the easy defeat of three tribes in the last weeks,
Caesar took the risk of not protecting the legions as they worked. It nearly
proved fatal.22
The Belgians displayed admirable discipline as they waited for the moment
to attack. The leaders of the army – a Nervian chieftain named Boduognatus
was in overall charge – had agreed that they would wait until the Roman
baggage appeared. Even though this did not follow the leading legion as
they had expected, the warriors remained calm and only when the
concentrated train of the army came into view on the far side of the valley
did they leave the cover of the woods and advance. The Romans’ auxiliary
cavalry and light troops could not hope to withstand a massed attack and
quickly gave way. The Belgian line had been formed into tribal contingents
under cover of the trees and surged quickly down the slope and across the
river. Some of their order was lost in the process, and the hedges on the far
shore probably encouraged the line to break up even further. For all that, they
were still better prepared for battle than the Romans, who struggled to form
any sort of a fighting line. The battles against the Helvetii and Ariovistus –
and indeed most large encounters in this period – were carefully prepared
and anticipated affairs, with hours spent carefully deploying the lines and
encouraging the troops for the clash to come. This time it was different and:
‘Caesar had to do everything at the same time: to raise the standard, which
was the signal to stand to arms, to sound the trumpet call which recalled the
soldiers from work, to bring back the men who had gone further afield in
search of material for the rampart, to form the line of battle, to address the
soldiers, and to give the signal for battle.’23
The proconsul could only be in one place at a time, and later paid tribute
to his legates, who set about organising the troops nearest to them without
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waiting for instructions from him. Similarly the legionaries and centurions
did not panic, but began to form up often in ad hoc units of whoever
happened to be near at the time. A battle line began to coalesce surprisingly
quickly, and even if it was less neat than was usual, and also less impressive
– there was no time to take the leather covers off shields or to fix crests and
plumes onto helmets – it was capable of putting up a resistance. It is
questionable whether the army would have coped so well with such a crisis
in the previous year, when army and commander were still unfamiliar with
each other and had yet to build up the cohesion that came from training
and the confidence derived from success. Caesar himself rode to each legion
in turn, coming first to his favourite the Tenth, who were on the left of his
ragged line. He gave them a few words of encouragement, telling them to
remain steady and to remember their proven courage. The Belgians – mostly
Atrebates on this flank – were now within 100 yards or so, and Caesar
ordered the Tenth to charge, which they did with considerable effect. A
volley of pila smashed into the enemy front ranks, halting the Atrebates.
The slope at this point was mostly in the Romans’ favour, and the enemy tired
from their rapid charge, so that the Tenth and neighbouring Ninth soon
drove them back down the slope. In the centre the Eleventh and Eighth were
also able to hold their own, pushing the Viromandui to the river. The right
and centre of the Belgian army was crumbling, and the Tenth and Ninth
even crossed the Sambre to chase the enemy back up the far slope. However,
the main weight of the Belgian attack, and the bulk of the Nervii led by
Boduognatus himself, had fallen on the Roman right. It was hard for the
Roman officers to see what was going on, since vision was so often restricted
by the high hedges, but by instinct or clear realisation the proconsul had
galloped to the spot:24
After addressing Legio X, Caesar hurried to the right wing, where he
saw his men hard pressed, and the standards [a shorthand term for the
units’ formations] of Legio XII clustered in one place and the soldiers
so crowded together that it impeded their fighting. All the centurions
in the fourth cohort had fallen, the signifer was dead and his standard
captured; in the remaining cohorts nearly every centurion was either
dead or wounded, including the primus pilus Sextus Julius Baculus,
an exceptionally brave man, who was exhausted by his many serious
wounds and could no longer stand; the other soldiers were tired and
some in the rear, giving up the fight, were withdrawing out of missile
range; the enemy were edging closer up the slope in front and pressing
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hard on both flanks. He saw that the situation was critical and that
there was no other reserve available, took a shield from a man in the
rear ranks, – he had come without his own – advanced into the front
line and called on the centurions by name, encouraged the soldiers,
and ordered the line to advance and the units to extend, so that they
could employ their swords more easily. His arrival brought hope to the
soldiers and refreshed their spirits, every man wanting to do his best
in the sight of his general even in such a desperate situation. The
enemy’s advance was delayed for a while.25
Roman generals normally led from close behind the fighting line, and
were at risk from missiles or the attacks of bold individuals eager to win
fame by killing the enemy commander. In this way they shared some of the
risks of the soldiers in their armies, and this was an important element in
bonding leader and led. This time Caesar went a step further, going right
up into the front of the fighting line, and displaying the personal courage
that was as fundamental an aspect of aristocratic virtus as the higher skills
expected of a commander. This willingness to stand and fight, if necessary
to die, with his men was the confirmation of the growing trust that had
developed between Caesar and his troops. Once there he encouraged the men
around him – the centurions as individuals, the ordinary legionaries as
‘fellow-soldiers’ and units – and he improved their deployment. There were
a number of stories about Pompey fighting at the front of his men, striking
down enemies with sword or spear in heroic fashion. This was how
Alexander the Great had fought his battles, and Pompey revelled in
comparisons between the two of them. Caesar was also said to be very
skilled with his personal weapons, but there is no mention in his own
account of his actually fighting. It may be that this was deliberate false
modesty, intended to allow his audience to imagine for themselves the
heroism of the proconsul, hinted at by the matter of fact comment about
borrowing a shield. However, Caesar does not seem to have wanted to
emphasise his personal prowess, instead concentrating on his role as a
leader and commander. In the end his account acknowledges that the
Sambre was a soldier’s battle, ultimately won by the determination and
discipline of the legionaries.
During a lull in the fighting Caesar redeployed the Twelfth and Seventh
legions, wheeling them back so that they formed a rough square or circle and
were able to defend against attacks from any direction. Such pauses in the
fighting were common, contrary to the Hollywood image of frenzied battles
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in which every man rushed forward, intermingled with the enemy and fought
individual duels, deciding the battle in a matter of minutes. Battles usually
lasted for hours, but hand-to-hand fighting was physically and mentally
exhausting and seems usually to have occurred in short furious bursts, before
the lines separated by maybe just a few yards, drew breath and tried to build
up enough enthusiasm to close again. When Caesar arrived the line had
been disintegrating, men from the rear ranks slipping off to escape from
danger. Many centurions were dead or wounded and collapse appeared
imminent. His example – and doubtless that of the other officers there, for
he encouraged the centurions and gave orders for a formation change through
the tribunes – stabilised the situation for the moment, but the two legions
were still under huge pressure and a collapse was probably only a matter of
time.26
The Roman right flank held out, but the battle was won elsewhere. The
two legions marching at the rear of the column to protect the baggage came
into the view of those Belgians who had bypassed the Roman right and
gone up the hill to attack the camp itself. The arrival of fresh Roman forces
dismayed the Belgians and encouraged those Romans able to see them.
Labienus was in charge of the victorious Roman left, and on his own
initiative sent the Tenth back across the river again to aid the rest of the army.
This legion, realising that things were not going well, hurried forward and
struck the Nervii in the rear. The Roman right was now able to advance, and
drive off the warriors facing it. In the meantime even the slaves
accompanying the baggage had joined the rallied cavalry and light troops
and repulsed the Belgians around the camp. The Nervii did not give way
quickly, many fighting on for a long time. Caesar claims that some warriors
even stood on the mounds of their own dead to keep on fighting. This was
doubtless an exaggeration, but testified to the ferocity of a combat that he
had seen from particularly close quarters. His claims for the number of
casualties inflicted on the tribe – that only 500 warriors survived out of
60,000, and just three tribal leaders out of 600 – were clearly also greatly
inflated, and are in fact disproved by his own comments in a later book of
the Commentaries. Nevertheless, the losses were high, and the will of the
Nervii and their allies to continue the struggle was utterly broken. Envoys
came and surrendered to the proconsul, who ordered them to remain in
future inside their own borders and not to attack anyone else. He also sent
instructions to the neighbouring tribes not to raid the Nervii in their
currently vulnerable state.27
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‘The Bravest of the Gaulish Peoples’: The Belgae, 57 bc
Mopping up
The Atuatuci had not rendezvoused with the other tribes before the battle
was fought. Learning of the defeat they returned to their homeland, but
showed no inclination to submit to Rome and prepared for a desperate
defence. Bringing the people in from other communities, they decided to
occupy a single walled town that lay in a strong natural position on a craggy
hilltop. Food supplies had been gathered to support them if Caesar attempted
a blockade. The defenders were confident, and showed this by their
willingness to sally out and attack the Roman army, which had arrived and
camped outside the town. Caesar ordered the legions to build a ditch and
rampart surrounding the hilltop, strengthening it with forts at short intervals
to form a line of circumvallation. Altogether, it stretched for some 430 yards,
which gives some indication of the comparatively small size of the
stronghold. The forts probably contained light artillery of the sort used
before by the Aisne, which soon deterred the defenders from venturing
outside their walls. The Atuatuci could not get out, but at first they despised
the ramp and siege tower that the Romans laboured to make. Caesar tells
of how they mocked the ‘pygmy Romans’ and adds that the whole population
of Gaul was disdainful of the smaller stature of the Italian legionaries. A siege
tower was an unknown device, and there was dismay when the Romans
began to wheel it up the ramp and towards the wall. Now in a state of
despair, the defenders sent out delegates who offered to surrender and asked
only that they be allowed to keep their weapons lest their neighbours decide
to raid them. Caesar rejected this plea, saying that he would defend them as
he would defend the Nervii, placing them under Rome’s protection and
ordering the nearby tribes to refrain from any acts of hostility. The defenders
began to hurl down their weapons from the ramparts, creating a mound
that eventually almost equalled the wall in height.28
Although the gates of the town were left open, only a small number of
Caesar’s troops were allowed inside. As night fell, he ordered even these to
return to their camp, for he was not confident that their discipline would
hold when they were out of view of their officers in the dark streets. Army
pay was low, the career attractive only to the poor and the failures of society,
and it is probable that most legions contained their share of petty criminals
and others, who could readily get out of hand. Caesar was to repeat the same
precaution on other occasions. He had the gates closed to protect the
tribesmen who had surrendered themselves to Roman faith. However, some
of these tribesmen either regretted or had never shared in the decision to
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surrender, and once night fell began to equip themselves with hidden arms
and hastily improvised shields. In the small hours they charged out to attack
what they judged to be the weakest part of Caesar’s fortified line. The
Romans were alert, and sentries lit the prepared fires, which were the agreed
signal to stand the army to. Reinforcements moved to the threatened point
and the attackers were greeted with a barrage of missiles. All were killed
or driven back to the town. The next day Caesar held the entire population
responsible for this breach of the peace. His men battered down the gates
and arrested everyone inside. It is doubtful that there was any question of
keeping the legionaries under tight discipline. Everyone inside – 53,000
men, women, and children according to Caesar – was bought at a single
price by a company of merchants who would then sell them on as slaves.
It would have been quite normal for the era if most of the women were
raped by the soldiers before this occurred. A share of the purchase price
would also have gone to all of the legionaries, with larger shares to the
centurions and tribunes. The sale of war captives was one source of profit.
Another was plunder, though this is rarely mentioned in the Commentaries.
Caesar says that the Gauls had many sacred sites where gold and precious
objects had been dedicated to the gods and left piled up in public view. All
the tribes respected these sacred sites and no one dared to steal from them.
According to Suetonius, Caesar was unimpressed by such taboos and never
failed to loot them. The wealth he was gaining restored his own finances,
but as ever his main interest in money was to use it to buy friends and
popularity, both with his army and back in Italy.29
The defeat of the Belgic tribes was another massive victory, following
on from those of the previous year. If the suggestion that a book of
Commentaries was published each winter is correct, people in Rome were
already aware of the humbling of the Helvetii and Ariovistus. Now news
came to Rome of the fresh success and was greeted with great enthusiasm.
As Caesar proudly reports, the Senate voted him a public thanksgiving of
fifteen days, a longer period than that ever awarded to any general,
including Pompey. This official celebration vindicated his actions, making
it difficult for those enemies who tried to deny the legality of his
appointment. Yet not everything at Rome was going as Caesar would have
wished. Pompey may have been a little unhappy at the success and fame
of his son-in-law, and Dio claims that he had began to talk about recalling
Caesar before his five-year term of office had expired. The triumvirate
seemed about to collapse. The next danger Caesar was to face would not
come from foreign enemies.30
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‘Pompey replied to him in vehement terms, and made an unsubtle hint in
Crassus’ direction, saying openly that he would be much better prepared
to guard his own life than Africanus had been, who was murdered by C.
Carbo.. . . Caius Cato is being supported by Crassus; Clodius is also being
funded, and the pair encouraged by Crassus.’ – Cicero, 15 February 56 BC.1
‘I am in agreement with you, chosen fathers of the Senate . . . while you
did not approve, then I was also not of one mind with him; yet now that
his achievements have made you alter your opinion and feelings, then you
see me not only sharing this view but praising it’ – Cicero, May 56 BC.2
Caesar had already been away for two years, and the time had not passed
quietly in Rome. His consulship had been controversial, but in many ways
was mild in comparison with the turbulent months that followed, when
orchestrated mob violence became a regular feature of public life. In politics
few things last forever, and this was especially true in the Roman Republic.
Individual senators gained or lost influence, broke with old allies and found
new ones, occasionally made up old quarrels, but more often gained new
ones, and discovered that it was now in their interest to alter their views on
certain issues. In 59 BC Cicero had openly criticised the triumvirate,
prompting them to make his personal enemy Clodius a plebian and open his
path to the tribunate. Two years later, Caesar’s public thanksgiving was
awarded by a Senate voting on a motion that Cicero himself had proposed.
In the intervening months the orator had been exiled – if not necessarily
with Caesar’s actual co-operation, then certainly with his acceptance – and
some time later recalled, this time only after Caesar had acquiesced. Although
of huge personal importance, and recorded in emotional detail in his
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published correspondence, Cicero’s expulsion from Rome was a relatively
minor episode in the political struggles of these years, when virtually nothing
and no one seemed secure from attack. Caesar’s role in most of this was as
an observer, but a deeply interested one, since although he could not himself
go to Rome he could be deeply affected by events there. At best he hoped to
influence the key players in the political game, for he certainly could not
control them. There was no inevitability about the course events took, or how
they were eventually resolved. In the end, his position was strengthened, at
least for the moment, but this might not have happened, and it was for a while
quite possible that his work as consul would be undermined, and his
extraordinary command in Gaul prematurely terminated. That this did not
happen owed something to the skill with which he used his connections and
influence, as well as his imagination. As great, or even greater a role, was
played by luck, and in Rome as on the battlefield, the goddess Fortuna
continued to smile on Caesar.
In 59 BC the two wealthiest and most influential men in Rome had joined
together to achieve their immediate aims, using Caesar as their tool to
overcome opposition that until then had proved too solid. Pompey had
secured his Eastern Settlement and provided land for his veterans, while
Crassus had renegotiated the tax-farmers’ contracts. Both men were satisfied,
as was Caesar with his land reform and military command, but only for the
moment, and each of the triumvirs had further ambitions for the future.
Ultimately, like all Roman politicians, their aims were personal and
individual. It had suited each man’s purpose to combine their efforts for a
while, permitting a degree of success that none could have managed on his
own. Yet it was not an alliance built on deep roots of shared ideology or
commitment to a cause, and would last only so long as each man felt himself
to be better off remaining loyal to the other two rather than splitting from
them. Caesar’s relations with both of the others were cordial, which is not
to say that he or they would never contemplate turning against former allies.
In spite of his recent successes in Gaul, he was still the junior partner and
had most stake in a continued association with the other two, especially as
they were still in Rome and he was not. Pompey and Crassus were never
close since, in the end, they disliked each other intensely and the rivalry that
had been such a feature of their lives was only ever just below the surface.
Working together with a consul like Caesar as their agent, they had been able
to get what they wanted, although not without a struggle. The consuls for
58 BC were favourably inclined towards the triumvirs, but neither man had
Caesar’s ability or drive. No one else at Rome could match Pompey’s and
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Crassus’ wealth, fame and auctoritas, but these things gave a man influence
more than power, and even in combination the two men could not
permanently control every aspect of public life. Cato would not be muzzled,
and he and other members of the ‘good’ (boni) or ‘best’ (optimates) men also
had reputations, wealth and clients. So did many other ambitious men with
aims of their own. How men felt towards the triumvirs as a group or as
individuals was only one factor influencing their behaviour, and often it was
a minor one. Office-holders, especially those able to preside over meetings
of the Senate or assemblies, had the opportunity to act in a way always
denied to other senators, no matter how eminent. In 70 BC Pompey and
Crassus had restored full powers to the tribunes of the plebs. Now it was from
this office most of all that challenges would come to their recent dominance.
The ‘Patrician’ Tribune of the Plebs
Pompey and Caesar – presumably with Crassus’ approval – had arranged the
transfer of Publius Clodius Pulcher from patrician to plebian status in 59 BC
(see pp.176–7). It would be wrong then or later to see him as their man, just
as it would be mistaken to view Caesar as Pompey’s or Crassus’ man. They
had done him a favour and, by convention, he was expected to be grateful
and willing to assist them in return, but by no stretch of the imagination
could he be seen as under their control. In part this was simply because
Roman politics was ultimately a question of individual success, but had
even more to do with his fiercely independent character. No one else could
ever really control Clodius, or for that matter Caesar, Pompey, Crassus,
Cato, Cicero or any other leading senator. His family was one of the greatest
patrician houses, which unlike the Julii had managed to remain at the heart
of the Republic for generation after generation, producing a long succession
of consuls and famous statesmen. The pride or arrogance of the Claudii
was proverbial, reinforced by the tales of men like the Publius Claudius
Pulcher who had led a Roman fleet to disaster during the First Punic War.
Before the battle he had been annoyed when the sacred chickens had refused
to eat up their meal in the approved manner, which would have demonstrated
that the gods favoured the Romans and that their attack on the Carthaginian
fleet would succeed. Publius had promptly picked the birds up and tossed
them over the side of his flagship, declaring that ‘if they would not eat, then
they would drink’. A few years later his sister was frustrated by the crowds
that slowed her litter as she was carried through the streets of Rome and
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loudly wished that her brother would go and drown some more of the poor.
Though the Claudii were not always especially liked, they were always
important. Although he might have officially become a plebian, Clodius
remained in everyone’s mind a Claudian and enjoyed the auctoritas of the
name, and the solid support of clients and other connections built up by a
great patrician house over the centuries.3
The Claudii promoted themselves just like any aristocratic family. Clodius’
father died when he was young and the family was headed by his oldest
brother Appius Claudius Pulcher, who was obsessed with maintaining their
prestige. Simply because of their name the Claudii could not be ignored,
but the flamboyance of this generation made them a powerful force in the
public life of the city. There was also strength in numbers. Clodius had
another brother, Caius, as well as three sisters, each of whom had been
married off to a husband from a prominent family. One of the three was
immortalised as the Lesbia of Catullus’ poems, the lover with whom he
shared a brief, passionate and adulterous affair, but whose subsequent
rejection of him inspired some of his bitterest verses. Publius was the youngest
of the six children, and perhaps the wildest, although all of them had a
popular reputation both for unpredictable behaviour and for their scandalous
sexual exploits. The Bona Dea scandal had shown Clodius’ contempt for
sacred tradition, but his subsequent exoneration had shown that he was a
survivor, and a man to be reckoned with. Apart from his adulterous liaisons,
it was widely rumoured that he had enjoyed incestuous relationships with
each of his sisters. This was publicly stated by one of their husbands, Marcus
Lucullus, when he finally divorced her. It may have been no more than
malicious rumour, a number of other prominent Romans were accused of
the same thing, but both at the time and since it was very difficult to be sure
of anything with Clodius and his siblings. There was bad blood between
him and the brothers Lucullus from the time Clodius had served on Lucius
Lucullus’ staff in Asia. It was perfectly normal for young aristocrats to gain
military experience under the command of a relative or friend, but Clodius
was never one to be bound by convention and chose to lead a mutiny against
his brother-in-law. Shortly afterwards, he transferred to the staff of the
husband of another sister, and seems to have managed to complete his service
without falling out with this man.4
No one can have been too sure just what Clodius planned to do when his
tribunate began in December 59 BC. It may be that he had not yet made up
his mind whether or not to fulfil his threat, made some months before, to
attack Caesar’s legislation, but more probably this had been intended to let
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the triumvirs know that he could not be taken for granted. His chief aim
was personal, to confirm his existing popularity amongst the population of
Rome, and especially the less well-off citizens. To do this, his most important
piece of legislation involved the wholesale reorganisation of the supply of
State-subsidised grain to Italy, including the provision that citizens actually
living in Rome would receive a regular dole of free corn. He also removed
the ban imposed in 64 BC on the collegia – guilds or associations based on
trade or regions within the city. Other reforms outlawed attempts to use
unfavourable omens to block public business – a clear reference to Bibulus’
recent activity, although the law was not retrospective so did not actually
overrule his declarations – and restricted the freedom of the censors to
expel men from the Senate. All four bills were passed in early January 58
BC. The free grain was very popular with the urban plebs, and Clodius used
the collegia to help organise his supporters. Having done a deal with the
two new consuls to assist them in securing lucrative provinces – both men
were in debt and needed a profitable command – he now decided to flex his
muscles.5
Cicero was the first target, and soon discovered that all the assurances he
had had from Pompey, and subsequently even from Clodius himself, were
hollow. The execution of the conspirators in 63 BC was the chief charge
against him. The attack began in early 58 BC, while Caesar was still just
outside Rome – he could no longer enter the city since he had assumed his
provincial command – watching events and defending himself against the
attacks of two of the new praetors. A public meeting was held in the Circus
Flaminius, a stadium for chariot racing that lay outside the formal boundary
of Rome, so that Caesar could be present. However, his support for Clodius
was limited. Caesar repeated his arguments from the debate over the fate of
the conspirators, saying again that he did not feel that it was right for them
to have been executed. However, he also added that it would be wrong to
make retrospective legislation formally outlawing past actions in order to
prosecute Cicero. Around the same time he repeated his offer for the orator
to become one of his legates and so secure himself from prosecution. It
would have been a considerable coup for Caesar if Cicero had accepted, for
it would have placed the orator under a strong obligation to him. It would
also have removed a powerful and potentially hostile voice from Rome.
Cicero declined the offer, as well as the chance of an extraordinary legateship
from the Senate to travel abroad on public business. His initial confidence
then began to waver, as he realised that he could not count on Pompey’s
support, nor on that of many leading senators whose loyalty he had expected.
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Too many of the great men had some link or other with the Claudii and
saw no reason to break with Clodius on behalf of a ‘new man’. In the middle
of March – roughly the same time that Caesar set out for Gaul – Cicero
fled the city to go into voluntary exile, and soon passed into deep depression,
blaming everyone else for his plight and lamenting his own momentary
cowardice. Clodius had a bill passed formalising the expulsion and
confiscating his property. His house was burned down by a mob of the
tribune’s supporters and a shrine to the goddess of liberty (Libertas) set up
on the site. Clodius had given a demonstration of his power by removing a
famous ex-consul, even if he was a rather boastful ‘new man’ without strong
family connections. Cato was sidelined more subtly, as the tribune arranged
for him to be sent to oversee the incorporation of Cyprus into Rome’s empire.
This wealthy kingdom had been annexed in part to pay for the new corn dole,
and it was felt that the temptations open to the man appointed to oversee
the business were so great that Rome’s most famously moral citizen must be
sent. Cato accepted the honour, which further augmented his stern
reputation, even though he doubtless realised the true motives behind it. He
also effectively admitted that it was right for a tribune of the people such as
Clodius to interfere in foreign affairs rather than permitting the Senate its
traditional control of this sphere.6
The Cyprus business was something of an insult to Pompey, for it altered
some of the settlement that he had imposed on the East. A far greater
humiliation came when Clodius arranged the escape of the son of the King
of Armenia, held as a hostage in Pompey’s household. The tribune also
turned his gangs on the consul Gabinius, beating him up and smashing his
fasces, simply because he had taken Pompey’s side in the dispute. By the
summer of 58 BC Clodius began openly questioning the validity of Caesar’s
legislation as consul, calling Bibulus as a witness in a public meeting to
testify against his former colleague. It was a remarkable return to his position
in April of the previous year, and cheerfully ignored the question mark this
would then raise over his own plebian status and right to hold the office of
tribune. In June Pompey encouraged the Senate to vote for the recall of
Cicero, but the motion was vetoed. In August Clodius arranged for one of
his slaves to let fall a dagger at a public meeting and under interrogation he
claimed to have been sent to murder Pompey. The latter was a brave man on
the battlefield but had a deep-rooted terror of assassination, which was
perhaps unsurprising given the events he had witnessed in his youth. He
retired to his house and stayed there for several months. Clodius lost some
of his power when his term of office as tribune expired, and this encouraged
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a revival of efforts to recall Cicero. He still had his gangs of followers based
on the collegia, and these were frequently used to threaten his opponents or
break up meetings. Pompey replied by backing two of the new tribunes,
Titus Annius Milo and Publius Sestius, who formed their own groups of
thugs with which to combat Clodius’ men. Both sides included many
gladiators amongst their bands and at times there were large-scale battles
with killed and wounded on both sides. These disturbances were more
frequent, on a larger scale and far more violent than the struggles during
Caesar’s consulship. Pompey also toured Italy, visiting his many clients and
urging them to come to Rome and support a law to recall Cicero. In the
summer of 57 BC the Senate passed a decree to this effect, with only Clodius
voting against the motion, and the decision was promptly ratified by the
People.7
After some initial reluctance Caesar had followed Pompey’s example and
urged his clients by letter to support the move. From the start he had not
especially desired Cicero’s exile, although he had wanted to prevent the
orator from continuing to lend his weight to the attacks on the legislation
he had pushed through as consul. Now there was a chance to put Cicero
under obligation to him by backing his cause, and Caesar characteristically
seized on it. His initial hesitation – Publius Sestius travelled to his province
at one point to convince him – may well have been intended to make sure
that Cicero was aware of the debt that he would owe. Moving the vote of
thanksgiving in the Senate and other public statements were proof that this
had worked. There was an even greater debt to Pompey – though never quite
enough to erase the memory of his failure to protect him in the first place
– and Cicero had already had an opportunity of repaying some of this.
Grain imports to Italy were erratic, and the new system of state-controlled
supply set up by Clodius was not yet functioning well. He proposed a motion
to give Pompey an extraordinary command to sort out the problem. In its
eventual form the command was for five years, although there was an
unsuccessful attempt by a tribune – probably with Pompey’s tacit backing
– to give him imperium throughout the empire, which was superior to every
other governor, as well as control of substantial military and naval forces.
Pompey had power again, and although this meant that he theoretically had
to stay outside Rome the Senate was happy either to grant him a special
dispensation from this rule or to meet outside the formal boundary of the
city. Later disturbances in Egypt led to manoeuvring to secure him a further
command to restore the situation there, but others were ambitious for this
as well, and in the end it came to nothing.8
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As 56 BC opened Pompey had a formal position, but so did Clodius once
again for he had been elected aedile. He prosecuted Milo for political
violence, but the latter was defended by Pompey and Cicero, and each side
had brought along a mob of supporters to shout down and threaten their
opponents. Cicero subsequently described the scene to his brother Quintus:
Pompey spoke, or at least tried to; but when he stood up, Clodius’
gang began yelling, and he had to put up with this for the whole time
he was speaking, getting interrupted not just by shouts, but jeers and
insults. When he had finished – he showed great determination given
the situation, never flinching, he said all that he meant to say, some of
it even in silence coming from his force of character – but anyway when
he stopped up sprang Clodius. He was greeted by yells from our
supporters – we were pleased to return the compliment – and lost
control of his spirit, voice and expression. This went on from the sixth
hour, when Pompey finished speaking, to the eighth hour, with all sorts
of abuse and foul verses about Clodius and Clodia. Enraged and white
with anger he called out questions to his gang – and he was heard
clearly above the shouting – who was it who starved the people?
‘Pompey!’ his cronies replied. Who wanted to go to Alexandria?
‘Pompey!’ they called. Who do YOU want to go? ‘Crassus!’ they replied.
The latter was there, but without any goodwill towards Milo.9
The hostility between the two old rivals seemed to be brewing again, and
Pompey told Cicero that he believed Crassus was supporting Clodius and
Caius Cato, the youth who had accused him of dictatorship in 59 BC and was
now tribune. He even claimed that Crassus was plotting to murder him, and
once again relapsed into morbid fears and sent for extra bodyguards from
his rural clients. Mistrustful of Crassus, there were indications that Pompey
was also beginning to wonder whether or not he still needed Caesar. The
problems of maintaining the grain supply did not yield to an easy or swift
solution, and were made worse because the Treasury was seriously short of
funds. Cato had not yet returned with the wealth of Cyprus to swell the
coffers. Since 59 BC the Republic had lost a major source of revenue through
the distribution of the public land in Campania. Cicero and others now
advocated repealing Caesar’s law to return this important source of income
to the State. Cicero does not seem to have believed that Pompey was firmly
opposed to such a move. Caesar’s legislation was under threat, and so from
different quarters was his command. A tribune seems to have proposed his
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immediate recall, while one of the favoured candidates for the consulship for
55 BC was openly eager to replace Caesar after his own year of office. This
was Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, descendant of the man who had ridden
on an elephant and helped to settle Transalpine Gaul, and his family
connection to the region helped his case. It was not his first attack on Caesar,
for he had been one of the praetors who in early 58 BC had questioned the
validity of Caesar’s acts as consul. Cicero described him as a man for whom
the consulship was practically his birthright. This time Caesar was in some
ways the victim of his own success, since it could be argued that the public
thanksgiving he had received after his great victories showed that the war had
been won, and therefore that there was no need for him to remain for the full
five years of his command. Once again, Pompey was not believed to be
wholly averse to this, while Crassus simply said nothing. His recent support
for Clodius, which was widely perceived even if never open, had been a
reminder that he was still powerful and that Pompey could not afford to
ignore him. The latter had his new command, had just been voted a
substantial budget by the Senate to fund his activities and seemed to be
considering whether it was worthwhile maintaining the alliance. The
triumvirate seemed on the point of crumbling.10
In later years what followed was seen as a fairly public summit meeting,
where the triumvirs agreed to carve up the Roman world to their mutual
advantage. Suetonius says that: ‘Caesar made Pompey and Crassus come to
Luca, a city in his province, where he persuaded them to seek a second
consulship, thwart Domitius, and secure for him a five year extension to his
provincial command.’11 Appian and Plutarch talk of 200 senators trudging
north to Luca with their entourages – he claims that no less than 120 lictors
were counted – to wait outside while the three great men hammered out
their deal. The story evidently grew with the telling, and the few accounts
written nearer to the time suggest less organisation and much last-minute
improvisation. Crassus became worried about Pompey’s new strength
sometime in the spring of 56 BC and hurried north to Ravenna, just inside
Caesar’s province, for a meeting about Cicero’s fresh attempt to revive the
question of the Campanian land. Pompey was due to leave Rome on 11
April, going first to Sardinia and then to Africa as part of his responsibilities
for overseeing the corn supply. Cicero claims that he at least had no inkling
of this, but before embarking on his official trip Pompey diverted to Luca,
on the west coast of Cisalpine Gaul, to see Caesar. In Cicero’s account the
natural inference would be that Crassus was not present and that Caesar
represented his interests, but this is by no means certain. The outcome of the
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meetings was, as the later sources maintained, a pact for Pompey and Crassus
to stand for the consulship in 55 BC, and a five-year extension of Caesar’s
command. In this way, since after their consulship Pompey and Crassus
could expect major provincial commands, all three men would have armies
and formal imperium for the next few years.
The deal suggests that Caesar was less of a junior partner in the
association than had been the case when the triumvirate was formed, and
it is tempting to see him as the prime mover in arranging it. His personal
charm was doubtless a major asset in calming the hostility and suspicion
between Pompey and Crassus. Perhaps he devised the compromise, but the
secret of this, just like the original alliance, was that each man realised that
the association would be to his own personal advantage. As consuls, and
then proconsuls with armies, Pompey and Crassus would have personal
security and the ability to act. It also gave them the option of seeking new
military adventures, something that seems now to have had particular appeal
to Crassus, who was beginning to feel overshadowed by the martial
achievements not just of Pompey, but also of Caesar. Pompey was also
satisfied. More than either of the others he had appeared in recent months
to have been drifting away, but in the end he would not have been as well off
if the triumvirate had been broken. Even if he turned against Caesar, he
would still not have become acceptable to many leading nobles in the Senate,
and would have continued to face the criticism of Cato and the hostility of
Clodius. It is significant that he had not accepted the suggestion of a friend
some months before that he divorce Julia. Love may have been part of the
reason, but it is also likely that he felt that for the moment a connection
with Caesar remained a major asset. At its most basic level, it remained a
useful thing to have his son-in-law in command of an army stationed in
northern Italy, especially until he had troops of his own to command. In
many ways all three triumvirs gained more from the agreement in 56 BC
than their original association.12
It took time for the extent and full implication of the deal to be realised.
Cicero seems to have been genuinely shocked, but quickly accepted the
reality of the situation and came to terms with it. At the beginning of April
he had won a personal victory over Clodius and his family when he
successfully defended the young aristocrat Marcus Caelius Rufus. The latter
was accused of orchestrating political violence, murder and the attempted
murder of Clodius’ sister Clodia. Cicero’s speech was a skilful and highly
vicious character assassination of the pair, raking up the old allegations of
incest along with many other things, speaking of ‘that woman’s husband –
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I’m sorry I mean her brother’. This personal revenge may well have made the
subsequent renewal of the triumvirate easier to bear. Cicero’s brother Quintus
was one of Pompey’s legates on the grain commission and was given a blunt
reminder to pass on that Pompey and Caesar had not supported his recall
to have him criticise either of them. Probably at the beginning of May, Cicero
delivered a speech in the Senate arguing against the moves to remove
Transalpine and Cisalpine Gaul from Caesar’s control and send out a new
governor. His praise of Caesar was fulsome, and, so he claimed, justified by
the victories won in Gaul whatever their past differences:13
Under the command of Caius Caesar, we have fought a war inside
Gaul; in the past we have merely repelled attacks. Our generals always
felt that these people needed to be driven back in by war . . .. Even
Caius Marius himself whose divine and matchless courage protected
the Roman people after dreadful disasters and casualties and who drove
back hordes of Gauls who were flooding into Italy, did not attack them
in their towns and lairs. . . . I see that Caius Caesar’s thinking has been
very different. For he did not feel it sufficient to fight only against those
already in arms against the Roman people, but felt that all of Gaul
should be brought under our dominion. Therefore he has, with stunning
good fortune, smashed in battle the greatest and fiercest tribes of
Germans and Helvetii, and terrified the other peoples, checked them
and brought under our domination and power of the Roman people;
our general, our soldiers, and the arms of the Roman people have now
made their way through regions and nations which till now have not
even been known by story or written account.14
Backed by Cicero’s eloquence, and the combined weight of Pompey and
Crassus, Caesar’s command was confirmed and later extended. The Senate
also voted to accept responsibility for funding the extra legions Caesar had
recruited, not, as Cicero declared, because he lacked resources from his
provinces, but because it was unseemly to appear stingy with such a
distinguished servant of the Republic. Caesar was secure in his command,
but it required rather more effort to ensure that Crassus and Pompey would
be the consuls for 55 BC. Disturbances orchestrated by the tribune Caius
Cato, and apparently backed by Clodius, prevented elections being held in
the last months of 56 BC. Both men had evidently been persuaded to work
with the renewed triumvirate. The decision was a pragmatic one, but Crassus
may also have persuaded them, since he was widely believed to have been
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backing them in recent years. Pompey and Crassus had not declared their
candidature until after the legal date, and the consul due to preside over the
elections, Cnaeus Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus, refused to exempt them
from this rule. Therefore the elections were not held until January 55 BC,
after Marcellinus had laid down his office, and so were conducted under a
temporary official known as an interrex, who permitted them to stand. The
other candidates had largely fallen away, but Ahenobarbus was never a man
to back down and refused to give up his ambitions.
Crassus’ son Publius had lately returned from Gaul, and brought with
him a large number of soldiers given special leave to take part in the elections.
Some were officers – centurions perhaps, and certainly tribunes and prefects
– but others were probably just burly members of the rank and file. The
election day was marked by huge violence in which Ahenobarbus was
wounded and one of his attendants killed, before Crassus and Pompey were
declared the victors. The triumvirate was once again firmly in control of
Rome, although it had taken far more brute force than on the first occasion.
Intimidation prevented Cato the Younger from winning the praetorship. At
the election of the curule aediles the fighting was so widespread and brutal
that even Pompey ended up spattered by someone else’s blood. With Pompey
and Crassus as consuls it would be difficult for anyone to attack them, but
after their year of office was over things might change, especially if one or
both set out for provincial commands. Clodius was still there and it was
hard to judge what he would do in the future, while men like Ahenobarbus
and Cato were even more bitterly opposed to the triumvirs than they had been
in the past. In Rome power was never permanent, but for the moment the
triumvirate were riding high.15
To the Atlantic
Although there was to be considerable military activity in Gaul in 56 BC, the
operations were on a significantly smaller scale than in the previous years.
With the Helvetii, Ariovistus and the Belgic confederation defeated, it was with
some justification that Caesar felt that ‘Gaul was at peace’. He did not have
a major campaign planned for the summer, which meant that it was easier
for him to loiter in Cisalpine Gaul until well into April and arrange matters
at Luca. There was no obvious opponent left in Gaul and it may well be that
he was once again considering diverting his attentions to the Balkans. In the
following year he would lead an expedition to Britain, and it is highly likely
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that this possibility was already in his mind. Up until the meeting at Luca
political concerns occupied most of his attention, and afterwards he had the
security of an additional five years of command, which meant that he was
not pressed for time and so could afford to let the year pass without a grand
offensive. Detachments of his army under the command of legates had
anyway been active in a number of operations that were too small in scale to
require the commander and his main force. In the autumn of 57 BC the Twelfth
Legion under the command of Sulpicius Galba had attempted to occupy the
Great St Bernard Pass, so keeping this route over the Alps secure for military
convoys and commerce. The attempt failed and Galba was forced to withdraw.
Other parts of the army spent the winter deep in Gallia Comata. Publius
Crassus with the Seventh Legion was in the west, amongst tribes who had
submitted to him late in the previous summer. The tribal leaders had obeyed
the standard Roman request for hostages and everything seemed calm.16
At some point in the spring or early summer of 56 BC the mood of these
western tribes changed. Roman officers despatched to the tribal centres to
arrange for grain to be supplied to the army were seized and a message sent
to Crassus saying that they would only be released when their own hostages
were returned. It may simply have been that the locals had not at first
appreciated that the Romans expected to stay and make continued demands
for food, and that realisation swiftly turned to resentment. The first tribe to
act were the Veneti, living in what is now southern Brittany. They were a
maritime people, deeply involved in trade along the Atlantic coast. Dio
claims that they had heard rumours of Caesar’s planned expedition to Britain
and feared that this would disrupt their trade with the island, or throw open
the markets there to competitors. To Caesar, and doubtless to his Roman
audience, this was a rebellion, the tribes breaking the treaty that they had
so recently accepted and taking his officers – several of whom were
equestrians – as hostages. He gave orders for a fleet to be constructed on the
Loire, before hurrying to the area. The rebellion had spread rapidly and he
was afraid that other tribes might be tempted to join if they judged that the
Romans were weak. This was because the Gauls as a race were ‘inclined to
revolution and could readily be stirred to war’. He also acknowledged that
like all mankind, they ‘deeply loved freedom and hated slavery’. Therefore
he split his army into several independent columns. Labienus was left to
watch over the Belgic tribes defeated in the previous year, while Crassus
took twelve cohorts – probably the Seventh Legion reinforced with some
additional troops – into Aquitania. A larger force of three legions under the
command of Sabinus was sent to Normandy.17
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Caesar himself led the remainder against the Veneti, striking at what he
perceived to be the heart of the rebellion. The tribe was reluctant to form
an army and face the legions in the open, so the Romans targeted their
towns, many of which were built on coastal promontories. Although several
of these were stormed, in each case the inhabitants escaped in ships, along
with most of their possessions. The main strength of the tribe was its fleet,
numbering some 280 ships according to Caesar, and only when the newly
built Roman navy arrived was it possible to confront this. The Gallic vessels
were big sailing ships, designed for trade more than war, but they still proved
difficult propositions for the oared galleys that the Romans employed. The
standard methods of naval fighting in the Mediterranean world were
ramming and boarding. The first was ineffective against the thick timbered
hulls of the Veneti’s ships, while the second was made extremely difficult
by their high sides. The Roman fleet was led by Decimus Brutus, and through
ingenuity and good fortune it managed to destroy the enemy navy in a
single encounter. Devices similar to those used in sieges were made to cut
through and pull down the enemy sails and rigging, but it was a sudden
drop in the wind that left the Veneti becalmed and vulnerable, for their
ships had no oars. Caesar and the bulk of the army were mere spectators
to the action, watching from the shoreline. Without their fleet, and unable
to resist Roman assaults on their towns and villages, the Veneti had no
choice but to surrender.
No tribe allied to Rome seems to have come forward to plead their case
and Caesar decided that his punishment would be harsh. Their entire ruling
council – probably numbering several hundred – were beheaded, and the
rest of the population of the tribe sold as slaves. It is doubtful that the entire
region was depopulated, and the sheer practicalities of rounding up large
numbers of people make it unlikely that all were found and dealt with in this
way. It may only have been those men of military age who had been captured
or surrendered who were sold. Nevertheless, it was clearly an appalling blow
to the Veneti, removing all of their leaders and elders, along with a substantial
chunk of the rest of the tribe. This can only have caused massive social and
political dislocation. Caesar justified this terrible punishment by claiming
that it was necessary to show that representatives or ambassadors ought to
be accorded proper respect. Some scholars have rightly pointed out that
officers sent to collect grain would not normally be classed as ambassadors.
Yet Caesar’s attitude would have probably been shared by most contemporary
Romans. His officers had been seized while visiting peoples who were
supposed to be allied to Rome – he makes no mention of the men’s fate and
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whether or not any or all of them were recovered. The severe punishment
meted out to the Veneti was a warning that no Romans – particularly senior
officers and equestrians – could be mistreated without risking appalling
consequences. Taking hostages from the tribes was an important way for
Caesar to retain their loyalty, which was something demanded both of the
communities who welcomed Rome and those who were defeated. The
attempt to overturn the system by taking Roman prisoners could not be
allowed to succeed. Therefore the punishment of the Veneti was deliberately
appalling as a warning to others. The Roman attitude to such brutal measures
was entirely pragmatic. Cruelty for its own sake was condemned, but
atrocities that brought practical advantage to Rome’s position – and were
inflicted on foreigners – were acceptable. An extreme example had been
Crassus’ mass crucifixion of Spartacus’ followers in 71 BC. Whenever he felt
that it was in his interest, Caesar was utterly ruthless.18
Labienus’ presence had ensured that there was no attempt to renew the
war in that area. Both Crassus and Sabinus won victories in Aquitania
and Normandy respectively. At the end of the summer Caesar personally
led a force against the Menapii and Morini who lived along the coast of
what is now the Pas de Calais and Belgium. The attack was prompted
because they had never sent envoys to Caesar and acknowledged his and
Rome’s power by seeking his friendship. Both tribes were believed to have
contributed warriors to the great Belgic army that had taken the field in
the previous year. They had no large towns and lived in scattered
settlements. Even these were abandoned when the Romans advanced, and
the population took their cattle, flocks and movable possessions and hid
in the deep woodland and marshy areas of their country. It was difficult
terrain for the Romans to operate in, and the legions had no fixed target
to fight. They burned the villages and farms that they found, but this did
not make the enemy give in. Then the legionaries began clearing areas of
woodland and managed to capture some parties of the enemy along with
their animals, but they also suffered losses in ambushes. It was a different
type of warfare to the campaigns waged up to this point and little was
achieved in the few weeks left of the campaigning season. As the weather
closed in, Caesar withdrew leaving both tribes still undefeated. It was a
failure, but not a major or irredeemable one. On balance the year had
gone reasonably well, both in Gaul and especially with the resolution of
affairs in Rome. Secure in his command, Caesar was free to plan major
enterprises for the next summer. This was another reason for his harsh
treatment of the Veneti. He may well already have selected Britain as his
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next target, but it is possible that he once again had pondered turning his
attentions to the Illyricum frontier. Either way, he needed to ensure that
warfare would not erupt in Gaul while he and the bulk of the army were
elsewhere. The savage punishment of a single rebellious tribe was a
reminder that Caesar’s wrath was to be feared.19
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XIII
‘Over the waters’:
The British and German
Expeditions, 55–54 BC
‘On the 24th October letters came through from my brother Quintus and
from Caesar, dated 25th September and sent from the nearest place on the
coast of Britain. Britain is subdued, hostages have been handed over, no
plunder, but a tribute of money imposed, and they are bringing the army
back over from Britain.’ – Cicero, late October 54 BC.1
‘The divine Julius was the first of the Romans to cross to Britain with an
army. He cowed the inhabitants by winning a battle and got control of the
coast. Yet it is fair to say that he did no more than show the island to his
descendants, but did not bequeath it to them.’ – Tacitus, c. AD 98.2
In 56 BC the pace of operations in Gaul had slackened, but now Caesar was
determined to regain the momentum of his first two years there. During the
winter months he seems finally to have decided that Britain was to be his
next target, if he had not in fact already done so. He claimed that this was a
necessary task because the tribes of that island had sent military aid to the
Gauls fighting against him. There were certainly close trading links between
the coastal tribes of northern Gaul and the peoples on the other side of the
Channel. In the past there may also have been political connections, but in
his account of the defeat of the Veneti and other coastal tribes Caesar makes
no mention of large-scale participation by the Britons. However, it was
common amongst the tribes of northern Europe for individual warriors to
seek employment with the famous chieftains of other tribes, and it may well
be that some Britons had fought against Caesar’s legions in this way.
Ultimately, the suggestion that the British tribes were a military threat to
Rome’s interests in Gaul was no more than a pretext and Britain attracted
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Caesar’s attention for other reasons. There were rumours of rich natural
resources, which offered the prospect of a lucrative war. Suetonius claims
that Caesar’s personal fondness for pearls was an additional incentive, for
he believed – falsely as it turned out – that particularly fine examples were
to be found on the British coasts. More important than the possibility of
riches was the glory that always came to the man who was the first to lead a
Roman army into previously unexplored countries. With Britain there was an
added glamour because it lay across the sea, on the edge of the vast ocean that
was believed to encircle the habitable lands of the globe. No Greek or Roman
knew much about Britain and its peoples, and in the absence of facts wild
stories of strange creatures and weird customs flourished, resembling in many
ways the tales of the New World in the age of European exploration. A
success in Britain was bound to grab the attention of Romans of all classes.3
Treachery and Massacre
As usual Caesar spent the winter in Cisalpine Gaul, and he was still there
when news reached him of a new migration. Two Germanic tribes, the
Usipetes and the Tencteri, had left their homes east of the Rhine and crossed
the river into Gaul. Caesar claims that 430,000 people were on the move,
which on the same proportion as the Helvetii of one warrior to three women,
children or other dependants, would give a total force of over 100,000 fighting
men. As always we should be very cautious about accepting such a number
as meaning anything more precise than that ‘a substantial body of’ people
were on the move. Most probably, like the Helvetii, the tribes moved not in
a single massive column, but in many parties spread over a wide area. Once
again, the cause of the migration was warfare and raiding, but in this case
the two tribes were fleeing from the regular depredations of their larger and
more powerful neighbours, the Suebi. This broad group of related tribes
seems to have formed a loose confederation and was consistently depicted
by Caesar as more ferocious – and therefore more dangerous – even than the
other Germanic peoples. He claims that the tribes maintained vast numbers
of warriors, half of whom were available for war every year. German tribes
took pride in the amount of land around their boundaries that they kept free
from settlement as a sign of their martial power and as a deterrent to any
raiders. The Commentaries repeat a rumour, which Caesar does not bother
to confirm or deny, that on one side of their land no other people dared to
live within 600 miles of the Suebi. Yet although unable to cope with the
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The British and German Expeditions, 55–54 bc
onslaught of their larger neighbours, the Usipetes and Tencteri remained
warlike people, and were only briefly blocked by the Belgic Menapii, who held
the river crossings against them. The Germans pretended to retire, marching
eastwards for three days, but then sent their cavalry hastening back under
cover of darkness to launch a surprise attack. The Menapii were fooled by
the trick and dispersed, so that they were unable to mount any concerted
resistance. Their boats were captured and used to ferry the migrants across
the river. The two German tribes were able to subsist throughout the rest of
the winter on the food they had seized from the Menapii, sheltering in the
villages they had overrun.4
Caesar decided to rejoin the army earlier than usual. Before he arrived,
the migrants had begun to move again, pushing south into the lands of the
Eburones and Condrusi. The ensuing campaign very quickly became a source
of controversy, with Caesar’s actions being publicly attacked in the Senate
by Cato, who accused him of serious misconduct. Therefore, even more
than usual, the account presented in the Commentaries was intended to
defend his every move and show that he had behaved reasonably and
honourably, as well as with his accustomed calm efficiency. Yet even his
sternest critic would have conceded that the arrival of the two German tribes
threatened Roman interests. In the last three years Caesar had spread Roman
power throughout Gaul. The region was not as yet formally annexed as a
province and the tribes continued to govern themselves, but virtually all
openly or tacitly acknowledged Rome’s dominance. The Menapii were one
of the few exceptions, and had yet to submit and give hostages to Caesar,
but the Eburones and Condrusi had almost certainly done so in 57 BC. From
the beginning the proconsul had emphasised his readiness to protect allied
peoples from any enemy, making clear in each campaign both the advantages
offered by alliance with Rome and the terrible punishment awaiting any
who opposed its legions.
The migrants introduced a new and unstable element into the balance of
power that had been created. There was no unoccupied land in Gaul for
them to settle, and they had already demonstrated their willingness to use
force against anyone who did not admit them. Individual tribes – or more
probably chieftains within them – might choose to welcome the new arrivals,
feeling that the numbers and reputation of these warriors would be a great
asset to them as allies. Exactly the same motive had led some Gallic leaders
to welcome Ariovistus, the Helvetii and Caesar himself. Such a course was
now most attractive to those who had not done well since the area had been
dominated by the Romans, and especially those recently defeated by the
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legions. There was the prospect of new rivalries and conflict within and
between tribes, made worse by the possibility that the victors may eventually
win through Germanic rather than Roman support. When Caesar had
expelled Ariovistus from Gaul, he had publicly proclaimed his refusal to
admit German tribes across the Rhine. As we have seen he clearly exaggerated
the distinction between Gauls and Germans, and continually presented the
latter as a potential threat to Rome. Yet if he exaggerated, he did not entirely
invent either the differences between the peoples or the menace posed to
Roman interests. The Romans had never welcomed the incursions of peoples
into the regions around their frontiers.5
When Caesar reached his army in Gaul he received more information
about the migrants. Presumably much of this, along with the earlier reports
that had reached him south of the Alps, came from his legates left in
command of the winter camps. These seem to have taken no direct action
against the Germans. In part this was because campaigning was always
difficult in the winter months, but more importantly legates were not
expected to display too much initiative and it would have been inappropriate
for them to have embarked on a major operation on their own. Caesar also
received reports from allied tribes. A comment in a subsequent passage of
the Commentaries suggests that it was his normal custom to stay in the
houses of Gallic noblemen while he was travelling in Gaul. This was a useful
way of showing how highly he valued their friendship, for hospitality played
an important role in Gallic culture, but it also helped him to gauge their
mood and views. As in Rome, many of the great affairs of a Roman
magistrate were conducted at a very intimate level. Overall his various sources
presented a worrying picture. Already some chieftains and tribes had
approached the German migrants seeking alliance and making offers of
land in return for their military aid. Caesar summoned the leaders of all
the tribes to a council, where he arranged for them to supply the usual
contingents of cavalry and grain supplies. He did not feel that it was useful
to reveal that he knew some of the chieftains had been dealing with the
Germans. If he could quickly defeat the two tribes, then such negotiations
would not matter. The Roman army concentrated and marched north.6
When the column was within a few days march of the two German tribes,
a deputation came from them. The envoys told of how they had been driven
from their homes by the Suebi and asked Caesar to grant them land, or at
least let them keep what they were able to seize by force. As usual, his account
emphasised the barbarians’ pride, making them declare that they were fully
ready to fight if he refused them, since they feared no one apart from the
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The British and German Expeditions, 55–54 bc
Suebi. The proconsul replied ‘as seemed appropriate’, but made it clear that
he would not permit them to settle in Gaul. However, he offered to arrange
for them to settle amongst the Ubii, another German tribe who lived on the
east bank of the Rhine. They were also under pressure from the Suebi and
had recently sent ambassadors to him requesting support. The envoys from
the two tribes agreed to take this offer back to their people, and return to
Caesar in three days’ time with a decision. In the meantime they asked him
to halt his advance. Caesar refused, suspicious that this was merely a ploy
to gain time, for he knew that the bulk of the German cavalry was away on
a plundering and foraging raid.7
The Romans pressed on, until they were within 12 miles of the main tribal
encampment. This had probably taken three days, since Caesar was met by
the same deputation returning as arranged. Once again they asked him to
stop and wait, but the legions continued to advance. Caesar did grant their plea
to send orders forward to his cavalry screen telling them not to engage any
Germans they met. If they were attacked then the auxiliary and allied horse
were to do no more than defend themselves. In addition, the Germans wanted
permission to send envoys to the Ubii so that they could themselves negotiate
a settlement. Once again they requested that he grant them three days for this
to occur. Caesar remained sceptical of their motives, feeling that this was
simply another pretext to gain time for the raiding party to return. This was
not unreasonable, for even if the Germans were sincerely hoping for a peaceful
settlement it was obviously in their interest to negotiate from a position of
greater strength. Equally, if they intended to fight they would want to have these
troops, who had spearheaded the attack on the Menapii and doubtless included
some of their best warriors. In addition, if the raiders returned with food and
forage this would make it easier for the tribes to maintain themselves during
days of either negotiating or military manoeuvring.
Caesar made one modest concession, saying that he would only advance
4 miles during the day, moving to a position where his camp would have a
convenient water supply. In the meantime fighting had already broken out
between the cavalry of the two sides. The Germans had some 800 horsemen
still guarding their encampment. Caesar had 5,000 cavalry, although if these
were performing their duties as a patrolling and screening force properly,
then they would not all have been concentrated in one place. Even so, the
Gallic auxiliaries probably had a significant numerical advantage, and were
mounted on larger horses than their opponents, which makes it all the more
notable that the Germans quickly gained an advantage. In Caesar’s account
the Germans charged first, chasing away part of the Gallic cavalry, but were
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in turn met by their supports. Many of the Germans then dismounted to fight
on foot – perhaps with the support of the picked infantrymen who regularly
supported the horsemen of some Germanic tribes. The Gauls were routed
and fled, spreading panic amongst a large part of the auxiliary and allied
cavalry who galloped in terror back to the main force, which was probably
several miles away. Caesar maintains that the Germans were the ones to
break the truce with an unprovoked attack on his unsuspecting allies.
Elsewhere he notes that the Germans did not ride with saddles and, despising
horsemen like the Gauls who did so, were inclined to attack them on sight.
The truth of what happened will never be known, and may have been unclear
even at the time. Both the Gauls and the Germans were individualistic
warriors who prized displays of conspicuous valour and skill. It was difficult
for their leaders to impose any rigid discipline upon such men, and when large
numbers of warriors from different tribes met, then there was always the
potential for violence. Taunting could easily escalate into personal duels or
massed fighting. Throughout the Gallic campaigns German warriors
consistently defeated their Gallic counterparts, each success adding to their
fierce reputation. In this case seventy-four of Caesar’s Gallic allies were
killed, one of the very rare occasions where he gives a specific figure for his
own casualties. Amongst them was an aristocrat from Aquitania called Piso,
whose grandfather had been the king of his tribe and was recognised by the
Senate as a ‘friend of the Roman people’. Piso turned back during the rout
to rescue his brother, but as they escaped he was thrown from his horse,
surrounded and cut down. His brother spurred back towards the enemy and
was also killed.8
Caesar claims that the skirmish showed that the German tribes were
acting treacherously, spinning out peace negotiations until they were strong
enough to attack him. This may or may not have been true, but if it was, then
provoking a fight at this stage was clearly not in their interest. Worried that
rumours of the skirmish might be inflated into a major defeat and encourage
unrest amongst the Gallic tribes, Caesar summoned his legates and quaestor
and gave orders for an all-out attack on the following day. The next morning,
as the legions prepared for battle, a large deputation arrived from the
Germans. It included all of their main leaders and chieftains, who wanted
to apologise for the fighting on the previous day and explain that they had
not intended to break the truce in this way, but were still keen to negotiate.
The Commentaries stress the ‘treachery and dissimulation’ of the German
leaders, and in a rare moment of emotion say that ‘Caesar rejoiced’ because
they had placed themselves into his hands. Forgetting his outrage at the
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detention of his own officers – and that was the key difference, for they had
been Romans and his own men – he arrested the envoys. The legions marched
out in three columns, which could readily be converted into the battle line
of the triplex acies, and advanced the 8 miles to the German camp. The
Usipetes and Tencteri were surprised and leaderless, so that what followed
was more of a massacre than a battle:9
When their terror was made clear by the confusion and chaos, our
soldiers, enraged by the treachery of the previous day, surged into the
camp. There, those who were able to take up arms quickly fought for
a while amongst the wagons and baggage: All the rest, a mob of women
and children . . . started to run in all directions; Caesar sent his cavalry
to hunt them down.
Hearing the clamour from their rear, and seeing their own people
killed, the Germans threw down their arms, dropped their military
standards, and fled from the camp; and when they reached the point
where the Meuse and the Rhine join, they despaired of flight; many had
already fallen, and the remainder jumped into the river, and drowned
there, overcome by fear, fatigue or the current of the water.10
Caesar’s army suffered no fatal casualties and only a small number of
wounded in the one-sided fighting. He gives no figure for the German losses,
but these were probably considerable, with many being killed or taken to be
sold as slaves. Even more escaped, but at the cost of losing their possessions
in their abandoned wagons. If, as seems likely, the two tribes were not all in
a single encampment but in a number of parties spread over a fairly wide
area, then the other groups may have got away more lightly. The only
organised group of fugitives was the raiding band of cavalry, which recrossed
the Rhine and took refuge amongst the Sugambri tribe. After the destruction
and dispersal of their peoples the tribal leaders were granted their freedom,
but chose to stay in the Roman camp rather than face possible retribution
from the Gauls whose lands they had plundered.11
The Romans celebrated the easy victory that had freed them from ‘the
fear of such a great war’. The success reinforced the Roman dominance of
Gaul created by Caesar’s earlier campaigns. If he wanted to mount a British
expedition this year, then the speed of the campaign left this possibility open.
In practical respects the victory was good for Rome, but when news of this
episode reached the city it was not well received by a number of senators. It
is unlikely that the first report came from Caesar himself, and more probable
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that it reached Rome in letters written by men on his staff, or – directly or
indirectly – from merchants with the army. Cato led the attack against Caesar,
which focused not so much on the massacre itself, but on the belief that the
proconsul had violated the truce by seizing ambassadors and attacking by
surprise. The Romans set great store on their ‘good faith’ (fides), contrasting
it with the – in their view – duplicity of other races. While their record was
in fact scarcely unblemished, nevertheless they were aware that honouring
treaties and other formal agreements had the practical advantage of helping
future negotiations. At a more fundamental level, Rome’s special relationship
with the gods, which was demonstrated by its remarkable success in war,
relied upon virtue and honouring sacred obligations or oaths. In the Senate:
‘Cato urged them to surrender Caesar to those whom he had wronged, and
not to turn upon themselves, or allow to fall upon their city, the pollution of
his crime. “However,” said he, “let us also sacrifice to the gods, because they
do not turn the punishment for the general’s folly and madness upon his
soldiers, but spare the city.”’12
On a handful of occasions in the past the Romans had formally handed
over one of their magistrates to a foreign enemy in expiation of an injustice.
The most recent case had occurred in 137 BC after the consul Caius Hostilius
Mancinus had let his army be surrounded by Celtiberians outside their town
of Numantia. Mancinus had saved the lives of his soldiers by surrendering.
His army was allowed to go free, but the Romans were to accept a peace
that favoured the Numantines. Subsequently the Senate refused to ratify the
treaty, and ordered that Mancinus, as its guarantor, be clapped in irons and
left outside the walls of Numantia. (The Celtiberians did not see this as
much consolation and ignored him. Mancinus returned to Rome and, since
he was a Roman aristocrat, commissioned a statue of himself naked and in
chains. This was displayed prominently in his house to remind visitors of the
time he had been willing to sacrifice himself for the good of the Republic.)
Cato did not have a good case for comparing Caesar to men like Mancinus.
In the past men had only been handed over to an enemy when the Romans
were seeking reasons for recent defeats or wished to avoid an inconvenient
treaty. Caesar had won victory after victory, and as long as he continued to
do so it was unthinkable that the Senate would actually agree to Cato’s
demand, particularly while Pompey and Crassus were consuls. Yet there
clearly was disquiet among the senators and it may well have been on this
occasion that the Senate actually voted to send a commission to ‘investigate
the state of the Gallic provinces’.13 As far as we know no such commission
was ever actually sent. Cato’s criticism had clearly stung Caesar, for he chose
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to send a letter defending his actions to a friend who read it out at a meeting
of the Senate, ‘and when it was read, with its abundant insults and
denunciations of Cato, Cato rose to his feet and showed, not in anger or
contentiousness, but as if from calculation and due preparation, that the
accusations against him bore the marks of abuse and scoffing, and were
childishness and vulgarity on Caesar’s part’.14 Cato was too good an actor
not to be able to milk the situation to his advantage. Had Caesar been present
then his oratory might well have been more persuasive, and at the very least
he could have realised that he was losing the debate and changed tack. This
was the weakness of his position in these years, for he could not take part
in the meetings of the Senate or public gatherings at Rome. After his letter
had been read out, Cato was able to plunge into a detailed attack of all of
Caesar’s actions. For the moment he, and those who shared his hostility to
Caesar, could do no more than this, but their continued sniping showed no
sign of going away and was always in the background, even when the
Republic was formally celebrating the proconsul’s achievements.15
News of the slaughter of the Tencteri and Usipetes would not have reached
Rome for some time, so it is unlikely that these debates occurred until late
in 55 BC. Immediately after his success, Caesar had decided to take his army
across the Rhine in a display of force intended to deter any other German
tribes from invading Gaul. The Ubii had already given him hostages and
sought his protection from the Suebi, providing further justification for the
expedition. The tribe now offered to supply him with boats to ferry the
army over the river, but the proconsul felt that it was ‘too risky, and beneath
his own dignity and that of the Roman people’ to employ such a method.
Instead he set the legions to building a bridge, the design of which was
described in loving detail in the Commentaries, for the Romans valued the
engineering skills of their soldiers almost as much as their battlefield
successes. In ten days the bridge was complete and strongly garrisoned forts
set to protect both ends of it. The location of the bridge remains a mystery
– as, in spite of Caesar’s description, do some details of its construction.
However, somewhere between modern Coblenz and Andernach seems likely.16
Once across the river, the legions found no one to fight. The Sugambri had
already fled with their possessions into the deep forests, urged on by the
horsemen of the two migrant tribes who had sought refuge amongst them.
In a similar way the Suebi evacuated their settlements and sent their families
and herds into woodland where they could best hide from the invader. Their
warriors were told to muster at a well-known place in the centre of their
lands, where their army would confront the Romans. Caesar had no
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particular wish to penetrate deep into their territory or to seek battle. For
eighteen days he ravaged the land, burning farms and villages and harvesting
or destroying their crops. Then he withdrew to the western bank of the
Rhine, breaking down the bridge behind him. He had shown the Germans
of the region that the Roman army was both willing and able to reach and
attack their lands whenever it chose to do so. The fate of the Usipetes and
Tencteri, and before that the defeat of Ariovistus, provided dire warning to
any tribe who tried to settle in Gaul. The leaders of the Ubii were assured
that Caesar would return to aid them if the Suebi moved against them once
more. For the moment, the frontier of Gaul was secure.17
Reconnaissance in Force – the First
Expedition to Britain, 55 BC
It was now late in the summer, but Caesar was still determined to launch an
attack on Britain. It could be little more than a raid, hastily prepared and
with the expectation of returning to winter in Gaul. The fleet constructed
to fight the Veneti, along with whatever ships had been captured in that
campaign or could now be provided by his allies, were gathered on the coast
in the territory of the Morini (modern Pas de Calais). Caesar himself
marched with the legions from the Rhine to rendezvous with them, their
arrival prompting the previously hostile Morini to decide that making peace
with Rome was the prudent course for the moment. In addition to his oared
warships the proconsul had just under 100 sailing ships to serve as transports.
This was not an especially large total for the task in hand. Caesar decided
to take the barest essentials when it came to baggage and very little food, since
at that time of year he could expect to supply himself from the ripe crops
in the fields. Two legions, the Seventh and Tenth, were squeezed into eighty
transports. It seems likely that by this time these mustered no more than
4,000 men apiece, so that on average 100 would have been in each vessel.
Some legionaries may instead have acted as rowers in the warships. A further
eighteen transports were allocated to the cavalry, perhaps providing enough
space for several hundred of these along with their mounts. His senior
officers, plus their staffs and whatever possessions they considered to be
essential, were transported in the cramped conditions of the war galleys. In
comparison to the armies he had led in recent years, it was with this small
force that Caesar set out to invade Britain. The bulk of the army remained
in Gaul, sizeable columns being sent under its legates to subdue the Menapii,
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and those of the Morini who had not surrendered. An additional force acted
as garrison to his embarkation port, which was most likely near the site of
modern Boulogne – the land around what is now Calais does not yet seem
to have been reclaimed from the sea. After all the preparations, the Roman
fleet did not set sail until late August.18
During the weeks before setting out Caesar had tried to gather as much
information about Britain and its inhabitants as possible, but had in fact
discovered very little useful information. He interviewed traders who had
travelled to the island, but they claimed to know little. Caesar was planning
a landing in the south-eastern corner of Britain, while the principal trading
ports at this time lay much further west, one of the most important being at
Hengistbury Head. Therefore the merchants may genuinely have known little
about his target, but it is more than likely that they were also reluctant to
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0
0 30 km
20 miles
T R I N O V A N T E S
AT R E B A T E S
C A N T I A C I
Bigbury Richborough
Boulogne
R. Liane
R. Canche
R. Authie
R. Somme
Ambleteuse
St Omer
Deal
Walmer
Dover
Modern site
of Calais
Route of Second British Campaign
The probable coastline of Britain and Gaul in 55BC
proconsul 58–50 BC
supply him with information at all. The trade to Britain seems to have been
mainly in the hands of Gauls, with few Romans operating on these routes.
Many of these men came from the coastal tribes of Gaul that had so recently
been suppressed by Caesar. It would have been entirely reasonable for these
men to resent Roman intervention in the island, fearing that this would open
the market to Roman competitors. Having failed to learn anything very useful
by this method, Caesar sent a warship on a reconnaissance voyage across the
Channel. One of his officers, Caius Volusenus, was placed in charge of this.
He returned after five days with a series of observations about the coastline,
but since he had not risked a landing the detail contained within these must
have been limited. The coastline of south-eastern England was very different
at this period, with much of the lower lying land such as Romney Marshes
still under the sea. Thanet was a genuine island, and the lagoons around the
Wantsum Channel could have offered an extensive sheltered anchorage for
the invaders. However, Volusenus does not seem to have discovered this. The
news of the Roman intentions reached the British tribes and a number of
leaders sent representatives to Caesar’s camp on the Gaulish coast. These
offered to accept alliance with Rome and the usual demand for hostages as
surety. The proconsul decided to send his own envoy back with the
deputations, and chose Commius, a Gallic chieftain whom he had made King
of the Atrebates, for this task. Commius was believed to have influence and
connections amongst the British tribes. In fact, these proved of questionable
value, for on arrival in Britain he was almost immediately imprisoned. No
report came back to Caesar of his mission. In a real sense Caesar was sailing
into the unknown when he set out for Britain, but he was impatient to be off
and achieve something more tangible and spectacular – and perhaps less
controversial – before the year was out. When the winds turned in his favour
he led the warships and the legions out of harbour.19
There were problems from the beginning. The cavalry had not yet
embarked, and by the time that they had hastened to another port and gone
aboard the eighteen transports allocated to them the weather had changed.
Although he had spent some time with warships in the eastern
Mediterranean, Caesar consistently underestimated the power and
unpredictability of the sea, and especially the English Channel. The cavalry
transports were unable to follow. The main convoy had left before dawn
and the leading elements reached Britain – probably somewhere near modern
Dover – by late morning. Volusenus may well have located the natural haven
at Dover, and it is quite possible that Caesar had chosen this for his landing.
However, at this point the beach was overlooked by high cliffs, at the top of
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which crowds of British warriors were waiting. Caesar waited at anchor
until late afternoon, when most of his straggling convoy of ships had
concentrated. His senior officers were rowed across to his flagship for a
meeting and told that the nature of the operation required them to respond
especially quickly to his signals. Once all the ships had caught up, they were
to move 7 miles along the coast to a good landing spot that seems to have
been located by Volusenus on his earlier patrol. The Britons shadowed the
Roman fleet as it moved, but only their cavalry and chariots were able to
keep pace with the ships and contest the landing. Volusenus’ beach was
probably near Deal or Walmer, and was wide and not dominated by high
bluffs. Yet even so the Britons knew the ground and the tides and the Romans
did not. Horsemen and chariots swooped in to attack the legionaries as they
tried to disembark. The transport ships were not designed to land people or
cargo directly onto a beach and ran aground while still in fairly deep water.
The legionaries had to wade their way forward, encumbered by their bulky
equipment. They were vulnerable to missiles, which they could not easily
dodge or ward off with their shields, and arrived on the beach scattered in
ones and twos and in little shape to mount an organised resistance. There
is no evidence that the legionaries had been given any special training for this
operation. Caesar comments that on this occasion his veteran troops failed
to show their normal enthusiasm and aggression, but in the circumstances
it was hard for the assault on the beach to generate any momentum.20
Caesar signalled to his warships, ordering their captains to head for the
beach and run in as close as they could so that the crews on their decks
could bombard the Britons with slings, bows and bolt-shooting artillery.
This helped to relieve the pressure on the assaulting infantry, but even so
they were making little progress:
And then, when our soldiers were still hanging back, mainly because
of the depth of the water, the eagle-bearer of the Tenth offered up a
quick prayer and then yelled out, ‘Jump down, soldiers, unless you
want to give up your eagle to the enemy; everyone will know that I at
least did my duty to the Republic and my commander!’ After saying this
in a loud voice he jumped off the ship and began carrying the eaglestandard
towards the enemy. Then our ‘squaddies’ called out to each
other not to allow so terrible a disgrace [as to lose the standard of their
legion] and leapt down from the transport. When those on the nearby
ships saw them, they followed and began to close with the enemy.21
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There was still heavy fighting, and the Romans’ line was ragged as the
legionaries formed up with the first officer or standard-bearer they met, just
as they had done when surprised at the Sambre. As a rough fighting line
developed, Caesar watched from the deck of his flagship and sent forward
parties of men in rowing boats and his light scouting vessels to reinforce any
group that became cut off. Although the Britons resisted fiercely, by their
nature cavalry and chariots were not suited to defending a position and in the
end they gave way. Their mobility ensured that most of them escaped. It is
interesting that Caesar did not name the heroic eagle-bearer (aquilifer),
although he does have a tendency to celebrate the collective exploits of the
Tenth rather than the deeds of individuals from the legion. Presumably the
man was not of sufficiently high social class to warrant a mention by name.
The army would have known who he was, and although he does not mention
it, it would have been expected that as a Roman general Caesar would have
rewarded the man with promotion, a decoration and wealth.22
Caesar was ashore, but his army had no cavalry, limiting its capacity not
only to pursue a defeated enemy, but also to scout and gather intelligence
from the surrounding countryside. The legions constructed a camp as usual,
probably just behind the beach. In the normal way the oared vessels were
dragged ashore, while the transports sat at anchor offshore. Fortunately the
successful landing in the face of determined resistance was enough to overawe
the closest tribes, whose leaders sent to Caesar and willingly began to give
the hostages he demanded. Caesar probably also demanded grain supplies.
Commius was released by his captors and returned to Caesar. He brought
with him some thirty of his retainers along with some Britons, all of whom
were mounted and provided Caesar with at least a small force of horsemen.
As the Commentaries put it ‘by these things, peace was established’. However,
there were some things beyond Caesar’s control. Four days later the cavalry
transports set out again from Gaul and came within site of Caesar’s camp
before a storm blew up and drove them away. The weather turned worse –
as it often did and still does in the Channel at the end of summer – but the
Romans had either not been warned as Caesar claims, or had not bothered
to listen to the Gallic sailors who sailed these waters. The storm may also
have been an especially bad one and the Roman fleet suffered terribly, with
twelve ships dashed to pieces and most of the rest damaged to a greater or
lesser extent. Lacking significant food supplies and for the moment cut off
from the Continent, Caesar’s army was placed in a very difficult position.
The Britons quickly realised its vulnerability and decided to renew the war.
The chieftains quietly slipped out of the Roman camp. Knowing that the
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legions lacked food, they decided to cut off the grain supply. The Romans
would be starved into submission, or made to fight them at a disadvantage.
If this first expedition could be utterly destroyed, then it was not unreasonable
to think that the invaders would never return.23
While some men worked to repair as many ships as possible, each day
parties of legionaries went out to harvest the wheat in the fields around the
camp. As each area was used up, the parties had to go further afield and it
was fairly obvious where the Romans would go next. The Britons prepared
an ambush, hiding their forces in woodland bordering on the fields. After
several days, foragers from the Seventh were suddenly attacked by a large
force, again consisting mainly of chariots and cavalry. Chariots had long
fallen out of use among the Gauls, but persisted in Britain and Ireland for
several more centuries. They were expensive pieces of equipment, affordable
only to the tribal aristocracy. The aristocratic warrior fought, while an
unarmed charioteer controlled the team of two ponies. Social changes, along
with increasing availability of large numbers of bigger cavalry mounts,
probably explained the disappearance of chariots in Continental Europe.
British chariots were fast and light, but they were not projectiles that rammed
into the enemy – the remarkably persistent myth that scythes were fitted to
their wheels is not based on a shred of reliable ancient evidence. Caesar gave
a detailed description of chariot tactics, knowing that his audience would
be fascinated by these exotic vehicles, so reminiscent of Homeric heroes:
This is how they fight from chariots – to start off with they drive all
over the field and throw javelins, and so with the terrifying appearance
of the horses and the roaring of the wheels they often shake the order
of the enemy ranks; when they have charged forward between the
troops of their own cavalry, they jump down from the chariot cars and
fight on foot. In the meantime the chariot drivers withdraw gradually
away from the fighting and wait in such a way that, if they [the warriors]
are hard presssed by a host of foes, they may have an easy means of
escape. Therefore in battle they combine the speed of cavalry and the
steadiness of infantry, and by daily use and training they are so skilled
that they are able to gallop their horses down the steepest of slopes
and retain full control, to stop and to turn in an instant, to dash out
along the yoke and then like lightning run back to the car.24
Chariots allowed an aristocratic warrior to look spectacular on the
battlefield, were mobile missile platforms and let a warrior go forward to
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fight single combats on foot and then retire as necessary. They came from an
older tradition of warfare, which celebrated the personal prowess and heroism
of individual warriors. Yet, in combination with the British light cavalry and
especially against an enemy entirely on foot, they were dangerous opponents.
Some of the Roman foragers were cut down, the rest surrounded and exposed
to the javelins thrown by opponents whom they could not easily catch. The
outposts, stationed outside the Roman camp as part of the army’s normal
routine, reported that there was a large cloud of dust visible in the direction
where the foragers had gone. It was far larger than would normally have been
thrown up simply by the legionaries’ feet. Caesar guessed what had happened
and immediately led the outposts off to rescue his men. Before he left, he
ordered two cohorts to relieve them in position outside the ramparts of the
camp and the rest of the army to follow as soon as it was equipped and
formed up. The expedition to Britain was small in scale compared with earlier
campaigns, but even so it is striking that a proconsul commanding eight
legions and many auxiliaries personally led a force of less than a thousand
men into battle. The arrival of these cohorts was enough to check the Britons.
Caesar formed up facing them for a while, but then led the foragers and his
relief force back to the main camp. The Britons had won a small victory, and
more importantly had prevented the Romans from gathering the grain.
Encouraged by this success, they mustered their forces for an all-out attack
on the Roman camp. Caesar formed up his legions, along with Commius’ tiny
troop of cavalry, on the plain outside the rampart to meet them. In massed
fighting the legions were at their best and the Britons were quickly routed,
although very few were caught by the pursuers. Caesar’s men had to content
themselves with torching the neighbouring farms and villages.25
The reverse was sufficient to persuade many British leaders once again to
sue for peace. Caesar now demanded double the number of hostages, but said
that the Britons must transport them to Gaul as he was no longer willing to
delay his return there. Somehow all of the army was crammed into the
surviving warships and the sixty-eight transports which had been restored
to some sort of order. It was now near the September Equinox, but Caesar’s
luck held and in a patch of fair weather he set sail just after midnight. All
of the ships made it back, though two transports were driven off course
and landed on the coastline of the Morini. Seeing a good opportunity for
plunder, the local warriors began to attack them, more and more gathering
as the news spread. When reports of this reached Caesar the entire cavalry
of the army was sent to their relief, and brought them off without the
beleaguered men having suffered a single fatality. Next day Labienus took
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the weary legionaries of the Seventh and Tenth legions in a swift punitive
expedition against the tribe. Unlike 56 BC the summer had been dry and this
reduced the extent and difficulty of the marshes of the region. The Morini
soon surrendered. The Menapii had also been defeated by the legions sent
against them before Caesar had left for Britain.26
In most practical respects the first expedition to Britain had been a failure
and, indeed, had narrowly missed becoming a disaster. It had not even
contributed a great deal to Caesar’s pool of intelligence concerning the
tribes of the island, for he had been confined in a narrow stretch of country
for the few weeks he had spent there. Some help came from the native
chieftains who came as hostages or sought refuge in his camp, much as they
had done at Gaul. It is unclear how many came across the Channel over the
winter months, but at least one refugee prince does seem to have come to him,
driven from his own tribe by his enemies. By 54 BC Caesar had a little more
information, though scarcely enough to justify the effort required to gain it.
Left until very late in the campaigning season, the preparations for the first
raid were inadequate and the forces involved too small for the task. All of
these were errors for which Caesar was responsible. In this sense the campaign
was scarcely his greatest achievement, although as usual he showed his huge
ability in getting himself and the army out of a series of difficult situations.
Yet by the end of the year Caesar must have realised that, in propaganda
terms, the British expedition was a fabulous success. Rome went wild when
the news of this adventure arrived, thrilled at the idea that its legions had
now crossed to that strange and mysterious isle. The Senate voted Caesar
twenty days of public thanksgiving, five days more than he had been awarded
at the end of 57 BC after three campaigns of genuine value. This formal
recognition by the Republic of his achievements was the best possible answer
to the attacks of Cato, which may possibly have been made at the same
meeting. The year ended well, but Caesar was already resolved to return to
Britain in the following summer. He remained curious about the place, and
especially its rumoured wealth. The reaction back in Rome also made a
second visit attractive – the scale of the celebrations may even have made it
essential to live up to such acclaim.27
Invasion
The second expedition was more thoroughly prepared. Before the winter
was over Caesar set the craftsmen in his legions to ship building. They were
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issued with a standard design for a broad, low-sided transport ship equipped
with both sails and oars. In the following months 600 of these vessels were
constructed, making use of ropes, tackle and other equipment provided by
the Spanish provinces, which from the start of 54 BC were controlled by
Pompey. An additional twenty-eight war galleys were also put together. As
usual Caesar spent the winter in Cisalpine Gaul performing his administrative
and judicial duties. When he was about to leave to rejoin the army he was
diverted by news of raids into Illyricum. He hastened to the spot, raised
local levies and pressured the tribe responsible into making peace. Travelling
north he toured the army in its winter camps, praising the officers and men
for their energy in construction. He gave instructions for the entire fleet to
concentrate at Portus Itius (almost certainly modern Boulogne), ready for
the crossing to Britain. Before the campaign could get under way, he was
diverted again, this time by an internal dispute amongst the Treveri as rival
chieftains struggled for pre-eminence. Caesar took four legions in light
marching order and 800 cavalry to back the claims of his favoured candidate
for power. His rival offered to surrender and promptly supplied the requested
200 hostages, including his son and other close relatives. For the moment
Caesar was content, and had no wish to delay the attack on Britain any
longer. He returned to the coast and set about final preparations. Since he
planned to take a much larger force with him this time, he was eager to
make sure that Gaul remained peaceful in his absence. Chieftains from all
the tribes assembled at his camp, bringing with them the 4,000 cavalrymen
that he had requested for the coming year. In this way the legions were
provided with adequate numbers of good cavalrymen to support them.
These warriors, and particularly the aristocrats who led them, were also in
effect additional hostages for the good behaviour of their peoples.
Amongst them was a contingent of Aedui led by Dumnorix, the younger
brother of Diviciacus the druid. In 58 BC Caesar had had good reason to be
suspicious of the ambitions of this man and had kept him under observation.
Recently he had heard from another Gallic aristocrat that Dumnorix had
claimed at a meeting of the Aeduan council that the proconsul was planning
to make him king of the Aedui. Reluctant though they were to subject
themselves to the rule of a monarch, most of the other chieftains were equally
nervous of showing dissension regarding any of Caesar’s acts and did not
bother to check whether or not there was any truth in the claim. Only half
of the Gallic cavalry would accompany Caesar to Britain, but he had already
decided that Dumnorix must certainly go, since he was a man ‘craving
revolution’. The chieftain tried a whole range of excuses, pleading ill health,
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fear of sea travel and finally a religious taboo preventing him from leaving
Gaul. Caesar remained unmoved, so Dumnorix sought safety in numbers and
tried to persuade other Gallic chieftains to join him in his refusal to go to
Britain. He claimed that the Romans planned to kill them all once they had
taken them away from their tribes and crossed to the island. A number of
the other chieftains informed on him to the proconsul. There was ample
time for plotting and gossip in the camp, as unfavourable winds delayed
departure for the best part of a month. In the end Dumnorix and his warriors
slipped out of camp and fled on the very day when the weather broke and
embarkation began. Caesar was taken by surprise, but immediately sent a
large part of his cavalry in pursuit. He was determined not to leave until
the chieftain had been dealt with, even though he was impatient to start.
His men were ordered to bring him back alive if possible, but to kill him if
he resisted. Dumnorix did not lack courage, and challenged his attackers by
yelling out that he was a ‘free man from a free people’. Although none of his
warriors stood with him, he chose to fight and was cut down. It was an
openly brutal demonstration of Caesar’s power and the inability even of
one of Gaul’s wealthiest aristocrats to stand against him. Diviciacus is not
mentioned as taking an active part in events after 57 BC, and it is possible that
he was no longer alive to plead for clemency. Yet in the end Dumnorix was
simply inconvenient, and Caesar was impatient and so gave orders for the
man’s death.28
The second invasion force was much larger. Caesar took five legions –
including the Seventh and Tenth, although the identity of the others is
unknown – and half of the auxiliary and allied cavalry. His other three
legions, along with the remaining 2,000 cavalry, were left under the command
of Labienus. They were to secure the ports, ensure that if necessary grain
convoys could be despatched to the army in Britain, and also to keep an eye
on the tribes. The Roman fleet left harbour at sunset, but once again Caesar
and his officers underestimated the power of the Channel. The wind dropped
and the tides carried them off course. It had been a considerable achievement
to construct so many vessels in such a short time, but this did not mean that
all could be crewed by experienced sailors. The design of the new transports,
while well suited to carrying men, horses and equipment and getting them
onto a beach, was not ideal for coping with adverse weather. However, the
provision of oars proved highly advantageous, especially when combined
with the legionaries’ willingness for heavy labour. Only by rowing did the
Roman ships manage to make their designated landing beach. Caesar tells
us that this was at the most suitable place, but its location is unclear. Some
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have speculated that he was now aware of the Wantsum Channel and used
it, but this is not entirely convincing in the light of subsequent events. A
more natural reading would suggest that it was at or fairly close to the beach
chosen the year before. Wherever it was, the Britons had mustered to meet
them but were daunted by the sight of hundreds of vessels coming towards
them and retired. Most of the fleet was at the beach by noon. The Romans
began landing, marking out and constructing a camp behind the beach as
almost their first task. Patrols went out to find prisoners, who informed
them of the withdrawal of the British army to a new position inland.29
Caesar decided on an immediate attack, and marched out under cover of
darkness with forty cohorts and 1,700 cavalry. The remaining legionaries
and horsemen were left at the camp under the command of Quintus Atrius.
The Roman fleet lay mostly at anchor, Caesar confident that it would be safe
lying off ‘a calm, open shore’. Caesar’s column made good progress, covering
some 12 miles before dawn came and revealed the Britons waiting behind
the line of a river – most probably the Stour near modern Canterbury. On
wooded hills there was a walled enclosure – possibly the hillfort at Bigbury
Wood – where the main tribal force waited. Small parties of cavalry, chariots
and skirmishers periodically dashed forward from this shelter to hurl missiles
at the Romans. Such tactics were doubtless effective enough in inter-tribal
warfare, but posed few problems for veteran legions. Caesar attacked, his
cavalry brushing aside the Britons and allowing the Seventh Legion to launch
a direct assault on the hillfort. The legionaries formed the famous testudo or
tortoise, overlapped shields held above their heads to create a roof able to stop
all but the heaviest missiles. There was little need for the more complex
engineering often employed by the Romans in sieges. A simple ramp was
piled up against the wall and the enclosure stormed. There was only a short
pursuit of the fleeing enemy. Caesar’s men were tired after the Channel
crossing, night march and battle, and he still wanted them to construct a
marching camp in the proper way. The army halted for the night.30
On the following morning Caesar sent out three independent columns
to seek the enemy. It was normal on such occasions to burn and plunder
during the advance until the local leaders came to seek peace. Caesar clearly
believed that there was no prospect of the Britons re-forming as a single
main army so soon after their defeat, and therefore it was better to cover more
ground with a number of flying columns. He does not seem to have
accompanied any of these troops, but remained in the marching camp and
was there when a messenger came in from Quintus Atrius. The news was bad,
for a storm had blown up during the previous night and struck the anchored
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fleet causing a great deal of damage. Caesar recalled the three columns and
rode back to inspect the damage, discovering that forty ships were smashed
beyond repair. The craftsmen were called out from the ranks of the legions
and sent back to the camp to work on the remainder. A message was also
sent to Labienus in Gaul ordering him to set his legionaries to the task of
building more ships. After ten days of intense labour the bulk of the ships
with Caesar were once again in serviceable condition. Other soldiers worked
to construct a ditch and rampart running from the camp onto the beach
itself. All of the repaired ships were dragged ashore and beached inside the
protection of this fortification. The root of Caesar’s problem was that he had
no harbour in which his ships could be sheltered and easily loaded and offloaded.
The Wantsum Channel around the Isle of Thanet would probably
have given him most of what he needed, but the damage suffered in this
storm makes it very unlikely that he used it. Perhaps the Romans remained
unaware of it, or lacked the knowledge to find and navigate its entrance.
Throughout history the weather has always posed huge problems to seaborne
invasions – in 1944 the British, Americans and Canadians took their own
artificial ‘Mulberry’ harbours to Normandy, but still suffered great disruption
to the build-up after D-Day because of the heavy storms from 19–23 June.
Although it is hard to see what he could have done to solve this problem, there
is something cavalier in the way Caesar had done nothing to alter his plans
in 54 BC in spite of the carnage wrought on his fleet by the storm in the
previous year. The new fortification would serve to defend the ships from
enemy attack, but offered little protection against the elements. Many
commentators have criticised this failure to learn from experience. Most of
such criticism has been justified, but, unless he had simply sent the ships
back to the ports of Gaul and hoped that they would be able to return when
needed, the only safe alternative was not to have launched the second
expedition at all. Caesar was determined to do this, for reasons that were
essentially political and personal. On both British expeditions his luck nearly
failed him, but in each case he managed to escape.31
The pause gave the Britons time to recover. Several tribes, who in normal
circumstances were hostile to each other, combined to face the common
danger and appointed a war-leader named Cassivellaunus. Caesar tells us that
he came from a tribe north of the Thames, but nothing else is known of
him and we cannot be certain which tribe this was. When Caesar rejoined
the main force at the inland camp and resumed his advance, his patrols were
continually harassed by parties of chariots and horsemen. In close combat,
especially between large formed bodies of troops, Caesar’s legionaries and
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auxiliary cavalry consistently demonstrated their superiority, but in a number
of skirmishes parties of his men were lured into ambushes and suffered
badly. Cassivellaunus was encouraged and launched a big attack on the
Romans when they halted at the end of the march to begin entrenching their
camp. Caesar sent two cohorts up to reinforce his outposts, but it took more
reinforcements to drive the Britons back. One of his tribunes was killed in
the fighting. On the following day the British attacks were not pressed as
hard, until Caesar sent one of his legates out with three legions on a foraging
expedition. When most of the legionaries dispersed to set about their task,
the British chariots and cavalry rushed in to exploit this weakness. However,
the Romans quickly rallied, formed up and drove the enemy off. For a while
the British tribes dispersed and resistance was light.32
Caesar decided to target Cassivellaunus’ own homeland and marched
towards the Thames. It is not clear where he crossed – probably somewhere
in what is now central London – but his men forded the river and brushed
aside the warriors defending the far bank. The British commander decided
not to risk another open battle and resolved instead to harass the enemy,
relying mainly on his chariot force. Caesar claims that there were 4,000 of
these, but this seems likely to be an inflated figure – for instance it would
mean 8,000 ponies. Herds were driven from the fields along the Romans’
route of march and food supplies destroyed or hidden. The chariots were
there to ambush the Roman foragers. Caesar’s men began to suffer a steady
trickle of losses in these skirmishes, until he was forced to keep men close
to the main column at all times. Fortunately, as he had so often done in
Gaul, Caesar was able to make use of a local ally. With the army was
Mandubracius, a prince of the Trinovantes – a people living north of the
Thames in East Anglia – who had been driven into exile after Cassivellaunus
had killed his father. This tribe surrendered, asking Caesar to restore
Mandubracius to the throne, and willingly handed over both hostages and
food. Their example was soon followed by five other small tribes, whose
names are not otherwise known to history. The fragile alliance between the
British tribes was crumbling under the pressure of long-standing animosities.
From these new allies Caesar discovered the location of Cassivellaunus’ own
stronghold, hidden amidst woods and marshes. Straightaway he marched
the legions there and stormed the place, capturing considerable quantities
of cattle. It was a major blow to the war-leader’s prestige. At around the
same time Cassivellaunus had arranged for the tribes of Kent to mount an
attack on Atrius and the cohorts guarding the ships, but this was repulsed
with heavy losses.33
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Following these twin blows Cassivellaunus decided to seek peace. It was
now nearly the end of September and the proconsul was eager to resolve
matters and get back to Gaul. Negotiations were facilitated by Commius,
who had once again accompanied Caesar. The British war-leader promised
hostages and an annual tribute, and pledged not to attack Mandubracius and
the Trinovantes. Waiting only for the hostages to be delivered, Caesar began
to embark his army. However, even with all the repaired vessels he doubted
that there was enough capacity to carry both the soldiers and the large
numbers of hostages and slaves they had taken. The proconsul decided to
make two crossings. The first went smoothly, but it proved impossible for the
empty ships to return from the Gaulish side of the Channel. Similarly, none
of the vessels built or found by Labienus were able to get to the army in
Britain. After waiting for several days, Caesar decided that it was too risky
to stay where he was. It was already September and the weather was likely
to get worse, raising the prospect that he might be stranded in Britain with
only part of his army. Cramming the troops into those vessels he had, they
sailed overnight to reach Gaul by dawn. Caesar left Britain never to return.
It would be almost a century before another Roman army would invade the
island and turn it into a province.34
On both British expeditions Caesar avoided disaster, if only narrowly. It
is normally assumed that the annual tribute promised by the British tribes
was never paid or at least quickly lapsed. Trade between Britain and the
Roman world steadily increased in the years after Caesar, shifting away from
the old routes to the south-west and moving instead to the south-eastern
corner that he had visited. The destruction of the Veneti probably contributed
much to this shift, but it does also seem that more Roman merchants were
able to reach Britain as the century progressed. Yet even the tribes who had
submitted to Caesar could not in any meaningful way be described as now
being part of Rome’s empire – despite the occasional claims of Roman
propagandists. Cicero noted the quick realisation in Rome that campaigns
in Britain were not going to yield the eagerly anticipated profits. There was
no silver, nor any hope of ‘booty except for slaves; but I doubt we’ll find
any scribes or musicians amongst them’ – in other words those likely to
fetch a high price. Yet he remained excited by the whole business and wrote
with enthusiasm about his brother’s account of the expedition, for Quintus
Cicero was now serving as one of Caesar’s legates. Although influenced by
this family involvement, his mood seems to have been fairly typical of many
Romans. The expeditions to Britain brought Caesar huge and highly
favourable public attention, excited by the novelty and tales of chariots and
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barbarians who painted their bodies blue with woad. The landings were
undoubted propaganda successes, even if the actual results were negligible
and the risks taken very high. Cato’s attacks on him in 55 BC had shown the
difficulty of dealing with opponents when he could not confront them face
to face in the Senate or Forum. Yet no one could doubt that Caesar was
making the most of his opportunity to win glory and make himself
fabulously rich in the process. Even if the profits of the British expeditions
were a little disappointing, the cumulative result of five years of successful
campaigning had raised him from a debtor on the brink of ruin to one of
the Republic’s wealthiest men.35
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and Vengeance
‘And then, since he had not anticipated anything, Sabinus panicked, and
rushed here and there deploying the cohorts, but even this he did timidly
and in confusion – as is usually the case when a man is forced to decide
everything in the heat of the action. In contrast Cotta, who had guessed
that this might happen on the march and because of this had spoken
against setting out, did everything to ensure the safety of the force – and
in challenging and inspiring the legionaries he did the duty of a general,
while in the fighting he played the part of a soldier.’ – Caesar.1
While Caesar was in Britain in August 54 BC, his daughter Julia died in
childbirth. The infant – a girl in some accounts and a boy in others – survived
her by just a few days. For the Roman aristocracy, as indeed for most of
humanity until the modern age, such deaths were all too common. Julia had
become pregnant at least once before during her marriage, but had miscarried,
shocked, it was said, by the sight of her husband coming back from the
elections spattered in blood – someone else’s blood as it turned out. Since we
do not know her date of birth we cannot calculate Julia’s age when she died,
but at most she was in her mid twenties. Caesar’s mother Aurelia also died
in 54 BC. The cause is unknown, but she was by this time in her sixties, and
had been a widow for three decades. In one year Caesar lost the two members
of his family who were closest to him. It was his mother to whom he had
declared that he would come home as Pontifex Maximus or not at all, and
who had presided over the Bona Dea celebrations in his house. She was a
formidable woman who had had a great influence on her only son, and had
lived long enough to see some of his great successes. Now she was gone. The
news of both deaths reached Caesar by letter. There is no evidence that he
had seen either his mother or daughter in the four years since he had left
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Rome. These were bitter personal blows, most especially the loss of his child.
Cicero wrote an earnest letter of condolence to Caesar – he was devoted,
perhaps excessively so, to his own daughter Tullia and heartbroken when
she also died some years later. There was genuine grief and emotion and not
mere political bonding on such occasions. Pompey, too, was deeply sorrowful
at the death of his young wife. The couple had been very much in love in
spite of the great difference in age and the political inspiration of their union.
In recent years Pompey had often been criticised for spending too much time
with his wife on his grand estates, enjoying himself when he ought to have
been attending to the Republic’s affairs. Plutarch claims that he had not even
had any affairs while married to Julia.2
For all the real emotion of father and son-in-law at Julia’s death, the
concerns of public life were never far away for a senator. Pompey arranged
to have her ashes interred in a tomb on one of his Alban estates near Rome,
but after her public funeral in the city the great crowd of onlookers carried
her remains onto the Campus Martius and buried her there. They were said
to have been moved more by sympathy for Julia than particular fondness
for either Caesar or Pompey, but as ever it is difficult to know whether this
was genuinely spontaneous or orchestrated. A monument was subsequently
erected and remained visible for centuries. Caesar announced that he would
stage funeral games for her, although it would be a decade before these
actually took place. Julia’s death removed the closest bond between Pompey
and Caesar. Over subsequent months Caesar searched around for another
female relative to renew the marriage alliance. He proposed that Pompey
should marry his great niece Octavia, while he should in turn marry Pompey’s
daughter Pompeia. This would have required Caesar, Octavia and Pompeia
all to divorce their current spouses – Pompey’s daughter was married to
Sulla’s son Faustus. Pompey turned the idea down, and showed no inclination
to marry again for some time, perhaps because he wished to wait for a more
advantageous situation. Political concerns were never wholly absent from the
mind of a Roman senator, but it is quite possible that emotion also played
a part in his decision. His love for Julia had been deep, and Pompey’s grief
was real and powerful.
Although the bond between Pompey and Caesar was weakened it was
certainly not broken, and both men for the moment realised that it was to
their advantage to remain in alliance. By 54 BC all three triumvirs were
proconsuls and so unable to enter Rome itself without laying down their
office. During their consulship in 55 BC Pompey and Crassus had arranged
for the tribune Trebonius to pass a bill granting them each a five-year
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Rebellion, Disaster and Vengeance
command in enlarged provinces much like the one Caesar had received in
59 BC. Pompey was given charge of the two Spanish provinces. There was the
prospect for a campaign there, taking Roman rule right up to the north and
the Atlantic coasts, but the fifty-one-year-old Pompey had no desire for a
return to campaigning, especially while Julia was alive. He had already
triumphed three times and believed that no other commander could hope to
match his glory. Therefore he sent legates to govern the provinces and lead
the legions there, while he himself remained in Italy, usually hovering just
outside Rome in one of his comfortable villas. Pompey was still in charge of
the grain supply, and this provided an excuse for his unorthodox conduct,
for no Roman governor had ever acted in this way before.3
Crassus was in a different position. He had fought well for Sulla, but
believed that he had not received full credit for his deeds. The defeat of
Spartacus had been a major operation, during which he had shown his
competence as a commander after a string of humiliating Roman defeats.
Yet once it was over it was all too easy to forget the danger and dismiss the
campaign as just fought against slaves. By 55 BC Crassus had decided that
he wanted a major command in a foreign war and was allocated Syria. The
current governor of that province completed a campaign in Egypt before
Crassus could replace him, robbing him of one obvious chance for glory
and profit. Instead he planned to conquer Parthia, the great kingdom lying
beyond Armenia. Even by Roman standards, there was no good pretext for
attacking the Parthians. Pompey in his eastern campaigns and Caesar in
Gaul had pushed to the very limit their interpretation of what was in Rome’s
interests, but they had never quite gone beyond that to fight wars from purely
personal motives. With Crassus it was blatantly obvious that his own
ambition had little to do with the needs of the Republic. As word spread of
his plans there were public protests from two of the tribunes. One went so
far as to shadow Crassus’ entourage as he left the city in November 55 BC,
calling down terrible curses on his name for involving the Republic in a
needless and unjust war. As Cicero dryly remarked, it was not an impressive
beginning, and there was much that was incongruous about the expedition.
Crassus was in his late fifties, which was very elderly for a Roman field
commander, and had not been on active service for sixteen years. In the past
elderly men had been recalled to serve the Republic as generals, but normally
only at times of crisis. This time there was no dire threat to Rome, and
Crassus’ conduct of the war seemed slow and uninspired. He spent most of
54 BC in Syria, levying taxes ostensibly to fund the planned invasion, but
malicious tongues suggested that he was also lining his own pockets. The
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prospect of a lucrative campaign was clearly one of the main reasons why
Crassus had wanted a command. There was also an element of balance,
since if both Pompey and Caesar had provinces and legions to control then
the third triumvir needed a command to match them if he was not to be
placed at a severe disadvantage. Yet in most respects Crassus had already
achieved his main objectives in life – prominence, two consulships, a huge
fortune, massive influence and, as the Catilinarian debates had shown, virtual
freedom from political attacks or prosecution – and it is hard to avoid the
conclusion that rivalry with his political allies was his main reason for craving
a military command. He and Pompey had been jealous of each other since
they had both served Sulla, and Crassus had always resented the fame the
other man had won. Now Caesar too was proving himself to be a great
general, and Crassus, the oldest of the three triumvirs, does not seem to
have wanted to be overshadowed.4
With all three triumvirs away from Rome from 54 BC onwards, they were
all reliant to a great extent on agents acting on their behalf. They remained
dominant, but as in the past could not control everything. Lucius Domitius
Ahenobarbus made it to the consulship for 54 BC, and had Clodius’ eldest
brother Appius Claudius Pulcher as his colleague. At the same time Cato was
one of the praetors. Both consuls complained that they were unable to make
appointments even to such junior ranks as that of military tribune. Between
them the triumvirs commanded over twenty legions, the overwhelming
majority of the Roman army in existence at that time. Appius even travelled
north to visit Caesar in Cisalpine Gaul in order to secure a tribune’s
commission for one of his clients. Pompey hovered close to Rome, and
probably had little cause to miss regularly attending the Senate for he had
never been a particularly gifted speaker. Crassus was less of a force when he
was away from the city, since he was no longer able to keep himself in the
public eye and do favours by appearing as an advocate. Caesar was already
used to the problems of maintaining his interests in Rome while he was away
from Italy. His agents, particularly Balbus, were active, and we get some
glimpse of the flood of correspondence that went back and forth between
Caesar’s headquarters and the leading men of Rome from Cicero’s letters.
His brother Quintus had served as one of Pompey’s legates supervising the
grain supply to Rome, and then went to Gaul as one of Caesar’s legates in
54 BC. This was a mark of the goodwill that his brother owed to both men
for his recall. Cicero himself was reluctant to leave Rome, and was anyway
more useful to the triumvirs there, and so Quintus was obliged to undertake
this service for the good of the family. In his letters to his brother Cicero
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makes constant inquiries about Caesar’s mood, and signs of favour towards
them. He mentions sending poetry and other literary compositions to Caesar
for his opinion. Much of this communication was not overtly political, but
informally cemented the bonds between them. We know that Caesar wrote
at least three letters to Cicero in Rome during the course of the second
expedition to Britain.5
Several letters have also survived written by Cicero to one of his clients,
Caius Trebatius Testa, who had been given a post on Caesar’s staff at the
orator’s request. The young man would later become a famous jurist and was
already committed to pursuing a career in law. We have the original letter
of recommendation sent to Caesar, which brought the appointment about.
The orator later told Quintus how Caesar ‘expressed his thanks to me very
politely and wittily. He says that in all his huge staff there was no one able
to put together properly even a form of recognizance’. Trebatius was not
given a military post – although Cicero did secure a commission as military
tribune for another client – and was employed on administrative and legal
duties. Even so, Trebatius was for a long time unenthusiastic about his new
post and missed Rome intensely. By August 54 BC Cicero was writing to tell
him that he had just heard from Caesar, who had written to him ‘very
politely’ to say that he had not yet had much chance to get to know Trebatius,
but assuring him that he would do so. Cicero informed his young client that
he had spoken to the proconsul on his behalf asking for further favours. In
this and other letters he expresses more than a little exasperation at the
impatience and lack of initiative he perceived in his client. A man’s own
prestige was weakened if his recommendations proved inadequate, and
although Caesar was probably willing to accept anyone so long as it
strengthened the obligation that Cicero felt towards him, the orator was
keen to play his part in the relationship. What is most striking is that both
men were in contact and discussing the normal preoccupations of Roman
senators even while Caesar was engaged in active campaigning. Most of the
letters between Cicero and Caesar have failed to survive even though they
were published. We can safely assume that Caesar was engaged in equally
copious correspondence with many other senators.6
Rebellion
Although Caesar never neglected his political concerns, in the coming months
he was to have little break from active service. On his return from Britain he
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had called the leaders of the Gaulish tribes to a meeting and then supervised
the movement of his army into winter quarters. The harvest had been poor,
and Caesar blamed this on an unusually dry summer, but it seems likely
that the campaigns he had fought in the last years had also disrupted the
agriculture of many regions. As a result his eight legions would camp
separately and were dispersed over a very wide area. Most were amongst
the Belgic tribes whose commitment to the new alliances with Rome
remained uncertain. In other years he had set out for Cisalpine Gaul very
quickly, but this time Caesar waited longer than usual, wanting to make
sure that the army was securely placed before he left. Each legion was placed
under the command of either a legate or his quaestor, who in this year was
Crassus’ eldest son Marcus. One of the new legates was the same Trebonius
who as tribune in 55 BC had secured five-year commands for Pompey and
Crassus and a similar extension for Caesar (see p.263). Each of these officers
was instructed to send a report as soon as they were in position and their
camp suitably fortifed. We know that Quintus Cicero was allowed to choose
the exact location of his legion’s camp, and it may well be that other legates
were given similar freedom of action. While this was underway, Caesar
became aware of unrest in a number of tribes. The king he had imposed on
the Carnutes was killed by other chieftains, prompting him to change his
dispositions and move one legion from amongst the Belgae to winter amongst
this tribe.7
Some chieftains had benefited from Caesar’s arrival in Gaul, but for others
it had meant seeing their rivals elevated. The summary killing of Dumnorix
when he became inconvenient had shown such men that Caesar needed little
provocation to dispose of anyone who did not behave as he wished. Yet
Roman domination did not end the fierce competition for power between the
aristocrats of a tribe, and if they were not doing well under Caesar, then
successfully opposing him offered a path to fame and power. Before leaving
for Britain in the summer of 54 BC, the proconsul had intervened in a dispute
between rival leaders of the Treveri. The man who lost out to an opponent
with Roman backing was Indutiomarus. At the time he had made his peace
with Caesar, going to his camp and handing over 200 hostages. During the
winter he saw an opportunity to strike at the Romans while their army was
dispersed and vulnerable. Indutiomarus planned to raise all the Treveri who
were loyal to him and attack the legion commanded by Labienus, which was
camped on tribal lands. Yet he knew that the Treveri on their own could not
defeat Caesar, and had spent time encouraging chieftains of neighbouring
tribes who similarly resented Roman dominance to join him in the rebellion.
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This was not a well co-ordinated revolt directed by a single leader, but a
series of separate outbreaks occurring at roughly the same time and feeding
off each other by dividing the Roman forces. It began not with the Treveri
and Indutiomarus, but amongst the Eburones, who lived in what is now the
Ardennes. The tribe appointed two war-leaders, Ambiorix and Catuvolcus,
who then proceeded to inflict on Caesar’s army one of the only three serious
defeats it ever suffered.8
Fifteen cohorts were quartered amongst the Eburones at a place called
Atuatuca (perhaps somewhere near modern Liège or Tongres, but its precise
location is unknown). The force included the entire Fourteenth Legion, but
it is not clear whether the remaining five cohorts were detached from other
legions or independent units – Caesar was to raise at least twenty cohorts
in Transalpine Gaul, where the recruits did not even have Latin status like
those from the Transalpine province. Caesar mentions that some Spanish
cavalry were with the legionaries, and there may have been other auxiliaries
as well, so that the force probably numbered between 6,000 to 8,000 men.
It was commanded by two of Caesar’s legates, Cotta and Sabinus, both of
whom had held independent commands in the past and proved reasonably
competent, if uninspired. They had also worked together against the Menapii
in 55 BC. Caesar does not say whether one of the men held overall authority,
but his narrative implies that they were jointly in command. The first attack
on their camp was repulsed without difficulty, but then Ambiorix came
forward to parley and claimed to have been forced to go to war by his people.
He told the Roman representatives that there was a conspiracy throughout
Gaul for each tribe to attack the legions on this set day. In honour of favours
he had received from Caesar in the past, he then offered to give the Romans
free passage to march and join either of the other two legions that were
camped within 50 miles. Late into the night, the legates argued over what
they should do. Sabinus wanted to accept the offer, while Cotta said that they
should not disobey Caesar’s orders but remain in the camp, where they had
plenty of food and could reasonably hope to hold out until relieved. In the
end Sabinus prevailed, and at dawn on the next day the Roman force marched
out. The Eburones knew the ground and were waiting in ambush where the
track passed through a ravine. The Romans were surrounded and gradually
whittled down. Cotta was wounded by a slingstone early on, but still kept
on encouraging the men and trying to organise resistance. Sabinus despaired
and was surrounded and killed while negotiating with Ambiorix. Cotta fell
when the final charge swept over the rough circle of men he had formed into
the last organised resistance. A handful of survivors straggled into the camp
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of Labienus over the coming days, but the fifteen cohorts had effectively
been wiped out.9
In the Commentaries Caesar places all the blame for the disaster on
Sabinus. Cotta is shown arguing sensibly and behaving as a Roman aristocrat
should during a crisis. Neither man came from an especially influential
family and therefore Caesar did not have to worry too much about upsetting
powerful interests in the Senate. He claims to have reconstructed events from
the stories of survivors and interrogation of prisoners captured in later
actions. There is nothing inherently implausible about the version given in
the Commentaries, which has similarities with other military disasters in
other periods – Elphinstone and Macnaughten at Kabul during the First
Afghan War spring to mind. It may genuinely have happened that way, but
the narrative was obviously intended to soften the impact of the disaster
and distance Caesar himself from blame. The account is very detailed,
describing the debate between the commanders, and the confusion in the
column when the ambush was sprung. Apart from Cotta’s stirring but futile
efforts to hold the men together, there are heroic cameos, such as the
centurion who died trying to rescue his son, or the eagle-bearer – this time
named, unlike the hero of the landing in Britain – who threw his standard
to safety before he was killed himself. (The eagle was presumably captured
anyway when the last survivors who had taken refuge inside the camp all
committed suicide during the night.) Caesar tried to shift the blame onto his
legate, but few if any of his contemporaries were fooled and all our sources
see this as his defeat. As the proconsul with imperium, he was responsible
for the entire army under his command – hence the conventional opening
for any letter from a Roman governor to the Senate, ‘I am well, and so is the
army.’ Both Sabinus and Cotta were his legates or ‘representatives’, chosen
by him and acting under his orders. If they held joint command then it was
Caesar’s fault for permitting such an untidy situation to exist. Napoleon
was later to comment that it was better to have one bad commander than
two good ones with shared authority. Sabinus may have been disobeying
Caesar’s orders when he chose to march out of his camp, but even this
suggests that the proconsul had either not made his intentions sufficiently
clear or had failed to accustom his legates to strict obedience. Ultimately
Caesar was responsible, and even if the mistakes had been made by his
subordinates, the defeat was still his. A substantial part of his army had
been destroyed by one of the least prestigious tribes of Gaul. It was the first
time that such a thing had happened, and it challenged the illusion of Roman
invincibility created by his constant success up to this point.10
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The first sign of this came when Ambiorix and his retainers rode into
the lands of their neighbours the Atuatuci, and then on to the lands of the
Nervii. The vast majority of the Eburones had dispersed, carrying back
their plunder to their homes in the manner of so many tribal or irregular
armies throughout history. Yet the story of their success was enough to rouse
the other tribes and persuaded the Nervii to strike against the legion
wintering in their lands. This was commanded by Quintus Cicero, serving
as a legate simply to confirm good relations between his brother and Caesar.
Quintus did what was necessary for his family, but he was not the most
enthusiastic of soldiers. In his letters home he complained of the rigours of
life on campaign, and his mind does not seem to have been focused entirely
on his duties. In the autumn of 54 BC, while moving his legion into its winter
camp, he informed his brother that he had composed four tragedies in just
sixteen days. However, when the Nervii suddenly attacked his camp, Quintus
Cicero responded well. The Romans had no warning, for they had not yet
received any word of the disaster, but although surprised they repulsed the
first attack. The Nervii, backed by allied clans and numbers of Atuatuci
and some Eburones, then settled down to besiege the camp. Overnight
Cicero’s men built 120 small turrets to strengthen the ramparts of their camp
– the material for these had already been gathered into the camp, but
evidently the fortifications were not yet completed. Now the work continued
at a furious pace. A second all-out attack was repulsed on the following day.
Whatever his personal inclinations and abilities, Quintus Cicero behaved
as a Roman senator should, encouraging the men by day as they fought,
and supervising them each night as they laboured to strengthen the defences
further and to produce fresh supplies of missiles. His health was poor and
eventually he was persuaded to retire to his tent by the soldiers. It is tempting
to think that Cicero’s officers were the real heart of the defence, and that at
times he may have almost got in the way. Caesar wanted good relations with
Quintus and especially with his older brother, and this ensured that he would
be portrayed favourably in the Commentaries. Yet even if his skill and
experience were limited, Quintus Cicero showed real courage, and did all that
he could, coldly rejecting the offer of a truce to permit his men to march away
to safety. The siege continued, the Belgians surrounding the fort with a ditch
and wall, and constructing mantlets and other siege devices. Just a few years
before such things had been unknown in Gaul, but the tribes had watched
Caesar’s men in action and learned from them. The Roman garrison was
slowly worn down, many men being wounded, which meant that those who
were fit had to shoulder more of the burden. They were heavily outnumbered
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– Caesar reports that the Nervii had 60,000 men, quietly forgetting his claim
of the massive casualties they had suffered in 57 BC – and must eventually
have been overwhelmed if they were not relieved.11
Quintus Cicero had sent messengers to Caesar as soon as he had been
attacked, but none of these men had been able to get through the Belgian
lines. Several were brought back to within sight of the walls and executed
in full view of the legionaries. The siege had lasted for more than a week
before a man was able to get through. The messenger was a Gaul, a slave of
a Gallic nobleman who had remained loyal to the Romans and had stayed
with Cicero. The news reached Caesar in his camp at Samarobriva (modern
Amiens) late in the evening. As well as reporting his own situation, Cicero’s
dispatch gave Caesar the first inkling of the destruction of Sabinus’ and
Cotta’s men. Up to this point he had been completely oblivious of the
rebellion, an indication of just how much his intelligence was reliant on
friendly noblemen amongst the tribes. It was a dreadful shock, but Caesar
realised that he must act swiftly. Quintus Cicero’s garrison needed to be
relieved as soon as possible if it was not to fall. A second victory would add
even more momentum to the rebellion, encouraging more and more leaders
and tribes to join. With him at Samarobriva he had only a single legion,
guarding the main baggage train of the army with its records and pay chest,
and also supplies of grain brought in from all over Gaul, as well as the
hundreds of hostages he had taken since 58 BC. Cicero’s client Trebatius was
there along with many other administrative officials and clerks. Caesar could
not move quickly with all these non-combatants and impedimenta, but
neither could he leave them unprotected. Therefore his first order was to
his quaestor, Marcus Crassus, who was camped with his legion no more
than 25 Roman miles away. Crassus was ordered to march with all haste to
Samarobriva, leaving his camp at midnight. This probably meant that he
sent off his standing pickets first, the rest of the legion following as soon as
it was ready to march. By mid morning on the next day the leading patrols
of Crassus’ legion – probably mounted men – reached Caesar and informed
him that the main force was not far behind.12
Leaving his quaestor to guard Samarobriva and its precious contents,
Caesar himself set out, covering 20 miles in that first day. He had managed
to scrape together 400 auxiliary and allied cavalry to add to his one legion,
and hoped to be joined by two more legions on the march. A messenger had
gone to Caius Fabius, who was amongst the Morini, instructing him to
march through the lands of the Atrebates to rendezvous with Caesar as he
went through the same region. Another order was sent to Labienus, telling
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him to try to join the main force on the borders of the Nervii, but granting
him considerable discretion to stay where he was if the local situation
required it. Fabius was a little late, but still managed to join him. Labienus
sent a despatch rider to report that he was unable to move, because the
Treveri had gathered an army and were now camped just 3 miles from his
position. He also confirmed the fate of Sabinus and Cotta, giving some of
the details provided by the survivors who had reached him. Caesar concurred
with his senior legate’s reasoning, but was left with just two legions, both
of which had been on campaign for some time and were markedly under
strength. Even with his cavalry, he had little more than 7,000 men, but there
was no prospect of gaining further reinforcements for a number of weeks.
If he waited, then Cicero’s camp might well fall and another legion be lost,
a success that was bound to fuel the rebellion. He had marched with only
light baggage and minimal supplies of food. It was well into the autumn
and his men could not expect to find much food or fodder in the lands they
passed through. The Romans needed to win quickly and could not afford a
cautious, long drawn-out campaign of manoeuvre. Caesar pushed on to
rescue the beleaguered garrison. The decision made strategic sense, and
conformed to Roman military thinking, which always emphasised aggression,
but it was certainly risky. Yet there was another, more personal motive that
meant that Caesar had to keep going. His legionaries were in danger, and
the trust that had grown up between army and commander was based at its
most fundamental level on each keeping faith with the other. Caesar could
not leave his men to die if there was any chance of saving them. He had
already shown the depth of his feeling for the loss of the fifteen cohorts by
swearing an oath not to shave or cut his hair until he had avenged them.
This was a particularly significant gesture for the ever fastidious Caesar.
Unshaven, the proconsul force marched his 7,000 men onwards.13
Patrols had brought in prisoners who confirmed that Cicero’s men were
still holding out. A Gallic cavalryman was persuaded to take a message
through the lines. It was written in Greek characters, which it was believed
the Belgians would not be able to read. Unable to get into the camp, he did
as instructed and tied it to a spear, which he then hurled into the camp. For
two days no one noticed the unusual attachment on the spear stuck into the
side of one of the towers, before someone spotted it and took it to Cicero.
The legate paraded his men and read out the contents, which informed them
that Caesar was on the way. Confirmation came when they sighted columns
of smoke rising in the distance – a sign that a Roman force was advancing,
setting fire to ‘enemy’ farms and villages along its route in the normal way.
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Belgian patrols reported the same thing, and the besieging army abandoned
the siege to meet this new threat. Even if they did not have the 60,000 men
reported by Caesar, they probably still outnumbered his small column by a
big margin. Cicero, calling on the same Gaulish aristocrat as before to
provide a man willing to slip through the enemy lines, wrote to Caesar
informing him that the Belgic army was moving against him. The Gaul
arrived in Caesar’s camp at midnight, and the proconsul immediately told
his men of its contents – Suetonius claims that he usually broke any bad
news to them himself, telling the soldiers in a matter of fact way and so
confidently that it showed they need not be worried. Sometimes he even
exaggerated the danger. For all this he remained a careful commander. Up
until now he had begun his marches before the night was over, but on the next
day he waited until dawn before moving his column 4 miles. In this season
the days in northern Europe are short. The Nervii and their allies were
waiting for them on a ridge behind the line of a stream. Twice in 57 BC the
Belgians had adopted a similar position, and it is quite possible that in each
case they occupied sites on main routes into their land, which were often used
in inter-tribal warfare.14
Caesar was heavily outnumbered and did not have enough food to engage
in protracted manoeuvring. Attacking over a stream and uphill against the
waiting enemy would have placed his men at a severe disadvantage and
probably resulted in disaster. Therefore he needed to persuade the Belgians
to give up their position and come and attack him. To this end he made his
camp deliberately smaller even than was normal for a small force without
baggage, making the streets that intersected the various units’ tent-lines
narrower than usual. He wanted the Nervii to despise his army, hoping to
persuade them to attack him, but in case this did not work he sent out patrols
to look for other routes across the stream, wondering whether he could
outflank the enemy position. During the day the two armies stared at each
other from opposite sides of the valley, and only the cavalry went forward to
skirmish. At dawn on the next day the same thing happened, but Caesar
ordered his auxiliaries to give way before the enemy. The Nervii had few
horsemen and these did not have a good reputation, so it was doubtless
especially encouraging when these chased Caesar’s cavalry back to their camp.
To add to the impression of fear, the Romans made the ramparts of this
higher than usual, and blocked up each of the four gateways with a wall
consisting of a single row of cut turf. The Nervii took the bait and came
across the stream to the Roman side of the valley. Warily, they edged closer
and closer to the enemy camp, lured on by deliberate displays of panic. The
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legionaries even abandoned the walls as if terrified of the approaching
warriors. The Belgians sent forward heralds, proclaiming that any of Caesar’s
men who wished to desert could freely do so, but any that failed to come
across by a set hour would be shown no mercy. After a while the Nervii came
up to the ramparts, and some began to tear down the turf walls blocking the
gates. Only then did Caesar order an attack. The column of troops that had
been waiting behind each gateway now charged, easily pushing down the
flimsy barrier. The Nervii panicked and fled, pursued by the legionaries and
the cavalry that Caesar ordered out in support. Some were killed, others
abandoned weapons and shields as they fled, but he recalled his men before
very long, fearing that they might suffer if they followed the enemy too far
and were ambushed in the nearby woods and marshes.15
With the enemy army dispersed, Caesar pressed on to relieve Cicero. He
took care to praise his legate, and separately inspected and commended the
officers and men of the garrison. Only one-tenth had escaped being wounded
during the siege, although it seems likely that many of the injured were fit
enough to perform duty. On the following day there was another parade,
and this time the proconsul spoke of the defeat of Cotta and Sabinus, making
the latter the scapegoat and encouraging the troops for the future. When
news of the Roman victory reached the Treveri, their army withdrew from
its position facing Labienus’ camp. Caesar sent Fabius and his legion back
to their camp amongst the Morini, and led Cicero and his own legion back
to Samarobriva. He kept both of these units and Crassus’ legion near the
town throughout the winter to give himself a concentrated striking force in
case of further rebellions. The proconsul stayed with them, the first time
that he had not gone south of the Alps for this season. The situation in Gaul
was simply too tense for him to leave. It is also likely that this was the
only year when a book of Commentaries on the last campaign was not
published. Most probably books five and six came out together in the winter
of 53–52 BC. Caesar was simply too busy, and until he had stamped out all
the embers of rebellion then it was doubtful that he wanted to send a
narrative of an uncompleted conflict. The news had already reached Rome
of hard fighting in Gaul by December 54 BC, when Cicero would write to
Trebatius that he had heard that they had been having a ‘hot time of it’
lately.16 Throughout the winter Caesar kept a close eye on the tribes: ‘Now
when they heard of Sabinus’ death and defeat, nearly all the Gaulish tribes
started to take thought of war, sending off ambassadors and delegations
to every region to discover what the rest thought and where the war would
begin, holding night-time meetings in remote spots.’17
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In Amorica (roughly equivalent to modern Brittany) a force of tribesmen
gathered near the camp of Lucius Roscius and the Thirteenth Legion, but
subsequently dispersed. Another of Caesar’s appointees, Cavarinus the king
of the Senones, was attacked by his chieftains and only narrowly escaped with
his life and made his way to Caesar at Samarobriva. The only real fighting
of the remainder of the winter was done by Labienus. Indutiomarus had
tried and failed to raise German allies but, nevertheless, once again brought
an army of his fellow tribesmen against Labienus’ camp. For days the Treveri
formed up in battle order in the plain outside and challenged the Romans
to battle. Labienus repeatedly declined, but then one day as the Treveri once
again dispersed to go back to their own camp, he sent his allied cavalry out
against them. The men were ordered to kill Indutiomarus and ignore everyone
else. He was caught and his head brought back to the Legate. Without their
leader, the warriors dispersed again.18
Vastatio – Punishing the Tribes
Over the winter Caesar took care not simply to make good his losses, but to
raise double the number of new troops so that the Gauls would come to
believe that Roman resources of manpower were inexhaustible. Three new
legions were recruited in Cisalpine Gaul, a new Fourteenth to replace the
massacred unit, the Fifteenth and the First. Although raised in Caesar’s
province, the last of these had actually been intended to form part of Pompey’s
army in Spain and had taken an oath to him, hence its number came from
another sequence. Not planning major campaigns of his own, Pompey agreed
to ‘loan’ the new legion to Caesar ‘for the good of the Republic and out of
personal friendship’. Caesar now had ten legions, but the tribes in rebellion
were also gathering their strength. Ambiorix was playing a key role in
encouraging them, and had made formal alliance with the Treveri. In addition
the Nervii, Atuatuci and Menapii were all in open war with Rome, while
other tribes like the Senones and Carnutes had rejected leaders favourable to
Caesar and were refusing to come in answer to his calls to council. Caesar
decided that he must begin operations before the normal start of the
campaigning season at the beginning of spring. He wanted to regain the
initiative, which inevitably at the beginning of a revolt lay with the rebels. The
Roman army would attack and would show that Rome was still strong in
spite of a defeat, and that the consequences of opposing it were appalling.
The tribes had no single leader, no capital and looked unlikely even to mass
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into a single field army. Nor would the defeat of one necessarily cause others
to capitulate, and each had to be defeated in turn. Lacking these clear targets,
Caesar would instead attack the homes and farms of the warriors. Houses
would be burned, crops and herds consumed or destroyed, and people killed
or enslaved. The Romans had a word for this activity, vastatio, which is the
root of the word devastation, and even a verb vastare for the process. It was
brutal in the extreme, but could be effective, terrifying the enemy into
admitting defeat and coming to terms. Throughout history occupying forces
have often turned to similar methods, but few have surpassed Caesar’s legions
in their ruthlessly efficient application.19
Before the winter was over Caesar concentrated four legions – presumably
somewhere near Samarobriva – and attacked the Nervii. It always took time
to muster a tribal army and the Nervii had little chance either to defend
themselves or to flee. The surprise was all the greater because no large Gallic
army could have operated at this season – in 57 BC the great Belgic army
had even been forced to disperse when it ran out of food in the summer
months. Only the organised supply system supporting the Roman army
made this possible. Caesar’s column captured large numbers of people,
rounded up their herds and flocks, and torched the villages. Faced with this
onslaught the Nervii quickly capitulated and supplied the Romans with
hostages. Caesar withdrew his army, and sent messages to the tribes
summoning them to a council at the beginning of spring. Once again the
Senones and Carnutes failed to attend, as did the Treveri, who were now
led by some of Indutiomarus’ family. The council was to be held for the first
time at Lutetia on the Seine, the main town of the Parisii, the people whose
name is preserved in that of the modern capital of France. Before the council
convened, Caesar took his legions against the Senones. Surprised before
they could take refuge inside the walls of their town the tribe swiftly
submitted. The Aedui spoke on their behalf and Caesar treated them
relatively leniently. Partly this was because of his desire to show respect to
Rome’s old ally, but also because he wanted to get on with operations against
the other rebellious tribes. One hundred hostages were handed over to his
camp, but there was no mass enslavement of the population. Realising that
they were most likely next on Caesar’s list, soon afterwards the Carnutes sent
envoys to him, accompanied by representatives from the Remi. The proconsul
was again willing to accept their surrender. As was his usual practice, at the
council he requested contingents of cavalry from the tribes. Privately he
resolved to keep those supplied by the Senones with him, so that he could
keep an eye on their commander, the chieftain Cavarinus.20
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Central Gaul was now ‘pacified’ and the proconsul turned his attention
to the north-east. Ambiorix was the most influential and charismatic of the
leaders opposing him, but Caesar judged that he was unlikely to risk open
battle. Therefore he decided to strip him of real or potential allies in the
region. The army’s baggage and supply train was sent to Labienus with an
escort of two legions. Caesar himself took five legions with minimal stocks
of food and heavy equipment and led them against the Menapii – at this
point only one of the three new legions seems to have reached the main
army. As usual, the Menapii avoided contact and relied on the inaccessibility
of the forests and marshes of their land for protection. This time, however,
the Romans were prepared. Caesar divided his force into three independent
columns, each of which began clearing a route into tribal territory,
constructing bridges and causeways as necessary. Such was the engineering
skill of the legions that there were few places where they could not go if
they were led with determination. Dismayed to realise that they were not as
safe as they had believed, and seeing the smoke rising from their burning
villages, the Menapii sent in envoys and surrendered. The main army moved
on, leaving the Atrebatian chieftain Commius and his retinue of warriors
behind to ensure that the Menapii did not repent of their decision. While this
operation was underway, the Treveri had moved against Labienus. Showing
all his accustomed skill, the latter had lured them into a bad position and
then turned on them, allegedly telling his men to ‘show the same courage they
had often displayed for their general’. His three legions – his own legion
having been reinforced by the two escorting the baggage just before the
engagement – cut the Treveri to pieces. After this defeat the hostile chieftains
fled across the Rhine, and power within the tribe was restored to Caesar’s
candidate Cingetorix.21
Indutiomarus and Ambiorix had both sought allies from the German
tribes on the east bank of the Rhine. Neither had enjoyed much success, for
according to Caesar the Germans were still intimidated by the fate of
Ariovistus and the Usipetes and Tencteri, and only a few bands of warriors
had come to their aid. Even so the proconsul now decided to cross the Rhine
for a second time, both to deter the tribes from offering even such modest
aid to his opponents in Gaul and to prevent Ambiorix from seeking refuge
on the far side of the river. The Roman army marched to the Rhine and
built a bridge only a short distance away from the one they had constructed
and then destroyed in 55 BC. Caesar did not bother to describe the design in
any detail, but noted that having performed the task once before, his
legionaries completed it very quickly. Bridging the Rhine in 55 BC had been
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an exciting foray into unexplored country, but now it was simply a matter
of routine. That was essentially the point of the operation, to make it
absolutely clear that the river was no barrier to the Romans and that Caesar
could attack the Germans in their homeland whenever he wanted. As on
the first occasion there was no actual fighting. The Ubii quickly sent envoys
telling Caesar that they had remained faithful to their alliance with Rome.
The Suebi withdrew into their heartland, and Caesar was informed by the
Ubii that they were massing their army to meet him if he invaded. He made
arrangements to ensure that he had sufficient supplies, ordered the Ubii to
hide their own food stores and herds so that the enemy could not try to
make use of them, and then advanced. When they learned of this, the Suebi
withdrew and decided to offer battle at a place much deeper within their
country. It may well be that the size of Caesar’s force had surprised them and
that more time was needed to mass sufficient warriors to oppose him. Caesar
decided not to march further away from the Rhine, claiming that it would
be difficult to supply his army since the Germans were essentially pastoralists
rather than farmers, making it difficult for him to live off the land.
Archaeology has shown that Caesar’s portrayal of the Germans is misleading,
for there was a long tradition of agriculture in the region. Nevertheless, it
may be that the population was less dense and the amount of wheat and
barley produced smaller in comparison with much of Gaul. Supporting his
army would probably have been possible, but certainly would have been
considerably more difficult in a region where he did not have numbers of
allies capable of providing for his needs from their own surplus. Meeting and
defeating the Suebi was not essential for Caesar. He had put on another
show of strength, and had made their army retreat from its first position.
Both sides had a wary respect for the other’s power and were unlikely to
attack each other, especially while both Caesar and the Suebi had closer and
weaker opponents to fight.22
Caesar exaggerated the importance of the Rhine as a boundary and the
differences between Gauls and Germans, but did so to justify a clear strategy.
For all his willingness since 58 BC to exploit opportunities for new conflicts,
he was not pursuing some dream of endless conquest in the manner of
Alexander the Great. He knew that he would only hold his command for a
limited time, and eagerly anticipated his eventual return to Rome with the
benefits his new-found glory and wealth would bring. Quite early on he
decided to focus his attention on Gaul and to bring the whole region under
Roman dominion. This was a task that he could reasonably hope to complete
– his first thought was probably within the initial five years of his command,
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but certainly when this was extended in 55 BC. Conquering Germany was too
big a project to add to this objective, and operations east of the Rhine were
always a distraction, if a necessary one, to winning in Gaul. He may well have
believed that he could manage to add Britain, or at least its south-eastern
corner, to Gaul, but his initial thinking on this subject was based on a very
vague concept of the island’s geography. After the second expedition, Caesar
never had the time, if indeed he still had the desire, to establish more
permanent control. Any plans for significant operations in Illyricum were
also abandoned as the years went by. Caesar concentrated on Gaul, and
everything else was subordinate to this in strategic terms. The River Rhine
offered a readily understandable boundary for an Italian audience, a
boundary beyond which no one must be allowed to challenge Roman
dominance of the new province of Gaul.23
After he returned to the west bank, Caesar broke down a wide section of
his bridge and left a garrison to protect it. It was now late summer and the
harvest was ripe, making it much easier for armies to rely on foraging. Caesar
now turned to the Eburones and Ambiorix whose heartland lay in the forests
of the Ardennes. The cavalry were sent ahead of the main army and ordered
to light no fires at night lest their position be revealed by the light itself, or
the reflection from clouds. Their sudden appearance surprised the enemy and
they were able to take many prisoners. These revealed the whereabouts of
Ambiorix, and the chieftain was nearly taken when the cavalry swooped
down on a village. Most of his possessions, horses and plunder were found
by the allied horsemen, but Ambiorix himself slipped away, and he and his
followers hid themselves in the densest woods of the area. Catuvolcus – the
man who had shared with him the glory of defeating Sabinus and Cotta –
felt himself too old to hide in this way and hanged himself from a yew tree.
(Caesar makes no comment, but it is tempting to see some element of ritual
in this suicide, perhaps a king killing himself after a failure to avert the harm
from his people.) Caesar moved the army to Atuatuca, the site of the disaster
in the previous winter. Around this time he was also joined by the remaining
two of the recently raised legions. He left his baggage there, protected by the
new Fourteenth Legion under the command of Quintus Cicero, and divided
the rest of his force into a number of flying columns to harass the enemy.
Caesar himself led three legions towards the River Scheldt, Labienus took
three more against the Menapii, and Trebonius with a force of equal size
moved against the Aduatuci. Speed was of the essence and the columns
marched with basic rations, for it was planned that all should return to
Atuatuca after a week. None of the forces met serious resistance, but
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stragglers or small groups who separated from them were often ambushed.
Caesar decided that his legionaries were too valuable to risk the steady drain
of casualties likely to come from continuing to ravage the land himself.
Instead he issued a decree throughout Gaul, granting permission for anyone
who chose to plunder the Eburones and their allies. Many warriors welcomed
the call, and there were soon many parties of Gauls enthusiastically
plundering the tribe.24
Before Caesar returned to Atuatuca, Cicero’s camp came under attack
from a band of Germans. These had originally crossed into Gaul to share
in the despoiling of the Eburones, but then decided that the Roman baggage
train was too tempting a target to miss. The attack was repulsed, but not
before a couple of cohorts caught outside the camp had been badly cut up.
In the Commentaries Cicero was lightly admonished for disobeying Caesar’s
orders and permitting troops to go too far outside the camp, but the criticism
is gentle in the extreme, since he did not desire to alienate either the legate
or his brother. It was an embarrassing reverse, especially since it occurred
so close to the site of the previous winter’s disaster, but still a minor one. For
the rest of the year Caesar continued to hunt Ambiorix, but never quite
caught up with him. It was a grim business, as more and more Gallic allies
arrived to share in the spoils:
Every village, every house that anyone could see was put to the torch;
captured cattle were everywhere rounded up; the wheat was not only
consumed by soldiers and animals, but squashed flat by the heavy rain
common at that time of year, so that if anybody managed to hide
themselves in the meantime, it seemed that they were bound to starve
once the army left.25
Caesar spent most of 53 BC on campaign, beginning before winter was
over and continuing into the early autumn, but did not fight a single battle.
The only significant action was fought and won in his absence by Labienus.
During the year the Romans had spread destruction and terror – mainly
terror, for the armies only destroyed what was in their path – over a wide
area. North-eastern Gaul suffered badly, and it is striking that there is a
huge drop in the quantities of gold and other precious metals found in sites
in this area after Caesar’s time in Gaul. Overall the archaeological record
shows a marked decline in the quality and quantity of material culture,
and suggests that the region did not recover for at least a generation. The
danger with such a policy of intimidation was that it sowed the seeds of
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future resentment, but Caesar decided that the memory of Sabinus’ defeat
could only be eradicated by extreme ruthlessness. It is not recorded at which
point he decided that his vow of vengeance for his lost soldiers was fulfilled
and he had his slaves shave him and cut his hair. At the end of the
campaigning season he withdrew the army and summoned the leaders of
Gaul to another council, this time at Durocortorum (modern Reims), one
of the chief towns of the Remi. Earlier in the year he had been content to
let the matter of the disturbances amongst the Senones and Carnutes pass.
Now he investigated the affair, and decided that the prominent Senonian
aristocrat Acco was the man behind the affair. Caesar resolved to impose
a harsher penalty than was ‘his normal custom’ and had Acco publicly
flogged and then executed. This action shocked the tribal leaders even more
than the killing of Dumnorix and was to have deep consequences. It may
have been a carefully considered decision on Caesar’s part, but it is also
likely that a desire to depart for Cisalpine Gaul made him especially
impatient. The fact that one of his own appointees had been killed and
another driven out by rivals also encouraged particular harshness, for Caesar
always stressed his loyalty to and care for his ‘friends’, whether Roman or
foreign. Whatever his thinking, Caesar gave the order, dividing his army
so that two legions wintered in a position to watch the Treveri, two more
observed the Lingones and the remaining six were concentrated near one
of the main towns of the Senones.26
After spending the last year and a half north of the Alps, there was
doubtless much that needed his attention in Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum.
It was probably during these months that he wrote and released books Five
and Six of the Commentaries on the Gallic War, covering 54 and 53 BC.
Book Five carefully presented the defeat of Cotta and Sabinus, not only
contrasting the behaviour of the two legates, but then following this with the
more inspiring tale of Quintus Cicero’s successful defence of his camp and
the heroism of his centurions and soldiers. Book Six included long digressions
discussing Gallic and Germanic culture, padding out an account of punitive
expeditions that involved little actual fighting and did not make the most
dramatic reading. Some of the details appear to have been lifted from existing
ethnographic works and it is tempting to see this as an indication of especially
rapid composition. He repeats a number of bizarre stories, for instance of
an animal called an elk, which lived deep in the forests of Germany and had
no knees so slept leaning against a tree. Hunters were supposed to catch
these animals by sawing almost completely through the trunk of a tree, so
that when the elk leaned on it to go sleep, tree and animal both fell over.
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The Greeks and Romans had great difficulty obtaining accurate information
about distant lands, but it is very hard to believe that a man as intelligent
and well educated as Caesar took such absurd tales seriously. It is very
tempting to see this as a rare note of humour in the otherwise calm reportage
of the Commentaries, but difficult to know whether or not his audience
would have recognised it as such.27
Much had happened since Caesar was last south of the Alps and the
public life of Rome had continued to be turbulent, but the most important
event for him had occurred far out on the eastern edge of the Roman world.
Late in 54 BC Crassus had been joined by his dashing son Publius and a
contingent of 1,000 cavalry he had brought with him from Gaul. Father and
son had then begun their long anticipated invasion of Parthia, although
little was achieved before the campaigning season was spent. In the spring
of 53 BC they resumed the offensive. With a force centred around seven
legions, they were confident, for in the past Lucullus and Pompey had
demonstrated how easy it was for the Romans to smash far larger Asian
armies. The Parthians were equally sure of themselves, again used to
beating their neighbours without difficulty, and it came as something of
a shock to both sides to realise that this new enemy was very different
from anything they had met before. In spite of their allied cavalry and
light infantry, the Roman army was still essentially an infantry force. In
contrast the Parthians relied on their two types of cavalry – the heavy
lance-wielding cataphracts where both horse and man was protected by
armour, and the fast-moving horse archers armed with powerful composite
bows. When the two sides clashed for the first time at Carrhae the cavalry
army proved superior, although not by as big a margin as is often claimed.
Publius Crassus was lured away from the main force and he and all his
men killed, but the battle ended in a tactical stalemate, neither side able
to break the other. The Romans had certainly suffered heavier casualties
and were a long way from home. Crassus had shown flashes of his old
military skill during the battle, but in the night after the battle his spirit
and that of his army broke. They retreated, something that was never
likely to be easy when the Romans were on foot and the Parthians mounted.
In the pursuit the Roman army was virtually destroyed. Crassus was killed
while negotiating with the enemy, and his head sent back to the Parthian
king. It was a humiliating disaster, which dwarfed in scale the loss of fifteen
cohorts in the Ardennes just a few months before. The first of the triumvirs
had gone, and the death of one of Rome’s richest and most influential
men inevitably caused a deep shift in the political balance in the Republic.
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By coincidence the Parthian campaign also brought fame to Crassus’
quaestor, who managed to lead a force of survivors back to Syria and
repulse Parthian raids on the province. His name was Caius Cassius
Longinus, and nine years later he would be one of the two leaders of
Caesar’s assassins.28
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XV
The Man and the Hour:
Vercingetorix and the
Great Revolt, 52 BC
‘The chieftains of Gaul called councils in remote spots deep in the forests
and bemoaned the death of Acco; they realised that the same fate could
well befall any of them; they pitied the common plight of Gaul; by pledges
and gifts they encouraged men to start the war and risk their own life in
the cause of the liberty of Gaul.’ – Caesar1
Successful imperial powers have always relied as much – or even more – on
diplomacy and political settlement as on military force. Armies could and
can smash formal opposition, and were and are capable of curbing guerrilla
warfare, although they may not be able to destroy it. Yet if military actions
were not to be constantly repeated, then a settlement needed to be reached
which was acceptable to enough of the occupied peoples, and in particular
those with power and influence. This principle was as true for men like
Wellesley in British India or Bugeard in French North Africa as it was for
Caesar in Gaul. All of them were gifted soldiers who won great battlefield
victories, but each realised that this was not enough without effective
diplomacy and competent administration. For senators, the intimate
connection between war and politics in the Roman Republic helped to
prepare them for this aspect of their role as a provincial governor. It was
also important that Roman expansion outside Italy was not a question of
eradicating the indigenous population and replacing them with Roman
colonists, or even of imposing a Roman elite who would exploit a subject
population. For all the massacres and mass enslavements that accompanied
Roman imperialism, the province of Gaul that Caesar created would be
lived in by the tribes who were there when he had arrived. In most day-today
affairs they would be ruled by leaders drawn from the existing aristocracy.
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A permanent conquest relied on persuading the tribes and their leaders that
it was more in their interest to accept Roman rule than to oppose it.2
From the beginning Caesar understood this and embedded his campaigns
firmly within a political context. His initial interventions in Gaul all came
in response to appeals from allied tribes. Invaders were expelled, but Gaulish
opponents were treated far less harshly than German enemies, and following
a defeat became Roman allies deserving of his protection. Caesar met with
the tribal leaders frequently – there was invariably at least one council every
year, and usually two or more. He paid close attention to the balance of
power within each tribe, and tried to gain some idea of the character and
inclinations of individual leaders. Certain men were favoured, strengthening
their position within the tribes to provide leaders who were indebted to
Caesar. One of these was Diviciacus, who virtually became the leader of
the Aedui for a few years, and was also able to place other tribes in his debt
by seeking favours for them from the proconsul. Commius, the man who
acted as Caesar’s envoy in Britain, was made king of his own tribe the
Atrebates and was also given overlordship of the Menapii. It would be wrong
simply to dismiss such men as mere quislings, no more than tools of the
Roman imperialists. Each had ambitions of his own. The arrival of Caesar’s
legions in Gaul could not be ignored. The alternative powers – the Helvetii,
Ariovistus and the German migrants – had all been driven out and could no
longer be used to counterbalance the Romans. Winning Caesar’s favour
offered chieftains great advantages, and as far as they were concerned they
were using him just as much as he was using them. The proconsul’s influence
was considerable, but he could not control the internal politics of the tribes,
as was shown by the rejection of the kings he had raised up amongst the
Senones and Carnutes. The Gaulish aristocracy was not changed in any
fundamental way by Caesar’s arrival and chieftains still competed for power.
Alliance with Rome brought advantages, but these were not necessarily
overwhelming, and there were other sources of prestige and wealth. The
position of king was a precarious one in most tribes, so that even if Caesar
elevated a man to the monarchy there was no certainty that he would be
able to remain there.3
Caesar’s understanding and manipulation of tribal politics was generally
good, but over the winter of 53–52 BC, his policy failed badly. There were a
number of reasons for this failure, but at its root was the growing sense of
the extent to which his presence had changed things. This was especially
true of the Celtic/Gallic peoples of central and southern Gaul, one of the
three broad groups into which the Commentaries divided ‘the whole of
316
Gaul’. These tribes had not yet fought against Caesar to any meaningful
degree, although it was in their lands that the campaigns against the Helvetii
and Ariovistus had been waged. Dominating the trade routes with the Roman
world, tribes like the Aedui, Sequani and Arverni were wealthier and more
politically sophisticated than the peoples to the north. They had aided
Caesar, and he in turn had favoured the tribes and leaders most sympathetic
to him and had fought – or so at least he claimed – on their behalf against
the Helvetii and Ariovistus. Now, over the course of the next year, virtually
all of them would turn against him. This was not simply a question of
rebellion by those who had not received the proconsul’s favour and had
watched as their rivals were elevated above them. The rebels eventually
included many chieftains who had done rather well under Roman dominion.
That was at the heart of this new mood, the realisation that Caesar and his
legions were in Gaul to stay, and would not be returning to the confines of
the Transalpine province after a few swift campaigns. Rome now expected
her power to be acknowledged on a permanent basis throughout Gaul. The
ally had become the conqueror without ever facing serious resistance from
the Celtic peoples.
Some of Caesar’s own actions had brutally exposed this new reality. The
summary killing of Dumnorix and the flogging and beheading of Acco –
probably especially humiliating because the head had a great importance in
Gallic religion – showed that the proconsul had no qualms about disposing
of leaders accused of plotting against him. It was shocking to see great
chieftains disposed of in this way, and suggested that no one was entirely safe.
With hindsight Caesar’s actions could be viewed as misjudged, but it is not
easy to see how either situation could have been handled more effectively.
Ultimately, the execution of Acco was the spark that ignited rebellion, but
the rising probably would have happened at some point. Throughout the
Commentaries Caesar openly acknowledged that many of his opponents
were fighting for their freedom, which Rome’s best interests required him to
take from them. A large part of the Gaulish aristocracy decided that
continued Roman domination would mean their losing more than they
would gain. The Romans spoke of peace as the product of victory, but peace
in a real sense was imposed on the tribes as a result of Caesar’s campaigns.
Yet warfare had long played a central role in Gaulish culture and society,
and chieftains were first and foremost war-leaders, whose power was shown
by the number of warriors in their retinue. Tribes were no longer as free to
fight each other and martial glory could now only be won fighting as allies
of the Roman army. Powerful chieftains knew that seizing kingship amongst
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their own people would invite swift retribution if the Roman governor did
not approve. It was also harder to create a network of friends, allies and
clients within the leadership of other tribes. The world had changed, and the
leaders of the tribes now found that they lacked full liberty to govern
themselves in the traditional way. Even if Caesar only occasionally interfered
in the tribes’ day-to-day affairs, it was still evident that he could. Political
liberty had been curbed by a supposed ally, and along with it had gone the
freedom to raid and behead your neighbours, or to seize power by force
within your own tribe. Chieftains were judged by the size of their retinues,
but such followings of warriors were hard to support without regular warfare
and raiding. Throughout Gaul resentment was widespread and during the
winter months there were secret meetings where rebellion was discussed and
planned. Many took place in the territory of the Carnutes, perhaps because
these contained cult sites sacred to all of Gaul. The leaders could not
exchange hostages to cement their new alliances, since this would probably
have come to the attention of the Romans. Instead they symbolically stacked
their standards together and took oaths.4
Growing resentment of the Roman presence in Gaul spurred the plotters
on, but they also sensed an opportunity. Caesar had gone south to Cisalpine
Gaul and they knew from experience that his legates were unlikely to act
aggressively until he returned in the spring. There was even the hope that he
would not be able to come back at all, for rumours spread of chaos at Rome.
The stories were not invented, for after Crassus and Pompey had left to take
up their commands the public life of the city had been turbulent. Bribery on
a scale that was staggering even by the standards of the Republic had been
uncovered in the consular elections for 53 BC, and after repeated disruptions
these had still not been held when the year began. Clodius was standing for
the praetorship for 52 BC, promising electoral reform that would benefit
freedmen, and many of these swelled the ranks of the gangs who used force
to back his campaign. Against them his old enemy Milo, who was seeking
the consulship himself, ranged his own band of thugs and gladiators, and
the ensuing violence made it impossible to hold elections once again, so
another year opened without consuls or senior magistrates to guide the
Republic. On 18 January 52 BC, the rival gangs encountered each other on
the Appian Way just outside Rome, and in the ensuing fighting Clodius was
killed. The next day his supporters carried his body into the Senate House,
built a pyre there and cremated him, burning the building down in the
process. Not for the first time there was talk of making Pompey dictator to
restore order by force. A levy of all male citizens of military age and living
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Vercingetorix and the Great Revolt, 52 bc
in Italy was also decreed in case emergency forces would be needed. Caesar
duly performed this in Cisalpine Gaul, and naturally watched events in
Rome with a keen interest. A chance remark from a letter written over two
years later, tells us that Cicero travelled up to Ravenna in the Cisalpine
province for a meeting with Caesar. The orator was doubtless not the only
visitor, and it may have been around this time that Caesar put forward his
proposals for renewing the marriage bond with Pompey. The Gauls were
wrong to believe that the troubles in Rome would prevent Caesar from
returning, but they were certainly right to guess that they would not be the
main focus of his attention during these months. If his legates in Gaul gained
any inkling of the planned rebellion, then they ignored or disbelieved the
reports. The outbreak came as a complete surprise to the Romans.5
The Carnutes had pledged themselves to launch the first strike. Two of
their chieftains led their warriors to the town of Cenabum (modern Orléans)
and massacred the Roman traders who were living there. Also killed was an
equestrian who had been given charge of the grain supply by Caesar. News
of the massacre spread rapidly, the Commentaries claiming that it was known
160 miles away by midnight. The next to take up arms was a young Arvernian
aristocrat named Vercingetorix. His father had for a while dominated much
of Gaul, but had been killed by the tribe when he tried to make himself their
king. Vercingetorix was known to Caesar and seems to have been one of
those young aristocrats whom the proconsul had tried to win over. Past
friendship was now set aside and he began raising an army, but was forcibly
expelled from the Arverni’s main town of Gergovia (probably a few miles
from modern Clermont) by his uncle and other leading men of the tribe. Not
disheartened, he recruited more men – Caesar says vagrants and outcasts,
but they may actually have been warriors who simply lacked a chieftain to
support them. With this new strength he returned, forced his opponents out
of Gergovia and was proclaimed king by his men. Virtually all the tribes to
the west as far as the Atlantic coast rapidly joined him, their chieftains
acknowledging him as their war-leader. From the beginning his attitude was
markedly different to most Gaulish commanders, and he tried to impose
discipline on his army and organise its supply. Caesar claims that
disobedience was punished by death or mutilation.6
Vercingetorix was soon ready to attack, targeting tribes allied to Rome.
While another chieftain took one force against the Remi, he led his main
army against the Bituriges, who lived to the north of his own people. The
Bituriges were dependants of the Aedui and immediately appealed to them
for protection. They in turn consulted Caesar’s legates, who advised the
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Aedui to send an army to help the Bituriges. It is striking that the Roman
officers did not themselves act, and suggests that they did not yet appreciate
the scale of the uprising. With the exception of Labienus, Caesar’s legates
appear to have been men of modest talent, and he did not encourage too
much initiative on their behalf. It was still winter, making operations difficult
– though not impossible, as Caesar had shown a year before. Revolts are at
their weakest when they begin, while many prospective recruits are waiting
to see whether or not it seems likely to succeed. Normally Roman
commanders tried to strike as soon as possible at the first sign of rebellion,
but in this case the reaction was half-hearted. The Aedui were similarly
tentative in their response. Their army reached the Loire, marking the border
between their own lands and the Bituriges. There they halted for a few days,
before withdrawing, claiming that their dependants were in league with
Vercingetorix and planned to attack them as soon as they crossed. Caesar
says that even after the rebellion he was not sure whether the leaders of the
Aeduan force actually believed this, or were already plotting treachery. After
they had retreated the Bituriges openly joined the rebellion.7
Perhaps by this stage Caesar’s officers were beginning to realise that
something big was occurring, and their report on this episode was enough
to convince him of the need to rejoin the army. The situation in Rome had
stabilised by this time, Pompey having been made sole consul rather than
dictator, and having brought troops into the city to restore order by force.
Caesar crossed the Alps to Transalpine Gaul. By this time more tribes had
joined Vercingetorix and the rebels – some willingly and others through
coercion. The revolt was gaining momentum. Tribes loyal to Rome or her
close allies were being systematically attacked, and most were switching
sides. Caesar was in one of the worst possible situations for any general,
separated from his army by hundreds of miles at a time when an enemy was
in the field against him. If he ordered the army to march to join him, then
it might encounter the enemy’s main force on the journey and have to fight
without him. That could mean defeat, or at best a victory where the credit
went to Labienus or one of the other legates. There were also great risks if
he went to the legions, since his escort would be small and with so many
tribes defecting to the rebels he would not know which chieftains could be
trusted. It is doubtful that he took long reaching his decision. For Caesar
danger to himself was preferable to risk to his army. Even after six years of
victories, he knew that one bad defeat would be all the ammunition needed
by his domestic enemies to destroy his reputation. He also knew that it
would be quicker for himself, his attendants and probably some staff, and
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Vercingetorix and the Great Revolt, 52 bc
his escort of 400 German cavalrymen, to hasten to the army than for the
legions to march to him. Yet before he could set out, there were threats to
the Transalpine province itself. A number of tribes living on the borders had
gone over to the rebels, and now a rebel force had invaded the province and
was moving against the colony of Narbo.8
Counter Attack
Caesar rushed to the town and organised its defence. There were no legions
in the province, but there were a number of locally raised cohorts as well as
drafts of new recruits he had brought from Cisalpine Gaul. He probably
also had cavalry from the tribes of the province. Some of these he stationed
in a defensive line to protect against attacks and soon forced the raiders to
withdraw, but he ordered the bulk to concentrate in the lands of one of the
Gaulish tribes living in the province, the Helvii. From there he led this
improvised and largely inexperienced force over the Pass of the Cevennes and
down to attack the Arverni. Surprise was complete, for it was still winter and
even the locals assumed that the road would be closed by snow. Caesar’s
men toiled to clear a path through 6 foot drifts, and then pushed on to reach
Arvernian territory. Once there Caesar sent his cavalry out in small
detachments, ordering them to range over a wide area, burning and killing.
The damage they inflicted was probably slight, but the attack gave the
impression of the beginning of an all-out invasion. Messengers went to
Vercingetorix who was camped with his main army about 100 miles north
amongst the Bituriges. The Gaulish leader started his army marching south
to reassure his own people. After two days of raiding the surrounding
country, Caesar left Decimus Junius Brutus in charge, telling him to continue
sending the cavalry on marauding expeditions. The proconsul announced
that he needed to return to the province to raise more levies and allied cavalry,
but that he would return in three days. He seems to have been confident
that this news would swiftly reach the enemy, for after recrossing the
mountains he rode quickly to Vienna (not the modern Austrian capital but
Vienne in the Rhône Valley). Earlier he had arranged for a force of cavalry
to be waiting there for him. Without halting even for one night, he took this
force on, riding hard through the lands of the Aedui, until he reached the two
legions wintering amongst the Lingones to the north. Once there he halted,
but sent despatch riders to the other legions and ordered them to concentrate
at Agedincum (probably near modern Sens). It had been a bold ride through
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potentially hostile territory. (Suetonius tells a story of Caesar disguising
himself as a Gaul to reach his army during a rebellion, which, if true, may
refer to this incident.) The commander and his army were reunited. Now it
was a question of seizing back the initiative.9
Vercingetorix had been wrong-footed by the raid over the Cevennes and
it had taken him several days to realise that this was only a feint. Then he
returned to his plan of moving against the tribes still loyal to Rome. He
came north again and attacked the Boii, who had accompanied the Helvetii
in 58 BC and been permitted to settle on their lands at the request of the
Aedui. The Gaulish army besieged one of their main towns at a place called
Gorgobina. It was still winter and it would be difficult to supply the legions
if they took the field, since there had been no time to prepare for operations
and to gather food and transport animals. Yet if Caesar delayed the Boii
might be forced to capitulate and join the rebellion. Vercingetorix would
then be free to attack other tribes and clans allied to the Aedui, demonstrating
to all that even the Aedui, the people closest to Rome, were unable to protect
their friends. If this happened, then there was little incentive for any tribe
to remain loyal to Rome. Rather than accept such a ‘shameful humiliation’,
Caesar sent envoys to the Boii telling them that he and the army were coming
to their relief. The Aedui were instructed to gather sufficient grain supplies
for the army’s need. Then, leaving two legions to guard his baggage train at
Agedincum, he led the remaining eight to help the Boii. Only weak cavalry
forces accompanied the column, for Caesar had not had a chance to raise
the usual levy of allied contingents from the tribes. The Romans also had
little food, which meant that they could not afford to remain in the field for
very long unless they were able to find a new source of supply. It was a
gamble, but it was better than sitting idly by and watching the revolt gain
strength and momentum. Inactivity would be seen as weakness, but putting
on a bold front and counter-attacking was likely to make wavering tribes and
chieftains pause, at least for the moment.10
After a day Caesar reached Vellaunodunum, one of the walled towns of
the Senones. The legions began to besiege the place and on the third day
the inhabitants surrendered, promising to hand over their weapons, 600
hostages and – most important of all for the army’s immediate needs – pack
animals. Moving on the Romans came swiftly to Cenabum, the place where
the rebellion had begun with the massacre of the Roman merchants. Caesar
reached it in only two days, surprising the townsfolk who had not yet finished
their preparations to resist a siege. It was late when the legions arrived, so
the proconsul decided to postpone his assault until the following morning.
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Yet he also ordered two legions to stand to arms during the night, in case the
townsfolk chose to flee across to the far bank of the Loire. The guess proved
correct, and at about midnight the Roman scouts reported that crowds of
people were heading from the town for the bridge over the river. There was
no significant resistance when he sent his two legions into the town, while
congestion at the bridge prevented many of the people from escaping
captivity. Caesar ordered the town to be sacked and then burned down, and
presumably had most of the prisoners sold as slaves. Then he crossed the
Loire and advanced against the Bituriges. The Romans had regained the
initiative, forcing Vercingetorix to respond to their actions and not vice
versa. The latter had already abandoned his attack on the Boii and hurried
back to protect the Bituriges. The Gaulish army arrived just as the Romans
were accepting the surrender of the town of Noviodunum, and prompted the
townsfolk to renew the fight, chasing out the centurions and small groups
of soldiers who had entered their walls. A cavalry combat took place in the
fields outside the town, and the Romans eventually won this when Caesar
threw in his band of 400 Germans. This minor success, as well as the fact
that the Romans were close outside their walls and the bulk of the Gaulish
army still some way away, prompted the people of Noviodunum to change
their minds for a second time, and they surrendered again, handing over the
men responsible for breaking the truce. Caesar resumed his advance, heading
for Avaricum (modern Bourges), one of the most important and certainly
the best defended town of the Bituriges. Having regained the initiative, it was
vital to keep it and give the enemy no chance to recover.11
From the beginning Vercingetorix was sceptical about his ability to defeat
the legions in battle, and the speed with which the Romans had taken three
towns had only confirmed his respect for their fighting power and siegecraft.
Instead he planned to shadow the enemy, ambushing small detachments but
not risking a massed encounter. He wanted to deprive the Romans of
supplies, and to do this he told his followers that they must be utterly ruthless:
‘. . . private possessions must be disregarded, villages and houses put to the
torch in all areas as far afield as the enemy foragers were likely to range
from their main route of march’.12 Even entire towns that could not be
protected from the enemy were to be destroyed, to prevent the legions from
capturing the food stores within them. The Bituriges set fire to twenty of the
main settlements in response to this order. Vercingetorix argued that terrible
though this was, the alternative was death for the warriors and enslavement
for their families. His strategy was considerably more sophisticated than
that employed by Caesar’s earlier opponents, and Vercingetorix must clearly
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have possessed considerable charisma and force of personality to persuade
his followers of the necessity of such uncompromising measures. It was
remarkable just how much the tribes were willing to sacrifice, but
unsurprising that they occasionally balked at the prospect. After pleas from
all the leaders of the Bituriges, Avaricum itself was not destroyed.
Vercingetorix grudgingly made an exception of the town, although he lacked
their conviction that its natural and man-made defences rendered it
impregnable.13
Avaricum was certainly a more daunting prospect than the towns taken
so easily in the past weeks. Surrounded by river or marshes on most sides
there was only one practical route for an assault, and it was next to impossible
to create a solid blockade. Caesar’s army camped at the foot of this slope
and began to build a ramp that would allow them to reach the wall. The
legionaries also made mantlets and sheds to shelter the workers as they got
nearer to the enemy, and two siege towers to climb the ramp when it was
finished. Caesar’s eight legions were most likely under strength, so that he
had perhaps 25,000–30,000 men, along with a few thousand auxiliaries and
many more slaves and camp followers. It was very difficult to feed such a force
while it was moving. When it settled down to besiege Avaricum the task
became almost impossible. Foraging was unproductive and dangerous, since
Vercingetorix was camped no more than 16 miles away and shadowed every
detachment the Romans sent out, cutting up any group that became exposed.
The proconsul sent repeated messages to the Aedui and Boii asking them to
send him convoys of provisions, but very little arrived. The Aedui showed
no enthusiasm for this task, although – perhaps in part because – they had
been one of his main sources of supply since 58 BC. The Boii were still
grateful for his support, but were too small a people to have much of a grain
surplus available. The scorched earth tactics of Vercingetorix were beginning
to bite. At one point the Romans completely exhausted their stocks of grain,
but fortunately the foragers had brought in enough cattle for these to be
slaughtered and a meat ration supplied. Caesar praised his men for their
fortitude in keeping on working while receiving only a meagre and
monotonous issue of food. (The persistent myth that Roman legionaries
were vegetarian is based on a misunderstanding of this and a couple of other
passages. Normally they ate a balanced diet of meat, grain and vegetables.
What was exceptional in this case was that they were receiving only meat,
not that they were eating it at all.)14
In spite of the shortages, and the watching menace of the main Gaulish
army – for Vercingetorix kept in close communication with the defenders of
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the town – the legionaries kept toiling at the siege works. Caesar toured the
lines as they laboured, inspecting the work and encouraging the men. On
several occasions he offered to abandon the siege and withdraw if they felt
that the task was beyond them. It was a clever way of exploiting the
legionaries’ pride in themselves and their units, as no one wanted to be seen
as the first to quit. The men implored him to let them finish the job, rather
than suffering the shame of giving up. The memory of the massacre of the
Romans at Cenabum was still strong and provoked widespread anger. Caesar
tells us that the soldiers requested their officers to emphasise to him their
determination to continue and their absolute faith in their ultimate victory.
By this time the ramp was getting bigger, so that the siege towers could move
close to the walls, though not yet close enough for the rams mounted in
them to begin creating a breach.
It was not only the Romans who were facing supply problems, and there
were serious shortages in the Gaulish camp. In part this was simply because
of the season and the need to remain in one place, but it also highlights the
lack of logistic organisation in tribal armies. Vercingetorix was a better
commander than most Gaulish leaders, and his army more flexible and
better prepared than the average tribal force, but it still lagged a long way
behind the Roman army in these respects. The progress of the siege may
also have made him feel that he needed a fresh victory to encourage his men.
The Gaulish army moved a little closer to the town. He then led out his
cavalry and light infantry in person, hoping to mount an ambush on the
Roman foragers. Caesar found out about this, either from his patrols, from
prisoners or from deserters, and took the bulk of his army out to threaten
the Gaulish camp. The enemy formed up to meet him, but were in too strong
a position for him to attack without suffering heavy losses. The legionaries
were keen for battle – encouraged by their own record of success and
brimming over with the frustration caused by hard work and short rations.
Caesar told them that he would not suffer casualties needlessly, for ‘their lives
were more important than his own needs’. The Romans watched the enemy
for a while and then marched back to camp. The threat had been enough to
cause Vercingetorix to change his plans and return to his main force. Caesar
had made it clear that he could not press too closely if he was unwilling to
fight. For a while there was dissension in the Gaulish army, some even
claiming that Vercingetorix was in league with the Romans and wished to
be made king of all Gaul with Caesar’s aid. It is more than likely that the
two men had met, and fairly probable that Vercingetorix had even received
some favours from Caesar during his cultivation of the Arvernian aristocracy.
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Eventually he calmed them, bringing out captive Roman slaves and claiming
that they were legionaries. The men had been coached to tell a plaintive
story of the hardships and shortages in the Roman camp. Having convinced
the men of the wisdom of his plan, he and the other chieftains selected
10,000 warriors and sent them to reinforce Avaricum.15
Sieges were tests of ingenuity as much as sheer determination. Some of
Avaricum’s importance came from the iron mines in the area and as a result
skilled miners were available to try to undermine the Roman ramp. Other
men worked to run up wooden towers strengthening the wall, and kept
adding to these as the Romans increased the height of their own works. As
the defender or attacker gained an advantage, so the other tried to devise a
countermeasure to rob them of it. Yet in the end the Romans had greater
engineering skill and, in spite of frequent sallies aimed at setting light to it,
after twenty-five days the ramp was virtually complete. All in all it measured
330 feet wide and 80 feet high and had almost reached the town wall, so
that soon the battering rams in the towers would be in range. That night the
defenders set light to the timber supports in their mine, hoping either to
collapse the whole ramp or to set fire to it. In the small hours Roman sentries
spotted smoke coming from the wooden ramp. Almost immediately a shout
went up from the wall and two groups of defenders charged out of separate
gates carrying torches and incendiary material as well as weapons. According
to Caesar’s standing orders, two legions were on piquet duty throughout
the hours of darkness. More Roman troops were sent in to support them as
the furious combat swayed back and forth. Some of the legionaries fought
off the enemy, while others dragged the siege towers back to safety, although
they were not able to save some of the mantlets and shelters further up the
ramp. It was a desperate struggle, and in the Commentaries Caesar makes
one of those rare mentions of a minor incident that he witnessed. A Gaulish
warrior stood near one of the town gates and kept hurling lumps of pitch
and tallow at the Roman works. He was killed by the bolt from a scorpion
– one of the Romans’ light artillery pieces that shot its projectile with great
accuracy and appalling force. As soon as he fell, another took his place,
then another and another, as each was struck down by a bolt from the same
ballista. Caesar was clearly impressed by their courage, something that the
Commentaries never tried to deny the Gauls, even if Caesar tended to depict
it as somehow not quite as good as the disciplined bravery of the legions.16
After bitter fighting the defenders were driven back inside their walls,
having failed to inflict enough damage to seriously impede the Romans. A day
later they willingly obeyed Vercingetorix when he urged them to escape from
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the town. Under cover of darkness the warriors tried to sneak out of the
town and make their way through the marshes to the main army. The attempt
failed when their abandoned families realised what was happening and raised
such loud cries that it was feared the Romans would discover their purpose.
On the following day – the twenty-seventh of the siege – the legionaries
completed the ramp. It was raining heavily and Caesar decided on an
immediate assault, judging that the defenders were likely to be off their guard.
Orders for the storming were issued, and the necessary preparations made,
the attacking troops forming up under cover of the sheds and shelters of the
siege works to conceal the Roman purpose. Roman generals were always
keen to encourage individual boldness, and the proconsul promised great
prizes to the first men over the wall. At a signal the men suddenly erupted from
cover and charged forwards, overcoming the surprised defenders and quickly
seizing the rampart. A few parties of Gauls formed up in such open spaces
as the market place, but their nerve cracked when they saw the Romans
swarming around the walls. Throughout history troops who have stormed a
fortified position have often been inclined to run amok once inside. Sieges have
always been difficult and dangerous operations, the actual assault even more
hazardous, and it was often hard for men who had endured both to switch
off once they were inside, especially since in the narrow streets they were no
longer under the close gaze of their officers. When a town was stormed it was
normal for anyone who showed even the slightest resistance to be killed,
while women were raped. This time the mood of the soldiers was more
ferocious even than was usual on such occasions. Caesar says that the
legionaries: ‘Remembering the massacre at Cenabum and the labours of the
siege, did not spare the elderly, the women and the infants. In the end from
the whole number, about 40,000 people, little more than 800 who had fled the
town at the first shout escaped to join Vercingetorix.’17
About a century earlier Polybius had described how the Romans
sometimes deliberately massacred the inhabitants of a captured town, killing
even the animals they found there, so that this would inspire terror and
persuade future enemies to surrender and render an assault unnecessary.
There is no reason why Caesar should not have told us if he had ordered the
slaughter of Avaricum’s population as a warning to others. He was candid
about other massacres or mass executions, and no Roman reader was likely
to be too upset about the fate of foreign enemies. It does seem that it was
sheer rage on the part of the legionaries, frustrated and weary after a difficult
siege in cold weather and with very poor provisions, that led to the slaughter.
Killing the inhabitants – and even if it was perhaps not quite as total as
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Caesar implies, the death toll must have been substantial – was not really in
their interest on a pragmatic basis, since every defender killed was one fewer
to be sold as a slave for the profit of all. Having said that, Caesar does not
seem to have made any effort to restrain his men, although it is highly
questionable whether he would have been able to do so even if he had tried.18
Setback at Gergovia
Caesar rested his army for several days after the sack of Avaricum. Large
stores of grain and other provisions were discovered inside the town, greatly
easing the supply situation. Spring was also beginning, making foraging
more practical. The two legions left to guard the baggage train were brought
up to join the main force. Caesar was eager to resume the offensive to make
it harder for Vercingetorix to wrest back the initiative, but he now received
an appeal from the Aedui that he could not afford to ignore. Two men were
both claiming to have been elected to the tribe’s supreme magistracy, the
post of Vergobret. Dissension amongst the chieftains of his largest and most
important ally was obviously dangerous at a time of rebellion, for it would
be all too likely that one side or the other would seek support from
Vercingetorix. Therefore Caesar hastened south to meet with the rivals –
the Vergobret was forbidden to leave tribal territory in his year of office, so
this restriction, as well as the reluctance to offend an ally at this time, meant
that he could not make them come to him. The proconsul decided which man
was the rightful magistrate, having discovered that tribal law effectively
barred his opponent. He then asked that the tribe supply him with as many
cavalry as they could as well as 10,000 infantry to be used to defend his
supply lines. Hurrying back to the army, Caesar decided to divide into two
columns. Labienus was to take four legions and move north against the
Senones and Parisii, while he took the remaining six southwards and attacked
the Arverni. It was clearly dangerous to divide his resources in this way, but
given the reluctance of the rebels to risk a pitched battle, he must have judged
that the risk was acceptable. The rebels had no single capital or even a united
army, the defeat of which would convince them to surrender. For all the
charisma of Vercingetorix, he still led many fiercely independent tribes and
each of these would need to be suppressed. If an area in rebellion was left
unmolested, then this would only cause the rebels to grow in confidence
and in numbers, and make it likely that more neighbouring peoples would
be encouraged or coerced into joining.19
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The short lull had given Vercingetorix time to recover from the loss of
Avaricum. In some ways the defeat strengthened his own prestige, since he
had spoken against defending the town from the beginning and had only
reluctantly been persuaded to relent. His plan remained much the same, to
harass rather than confront Caesar and his army, and to try to win over
more chieftains and tribes to his cause. As the Romans marched along the
line of the River Allier, Vercingetorix kept pace with them on the opposite
bank, sending men out to break down all the bridges and to guard all the
spots where a new one might be built. Caesar needed to cross if he was to
threaten Gergovia, the town where Vercingetorix had first declared himself
as the leader of the Arverni, but at this time of the year the river could not
be forded by an army. That day the Roman column camped in wooded
country close to one of the destroyed bridges. When the army marched out
the next day, Caesar and two legions stayed behind under cover of the trees.
The other four legions ‘opened out some of their cohorts, so that the number
of units looked the same’. The Gauls suspected nothing as the Roman column
marched on and eventually built its camp in the same way that it had done
on all the other days. They in turn moved on, ready to deny all the crossing
places further down to the enemy. However, late in the day, by the time he
thought that the main force would have halted, Caesar brought out his two
legions and set them to constructing a bridge. Once that was complete they
went across and began work on the ditch and wall of a camp. Messengers
went to the main force recalling them. By the time that Vercingetorix
discovered what had happened, it was too late to do anything about it. He
headed away from the river, eager to put more distance between himself and
Caesar since he had no wish to stay too close. His plan was still to avoid
battle. Caesar followed him and in five days reached Gergovia.20
The proconsul rode forward to inspect the enemy position and soon realised
that it was a strong one. The town itself stood on a hill, and on the rolling high
ground around it Vercingetorix had camped his army, each tribal contingent
having been allocated a position to hold. Direct assault looked impractical
and would certainly be costly. The enemy might be starved into submission,
but the Romans could not hope to mount an effective blockade until they had
secured their own stocks of food. A convoy from the Aedui was on its way but
had yet to reach the army. As Caesar waited he mounted a night attack to
capture one of the Gaulish outposts, giving him a position from which to
threaten the enemy’s water supply and access to forage. A smaller camp
occupied by two legions was built on this spot and connected to the main
camp by a route enclosed by a deep ditch on either side. Both sides settled
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down to watch their opponents warily, sending out their cavalry and light
infantry to skirmish, but neither willing to risk a full-scale battle. Vercingetorix
held daily meetings for his chieftains and for the moment continued to impose
an unusually high standard of discipline for a tribal army.21
The loyalty of the Aedui was beginning to waver. Convictolitavis – the
man whose claim to the post of Vergobret Caesar had upheld – was in secret
contact with representatives from the Arverni and had accepted gifts from
them. At his instigation a chieftain called Litaviccus, who commanded the
10,000 warriors escorting the food convoy to Caesar’s legions, resolved to
turn against his Roman allies. Halting the convoy when he was 30 miles from
Gergovia, he announced to his men that the Aeduan cavalry serving with
Caesar had all been executed by the Romans on a charge of negotiating with
the enemy. Their only choice was to join Vercingetorix and so save themselves
from a similar fate. Like the Arvernian chieftain, Litaviccus was said to have
produced men who claimed to be survivors of this massacre and told a
dreadful story of Roman treachery. The ruse worked and the Aedui swiftly
turned on the Romans accompanying the column, torturing them to death
and plundering the food they were escorting. When news of this reached the
Aeduan chieftains leading the cavalry with Caesar’s army, one of them went
straight to the proconsul to report what he had learned. Caesar immediately
led out four legions in marching order, urging the troops on until they
managed to cover 25 miles and had come within sight of Litaviccus’ men. The
proconsul sent the Aeduan cavalry on ahead, telling them to show themselves
to their fellow tribesmen and so expose the lies of Litaviccus. The warriors
of the escort promptly surrendered, while Litaviccus and his retainers fled and
made their way to join Vercingetorix. Giving his legionaries only three hours
rest Caesar force marched the weary men back to the positions outside
Gergovia. On the way they met despatch riders sent by Fabius, the legate left
in charge of the two legions outside the town. He reported that they had
come under heavy attack throughout the day and, with two legions having
to cover positions built for six, had barely managed to hold their own, aided
by the power of their artillery. Caesar quickened the pace and managed to
bring his force back to the camps before dawn. Their presence was enough
to deter Vercingetorix from another direct assault on the Roman positions.22
Caesar had sent messengers to reassure the Aedui, but riders sent by
Litaviccus arrived first and prompted Convictolitavis to raise his people
against Rome. At the town of Cabillonum, a military tribune and some
Roman merchants were persuaded to leave and then set upon by a mob. As
more and more Gaulish warriors arrived to share in the spoils, Caesar’s
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messengers arrived, informing them that their cavalry contingent and the
10,000 infantry were all now in Caesar’s camp – and thus not only still loyal
to him, but effectively in his power. The Aeduan leaders officially repented
of their actions, blaming the common folk of the tribe. For the moment
Caesar was content merely to remind them of his past favours and urge
them to renewed loyalty, but privately he knew that the alliance with Rome
hung by the slightest of threads. His position was no longer good. Although
he had regained the initiative for a while by launching an offensive, now he
was stuck outside Gergovia without the resources to drive off Vercingetorix
and his army or to take the town. Staying where he was would achieve
nothing, but withdrawing would mean a huge loss of face. Since he had
raided the Arverni from Transalpine Gaul months before, he had kept on
attacking and advancing almost without pause. In practical terms this had
forced Vercingetorix to react to him, but even more important was the
impression it created of absolute confidence in Rome’s overwhelming might
and the inevitability of her ultimate victory. It did not matter if the impression
was largely a façade, it was still powerful in the minds of those who were as
yet undecided on whether or not to join the rebellion. Once Caesar stopped
advancing and began to retreat, then the illusion of Roman invincibility
would be shattered. Withdrawal in the face of the enemy was always a
dangerous operation, and in this case it would be seen as an admission of
failure and was very likely to convince uncommitted tribes that the rebellion
was going to succeed. However, it would allow him to regroup and add
Labienus’ four legions to his force – with ten legions he would probably
have had sufficient strength to win at Gergovia. Caesar chose the lesser evil
and decided to withdraw, but hoped first to win a minor victory and so
make his pulling out seem less of a retreat.23
While inspecting the smaller fort the proconsul noticed that one of the
hills, which had been strongly occupied by the Gauls on previous days, was
now virtually empty. Interrogating some of the many deserters who had
come into the Roman lines, he was told that Vercingetorix had become very
worried that the Romans might take one of the other hilltops and so had
drawn off most of his men to fortify it. Caesar saw the opportunity and
began to feed the enemy’s insecurity. That night cavalry patrols were sent out
to look at the hill Vercingetorix was busy fortifying. The horsemen were
told to make more noise than usual, just to ensure that the Gauls were aware
of their presence. On the following morning he mounted large numbers of
the army’s slaves on pack horses and mules, gave them helmets to wear and,
putting a few genuine cavalrymen around them to make the deception more
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convincing, sent the whole mass off towards the same spot by a roundabout
route. Later on a legion followed them, but halted in some dead ground and
then took cover in a patch of woodland. As the Gauls’ attention was drawn
towards the place where they expected and feared attack, Caesar saw their
forces shift to meet it. Then he quietly moved his legions to the smaller
camp, telling them to keep their shields covered and have their crests out of
sight. They moved not as organised cohorts but as dribs and drabs, strolling
along without any impression of purpose. Caesar briefed the legates put in
charge of each legion, explaining what he wanted them to do and emphasised
that they must ‘keep their troops under control, and not let their enthusiasm
for battle or hope of plunder carry them too far forward’.24
At a given signal the legions attacked up the slope, while the Aedui went
up the opposite side of the same spur. Each group made its way as best it
could, but the ridge was broken by re-entrants and it was often difficult for
one group to see the others. There were very few defenders and the legionaries
easily scrambled over a 6-foot wall of piled stones that the Gauls had built
halfway up the hill. The obstacle did not delay the Romans for long, but it
must have caused some disorder in the formations, and this was made worse
as they charged through the Gallic camps that were dotted around the slope.
The king of one tribe who had not long before defected to Vercingetorix
was surprised in his tent and was still only half dressed when he managed
to gallop away. Caesar was with the Tenth and, when he decided that the
attack had done enough damage, halted the legion and ordered the
trumpeters to sound the recall. The sound did not carry well. Some officers
heard it and tried to get the legionaries to obey, but most of the men kept
on going. They surged up through the camps against the wall of the town
itself. In the past they had overwhelmed and destroyed far more numerous
opponents in surprise attacks, and perhaps memories of these successes
spurred them on. For a while it looked as if Gergovia might actually fall, for
there were very few defenders at this spot and the inhabitants panicked:
Married women hurled down clothing and silver from the wall and,
baring their breasts, stretched out their hands to beg the Romans to
spare them, and not massacre women and children as they had done
at Avaricum. Some of the women even lowered themselves by hand
from the wall and gave themselves to the soldiers. Lucius Fabius, a
centurion of Eighth, who was known to have announced to his unit that
he was inspired by the rewards at Avaricum, and would not permit
anyone to climb the wall before him, got three of his legionaries to lift
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him up so that he could climb on top of the wall. He then pulled each
of them up onto the rampart.25
By this time the Gauls working on the fortifications beyond the far side
of the town heard the noise of the Roman attack and realised that they had
been duped. Vercingetorix also started to get messengers bringing pleas for
help from the townsfolk. He sent his cavalry back to meet the Roman attack
and the warriors on foot followed. As they arrived thoughts of surrender
were banished from the minds of the townsfolk and the women on the walls
now started to implore their menfolk to save them. The Roman attack had
run out of steam, the men being tired and disordered and unprepared to
meet fresh opponents. Many panicked when the Aedui suddenly appeared
on their flank, mistaking them for hostile Gauls and failing in the heat of the
action to notice that they had their right shoulders bared – the accepted
sign of a Gallic ally in Caesar’s army. The elation of success soon turned sour:
At the same time the centurion Lucius Fabius and those who had
climbed the wall with him were surrounded, killed and flung from the
rampart. Marcus Petronius, another centurion from the same legion,
who had tried to hack through the gate, was being overwhelmed by
numbers and was now in a desperate situation. Wounded many times,
he called out to the men of his unit who had followed him: ‘Since I
cannot save both myself and you, whom I led into danger through my
own lust for glory, I can at least manage to save your lives. When you
get the opportunity, look after yourselves.’ Straightaway he charged
forward into the midst of the enemy, killed two of them and forced
the rest back from the gate a short distance. His men tried to come to
his aid, but he said, ‘There is no hope of you saving my life, for my life’s
blood and strength are draining away. So escape whilst you have a
chance and make your way back to the legion.’ So before long he fell
fighting and saved his men.26
Caesar could do little more than cover the retreat, using the Tenth and
quickly ordering up the cohorts of the Thirteenth that had been left behind
to guard the small camp. In this way the Gauls were prevented from pursuing
too far, but even so casualties were very high. Around 700 soldiers and no
less than 46 centurions had been killed. Centurions led from the front and
normally suffered a disproportionately high casualty rate, especially if things
went wrong. On the day after the defeat, Caesar paraded the legions and
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spoke to them, praising their bravery but sternly reprimanding their lack of
discipline. In conclusion he assured them that they had only lost because of
the difficult ground, the enemy defences and their failure to obey orders –
the fighting power of the Gauls had had little to do with it. To ram the
message home, for the next two days he selected a good position – probably
on a ridge – and deployed in battle order, challenging Vercingetorix to come
out and fight. When the Gaulish leader was understandably reluctant to
risk a battle with the ground in the enemy’s favour, Caesar was able to assure
his men that the enemy were still frightened of them. On the following day
he marched away, moving towards the lands of the Aedui and not the way
he had come. The Romans reached the Allier in three days, rebuilt another
of the destroyed bridges and crossed. The Gaulish army made no serious
attempt to stop them. Caesar had already decided that he must accept the
bad impression created by a withdrawal. His attempt to lessen this by a
token success had ended in failure. Word of this soon spread and over the
next weeks more tribes openly joined the revolt. The Aedui were amongst
the first. The leaders of the cavalry serving with Caesar asked permission
to go home. He granted the request, since even though he no longer trusted
them he did not want to make the situation worse by holding them against
their will, so feeding fresh stories of Roman ‘treachery’.
Shortly afterwards the Aedui in the town of Noviodunum slaughtered
the small Roman garrison and the Roman traders who were there. This was
a doubly serious blow, for the town contained not only huge grain depots
gathered to support the army but also the main baggage train, with its
records and the hostages taken from the various tribes. Judging that they
could not defend the position, the Aedui burned the town, carrying off or
spoiling all the grain. Then they used the hostages to begin negotiations
with the other tribes. Vercingetorix and chieftains from all over the country
were summoned to Bibracte. There the Aedui tried but failed to have one of
their own men appointed to replace the Arvernian as overall commander.
Rather sullenly, they agreed to obey him for the common good. Now almost
all the Celtic or Gallic tribes were ranged against Caesar, and most of the
Belgic peoples had joined as well. Vercingetorix was determined to persist
with his strategy of avoiding battle, instead harassing the Romans and
preventing them from getting food for their men and forage for their animals.
Roman military slang called this style of fighting ‘kicking the enemy in the
stomach’. Keeping the same number of infantry that he already had with him,
Vercingetorix asked the tribes to supply more cavalry to increase his force
to 15,000 riders. To divide the Romans’ effort, he arranged for the Aedui
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Vercingetorix and the Great Revolt, 52 bc
and other tribes to launch fresh attacks on Transalpine Gaul, hoping that
the peoples there – notably the Allobroges, who had rebelled only a decade
before – would join the rebellion.27
Hearing of the defection of the Aedui, Caesar pressed northwards in an
effort to join up with Labienus’ command. By forced marches he reached the
Loire unexpectedly and managed to ford the river even though it was running
high with melted winter snows. Cavalrymen formed a chain upstream of
the legionaries as they waded chest deep through the water, carrying their
equipment in the shields raised over their heads. A few days later he was
met by Labienus, who was fresh from a victory near Lutetia (Paris). The
Roman field army was now once again concentrated, and its ten legions
probably mustered somewhere in the region of 35,000–40,000 men, supported
by some auxiliaries. Unable to get many horsemen from his dwindling supply
of Gaulish allies, Caesar sent across the Rhine to the German tribes for
cavalry and their supporting light infantry. When these arrived Caesar
replaced their small German ponies with better mounts taken from his
tribunes and other equestrian officers, as well as wealthier veteran soldiers
who had been recalled to the colours. The attacks on Transalpine Gaul were
worrying and he led the army through the borders of the Lingones into the
territory of the Sequani so that he could be nearer to the province. In the event
the attacks were dealt with by the levies from the province and the tribes
themselves, all under the command of his distant cousin Lucius Julius Caesar,
a member of the other branch of the family who had been consul in 64 BC
and was currently serving as a legate. Yet the initiative had for the moment
passed back to Vercingetorix and the Gaulish leader now resolved to press
the Romans more closely. With his great force of cavalry he would attack the
legions on the march, while they were encumbered with their baggage. Either
the enemy would have to leave their train and press on with the march or stop
to protect it and so be slowed to a snail’s pace, making the problems of
supply even worse. Spontaneously the warriors took an oath not to ‘go back
under roof, or see their parents, children or wives’ unless they had ridden
twice through the Roman column. On the following day the Gaulish cavalry
attacked in three groups – one striking the head of the column and the others
threatening the flanks. Caesar’s cavalry were heavily outnumbered but he
likewise divided them into three groups and moved up infantry as close
support whenever they were hard pressed. The legionaries could not catch
the enemy horsemen, but they provided a solid block for their own horsemen
to rally behind and re-form. In the end the Germans won the combat on
the right, routing the warriors facing them and causing the rest to withdraw.
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proconsul 58–50 BC
The Romans pursued, two legions staying behind to protect the baggage
train while the remaining eight followed closely behind the cavalry. Gaulish
casualties were heavy. Caesar noted with considerable satisfaction the capture
of a number of notable Aeduans, including two chieftains who had fought
under him earlier in the year, as well as the man whose claim to the post of
Vergobret he had rejected. He does not mention their fate.28
Climax – the Siege of Alesia
The fortune of the campaign had swung once again. Vercingetorix had
misjudged the situation, believing that Caesar was retreating and that he
needed to be harried mercilessly if the Romans were not simply to return in
the future in greater strength. In fact Caesar and his men were far from
beaten, and rapidly switched back to the offensive now that the Gaulish
army was close and provided them with a clear target. Vercingetorix retired
to camp outside Alesia (modern Mont Auxois in the hills of Côte d’Or), a
hilltop town of the Mandubii. A day later Caesar camped facing the town
and went out to reconnoitre the position. The town lay on a long hill with
steep slopes. To the west was a wide, open plain, but on the other three sides
there was high ground, intersected by a number of valleys. Together these
hills and ridges were roughly crescent shaped. A stream ran to the north
and south of the central hill of Alesia. Direct assault would be risky and
involve heavy casualties whether or not it succeeded, since Vercingetorix
and his men would have the advantage of ground. Caesar claims that he
now had 80,000 infantry in addition to his cavalry, but as usual it is hard to
know how reliable this figure is. Napoleon was sceptical and doubted that
the Gauls can have outnumbered the Romans at all. Even if this is correct,
a direct assault was an unattractive option, but in other respects the situation
was very different to that at Gergovia. Now Caesar had his full army and,
looking at the lie of the land, he was confident that they could enclose and
blockade Alesia and the Gaulish army.29
The Romans began to work on a monumental set of siegeworks, with a
rampart stretching for 11 miles and including twenty-three fortlets as well as
larger camps in which the soldiers would rest. The Gauls did not let this go
unmolested and sent their cavalry down to attack. They were met by the
auxiliary and allied cavalry, but it was not until Caesar committed his reserve
of German horsemen and formed up some of the legionaries in support that
the Gauls were driven back. Reconciling himself to enduring a siege,
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Vercingetorix and the Great Revolt, 52 bc
Vercingetorix sent his cavalry away before the blockade was closed, telling
them to return to their tribes and raise a relief army. The fate of Gaul would
be decided at Alesia, for Caesar would be pinned there just as surely as he
had bottled up Vercingetorix. Stocks of grain in Alesia were taken under
central control to be doled out as a fair ration, while the cattle were distributed
to individuals to look after them until they were slaughtered. The Gauls settled
down to wait for rescue and the final clash with Caesar. The Romans toiled
on to complete their line of circumvallation, completely surrounding the hill.
The site was located and excavated under the aegis of Napoleon III, who had
a personal passion for this episode of France’s history. More recently, modern
techniques and further work has added to a picture that in all important
respects strikingly conforms to the description given in the Commentaries –
the dimensions of the actual trenches are not always as regular as Caesar
suggests, but since these were so extensive this is unsurprising.
In the west where the plain was open, the Romans dug a straight-sided
ditch some 20 feet in width, which ran from one stream to the other. This was
337
0
0 1 km
1 mile
336
418
255
267
259
351
251
426
403
MONTAGNE DE BUSSY
G
REA
Rabulin
Ditch
PENNEVELLE
MONTAGNE DE FLAVIGNY
Brenne
K
PURGATOIRE
Oze
Oze
MONT AUXOIS
Ozerain
11
16
18
C
1
Ozerain
F
D
H
T
A
B
Wall
Identified fort marked with a letter. Fortlets marked with a number
Siege of Alesia: plan based on recent and nineteenth century excavations. Not all of
the area has been fully excavated, given the vast size of the site.
proconsul 58–50 BC
intended as an obstacle to delay any attack and give warning of its approach.
Four hundred paces (c. 130 yards) further back was the main defence line. This
consisted of a double ditch, the inner one flooded wherever this was possible,
and behind this a 12-foot high rampart strengthened with high towers at 80-
foot intervals. In front of the ditches were a series of obstacles and traps to
which the legionaries gave macabre nicknames. The stakes with ends that
had been sharpened and fire hardened were ‘marker-stones’ (cippi), those
hidden in circular pits covered in foliage were lilies (lilia), from their shape,
while the caltrops and spikes half buried were spurs (stimuli). Such traps
might cause an attacker some casualties, especially if he came under cover of
darkness, but their main function was to slow a charge down and rob it of
momentum, as men were forced to walk past them somewhat gingerly. The
defences were strong enough so that even a small number of men could hold
the lines under all but the heaviest assault, so that much of the army would
be free to forage and to continue building. As soon as this line was complete,
the proconsul set his men to building another, even longer line – a line of
contravallation – facing outwards to defend against the relief army that was
bound to come. It was vital to hunt out as much grain and round up as many
farm animals as possible before it arrived, and Caesar instructed his men to
gather sufficient to supply the entire army for thirty days. The labour and
effort involved in these tasks had been massive, but Caesar now had his whole
army and his ablest senior officers. In addition to the legates, who included
Quintus Cicero and Caius Trebonius, he also had young Decimus Brutus
and his new quaestor Marcus Antonius – Shakespeare’s Mark Antony. The
Romans worked and the Gauls in Alesia watched them, occasionally launching
harassing raids but unwilling to chance a major encounter until outside aid
arrived. Both sides were waiting for the storm to break.30
It took time for the tribes to mass a relief force. The chieftains met and
agreed on the numbers of warriors to be supplied by each people. Caesar
gives a long list of the contingents requested from each tribe and claims that
the army eventually mustered 8,000 cavalry and 250,000 infantry. His
information may have been incorrect, and he may deliberately have inflated
the figure, but it is worth noting that the numbers are in keeping with those
he gives throughout the Commentaries for tribal forces, although that may
mean no more than that he was consistent in his exaggeration. Nevertheless,
even if he exaggerated, the circumstances of such a big coalition, aware that
it was fighting the critical battle, would make it likely that this was one of
the largest Gaulish armies ever to take the field. Caesar says that the tribes
did not call out everyone who could bear arms, since they judged that such
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Vercingetorix and the Great Revolt, 52 bc
a host would be too vast, making it clumsy to control and almost impossible
to feed. Even so we would guess that many men who would normally only
have fought in defence of their own lands were included in the army, whether
willingly or at the command of their chieftains. Four leaders were appointed.
One was Commius, the king of the Atrebates, and two of the others were
the chieftains who had commanded Caesar’s Aeduan cavalry at the beginning
of the year. The other was Vercassivellaunus, a cousin of Vercingetorix, the
only one who does not seem to have served with Caesar’s army at some
stage in the past. The army gathered slowly and then moved slowly, as was
inevitable with such a big force. The men surrounded at Alesia grew nervous
as aid failed to arrive and decided on desperate measures. The people of the
town itself – the women, children and the elderly who could not fight
effectively – were driven out so that these ‘useless’ mouths would no longer
consume provisions needed by the warriors. Vercingetorix may have assumed
that the Romans would permit them to pass through their lines to safety. If
so, then he was disappointed. Caesar strengthened the sentries on the rampart
and would admit no one. He may have feared that the passage of so many
refugees could shield an attack by the warriors, or have been reluctant to let
them go into an area where his army was still foraging and use up resources
that he needed for his army. Perhaps he just felt that the Gauls would be
forced to take the civilians back and so make his blockade more quickly
effective. They did not. At this stage of the campaign each commander was
able to match the other’s cold ruthlessness. The townsfolk’s pleas were
ignored and they were left to starve to death between the lines. Caesar may
have felt that the sight would demoralise the Gauls. It certainly made the final
clash an even grimmer affair.31
The relief army finally arrived and camped on high ground, probably to
the south-west, little more than a mile from the outward facing line of
contravallation. On the following day the army massed, with the cavalry in
advance on the plain and the vast crowds of infantry on the slopes behind,
showing their great numbers to the enemy and their beleaguered friends. In
response Vercingetorix brought his warriors out of the town and their camp.
They moved forward and filled in a section of the wide trench Caesar’s men
had dug in advance of their lines. There they waited, ready to attack in
concert with the relief army. The legions were ready, men deployed on both
of the siege lines to meet attack from each direction. As a gesture of
confidence, Caesar sent his cavalry out from the lines to engage the horsemen
of the relief force. A whirling fight developed and lasted throughout the
afternoon, and seemed for a long time to have been going the Gauls’ way,
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proconsul 58–50 BC
when once again Caesar’s German cavalry charged and won the day for the
Romans. The Gauls did not commit their infantry, and the armies returned
to their camps as darkness fell. The next day was spent in preparation, the
Gaulish warriors working to make ladders and gathering ropes to climb the
Roman rampart and preparing fascines – bundles of sticks to fill the enemy
ditches. The relief army attacked at midnight, raising a great cheer to let
Vercingetorix know what was happening – with the Romans between them
the two Gaulish armies had no means of direct communication. The
Arvernian ordered trumpets to be sounded as a signal for his own warriors
to attack, targeting the corresponding stretch of the line of circumvallation.
However, it took them a long time to organise, and then even more time to
fill in more stretches of the Roman ditch. In the end they were too late to help
their comrades. Fighting was bitter but eventually Mark Antony and the
legate Trebonius, who were in charge of this section of the lines, moved up
reserves and repulsed both attacks. The defences constructed with so much
labour by Caesar’s men had proved their worth.32
Before launching another assault the four leaders of the relief army took
more care to scout and to speak to locals who knew the ground. They decided
that the vulnerable spot was a Roman camp on the slopes of a hill that
formed the north-western tip of the crescent-shaped high ground surrounding
the town. The Romans had been unable to include the hill within their lines,
since this would have massively increased the already huge task of building
the lines. Only two legions occupied the camp, but Commius and his fellow
chieftains resolved to send almost a quarter of their infantry, some 60,000
picked warriors, against the position. Vercassivellaunus took his men out
at night, leading them to the reverse slope of the hill where they could wait
out of sight of the enemy. Diversionary attacks would be launched elsewhere
before the real assault began at noon. Vercingetorix saw some of the
preparations and, although he did not know the details of the plan, resolved
to give what aid he could by launching an all-out attack on the inner lines.
At midday Vercassivellaunus and his men spilled over the brow of the hill and
poured down the slope against the vulnerable camp. Attacked in so many
places simultaneously, the Roman defenders were spread thinly and came
under great pressure. The lines were very extensive, but Caesar went to a
position from which he could see most of the action and began ordering
reserves up to reinforce threatened sectors. Even so, he was especially reliant
on his senior officers to keep him informed and to take the initiative where
there was not time to consult him. Vercassivellaunus steadily began to make
headway against the camp on the hillside, so Caesar sent Labienus – his best
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Vercingetorix and the Great Revolt, 52 bc
subordinate – with six cohorts to reinforce the men there. The senior legate
was told to use his judgement, giving up the position and getting the garrison
out if he felt that it could not be held.
Caesar now moved, knowing that it was not enough simply to observe and
direct. He went to the men and encouraged them as they fought, telling
them that this day would decide the whole war. Vercingetorix and his warriors
had been repulsed in their first attacks against the weakest sections of the
line of circumvallation. Now they switched to assaulting several spots that
were better protected by the slopes, but only thinly guarded by the Romans.
At one point they got over the rampart and used grappling irons and ropes
to pull over one of the Roman towers. Caesar sent Decimus Brutus to the spot
with some troops, but he could not hold the enemy back. More cohorts led
by the legate Caius Fabius were despatched to support them and the gap in
the line was plugged. The crisis over, Caesar galloped off to see how Labienus
was coping at the fort on the hillside. He did not go alone, but hastily
gathered four cohorts from one of the nearby fortlets. Most of the army’s
cavalry was also uncommitted and he split these into two, keeping one force
with him and sending the other outside the line of contravallation to come
round and take Vercassivellaunus’ men in the flank. By this time Labienus’
men had lost control of the fort’s rampart, but the legate had managed to
find fourteen cohorts to add to the six he had brought and the two-legion
garrison. With this formidable force he had patched together a fighting line
inside and near the fort and sent messengers to Caesar letting him know
what was happening. Everything was set for the crisis of the siege and the
campaign – in many ways, at least as far as the Commentaries were
concerned, the culminating point of Caesar’s campaigns since 58 BC. In his
account the skilful actions of Labienus and the other legates are noted, but
the focus at the end is on the author himself. His:
. . . arrival was known through the colour of his cloak, which he always
wore in battle as a distinguishing mark; and the troops of cavalry and
the cohorts which he had ordered to follow him were also visible,
because from the higher parts of the hill these downward slopes and
dips could be seen. Then the enemy joined battle: both sides cheered,
and the cry was taken up by a shout from the men within the
fortifications and rampart. Our troops threw their pila and got to work
with their swords. Suddenly [the Gauls] spotted the cavalry behind
them; other cohorts approached. The enemy turned around and were
caught as they fled by the cavalry; and a great slaughter ensued. . .
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74 captured war standards were carried to Caesar; very few of this vast
host escaped unscathed to their camp.33
The Roman counter-attack tipped the balance irrevocably in their favour.
The attempt to break into Caesar’s lines ended in bloody repulse.
Vercingetorix and his men had also been unable to break out and withdrew
when they saw the utter failure of the relief army’s efforts. Although the
fortunes of the day may not have turned quite as quickly or simply as Caesar
suggests, the decisive nature of his victory is unquestionable. The heart went
out of the rebellion. Vercingetorix and his men were now very short of food
and saw no prospect of escape. The relief force had made two great attacks
and failed in both. Such an enormous tribal army could not hope to supply
itself in the field for very long and there was no prospect of mounting a
successful assault before they had to disperse.34
The next day Vercingetorix summoned his chieftains to a council. He
suggested that they surrender, saying that he was willing to hand himself
over to the Romans. None of the council seem to have demurred. Envoys went
to Caesar, who demanded that they hand over weapons and that their leaders
surrender. In the Commentaries the act of capitulation is briefly described.
According to Plutarch and Dio, Vercingetorix put on his finest armour and
rode out of the town on his best warhorse. Approaching Caesar on the
tribunal where he sat on his magistrate’s chair, the Arvernian chieftain rode
once around his adversary, dismounted, lay down his weapons and sat down
at his feet waiting to be taken away. The Commentaries could not allow
their hero to be upstaged in this way.35
Virtually all the tribes involved in the rebellion capitulated. In many ways
Caesar’s final victory was all the greater because so many peoples had joined.
The Celtic/Gallic tribes had finally tested the military strength of the legions
and been utterly defeated. Virtually all of them now accepted the reality of
conquest. Caesar was generous to the captives from the Aedui and Arverni,
and probably also those from their dependent tribes. These men were not
sold into slavery, although Vercingetorix was held as a captive until the
celebration of Caesar’s triumph, when he was ritually strangled in the
traditional Roman way. However, there were plenty of other captives who
could be sold and the profits shared amongst the army. The Aedui and
Arverni were important peoples whom Caesar would prefer as more or less
willing allies, hence his leniency. He had won military victory, but knew that
creating an enduring peace was now a question of politics and gentle
diplomacy. In the case of both tribes, it seems to have worked.36
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XVI
‘All Gaul is Conquered’
‘Regarding Caesar, there are lots of rumours whispered about him, none
of them very good. According to one his cavalry have been wiped out –
but that one is certainly a fiction in my view; another says that the Seventh
legion has been badly mauled, and that Caesar himself is surrounded in
the territory of the Bellovaci and is cut off from the rest of his army.
However nothing is actually known so far, and even these unconfirmed
stories are not circulating widely, but told as an open secret amongst a
clique – you know who they are; Anyway, Domitius [Ahenobarbus] puts
his hand over his mouth before he speaks.’ – Marcus Caelius Rufus writing
to Cicero, c. 26 May 51 BC.1
Throughout his time in Gaul, Caesar took great pains to remind Rome of
his existence and to celebrate his achievements. The Commentaries were a
major part of this effort, but they were not his only literary output during
these years. Early in 54 BC, while travelling north from Cisalpine Gaul to
rejoin his army, he produced a two-volume work On Analogy (De Analogia).
The title was Greek, but the book analysed Latin grammar and argued for
accuracy and simplicity in speech and writing, in contrast to the fashion for
using archaic forms of words and complicated expressions. It was dedicated
to Cicero, and paid tribute to him as Rome’s greatest orator and ‘virtually
the creator of eloquence’, but followed this by saying that it was also a good
thing to consider everyday speech. No more than a few fragments of the
book have survived, but to have written such a detailed and authoritative
study at a time when his mind was occupied with the affairs of Gaul and
preparations for his second British expedition was an indication of both
Caesar’s intellect and his restless energy. In comparison with the
Commentaries, it was aimed at a narrower audience, though one that
included the many senators and equestrians obsessed with literature. Caesar
the author was a figure whom many found less controversial than Caesar the
343
popularis politician. The praise of Cicero was unforced and had much to do
with his new, closer relationship with Caesar resulting from his return from
exile. The orator sent drafts of his own works to Caesar and the two men
discussed these in a way that cemented the political friendship between
them.2
Literature was important to Rome’s elite, but other means were necessary
to reach much of the wider population. There was a long tradition of
distinguished men, and especially successful generals, building monuments
in Rome as physical memorials to their achievements. In 55 BC during his
second consulship Pompey commemorated his unprecedentedly great
victories with a grander monument than anyone else had ever built, formally
opening his great theatre complex. It was the first permanent stone theatre
ever to be built in the city and Dio still considered it to be one of Rome’s most
spectacular features almost three centuries later. Some ten thousand people
were able sit on its stone seats – the sensible and well prepared took along
cushions when they attended a performance. It stood on the Campus
Martius, towering high above a row of temples dedicated by other victorious
commanders over the centuries. No less than five shrines were actually built
into the structure, the main one to Venus Victrix (Venus the victorious), and
others to the deities personifying such virtues as Honour (Honos), Courage
(Virtus), and Good Fortune (Felicitas). Attached to the semi-circular theatre
was a portico, which itself covered an area of some 585 feet by 440 feet, and
everything about the structures from design to materials testified to the vast
expense of the whole project.
The same was true of the lavish festivities that marked the opening of
the complex. There were musical performances and displays of gymnastics,
as well as chariot racing and beast fights in the nearby Circus Flaminius.
Five hundred lions were killed in five days, while at one point heavily
armoured hunters were matched against about twenty elephants. The beasts
made an effort to escape from the arena, frightening the crowd as they tried
to smash through the iron railings, until they were driven back. Fear soon
turned to sympathy, and the people began to feel sorry for the animals and
angry against Pompey for ordering their slaughter. For all that the Romans
craved violent displays in the circus, simply spending huge amounts of money
on a show did not necessarily mean that the crowd would enjoy it and so feel
gratitude to the man who had provided it. Privately, Cicero also felt that the
sheer scale of Pompey’s theatre and portico were excessive. Other
conservative senators muttered that it was a mistake to give the theatre –
that most Greek of institutions – a permanent home in the city. In the past
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‘All Gaul is Conquered’
most of the audience for any performance had stood, and they feared that
giving them seats would just encourage more citizens to waste their days as
idle spectators.3
Caesar had his own plans to leave his mark on the city, and in 54 BC work
began on a large extension to the north side of the Forum and on the Basilica
Julia, which would border onto his new development. Not content with
this, he followed Pompey’s example and looked towards the Campus Martius,
where the saepta used for voting was to be replaced by a permanent marbledecorated
structure. The scale was immense, with a colonnade a mile long
running along the side. In another open sign of their new political
relationship, Cicero helped Caesar’s agent Oppius in planning and arranging
the projects. The enormous price – Cicero says that merely purchasing the
land needed for the Forum extension cost 60 million sestertii, while Suetonius
gives the figure as 100 million – of these grand structures was paid from the
profits of conquest in Gaul. When completed these projects would provide
a bigger and more spectacular Forum as a centre to the city, with more space
for public business and private commerce, and create a far grander
environment for voting in the Campus Martius. In the short term work on
the buildings provided paid employment for many poorer citizens in the
city, as well as profitable contracts to companies supplying materials.
The same was true of the gladiatorial games Caesar announced in honour
of his daughter. This was the first time that such contests would be staged
to mark the death of a woman, an extension of his earlier staging of public
funerals for his aunt Julia and first wife Cornelia. Large numbers of gladiators
were collected for the occasion, Caesar having arranged to save the lives of
men defeated in earlier appearances in the arena. These had then been trained,
not in a gladiatorial school as was usual, but in the households of senators
and equestrians known to be skilled in armed combat. Suetonius tells us that
Caesar wrote from Gaul to these men, asking them to take great care in the
training. By 49 BC he owned at least 5,000 of these fighters, many of them in
gladiatorial schools at Capua. A natural showman, Caesar was determined
that the games would be something special. The same was true of the public
feasts that formed the other main part of his daughter’s memorial. Some of
the food was prepared in his own household by his own cooks, but much
was bought from the expensive shops for which Rome was famous. Traders
benefited and the crowd was indulged, hopefully adding to the number of
citizens who thought well of Caesar. Although Julia’s memorial games and
feasts would not actually be celebrated for several years, the preparations for
them were very public and the events eagerly anticipated.4
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For all Caesar’s efforts to remain in the public eye, there were times when
it must have been difficult for anyone at Rome to pay much heed to what was
going on away from the city. In the closing years of the decade, it almost
seemed as if the institutions of the Republic were irreparably broken.
Electoral bribery was rampant. In the campaign for the consulship for 53 BC
two of the candidates had joined together and offered 10 million sestertii for
the vote of the centuria praerogativa, the century of the First Class chosen
to open the voting in the Comitia Centuriata, while a further 3 million would
go to the consuls of 54 BC who would preside over the elections. Caesar and
Pompey were both indirectly involved in the scandal, and were none too
pleased at its disclosure. However, it was not until the summer of 53 BC that
elections were actually held, with the proconsul Pompey supervising them
at the Senate’s request. The candidates for the following year were similarly
corrupt, and the situation made worse by the violence between the gangs of
Milo and Clodius, which culminated in the latter’s murder (see p.318).
Senators’ attendants had been killed in political riots in recent memory and
a number of leading men injured. It was far worse for a famous man, who
was not only a former magistrate but currently a candidate for office, to die
by violence. The cold-blooded nature of the killing added to the widespread
shock at the crime. Clodius had been wounded in the initial clash and had
then taken refuge in a tavern. Milo had deliberately sent men to drag his
old enemy outside and finish him off.
The disturbances that followed, as Clodius’ family and supporters vented
their grief in destruction, suggested that the Republic was relapsing into
anarchy – almost in a literal sense, since the Greek word originally meant
that disturbances had prevented the election of archons, the senior
magistrates of Athens. The Senate met and passed its ultimate decree, calling
upon Pompey to do what was necessary to protect the State. As a body it had
no police force or troops to control such a situation. Pompey had the
imperium of a proconsul and soldiers to command. There was some doubt
over what title and power to offer him and once again talk of dictatorship.
Others suggested recalling Caesar so that he could hold the consulship with
Pompey until the crisis was over, and all ten tribunes of the plebs supported
this proposal. Caesar wrote to thank them, but asked them to withdraw the
bill since he was needed in Gaul. In the end Bibulus – the same Bibulus who
had been Caesar’s colleague in 59 BC and had no love for either him or
Pompey – proposed that Pompey be made sole consul for the year. Cato
backed the motion and it was passed comfortably, since Pompey’s opponents
realised that he offered the best chance of restoring order to the city. Yet
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they deliberately avoided the word dictator, and wished to make clear that
he was not being invested with permanent supreme power of the sort Sulla
had taken, but that this was simply a temporary measure to cope with the
crisis.5
Pompey’s third consulship was anomalous in so many ways, not least
that he had no colleague, violating the most fundamental principle of this
magistracy. He had also not been elected by the people but was simply
appointed. Normally a consul had only his lictors to clear a path for him
through the streets, but Pompey brought armed soldiers into the city to
police its streets. When Milo was put on trial the court was surrounded by
the consul’s troops, who prevented his followers from disturbing the
proceedings. The court and its procedures were specially created by Pompey
to deal with the recent electoral abuses and political violence. Juries were
drawn from a pool of names selected by the consul. Milo’s guilt was clear
and, although this was not always a decisive factor in Roman trials, in this
case the mood of the court and the watching crowd was extremely hostile.
Cicero had agreed to defend Milo, for he felt a bond with the man who had
been the bitterest opponent of his own enemy, Clodius. However, his courage
failed him when he stood up to speak and was exposed to the barracking and
hatred of the crowd and he did not deliver his speech. Milo went into exile
in Massilia in Transalpine Gaul. Rather tactlessly, Cicero subsequently sent
him the manuscript of the speech that he had meant to deliver. His former
client replied sarcastically that he was glad that it had not been delivered,
since otherwise he would never have had the chance to sample the fine fish
of Massilia. Clodius’ supporters were jubilant at the outcome, but several
of his leading associates soon found themselves on trial and condemned in
the following months. Pompey was taking his role seriously and made a real
attempt to control the violence and bribery that had come to pervade public
life. Unlike earlier uses of the senatus consultum ultimum, in 52 BC there
were no summary executions and everything was done through the courts,
although these were the special courts created for the occasion and operating
under new regulations.6
Electoral bribery had become chronic, especially in the campaigns for
the consulship. Pompey passed a new law imposing even harsher penalties
for electoral malpractice. However, the sums involved were enormous and
many candidates relied on being given a wealthy province after their year of
office. Their creditors could then be paid from money squeezed from the
unfortunate provincials and from bribes given by the companies of publicani,
who wished no interference in their own exploitation of the people. The
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consequences were bad for the provinces, but most senators were more
concerned with the impact on elections. To break this circle Pompey
introduced a law imposing a five-year delay between the consulship and a
man going out to his province, on the basis that creditors would be much less
inclined to wait so long for repayment of debts. This inevitably created a
shortage of provincial governors, and therefore it was necessary in the short
term to make use of former magistrates who had chosen not to take a
command after their year of office. Cicero was one of these, and in 51 BC
found himself appointed proconsul of Cilicia, a task for which he had little
enthusiasm. At the same time Bibulus was despatched to govern Syria.
Pompey’s measures do seem to have substantially reduced the levels of bribery
and corruption in the consular elections for 51, 50 and 49 BC. Cato stood for
the office for 51 BC, proclaiming that he would do nothing at all to win the
favour of the electorate. While he was widely admired, he was never
particularly popular and such an approach was eccentric in the extreme,
and certainly not traditional. It came as little surprise that he lost by a big
margin. Pompey is unlikely to have been enthusiastic about Cato’s
candidature, but he could not control the outcome and the elections in these
three years showed the strength of the old established families. The victors
were three patricians and three members of one of the most distinguished
plebian lines. The brothers Marcus and Caius Claudius Marcellus won the
consulship in 51 and 49 BC respectively, while their cousin Caius was consul
in 50 BC. The latter was married to Caesar’s great niece Octavia – the same
one he had recently offered to Pompey as a prospective wife. Whether or
not he knew about this, Marcellus preferred to align himself with his cousins,
who were deeply hostile to Caesar.7
Pompey’s third consulship was another important step in his highly
successful, but utterly unorthodox, career. Once again he had been singled
out by the Republic as the only man who could deal with a crisis, with even
his personal enemies accepting the necessity of employing him. In the past
it had been Lepidus, then Sertorius, the pirates, Mithridates and the grain
supply, and now it was political violence in the city. As usual, he performed
the task well, but he would not have been a Roman senator if he had not also
taken the opportunity for gaining personal advantages. He made sure that
he was granted an extension of five years to his command of the two Spanish
provinces, ensuring that he would keep his imperium and his legions even
after his year as consul was complete. Early in 52 BC Milo and two of the
remaining three candidates for the consulship were condemned and sent
into exile. The last man, Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio Nasica,
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had one of the most distinguished family lines in Rome, as was indicated by
his enormously long name. Born a patrician Scipio – the family that had
produced the man who had beaten Hannibal in the Second Punic War and
the one who destroyed Carthage in the Third War – he had subsequently been
adopted into a branch of the Metelli, one of the most distinguished plebian
families. Metellus Scipio thus combined great wealth with enormous family
connections and hugely prestigious ancestors. His own abilities were
extremely limited, but he did have a pretty daughter, Cornelia, who had
been married to Crassus’ dashing son Publius and had been widowed since
Carrhae. Pompey decided to marry for the fourth time and found that his
approach was welcomed by Metellus Scipio. The charges faced by the latter
were quietly dropped and the wedding took place. Like Julia, Pompey’s new
bride was young enough to be his daughter, indeed almost his granddaughter,
but the marriage again proved a happy and successful one. Cornelia was
intelligent, sophisticated and charming, as well as physically attractive.
Pompey had always revelled in adoration and willingly responded to a wife
who gave every sign of being in love with him. He was fifty-four, but for a
man who had been so successful at such a young age and was proud of his
personal fitness and enjoyed having his good looks praised, coping with late
middle age may not have been easy. It is tempting to suggest that taking two
much younger wives helped him to feel rejuvenated. Politically the connection
was also a very good one, allying the maverick general with some of the
families at the very heart of the Republic’s elite. Cornelia’s father also
profited, not only by escaping prosecution but also being named as Pompey’s
consular colleague in August.8
Caesar may well have been disappointed at his former son-in-law’s decision
to seek a marriage alliance elsewhere. With hindsight we know that just two
and a half years later the two men would be fighting against each other, but
there is little evidence at the time of any great breach opening up between
the two surviving triumvirs. He had not wanted to return to become
Pompey’s colleague, since apart from the rebellion he had not yet completed
the settlement of his new conquests. Caesar was beginning to think of the
future and had already made it clear that he hoped to go straight from his
command in Gaul to a second consulship. He did not wish to spend an
interval as a private citizen, when he would be liable to prosecution, most
probably relating to his year as consul. Some of Pompey’s actions in 52 BC
seemed to conflict with this aim. The delay imposed on consuls going out
to their province indirectly threatened Caesar’s position. Until now, the
provinces that would be allocated to new consuls had to be named before
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the elections, so that there would be plenty of warning – some eighteen
months or so – if the current governor was going to be replaced. With the
new system an ex-consul could, in theory, be instantly appointed to any
province, including Caesar’s and especially Transalpine Gaul, which had
been granted to him by the Senate and not through popular vote. This was
unsettling, but it was reasonable to suppose that Pompey and Caesar’s other
friends in Rome could prevent this from happening, in spite of the efforts of
men like Domitius Ahenobarbus.
Of more concern was a law passed by Pompey that outlawed the practice
of candidates standing for the consulship in absentia, that is without actually
being present in the city. This meant that Caesar would have to lay down his
imperium and therefore become subject to prosecution if he wanted to stand
for a second term as consul. Earlier in the year he had persuaded the tribunes,
who had wanted to recall him to become Pompey’s colleague, to bring in a
bill specifically granting him the right to stand for election without being
present. Caesar’s associates in the Senate were quick to remind Pompey that
this earlier law seemed now to be contradicted by his own legislation. The
inscribed bronze tablet bearing the text of the new law had already been
deposited in the Republic’s records, but Pompey wrote an additional clause
with his own hand and ordered that this be attached to the main law.
Obviously such an addition was of questionable legal validity. The apparent
slight to Caesar may well have been unintentional, or it may be that Pompey
just wished to remind his ally that he could not be taken for granted. Both
of them were allies for as long as it seemed beneficial. For the moment
neither would gain from a split. The alliance may have been weaker by the
end of 52 BC than it had been in earlier years, but it still held. When news
arrived of the defeat of Vercingetorix, Caesar was voted another twentyday
public thanksgiving. Pompey was still willing to celebrate the deeds of
his ally, but also took care to commemorate his own achievements, dedicating
a temple to Victory (Victoria).9
The End in Gaul
‘The whole of Gaul was conquered . . .’ wrote Hirtius as he opened the
narrative of the book that he added to complete Caesar’s Commentaries on
the Gallic War. Yet his own account soon makes it clear that this was not
quite true. Many of the rebellious tribes capitulated after the surrender of
Vercingetorix at Alesia, but a few remained recalcitrant. On 31 December
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52 BC Caesar left Bibracte and took the Eleventh and Thirteenth legions out
of winter quarters and led them on a punitive expedition against the
Bituriges. The Romans attacked suddenly and the proconsul ordered his
men not to set fire to farms and villages in the normal way, so there were no
plumes of smoke to warn the tribe of their approach. Thousands of prisoners
were taken as the Gauls were unable to mount any organised resistance.
Their lands had been campaigned over by the rival armies in the previous
summer, when they had willingly obeyed Vercingetorix’s order to burn their
towns and food stores, and the Bituriges were in no position to fight and soon
surrendered. They were encouraged by the generous terms Caesar had
granted to other rebel tribes, and he was eager to extend his clemency to
them. In these circumstances there were no slaves or plunder to distribute to
the soldiers, so the proconsul gave them a bounty of 200 sestertii per man,
and 2,000 to each centurion, to reward them for their good conduct on a
winter campaign. Two and a half weeks later he took the Sixth and
Fourteenth legions on a similar operation to punish the Carnutes. The Gauls
fled from their homes and for a while Caesar billeted many of his men in the
houses of the town of Cenabum, scene of the massacre in the previous year.
Raiding parties of infantry and cavalry were sent out on a regular basis to
maraud around the surrounding countryside. Living in hiding and exposed
to the winter weather, the Carnutes soon ran short of food and suffered
badly. Many of them fled to take refuge with other tribes.10
Leaving Trebonius in charge at Cenabum, he called out the Seventh, Eighth
and Ninth legions from their winter quarters, ordered the Eleventh to join
them and moved against the Bellovaci. This tribe had a high reputation for
courage and had not sent many warriors to join the great army that had
tried to relieve Alesia. Only a couple of thousand men went at the special
request of Commius, who was well connected within the tribe. The rest
preferred to fight the Romans on their own and in their own way. Early in
51 BC the Bellovaci massed a strong army, led by Correus with the assistance
of Commius, who had refused to give himself up after Alesia. From prisoners
Caesar learned that the enemy planned to attack him if he was accompanied
by no more than three legions, but would otherwise observe and wait for a
better opportunity. He tried to conceal his fourth legion behind the army’s
baggage train, hoping to lure the Bellovaci into battle and win a quick victory.
The Gauls refused to be drawn and the two armies camped facing each other
across a valley. Neither side was prepared to attack uphill against the enemy
and place themselves at a disadvantage, but for added security Caesar had
his legionaries fortify the position more strongly than was usual for a
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marching camp. There were frequent skirmishes – both sides were using
German troops, for Commius had managed to persuade 500 of these to join
the Bellovaci – and on one occasion the Gauls ambushed and cut up a
foraging party of the Remi who were fighting as Roman allies. Caesar decided
that his forces were inadequate for the task and summoned the Sixth,
Thirteenth and Fourteenth legions to join him. The campaign was proving
a lot tougher than he had anticipated, and as news of this reached Rome wild
rumours circulated about serious defeats. When the enemy scouts reported
their approach the Bellovaci decided to withdraw, successively disengaging
under cover of a burning barrier of straw bales and dried wood that they had
secretly prepared for the occasion. After this they relied on ambush rather
than direct confrontation, keeping their main army some distance back.
Over the next days they inflicted a number of small reverses on the Romans.
Intelligence plays a huge role in such operations and Caesar sensed an
opportunity when he learned from the interrogation of a prisoner that
Correus, with 6,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry, was lying in wait for one of
his foraging parties. Forewarned, the auxiliary cavalry were able to hold the
ambushers off until the legions hurried up to support them. Most of the
Gauls fled, but Correus himself refused either to escape or to surrender and
was killed with javelins. Caesar took the legions on, moving against the
main enemy camp that his scouts believed was some 8 miles away.
Correus’ death and the arrival of fugitives from his defeat prompted the
Bellovaci to send peace envoys to Caesar. These men attempted to place all
the blame for the rebellion on the dead chieftain. The proconsul informed
them that he doubted that one man had been entirely responsible but was
anyway content to accept their surrender and not impose further
punishments on them. The Bellovaci gave him hostages. Impressed by his
leniency, a number of other tribes capitulated over the next weeks. There was
some truth to what Caesar had said about the influence of a single chief, but
he certainly realised the importance of charismatic leaders in keeping a
rebellion going. Soon afterwards he led another punitive expedition against
the Eburones, since their chieftain Ambiorix was still at large. Commius
also escaped from the defeat of the Bellovaci and he and his retinue were
hunted by the Romans. At one point Labienus feigned a willingness to
negotiate with the Atrebatian king in the hope of murdering him but
Commius escaped with just a wound. Later he was nearly caught by another
Roman patrol and declared that he was willing to make peace, so long as he
never had to come into the presence of another Roman. Caesar’s response
to this is not reported, but in the end Commius fled across the sea to Britain,
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making himself king of one of the tribes on the south coast and founding
a dynasty.11
There was one final major rebellion, this time amongst the tribes of the
South West, and centring around the walled hill town of Uxellodunum in
modern Dordogne. One of the two main leaders was Lucterius, the man
who on Vercingetorix’s orders had raided Transalpine Gaul early in 52 BC.
Much of the fighting was done by Caesar’s legates, but the proconsul himself
arrived to complete the business, on his way accepting the surrender of the
Carnutes after they handed over to him for punishment the main leader of
the rebellion. According to Hirtius, Caesar was forced to execute the man
because his soldiers were still outraged by the massacre at Cenabum. The
rebels were surrounded in the town and using his legionaries’ engineering
skill, he managed to cut off the Gauls’ water supply. When the defenders
came out to surrender, Caesar decided to make an example of them ‘since
his mildness was already well known’ as Hirtius puts it. Each of the warriors
had his hands cut off and was then set free to live on as a warning to others.
Some modern scholars are inclined to see Hirtius’ comment as more relevant
to the Civil War than Caesar’s campaigns in Gaul, but this is to see things
with a modern eye. Earlier in the book Hirtius has already given examples
of Caesar not imposing harsh terms after rebellious tribes had surrendered,
and noted that this encouraged others to give in. After military victory
Caesar was keen to win a political peace by persuading leading men
throughout Gaul of the advantages of loyalty to Rome. There was proof of
the effectiveness of this policy soon afterwards when Lucterius, who had
escaped capture at Uxellodunum, was handed over to the Romans by another
Arvernian chieftain. Hirtius described Caesar’s activity in the winter of
51–50 BC: ‘Caesar had one main aim, keeping the tribes friendly, and giving
them neither the opportunity nor cause for war. . . . And so, by dealing with
the tribes honourably, by granting rich bounties to the chieftains, and by
not imposing burdens, he made their state of subjection tolerable, and easily
kept the peace in a Gaul weary after so many military defeats.’12 Although
he may have misread the situation in the build-up to the great rebellion in
52 BC, Caesar seems now to have handled the diplomacy very well. The next
summer passed peacefully. At the beginning of 49 BC he would leave Gaul,
eventually taking the greater part of his troops with him. However, there
would be no great rebellion as soon as the Roman yoke slackened its grip.
The Bellovaci would rise again in 46 BC and have to be suppressed, but
otherwise Gaul remained peaceful for the next decade.13

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Caesar spent nine years in Gaul, extending Roman rule to the Rhine in the
east, the English Channel in the north and the Atlantic coast in the west. The
area would remain part of Rome’s empire for the best part of five centuries.
During most of that time it would have internal peace – broken by a few
rebellions in the first generation or so after conquest, then only by occasional
Roman civil wars and, especially in the later years, periodic barbarian raids
– and enjoyed widespread prosperity. The aristocracy earned Roman
citizenship and within a century of Caesar’s death the descendants of men
who had fought against him would take their place in Rome’s Senate. As
the population, or at least the wealthier classes, were granted the benefits of
glass in their windows, running water, sewers, bath-houses and central
heating, Gaulish culture was modified and influenced by Roman ideas and
concepts to become what is today known as Gallo-Roman culture. Latin
became commonly used, especially in the towns and cities and amongst the
aristocracy. Literacy and the idea of written records spread. The druidic
priesthood was suppressed and practices such as head-hunting and human
sacrifice stopped, but many other aspects of Gaulish religion continued,
even if gods and goddesses were sometimes given new Roman names. In
time the old religions would be challenged by the spread of Christianity, at
first as a secret cult, but from Constantine onwards as the official religion
of the Roman Empire. The new faith was just one of many ideas and
concepts that reached Gaul because it had become part of the wider Roman
world in which it was much easier and safer for people to travel. Rome’s
impact on Gaul and its peoples was profound and proved tenacious, far
more so than in Britain where most traces of Roman culture vanished within
a generation or two of its ceasing to be a province.
This was the history that Gaul would have as a result of Caesar’s
campaigns. We cannot know what would have happened if these had not
occurred – if, for instance, he had embarked upon a Balkan war instead.
More than two thousand years have passed and the number of possibilities
for what might have happened are truly vast. It is highly probable that the
Romans would at some point have conquered Gaul, although perhaps not
with the speed and intensity that Caesar brought to his campaigns. Given
the relatively limited possibilities for Roman expansion in the middle of the
first century BC, it is equally likely that this would have happened fairly
soon. Roman rule brought to Gaul and other provinces many advantages.
At a most basic level it is not unreasonable to say that more people were
better off living under the Roman Empire than they were before it came or
after it failed. The faults of Roman society – and there were many – were
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often shared by other cultures including the Gauls. Slavery is an obvious
example. The violent entertainments of the arena, which came alongside
literature, art and drama as part of Rome’s influence, were less usual. Caesar
was not responsible for Roman imperialism or for Roman culture, although
he was certainly an enthusiastic agent of the Republic’s expansion. His
conquest of Gaul was not a fulfilment of a long-term aim or ambition, in
any sense other than that he had long craved the chance to win glory. It was
chance and opportunity that led to him focusing his attention on Gaul.
The benefits of Roman rule are arguable but the grim nature of Roman
conquest is not. Plutarch claims that one million Gauls were killed during
Caesar’s campaigns, and the same number were captured and, in most cases,
sold as slaves. Pliny, adding in the casualties inflicted by Caesar’s legions on
the enemy in the Civil War, says that his men killed 1,192,000 opponents in
battle, although he did not feel that such an achievement added to his glory.
Velleius Paterculus says that 400,000 enemies were killed in the Gallic
campaigns and ‘still more captured’. It is hard to know the basis for any of these
numbers. The figures given for enemy casualties in the Commentaries on the
Gallic War do not add up to such a great total, while Caesar’s account of the
Civil War often did not mention such things. It is questionable that numbers
for losses amongst the Gaulish tribes were known with precision, although it
may just have been possible to calculate from records the number of prisoners
taken and sold into slavery. Probably these numbers are exaggerated, but still
give some indication of the appalling human cost of Caesar’s victories. The
impact of these campaigns on Gaul cannot have been anything but massive.
Certain areas were devastated and would not recover for decades. In 50 BC
Caesar set the annual revenue from his new Gallic province at 40 million
sestertii – less than he had paid for the land needed for his forum project. This
amount probably reflected the cost of eight years of intensive campaigning.
We can only imagine the social dislocation caused by, for instance, Caesar’s
execution of the entire ruling council of the Veneti. Caesar was entirely
pragmatic – effectively amoral – in his use of clemency or massacre and atrocity.
During the course of the conquest of Gaul his soldiers did some terrible things,
sometimes by order, as when they massacred the Usipetes and Tencteri, and
occasionally spontaneously, as when they slaughtered women and children at
Avaricum. Other Roman armies under other commanders had done similar
things in the past, and would continue to do so in the future. Indeed atrocities
as bad, or even worse, were committed by virtually all armies of the ancient
world. This is not to justify what Caesar did, merely to place it into context.
Warfare in antiquity was generally an extremely cruel business.14
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Caesar had worked for years for the opportunity of high command and
when he was given it in 58 BC he seized the chance with both hands, exploiting
every opportunity for conflict and conquest. In the campaigns that followed
he proved himself to be a general of genius, ranking amongst the finest
Rome had ever produced. His command style was typically Roman,
controlling a battle from close behind the fighting line, ordering up reserves
and encouraging the men while observing their conduct. His strategy was
aggressive, seizing and maintaining the initiative, and never doubting his
ultimate success regardless of the odds ranged against him. Again this was
the Roman way of warfare, and much that might seem rash to a modern
observer would not have been seen in this way by other senators. Of
contemporary commanders only Pompey might match his achievements
and skill, for although Lucullus had been a great tactician he lacked Caesar’s
ability as a leader. Both men were similarly aggressive in their campaigns.
None of this had come instantly – Caesar had faltered at times in his early
campaigns, and it took prolonged service and continued success before his
legions were won over by his charm, generosity and competence. There were
mistakes and failures, notably the haphazard nature of the British
expeditions, the loss of Cotta and Sabinus’ men and the defeat at Gergovia,
but Caesar convinced his men that under his command they would always
win through in the end. In eight years of intensive operations success after
success reinforced the legionaries’ certainty. By 50 BC he had created an army
that was utterly devoted to him. Caesar had won huge glory and made
himself fabulously rich, allowing him to spend freely in his efforts to win
more support in Rome itself. It now remained to be seen whether this was
enough to allow him to return to Rome and stand alongside Pompey as the
Republic’s greatest citizens.15
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Pa rt t h r e e

CIVIL WAR AND
DICTATORSHIP
49–44 BC
XVII
The Road to
the Rubicon
‘Then, catching up with his cohorts at the river Rubicon, the point at
which his province ended, he paused for a moment, and understanding
what a huge thing he was planning, he turned and spoke to the men with
him. “Even now we could turn back; but once we cross that tiny bridge,
then everything will depend on armed force.”’ – Suetonius, late first
century AD.1
‘All this has made him [Caesar] so powerful, that the only hope of standing
up to him rests on one citizen [Pompey]. I really wish that the latter had
not given him so much power in the first place, rather than waiting till he
was strong before fighting him.’ – Cicero, 9 December 50 BC.2
Gaul had provided Caesar with glory and wealth. By 50 BC there was no
serious fighting and there was every indication that the series of devastating
defeats inflicted on each rebellion had combined with the careful diplomatic
efforts of the proconsul to create a stable new province for the Republic.
The willingness of the vast majority of the tribal leaders to accept Roman
rule was not just a question of personal loyalty to Caesar. His murder six
years later did not provoke fresh outbreaks of unrest in Gaul. Like any other
successful Roman commander he had reaped great personal benefits from
his victories, but this should not obscure the gains his conquests had brought
to Rome. Formally, the Republic now had a new source of revenue, although
this had to balanced against the costs of garrisoning the province. Transalpine
Gaul and the important land routes to Spain were secured, while Italy itself
was now much better shielded from invasion by northern tribes following in
the footsteps of the Cimbri and Teutones. There was no imminent threat to
Italy from this direction, and such strategic concerns were not foremost in
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The Road to the Rubicon
Caesar’s mind when he initiated his campaigns. Yet they were no less real for
all that and it was undeniable that in this respect the conquest of Gaul was
beneficial to Rome. However, throughout history expansion has tended to
benefit individuals far more than states, and this was certainly true of Roman
imperialism. Trade with Gaul was important before Caesar’s arrival, but
his campaigns helped to open up new markets – for instance in Britain – to
Roman merchants and allowed them to operate in very favourable conditions
in the new province of Gaul. Fortunes were made even more rapidly by
Caesar’s senior officers and staff, who shared in his generous distributions
of plunder and slaves. He was also not one to hoard his own new-found
wealth, but spent lavishly on his building projects and planned
entertainments, and at a more personal level offered interest free loans or even
gifts of money to men he wished to cultivate. Many Romans who had never
been anywhere near Gaul gained from its conquest.
There were benefits to the Republic – and even more to individuals – from
the victories in Gaul, but all were dwarfed by the immediate and irrevocable
change these brought to Caesar’s personal fortune and status. By 50 BC he
was wealthier, had a more extensive network of friends and clients, and
could boast of greater and more glorious achievements than any other
senator except for Pompey. For several years he had made it clear that he
intended to seek a second consulship on his return to Rome. His electoral
success was virtually guaranteed, for he had always been popular with the
voters and now had even more money with which to court their favour. Long
established law, restated by Sulla during his dictatorship, decreed that a tenyear
interval should elapse between consulships. This had been set aside in
Pompey’s case in 52 BC, just one of many unorthodox steps in his career,
but the law remained in force and Caesar had no desire or need for
preferential treatment in this respect. He planned to put his name forward
as a candidate for election in the autumn of 49 BC, to assume the consulship
in January 48 BC, ten years after he had laid down the office at the end of
his first term as consul. The controversies of that year still dogged him, and
Caesar knew that he would be prosecuted as soon as he became a private
citizen. For that reason he wished to go straight from his proconsular
command into the second consulship. The law put forward by all ten tribunes
of 52 BC – admittedly in at least one case after some initial reluctance – had
granted him permission to become a candidate without actually entering
the city in the normal way. Pompey and Crassus had done the same thing in
71 BC, waiting with their armies outside Rome and only crossing the formal
boundary of the city when they actually assumed the consulship. Once he
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had become consul – ideally with a sympathetic colleague, perhaps even
one of his own former legates such as Labienus – Caesar would be in a
position to present new legislation, rewarding his veteran soldiers with land
and confirming his settlement of Gaul. Other bills could have been tailored
to add to his popularity with various sections of society. Back in the heart
of public life, he would have had a year in which either to win over his
political enemies or, at the very least, make himself so strong that they would
not risk attacking him in the courts. We do not know what he planned after
that, and it is more than possible that he had no clear idea himself at this
stage and intended to await events. A fresh provincial command would have
been one option, perhaps against the Parthians to avenge the stain of Crassus’
disastrous defeat at Carrhae. Alternatively, he may have hoped for some
appointment similar to Pompey’s, allowing him to hold imperium and control
legions while hovering just outside Rome.3
In the event, nothing worked out as Caesar had planned. Instead of coming
back home to a second consulship, a Gallic triumph, games honouring his
daughter and general acknowledgement as Pompey’s equal as the two foremost
men in the Republic, he returned as a rebel. His opponents held very different
ideas about the manner in which he should return, and so increasingly did
Pompey. There were attempts at negotiation, many offers of compromise, but
in the end it proved impossible to find a settlement that all were willing and
able to accept. Stubbornness, pride and suspicion on all sides, as well as deep
personal enmities in a few cases, all contributed to this impasse. So did
misplaced optimism, leading to the belief that opponents would back down.
Some had seen the possibility of civil war for more than a year before it actually
broke out, but very few of the key participants actually wanted it. Most,
including Caesar and Pompey, were gradually and reluctantly drawn into a
situation in which they decided that they no longer had any other acceptable
alternative. It would be very hard to say when war finally became inevitable.
The Civil War was not fought over great issues or between conflicting
ideologies, but was about personal position and dignitas – most of all that of
Caesar. In later years, especially for men living under the rule of Rome’s
emperors, some were inclined to see Caesar as aiming at revolution and
monarchy from his early youth. No contemporary evidence supports such
claims, while his actions certainly give no hint of such plans. A peaceful return
to take up a pre-eminent position within the Republic, his prestige, influence
and auctoritas acknowledged by all other senators, even those who disliked
him, was what Caesar craved. Having to resort to armed force to protect his
position was a sign of political failure, for Pompey as much as for Caesar.4
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The Breakdown of an Alliance
The pressure on Caesar had built up gradually. When Cato had condemned
his actions against the Usipetes and Tencteri in 55 BC, there had been no
realistic prospect that the Senate would act upon his proposal and actually
hand the proconsul over to the Germans. The triumvirate had been renewed
at Luca and between them Pompey, Crassus and Caesar – especially the first
two because they were actually in Rome – were too strong to oppose.
Domitius Ahenobarbus could only be denied the consulship for a year, but
his ambition to replace Caesar in the Gallic command was blocked without
too much difficulty. The death of Julia weakened the bond between Caesar
and Pompey. That of Crassus fundamentally shifted the balance of Roman
public life, since so many leading men had been under obligation to him
for past loans or favours. His surviving son Marcus was neither old enough
nor able enough to step into his father’s shoes at the centre of this network
of clients and political friends. Some of these men now attached themselves
to Pompey and some to Caesar, but the bonds could not instantly become
as strong as the ones to Crassus, who had devoted much effort over many
years to expanding his political capital as much as his financial wealth.
Many of the strongest critics of Caesar had also in the past been hostile to
Pompey, which made his appointment as sole consul in 52 BC on the motion
of Bibulus backed by Cato all the more striking. Cato did stress his continued
personal independence, bluntly telling Pompey that he would advise him
for the good of the Republic but that this did not imply any personal
friendship between them. This no doubt contributed to his failure to gain
the consulship. However, for the moment at least, Pompey, through his new
marriage and willingness to restore order to the State, had become more
acceptable to many of the leading men in the Senate. These liked to be
known as the ‘good men’ (boni) – or sometimes the ‘best’ (optimates) – and
came predominantly from very well-established families. In 52 BC they
willingly supported Pompey as a means of dealing with the violence that was
disrupting public life, especially since, apart from Milo, virtually all the
casualties from the trials in the new court were partisans of Clodius. Cato
had even said that Milo ought to be acquitted as one who had deserved well
of the Republic for disposing of his dangerous rival.5
In 51 BC Marcus Claudius Marcellus was consul and began a concerted
attack on Caesar, who was his personal enemy. The ultimate source of this
hostility is obscure, though a major factor was doubtless the resentment of
the virtual monopoly of grand and important commands held by the
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triumvirate. Under normal circumstances, such opportunities for serving
the Republic and winning glory ought to have gone to men from the great
aristocratic families – men like Marcellus himself, his brother and cousin.
Pompey was too strong to attack at present, but Caesar appeared to be
vulnerable. Marcellus openly declared his intention of having Caesar recalled
from his command, arguing that his great victory over Vercingetorix, which
the Republic had marked with a public thanksgiving, showed that the war
in Gaul was now over. This justification was necessary, since in 55 BC Crassus’
and Pompey’s law had granted Caesar a new five-year command in Gaul.
Marcellus also argued that Pompey’s more recent law concerning provincial
commands superseded the tribunes’ law granting Caesar the privilege of
becoming a candidate for his second consulship without actually returning
to the city. As early as March Pompey expressed his disapproval of the
consul’s intentions. Apart from his ties with Caesar, it was deeply insulting
to have his own law challenged in this way, especially since clauses in the
law itself had forbidden alteration of it by subsequent meetings of the Senate
or Assembly. He made it clear that he would never support any move to have
Caesar recalled before his legal term as proconsul had expired.
In July questions were asked in the Senate about the legion that Pompey
had ‘loaned’ to Caesar after the defeat of Cotta and Sabinus, and he was
urged to take it back under his direct command. Grudgingly Pompey declared
that he would do so, but refused to be coerced and set no date for recalling
his troops. Marcellus kept up the pressure and, after a postponement,
managed to ensure that the Senate would debate the matter of Caesar’s
province on 1 September. The Senate met outside the formal boundary of
the city, so that Pompey could once again be present. He again stated his view
that it would not be proper for the Senate to rule on this question at the
moment. His father-in-law Metellus Scipio did put forward a motion for
the issue to be raised again on 30 March 50 BC, and it seems unlikely that
Pompey disapproved of this. In fact Marcellus was able to secure a fuller
debate much earlier than this on 29 September. Once again Pompey was
present. Marcellus put forward a motion very similar to that of Scipio
decreeing that the Senate should address the issue of the ‘consular provinces’
on or after 1 March. This was approved. Further measures, one to bar any
tribune from vetoing the decision of that debate, and another to begin the
process of discharging any of Caesar’s soldiers who had served for their full
legal term – which at this period was most probably sixteen years – or had
other grounds for honourable discharge were debated. Both of these
proposals were vetoed by two or more tribunes, as was another dealing with
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appointments to propraetorian provincial commands that would also have
affected the number of men waiting for commands when Caesar’s term
expired.6
Marcellus had not won outright, but neither had he altogether lost. Caesar
was still formally acknowledged as rightful governor of his three provinces
when the consul laid down his office at the end of the year. Earlier in the year
he had shown a sign of his frustration with working solely through the proper
channels in the Senate. In 59 BC as part of his agrarian legislation Caesar had
established a colony at Novum Comum in Cisalpine Gaul north of the River
Po. Throughout his time in Gaul, he had also treated the Transpadanes as
citizens even though they as yet had only Latin status. Marcellus ordered a
former magistrate of the colony to be flogged, a punishment from which
citizens were exempt, telling the man to go back to Caesar and ‘show him his
stripes’. It was a crass act, which disgusted Cicero when he heard about it,
and indicates just how bitterly Marcellus loathed Caesar. Even if he had not
secured the proconsul’s recall, Marcellus had raised serious questions over his
future. Some of Pompey’s comments during and after the debate on 29
September certainly encouraged Caesar’s opponents. He stated that he could
not countenance the removal of Caesar from his command until 1 March
50 BC, but that after that his attitude would be different, which rather suggests
that he believed that the command granted to Caesar by his own and Crassus’
law would expire on that date. Asked what his attitude would be if a tribune
vetoed the Senate’s decision at that point, Pompey’s answer implied little
closeness with his ally and former father-in-law. He said that it did not matter
whether Caesar opposed the Senate himself or via the agency of a tribune –
either by implication would be wrong. Cicero was not in Rome at the time –
having gone reluctantly to govern Cilicia as a result of the new regulations
introduced in 52 BC. Fortunately one of his correspondents – the same Caelius
Rufus he had successfully defended in 56 BC and who was now aedile – sent
him a detailed account, which mentions one last question put to Pompey:
‘“What if,” someone else said, “he wants to be consul and still retain his
army?” To this Pompey responded mildly, “What if my son wants to attack
me with a stick?” These words have made people suspect that Pompey is
having a row with Caesar.’7
The question of precisely when Caesar’s provincial command expired
has long been a source of academic debate and seems unlikely ever to be
finally resolved. Clearly some obvious significance must have been attached
to 1 March 50 BC for Pompey to select this as the date after which it would
be proper to consider a replacement. This tends to suggest that the law
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passed in 55 BC granting Caesar an extension of his command had come
into force in February of that year. Therefore the five years granted to Caesar
began then and expired on the first day of March 50 BC, known to the
Romans as the Kalends of March. From that point, a new governor could
be appointed by the Senate and Caesar’s command would end as soon as this
replacement arrived. Caesar clearly interpreted the law differently and may
have preferred to see it as having granted him an extension of his original
five-year command, the new period not commencing until the first was
complete. However, he does not seem to have made any formal
announcement as to when he believed his command should legally end. It
is perfectly possible that the original law was imprecise, for it was likely to
have been prepared in considerable haste and at a time when the alliance
between the triumvirate was strong. The situation was further complicated
by the bill passed by all ten tribunes, granting Caesar the right to stand for
election without having to present himself in person as a candidate. He took
this to mean that he should not be replaced in Gaul until the elections had
occurred, a period of some eighteen months if his term ended in March 50,
and he intended to wait till the consular elections in the autumn of 49 BC.8
Domitius Ahenobarbus had wished to take over the command in Gaul for
some time and since his praetorship had also attacked Caesar’s consulship.
Cato was equally vocal in his criticism and repeatedly stated his intention
of prosecuting Caesar for the events of 59 BC, and had even taken an oath
to that effect. More recently he had taken to declaring that Caesar would
stand trial just as Milo had done, with armed soldiers surrounding the court.
Bibulus had also lost none of his resentment, though for the moment, just
like Cicero, he found himself despatched as provincial governor, in his case
to Syria. Marcellus, his brother and cousin were all equally hostile, and
Metellus Scipio was at best unfriendly. All were united in their desire to
prevent Caesar from returning to a second consulship and avoiding trial.
Yet for all their bitter hatred, none of this would really have mattered if
Pompey had decided to give his full support to Caesar, since this would
surely have allowed the latter to secure everything he wanted. Pompey had
proconsular imperium and a formed army in Spain. Without him there was
no force with which to threaten Caesar, still less to fight him if it came to
open conflict. Caesar’s opponents could achieve nothing without Pompey’s
support, as the failure of Marcellus to recall him from Gaul in 51 BC clearly
demonstrated. Equally, Caesar would struggle to remain in his command and
return to Rome as he wished without Pompey’s backing, or at least, neutrality.
As was so often the case, what Pompey was thinking was not clear to anyone
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else. Caelius already suspected a rift between the two remaining triumvirs
in the autumn of 51 BC. Pompey’s position was extremely strong and, in the
end, his greatest concern was how to profit from and maintain this
dominance. His old ally Caesar needed his help to get what he wanted. So
did Caesar’s opponents, to whom Pompey had become closer in the last few
years. If Caesar came back with all the wealth and glory of his Gaulish
victories then he would become Pompey’s equal and perhaps, in time and
given his greater political skill, eventually his superior. Yet if Caesar was
disposed of altogether, as Cato, Domitius, the Marcelli and their allies
wanted, then they would have less need of Pompey, and he might easily find
himself reduced to the comparative political impotence that had been his fate
when he returned from the east in 62 BC. For the moment Pompey held the
advantage, showing both Caesar and his opponents that they needed him,
but that neither could take his aid for granted.9
The new year seemed to augur well for Caesar’s enemies. Another
Marcellus was consul, after being acquitted on a charge of electoral bribery,
with Lucius Aemilius Lepidus Paullus as his colleague. The latter was the son
of the Lepidus who had rebelled in 78 BC, only to be suppressed by Pompey.
In spite of this, he was not believed to be especially well disposed towards
Caesar either, and was anyway currently more concerned with his efforts to
rebuild in grander fashion the Basilica Fulvia et Aemilia, a great monument
to an earlier member of his family. One of the new tribunes was Curio the
Younger, who in 59 BC had been one of the few men to criticise the triumvirate
publicly. Cicero’s lively correspondent Caelius was close to the tribune at
this time. Both were prominent members of a generation of young Romans
notorious for their wild lifestyle, which, combined with their grand
ambitions, often placed them into debt. Mark Antony was another of this
group of reckless youths, and Curio is said to have first introduced him to
the pleasures of mistresses, drinking and a flamboyantly luxurious lifestyle.
The consequence of this was that Antony was soon massively in debt, and
Curio’s father banned him from their house lest his own son proved too
willing to pay his friend’s way. More recently Curio had spent a huge sum
on staging spectacular funeral games in honour of the Elder Curio, who
died in 53 BC. He even constructed a wooden amphitheatre that revolved
and could be divided into two semi-circular theatres for individual theatrical
performances. A little later he had married Clodius’ widow, the forthright
and forceful Fulvia. These young men – they were still ‘adolescents’ in the
Roman understanding of the term – were talented, but did not seem at all
stable to the older generation.
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Caelius was convinced that Curio planned an all-out attack on Caesar, but
one of his first acts as tribune was to propose a new programme of
distributing land to the poor. The hostility of the consuls effectively blocked
this and instead he put forward bills for a new grain dole to citizens in Rome,
and a five-year programme of road building in Italy. At the same time he
began to make it clear at public meetings that he supported Caesar’s cause.
Later there was talk of Caesar buying his support by paying off his massive
debts with gold from the spoils of Gaul. Velleius Paterculus mentions
rumours of a bribe of 2.5 million denarii, while Valerius Maximus talks of
the staggering sum of 15 million. Gossip doubtless inflated the figure, but
in one sense Caesar was doing for Curio effectively what Crassus had once
done for him, covering his staggering debts in order to gain a useful political
ally. There was also talk of Paullus benefiting on the scale of 9 million
denarii, helping him to complete his building plans. Both men were ambitious
Roman aristocrats and looked to their own advantage when they switched
to supporting Caesar. For the moment they had been persuaded that it was
in their interest to support him. Curio was probably frustrated by the
blocking of his bills, which gave him no incentive to aid the leading men in
the Senate.10
The profits of his victories had allowed Caesar to win useful friends
amongst the magistrates. When Marcellus duly raised the question of
Caesar’s command on 1 March 50 BC his colleague did not support him,
but the real counter-attack was led by Curio, who focused most of his
attention on Pompey’s position. If Caesar was to be replaced in his Gallic
command, then the tribune argued that it would only be fair, as well as safe
for the Republic, if Pompey simultaneously gave up his extraordinary
command of the Spanish provinces. He had already voiced this proposal
at public meetings to the approval of the crowd. Caesar certainly approved
of the tactic and may well have suggested it in the first place. The Spanish
command had been renewed in 52 BC and still had several years left to run,
so there were no legal grounds for this proposal, but it was a reminder of
Pompey’s unprecedented position. It placed him and Caesar on the same
level, suggesting that either both or neither should enjoy the honours voted
to them by the Roman people. More personally, it was clearly intended to
show Pompey that it was to his advantage to maintain the alliance with
Caesar, since his own position might not in reality be as strong as he
thought. Adding this element to the debate raised the stakes, but took
back some of the initiative from Caesar’s opponents. They were at first
stunned, and for several months there was deadlock, with Curio vetoing
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any attempt by the Senate to act against Caesar. In April, Caelius wrote
again to Cicero:
As for the situation of the Republic, all contention is focused on a
single cause, namely the provinces. At the moment Pompey seems to
be backing the Senate in demanding that Caesar leave his province by
the Ides [13th] of November. Curio is utterly determined to prevent
this – he has abandoned all his other projects. Our ‘friends’ (you know
them well!) are afraid of pushing the issue to crisis point. This is the
scene – the whole thing – Pompey, just as if he was not attacking Caesar,
but making a fair settlement for him, blames Curio for making trouble.
At the same time he is absolutely against Caesar becoming consul
before giving up his province and army. He is getting a rough ride from
Curio, and his entire third consulship is attacked. You mark my words,
if they try to crush Curio with all their might, Caesar will come to the
rescue; if instead, as seems most likely, they are too frightened to risk
it, then Caesar will stay as long as he wants.11
It is not clear why Pompey chose 13 November as the new date for the end
of Caesar’s command. It was not much of a concession, since he would still
have had the best part of a year to wait before the consular elections in the
autumn of 49 BC. It might have been acceptable to Caesar if he wanted to
stand for the consulship in the elections at the end of 50 BC, but he does not
seem to have made any attempt to secure exemption from law decreeing a
ten-year interval between consulships. In any case, given the circumstances
he may have decided that this was unlikely to succeed. By June, Caelius was
reporting that Marcellus suggested negotiating with the tribunes, but the
Senate voted against any such compromise. Curio continued to insist that
Caesar’s command should not be discussed independently and that he must
be treated in the same way as Pompey. A year before there had been talk of
Pompey going out to Spain – now some suggested that either he or Caesar
should go to deal with the Parthians. Cicero was very nervous that the latter
might launch an all-out invasion of Rome’s eastern provinces before he could
give up his own post as governor of Cilicia – knowing that once an attack
occurred it would be dishonourable for him to leave. That summer the Senate
decided to take one legion from Pompey’s and another from Caesar’s armies
and send the troops out to bolster Rome’s forces on the Parthian border.
Pompey decided to send the one that he had loaned to Caesar in 54 BC, and
which had been campaigning with him ever since. Effectively this meant
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that Caesar lost two legions, but before he sent the men on their way he
gave each soldier a bounty of 250 denarii, a sum amounting to more than
one year’s pay. The whole affair seemed even more suspicious when the two
units marched back to Italy and then remained there, no one making any
effort to send them overseas. A young member of the Claudian family had
collected the troops from Gaul and returned claiming that Caesar’s entire
army was disaffected. It was just what Pompey wanted to believe.
Soon afterwards Pompey fell ill, suffering from a recurring fever that may
possibly have been malaria. Apparently spontaneously, people throughout
Italy began praying and making offerings for the return to health of the
man who had performed such great services to the Republic. When he
recovered the celebrations were ecstatic, crowds greeting him all along his
route as he went from Naples back to the outskirts of Rome. Pompey had
always thrived on adoration, whether from his wives, his soldiers or the
people, and was deeply moved. More dangerously he interpreted this
enthusiasm as a clear sign of widespread devotion to his cause. While still
ill he had sent word to the Senate that he was willing to resign his command,
assuring them that Caesar would do the same. Curio responded by saying
that that would be fine, as long as Pompey laid down his post first. By August
Caelius was speaking to Cicero of the prospect of civil war. ‘If neither of the
two sets off on a Parthian war, then I can see great discord ahead, which will
be decided by cold steel and brute force. They are both well prepared in
spirit and with armies.’12
Yet there was little enthusiasm for conflict beyond the immediate partisans,
as was shown when the Senate debated the issue on 1 December. Curio again
proposed that both Caesar and Pompey should give up their commands
simultaneously. The consul Marcellus split this into two and presented
separate motions to the House. The first, that Caesar should resign, was
passed by a big majority, but the second asking Pompey to do the same was
defeated by a similarly large margin. When Curio responded by asking the
Senate to divide on the motion that both men should resign, the result was
highly revealing. Only twenty-two senators voted against this, but no fewer
than 370 backed it. The ‘back bench’ pedarii had lived up to their name and
voted with their feet, even though most of the great names had been with
the twenty-two. Marcellus dismissed the meeting, declaring ‘If that is what
you want, be Caesar’s slaves!’, and the votes were ignored. It had not been
a victory for Caesar, since a clear majority had wanted him to lay down his
provinces and his army, while supporting Pompey’s claim to retain his
command. Yet in the end what it had shown was that nearly the entire Senate
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wanted peace above all else. They were certainly not committed to Caesar’s
cause, but nor were they eager to risk civil war on behalf of Pompey, still less
of Cato, Domitius and their associates. By this time Cicero had come back
to Italy from his province and his view was similar. He felt that Caesar’s
demands were outrageously excessive, but even so preferred to grant them
rather than allow the Republic to tear itself apart. He, like many others,
remembered the dark days of the struggle between Sulla and the Marians and
had no wish to see such ghastly strife repeated. In his view there was still the
chance for compromise and a peaceful settlement. Perhaps there was, but the
mood of the main participants in the dispute had hardened to the point
where war was becoming more and more likely.13
A hard core of distinguished senators loathed Caesar, many of them for
personal as well as political reasons. Much of this hatred was not entirely
rational. There were memories of his popularis behaviour as aedile and
praetor, and even worse his turbulent consulship. To Cato and his associates
Caesar was the Catiline who had never quite allowed his villainy to become
so open. They saw the effect of his charm on others – on other men’s wives
as often as on the crowd in the Forum – but felt that they had seen past it,
which only made it all the more frustrating that others had not. It can never
have helped that Cato’s half-sister had been one of Caesar’s most ardent
lovers. Cato, his son-in-law Bibulus and brother-in-law Domitius
Ahenobarbus had stood up to Caesar in the past and had had their moments
of success. More often they had simply pushed Caesar into going further,
and time after time he had got away with it, riding roughshod over them in
59 BC. They despised Caesar as a man, which made his obviously exceptional
talent in public life and as an army commander all the more galling. Appius
Claudius, older brother of Clodius, who had co-operated with Caesar much
of the time, was obsessed with maintaining the dignity of his ancient
patrician heritage. One of his daughters was married to Servilia’s son and
Cato’s nephew Brutus, and another to Pompey’s eldest son. Opposition did
not just come from Cato’s extended family, for families like the Marcelli
and Lentuli did not like to see their current resurgence of electoral success
overshadowed. For Metellus Scipio there was concern both to live up to his
famous ancestors – both real and adopted – and eagerness to exploit the
advantages offered by his marriage tie to Pompey.
Ultimately, no Roman senator liked to see another man excelling him in
glory and influence. It was not so much what Caesar had done that provoked
their hostility – most would have happily praised the same deeds, especially
his victories in Gaul, if only they had been performed by someone else, or
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better yet by several other men so that no one individual gained too much
glory. Men from established families were raised to believe that they deserved
to guide the Republic, but Caesar’s eminence robbed them of much of this
role. Now there was a chance to end his career – preferably in court, and a
court that shared their view of the accused and the need to be rid of him,
but if not, by armed force. Pompey’s aid made this possible and so, for the
moment, he was useful enough for his own anomalous position to be ignored.
In the future then it might be possible to discard him or at least reduce his
dominance. Since he first hinted that he was not firmly committed to backing
Caesar’s demands, Pompey had encouraged his opponents. Cato at least
does seem to have hoped to avoid civil war, and once it began made some
effort to moderate the vehemence with which it was fought. His expectation
was that Caesar could be forced to submit. The attitude of his allies was
less clear. Some of them clearly hoped to profit from war. Cicero was
surprised and rather disgusted by the militancy he saw in many of these
men. He could also see no sense in fighting Caesar after years of allowing
him to become so powerful.14
Pompey’s attitude was different. Even at the end he would have been
content for Caesar to return to public life so long as it was in a way that
made it clear that he was not Pompey’s equal, still less his superior. This
desire had hardened as the months had gone by, and Curio had made such
efforts to place the two men on the same level. Crassus he had been able to
accept as an equal, for he was several years his senior and had fought for
Sulla. Perhaps as importantly, Pompey had always been confident that his
own charisma and spectacular military exploits – three triumphs compared
with Crassus’ mere ovation – gave him a comfortable advantage over his
rival. Caesar was younger by just six years, but more importantly he had
done nothing when Pompey had formed and led his own armies to victory,
and in this respect his career was decades behind. He found it easier to like
Caesar than Crassus, but perhaps in part that was because he did not see him
as a competitor, at least at first. Even after Caesar’s successes in Gaul,
Germany and Britain, Pompey still viewed him as a junior ally. After all he
had won triumphs on three continents – Asia, Africa and Europe – and
defeated many different opponents, some of them Roman, in the process
and not just barbarian tribes. ‘What if my son wants to attack me with a
stick?’ – the comment implied not just the ease of dealing with such a threat,
but how absurdly unlikely it was that it would even happen. Pompey did
not want civil war, but had little doubt that he could win it if the worst
came to the worst and it occurred. Around this time he would begin to boast
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that he had only to stamp his foot and armies would spring up from the soil
of Italy. In the end Caesar must realise that he needed to respect Pompey,
accept his terms for coming back, and trust to his friendship for protection
in the courts. Curio’s attack on his own position made him all the less
inclined to grant too many concessions to the proconsul in Gaul. Caesar
would have to see sense, but he could still be very useful to Pompey, who was
aware that Cato and his allies had no great love for him either.
Caesar claimed later that he had to fight a civil war in order to defend his
dignitas – his reputation. In his view the laws of his consulship had been
necessary and effective, especially the land laws. Since then he had served the
Republic well, defending its interests and its allies, and making Roman power
respected in regions that had never before seen a legion. For these
achievements the Senate had awarded him no less than three public
thanksgivings of unprecedented length. Now his command was to be
prematurely curtailed – at least in his view – while the law put forward by
all ten tribunes in 52 BC as an expression of the will of the Roman people
was being set aside both in detail and in spirit. His enemies, ignoring all his
successes, were boasting of attacking and condemning him because of his
consulship almost a decade ago. The great men of the Republic were not
taken to court. Pompey had not been prosecuted since his youth, before he
had raised his own legions. No one had ever dared to bring Crassus to trial.
Simply having to defend himself would have been a great blow to Caesar’s
pride and auctoritas. There was also the very real danger that he might be
condemned, especially if the court was controlled by enemies. As consul
his behaviour had been controversial at the very least, although innocence
or guilt was seldom the decisive factor in Roman trials. Milo’s fate offered
a warning, as did that of Gabinius, the man who as tribune in 67 BC had
secured Pompey the command against the pirates, and as consul in 58 BC with
Caesar’s father-in-law Calpurnius Piso had helped to secure the triumvirate’s
position. After that he had gone to govern Syria and, largely on his own
initiative, had taken his army into Egypt to restore the deposed Ptolemy
XII, a highly profitable enterprise. Yet he was a deeply unpopular man and,
in spite of his money and the support of Pompey, he was eventually
condemned when he returned to Rome in 53 BC, going into exile.
Caesar could easily have suffered a similar fate, but at the very least would
have been politically damaged, when any hint of vulnerability would attract
further prosecutions. He would therefore be taking a great risk if he placed
his trust in Pompey’s protection and gave up his command. Even if he chose
to support Caesar, Pompey might not have been able to save him. In any
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case, Cicero’s exile had demonstrated that Pompey was not always reliable.
Had Caesar given up his command he could have retained his imperium
and the command of some detachments of troops and remained just outside
Rome, on the reasonable basis of waiting to celebrate the triumph that must
surely be awarded for his victories in Gaul. Until he entered the city and so
laid down his imperium he would remain exempt from prosecution. Yet
there was no guarantee that if he did this he would still be permitted to
become a consular candidate in accordance with the tribunician law. While
still in command of three provinces and an army of ten legions, his
bargaining position was strong. After well over a year of attacks on his
position, he was very reluctant to sacrifice this. He knew that his enemies
were determined to destroy him. Pompey’s attitude was never easy to read.
By the close of 50 BC Caesar felt himself backed into a corner, reluctant to
place too much faith on his old ally.15
A century later the poet Lucan would write that ‘Caesar could not accept
a superior, nor Pompey an equal.’ For him, the Civil War was virtually
inevitable after Julia’s death severed the close bond between them, while
Crassus’ loss in Parthia removed from each the fear that he could end up
fighting alone against the other two. It was a fairly common view in the
ancient world and contains more than a grain of truth. Yet this tends to
imply an inevitability about the Civil War, and this should not be pushed too
far. Even in the last months before the war broke out, neither Caesar nor
Pompey seems to have believed that the other would not back down, or at
least offer acceptable terms. The long dispute had eroded their trust in each
other, however, and this made compromise far harder. They had raised the
stakes, which added to their nervousness about making a mistake at the last
minute. The outcome of the autumn’s elections further increased the tension.
The third Marcellus would become consul in the new year, with a colleague
from another noble family. They had beaten Servius Sulpicius Galba, who
had served competently as Caesar’s legate for most of the Gallic campaigns,
one of the few patricians to serve with him for any length of time. Appius
Claudius and Caesar’s father-in-law Calpurnius Piso became censors. The
former began to purge the Senate of men he considered to be unfit, something
that was generally seen as ironic given his own dubious reputation, and his
targets were mostly men believed to be associated with Caesar. Sallust, the
future historian, was expelled at this time and soon joined Caesar. An attack
on Curio was thwarted by Piso and the consul Paullus, but still resulted in
a brawl in the Senate during which the tribune tore the censor’s robe. There
was also a vacancy in the priestly college of augurs and Domitius
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Ahenobarbus was enraged to be beaten in the race for this by Mark Antony,
who was also elected tribune for the coming year. Most of Caesar’s opponents
were united only in their hatred of him, so it would be a mistake to see their
actions as co-ordinated. Yet there was a sense that the proconsul of Gaul was
vulnerable, and this encouraged their hostility and so helped to make him
even more suspicious and nervous. The mood on both sides was scarcely
conducive to compromise.16
Mark Antony would play a major role in what followed and it is worth
pausing to consider this flamboyant character. He had already proved himself
to be a courageous and skilful soldier, leading Gabinius’ cavalry during the
operations in Judaea and Egypt. In 52 BC he was Caesar’s quaestor and had
served in the campaign against Vercingetorix, as well as the rebellions of
the following year. The two men were distant relations, for Antony’s mother
was a Julia, although from the other branch of the family. Her brother was
the Lucius Julius Caesar who was consul in 64 BC. In the familiar Roman way,
Antony’s father and grandfather were both also named Marcus Antonius.
His grandfather was one of the leading orators of his day, but was killed in
the purge that accompanied Marius’ return to Rome in 87 BC. His father
was given a special command to deal with the pirate problem in 74 BC but
could not call on the resources later lavished on Pompey and was defeated,
dying shortly afterwards. Antony was only nine at the time. His mother
soon remarried, and the boy spent much of his formative years in the house
of his step-father Lentulus, one of the Catilinarian conspirators executed on
Cicero’s orders in 63 BC. This may well have given little cause for Antony to
like the orator, but there is no evidence that the bitter feud between the two
men developed until much later. After Caesar’s death, Cicero’s rhetoric –
especially his famous Philippics, a series of virulent speeches modelled on
those originally delivered by the famous orator Demosthenes warning the
Athenians of the threat posed by Alexander the Great’s father, King Philip
II of Macedon – would do much to blacken Antony’s name. Yet in spite of
the exaggeration and bias, other sources suggest that Antony had genuinely
provided plenty of material with which Cicero could work. As already noted,
tradition maintained that it was Curio who had first introduced Antony to
wild parties, wine and women (see p.365). Whether or not this was true,
there is no doubt that Antony took immediately to all such things with
enormous enthusiasm and almost no self-restraint. There was a great passion
in the man that seemed always ready to boil over, and which gave force and
massive determination to all that he did. His oratory, his soldiering – as well
as his drunkenness and womanizing – all seem to have had a power behind
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them that came from his personality more than skill or training. A big, burly
man, it was said that he liked to be compared with Hercules, just as Pompey
had enjoyed references to himself as a new Alexander. As tribune, Antony’s
strident character would make him hard to ignore, and even harder for
Caesar’s opponents to browbeat. Yet for more subtle negotiation Caesar
would need to rely more on men like Balbus, the equestrian from Spain who
privately acted as his agent. Antony was unlikely to give anyone the
impression that the proconsul was keen for compromise and did not plan a
radical second term as consul.17
‘The die is cast’
Rumour and misinformation also played their part in the growing crisis. In
October the story circulated that Caesar had concentrated four legions in
Cisalpine Gaul, which was taken as an indication that he was preparing for
war. In fact he had only one legion in the province, the Thirteenth, which he
claimed was there to secure the border areas against barbarian raiding. In
early December, shortly after the disgusted Marcellus had dismissed a Senate
for wanting to disarm both men and avoid conflict, another report came to
Rome claiming that Caesar had already massed his army and invaded Italy.
The story was false, but the consul probably did not know this and now
urged the Senate to act. Helped no doubt by Curio, but also by the reluctance
of the overwhelming majority to plunge into war, the House refused.
Accompanied by the consuls elect, but not by his own colleague, Marcellus
went to Pompey and presented him with a sword and called on him to protect
the Republic. He was given command of the two legions recalled from Gaul
ostensibly for the projected war against Parthia and instructed to raise more
troops. None of this was legal, since the Senate had not approved the action
or granted emergency powers. Pompey told them that he would accept their
charge and fight, if this proved necessary. He began trying to recruit troops,
but no aggressive moves were made. In part this was because the troops were
not ready to fight, but the discovery that the rumour was untrue must have
played a part.
Public business went on at Rome almost as if nothing had happened.
Caesar had not in fact started a war, so his opponents were determined that
they would not take the blame for beginning a conflict. Marcellus and
Pompey may still have been more interested in making a gesture, sending a
message to the senators of their confidence and to Caesar of their
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determination to fight if he provoked them. They may well have still hoped
that he would back down. Caesar was at a major disadvantage because he
could not leave his province to negotiate in person and had to rely instead
on letters or representatives. Curio tried to persuade the Senate to pass a
decree condemning Pompey’s recruitment drive and instructing good citizens
to ignore the call to arms. This failed, and since the tribuncian year began
and ended earlier than the normal political cycle, his term of office ended
and he left to consult with Caesar. What Caesar’s men did not do was as
eagerly scrutinised as what they actually did and said. On 6 December
Caesar’s trusted subordinate Hirtius arrived in the city, but left after just a
few hours. He did not visit Pompey, and did not wait around for the meeting
with Metellus Scipio which had been arranged for the following morning.
Pompey told Cicero that he interpreted this as a sign that the breach with
Caesar was now irreparable. However, although he and others were now
expecting war, they still did not wish to initiate it.18
On 1 January the new consuls took up their office. Lentulus, who was
hugely in debt, and according to Caesar boasted that he wanted to be a
second Sulla, proved far more extreme than Marcellus. However, Mark
Antony was now tribune and, along with one of his colleagues Quintus
Cassius Longinus, was fulfilling Curio’s role. It was only through the
persistence of these men that a letter from Caesar was allowed to be read out
in the Senate, although the consuls prevented a debate on it. In the letter
the proconsul recounted his great achievements on the Republic’s behalf
and returned to the demand that he should only be forced to lay down his
command if Pompey did the same, appearing to threaten war if the latter
refused. Cicero, who had just arrived back on the outskirts of Rome,
described it as a ‘fierce and threatening letter’. A vote was taken on a motion
proposed by Metellus Scipio, stating that Caesar must lay down his command
by a set day or be considered a public enemy. It was passed, but promptly
vetoed by Antony and Cassius. In private, Caesar’s tone was more
conciliatory and he seems to have written or sent representatives to many
leading figures including Cato. He offered to give up Transalpine Gaul and
all save two of his legions, so long as he was permitted to retain the rest of
his command and make use of the privilege granted to him by the tribunes
in 52 BC. This would have balanced the forces under Pompey’s command in
Italy but seriously impeded his capacity to fight an aggressive war. Cicero
became involved in the negotiations, for he believed everything should be
done to prevent conflict and felt that the overwhelming majority of senators
agreed with him. He spoke to Caesar’s opponents and friends, and the latter
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agreed to a further concession, allowing him to keep just Cisalpine Gaul
and a single legion. It was still not enough. Cato declared that he could not
agree to anything presented in private rather than before the whole Senate,
but ultimately neither he nor any of his closest allies were willing to accept
anything that would allow Caesar an unhindered path to his second
consulship. Even in late December Cicero had felt that Pompey had reached
the point of actively wanting war. The sources are contradictory, but he
probably rejected the first proposal. The second – just one legion and
Cisalpine Gaul – satisfied him, but he found that he was overruled by Cato,
Metellus Scipio and the rest. Overall it was hard for anyone to be too trusting
in the atmosphere of suspicion and hate. Nor did the distance help. Caesar
away in Gaul at the head of a veteran army was a fairly sinister figure even
to moderates. His charm had no opportunity to work at such a long range.19
Senatorial meetings were becoming deadlocked, with Antony and Cassius
vetoing the repeated motions attacking Caesar that were presented by the
consuls. The situation was difficult, but even so Antony’s temperament
probably did not help. He was a man who always struggled to contain his
passions. Years later Cicero would speak of him ‘vomiting his words in the
usual way’ when delivering a speech. A few weeks earlier the tribune had
delivered a particularly vitriolic performance in the Senate, attacking
Pompey’s whole career and threatening armed conflict. Afterwards, Pompey
had commented ‘What do you reckon Caesar himself will be like, if he gets
to control the Republic, if now his weak and worthless quaestor acts like
this?’ Following one of the Senate’s meetings, Pompey summoned all of the
senators to his house outside the city’s boundary, seeking to reassure them
of his steadfast support and willingness to fight if necessary. Caesar’s fatherin-
law Piso asked that he and one of the praetors be permitted six days to
travel up to Cisalpine Gaul and talk directly to Caesar before the Senate did
anything else. Other voices suggested an even larger deputation. Lentulus,
Cato and Metellus Scipio all spoke against this, and these ideas went no
further. Instead, on 7 January 49 BC the Senate passed the senatus consultum
ultimum, calling on ‘the consuls, praetors and tribunes, and all the proconsuls
near the city to ensure that the Republic comes to no harm’. There was no
specific mention of Caesar – whereas the reference to proconsuls was
obviously intended to place Pompey at the centre of things – but its target
was obvious to all. Caesar claimed that Lentulus, Pompey, Cato and Scipio,
along with many of his other opponents, were now all determined on war.
Some of them may have been, but for others this may have represented the
final raising of the stakes, making it utterly clear to Caesar that he could not
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get his way save by fighting and so must back down. The Senate’s ultimate
decree suspended normal law and was not subject to veto. Lentulus warned
Antony and Cassius that he could not guarantee their safety if they remained
in Rome. Along with Curio, who had returned probably carrying Caesar’s
letter read out on 1 January, the two tribunes disguised themselves as slaves
and were smuggled out of the city in a hired wagon.20
The precise chronology of what happened over the next few days cannot
be firmly established. Caesar had been in Cisalpine Gaul for some time,
arriving first – or so he claimed – to canvass for Mark Antony in his bid to
be elected augur and then, since this had already succeeded by the time he
arrived, in his campaign for the tribunate. Lately he had stayed in Ravenna,
close to the border of his province. With him he had the Thirteenth Legion
and some 300 cavalry. Several of our sources state that the legion was at
near enough full strength, with 5,000 men, but it is questionable whether they
had any reliable information about this. It is more likely that it was somewhat
under strength. Since the early autumn Caesar had redeployed his army,
placing some legions ready to block any threat from Pompey’s army in Spain,
while the equivalent of three or four more were ready to move to join him
south of the Alps. However, he had studiously avoided concentrating a field
army lest his opponents use this as proof that he was seeking war. Pompey,
with his vast military experience, seems to have been convinced that Caesar
was not ready for an invasion of Italy. On the road from Ravenna to
Ariminum (modern Rimini) the boundary between the province and Italy
itself was marked by the Rubicon, a small river that to this day has not been
positively identified. Caesar heard quickly of the attacks on him in the Senate
at the beginning of January, of the passing of the ultimate decree and the
subsequent flight of the tribunes. The news may have reached him before the
fugitives. In any case he decided to act.
The Commentaries skim over what happened next, not mentioning the
Rubicon at all, but later sources provide a more detailed version. Caesar
spent the day in Ravenna, calmly going about his normal business as if
nothing unusual was about to happen. It was probably 10 January, though
yet again certainty is impossible regarding this crucial episode in the history
of the ancient world. He had already despatched some centurions and
legionaries in civilian clothes and with concealed weapons to seize control
of Ariminum. The proconsul spent some hours watching gladiators
practising and inspecting plans for a training school that he wanted to build.
As night fell he bathed and went to dinner, first greeting the numerous guests
invited to join him. Much earlier than usual he excused himself and left,
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asking them to stay and await his return. A few of his senior officers and
attendants had been warned of this and met him outside. One was Asinius
Pollio, who would later write a history of the Civil War, which was used as
a source by Plutarch and probably Suetonius as well. Orders were also issued
to the Thirteenth and the cavalry to follow him as soon as they were ready.
He and several of his officers travelled in a hired carriage – Suetonius claims
that it was drawn by a team of mules borrowed from a nearby baker’s shop.
Then they set off into the night down the road to Ariminum. According to
Suetonius an element of farce entered the proceedings when Caesar and his
carriage got lost in the darkness and blundered around until dawn, when they
found a guide who set them on the right path. Plutarch and Appian make
no mention of this, and both state that he was already at Ariminum as dawn
broke. Therefore at some stage early on the 11th he overtook the marching
cohorts and came to the River Rubicon. Before he crossed the bridge, he is
said to have stopped, spending some time in silent thought before beginning
to talk to his officers, Pollio amongst them. He is supposed to have spoken
of the cost to himself if he did not take this step, and the price the whole
Roman world would pay if he did so. Suetonius claims a supernatural being
appeared, played first upon a flute and then, grabbing a trumpet from one
of the military musicians, sounded a blast and strode across the river,
encouraging the troops to follow. It seems unlikely that Pollio was the source
of this tall tale. He did presumably repeat Caesar’s final words as he decided
to cross, although even here we have several slightly different versions.
Plutarch maintains that he spoke in Greek, quoting a line from the poet
Menander, ‘Let the die be thrown!’ (aneristho kubos). Suetonius gives the
more familiar Latin expression ‘The die is cast’ (iacta alea est).21
The gambler’s phrase was appropriate, for he was embarking on a civil
war when little more than a tenth of his forces were with him. Even when
all his troops were concentrated, he would still be overmatched in resources
by his enemies. Although with hindsight we know that Caesar prevailed,
this was by no means certain – perhaps not even likely – at the time. He
chose to fight because as far as he was concerned all the alternatives were
worse. The Republic had become dominated by a faction who ignored the
normal rule of law and particularly refused to acknowledge the traditional
powers and rights of the tribunate. Yet Caesar was quite open that it was first
and foremost because this faction of men had attacked him that he now
moved against them. The Roman world was being plunged into chaos and
bloodshed because one man was as determined to protect his dignitas as
others were to destroy it. Over the preceding eighteen months the stakes
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had been raised in turn by both sides. Attitudes had tended to harden,
suspicions had grown, and trust declined too far to give compromise a real
chance. The Civil War that began in January 49 BC could not have happened
without the bitter, almost obsessive hatred felt towards Caesar by men like
Cato, Domitius Ahenobarbus and the others, which made them determined
to prevent his return to public life as a consul. Even this would not have
mattered if Pompey had not seen an opportunity to demonstrate his
supremacy and show these men, as well as Caesar, that they needed to placate
him. Finally, the struggle would not have begun had Caesar not placed such
a high value on his prestige and position. His life up to this point had
demonstrated his willingness to take risks if there was a chance of a valuable
prize. Only rarely – as when he was dismissed from his praetorship – had
he been willing to back down, and even then it had only been because this
was clearly his sole means of continuing his career. In 49 BC that option had
largely been closed to him, or at least been surrounded by risks that appeared
greater even than those of fighting. The ethos of the Roman aristocracy
celebrated determination and especially admired the generals who would
not concede defeat. Yet for all the dubious legality of his opponents’ actions,
in the end only one thing mattered. North of the Rubicon Caesar held
rightful imperium and south of the river he did not. As soon as he crossed
Caesar was undoubtedly a rebel, whatever the reasons that had driven him
to this act. In this sense his enemies won a victory and could more readily
claim to be fighting for the legitimate Republic. They were determined now
to crush him by force, just as Catiline and, before him, Lepidus had been
suppressed. Resorting to his army was a mark of Caesar’s failure to get what
he wanted by political means. The die had been rolled, but so far no one knew
what number it would show when it came to rest.
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Blitzkrieg:
Italy and Spain,
Winter–Autumn, 49 BC
‘I ask, what is going on? What is happening? As for me I am in the dark.
Someone says, “We hold Cingulum – we have lost Ancona; Labienus has
deserted from Caesar.” Are we talking about a general of the Roman People
or about Hannibal.. . . He claims that he is doing all this to protect his
dignity. How can there be any dignity where there is no honesty?’ – Cicero,
c. 17–22 January 49 BC.1
‘Let us see if in this way we can willingly win the support of all and gain
a permanent victory, since through their cruelty others have been unable
to escape hatred or make their victory lasting – save for Lucius Sulla, and
I do not intend to imitate him. This is a new way of conquest, we grow
strong through pity and generosity.’ – Caesar, early March 49 BC.2
At the beginning of the Civil War Caesar paraded the Thirteenth Legion
and addressed the men. In his own account he tells us that he spoke of the
injustices done to him by his enemies, and of how his old friend and ally
Pompey, now jealous of his achievements, had been lured away to join them.
Most of all the proconsul laid before the legionaries the contempt shown for
the hallowed rights of the tribunes of the people, ignoring their right of veto
– something that not even Sulla had done. He did not dispute the Senate’s
right to pass the senatus consultum ultimum, but denied that it had been
necessary, and also made clear that it had never been used in similar
circumstances, but only when Rome itself was under direct threat. Other
sources tell us that to underline his point Caesar brought Antony and Cassius
before the troops. They were still wearing the disguises in which they had fled
from Rome, and the sight is said to have deeply moved the soldiers, first to
380
pity and then to anger against the men who had trampled on the college of
magistrates first created to protect the ordinary citizens. By the time Caesar
had finished, the legionaries were yelling out that they were ready to avenge
the wrongs done both to him and to the tribunes. It is not clear whether this
parade occurred in Ravenna or in Ariminum after crossing the Rubicon.
What mattered most was the reaction of the troops. The Thirteenth had
been formed by Caesar seven years earlier and had served with him ever
since. The soldiers trusted him to bring them victory as he had always done
in the past. They remembered his generosity with spoils, with praise and
decorations. At some point he almost doubled the basic annual salary of a
legionary, from 125 to 225 denarii. Many of the Thirteenth were probably
from north of the Po, men officially with Latin status, but whom he had
treated as full citizens. Their officers, both the half-dozen or so tribunes
and the sixty centurions, all owed their commissions and subsequent
promotions to him. Some may originally have been recommended to him by
Pompey – all of these were allowed to leave unharmed and with all their
possessions, if their conscience told them to honour their earlier loyalty. We
are not told how many men chose to take advantage of this. All ranks – not
just in the Thirteenth but throughout the entire army – had gained much from
Caesar and could expect even more in the future, particularly plots of land
for discharged veterans. A Senate dominated by Caesar’s opponents was
unlikely to be generous in this regard. In this pragmatic sense the army in
Gaul had a vested interest in Caesar’s victory, now that it had come to civil
war. They knew and trusted their commander after serving together for so
long, whereas few knew his opponents to any degree.
The loyalty of Caesar’s army throughout the Civil War – and indeed even
after his death – was truly remarkable, but is all too easily taken for granted.
Much of it was clearly the result of the bond between the general and his
officers and men, which grew up during the campaigns in Gaul, as he carefully
cultivated and rewarded them. Yet it would be wrong to see this as the whole
story, or to deny that politics played any part at all. The officers in particular
may have had fairly detailed knowledge of what had gone on in Rome. It
seems reasonable to say that most of Caesar’s army came to believe that he
– and by extension they – had been treated shabbily by a group of senators
whose own behaviour made it difficult to see them as the legitimate leaders
of the Republic. For many Romans – wealthy and humble alike – there was
a strong sentimental attachment to the tribunate. A sense of what was right,
along with old loyalty and self-interest combined to ensure that Caesar’s
army had no hesitation about fighting other Romans to set things right.3
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The choice of which side to join does not seem to have required much
thought for the overwhelming majority of Caesar’s troops, but for most
Romans it was very difficult. Only a small number of people were deeply
committed by the time hostilities opened. Even some of those who might have
appeared fervent partisans now took a step back. One was Caius Claudius
Marcellus, who as consul in 50 BC had presented the sword to Pompey and
called on him to defend the Republic. Now that civil war had come, he chose
to remain neutral, perhaps thinking of his marriage to Caesar’s niece.
Calpurnius Piso could not be expected to side against his son-in-law, but
did not play an active part in the war, especially in the early months. Family
ties and longstanding bonds of friendship played a major role in determining
allegiance for many men, but in the small world of the Roman elite many
men had links with the leaders on both sides and faced a very difficult
decision. Most did not feel a strong commitment to either side, but memories
of the struggle between Sulla and the Marians suggested that refusing to
take part would not guarantee a man’s safety. Brutus, Servilia’s son, had
studiously avoided ever speaking to Pompey, as he had executed Brutus’s
father in 78 BC during Lepidus’ rebellion. Now he decided that his mother’s
long-time lover was in the wrong and declared himself willing to serve under
the command of his father’s killer. In part this was a matter of principle, but
with his family connections there can have been little real doubt about his
decision. He had been raised in Cato’s house and shared his uncle’s love of
philosophy, while his wife was one of Appius Claudius’ daughters.4
There was one major defection from Caesar’s army when Labienus left
him in the middle of January. His senior legate had served with him in Gaul
from the very beginning and had proved himself to be by far the most gifted
of his senior officers. Compared to the other legates, Labienus was granted
a more prominent place in the Commentaries. Scholars have put forward the
conjecture that Labienus held the praetorship before coming to Gaul, perhaps
in 60 BC, but there is absolutely no evidence for this. If this is correct, then
he would have been at least fifty years old by the time of the Civil War and
thus had been eligible for the consulship for a considerable time. On Caesar’s
behalf he had effectively postponed his own career for the duration of the
campaigns in Gaul. As a legate he won some glory, although the lion’s share
of this went always to the proconsul. Several of his independent operations,
especially those against the rebellious tribes in 54–53 and 52 BC, would
certainly have won him a triumph had Labienus been a provincial governor
himself, instead of a subordinate. He had also become very rich during these
campaigns, for Caesar was far more generous with money than he was with
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Blitzkrieg: Italy and Spain, Winter–Autumn, 49 bc
glory. Cicero bemoaned the new-found wealth of Labienus. He may also
have attracted the scorn of Catullus, if the theory is true that he was the
Mentula – dick or dickhead – attacked in his poems. It is more than possible
that Caesar intended further reward and hoped to have Labienus as his
consular colleague in 48 BC. There seem to have been rumours about the
senior legate’s loyalties as early as the summer of 50 BC, but Caesar had
chosen to show his confidence in his subordinate by sending him to Cisalpine
Gaul, near to Italy and therefore also nearer to hostile influences. In the
event the gesture failed and Labienus went to join Caesar’s enemies. He may
in fact have simply returned to an earlier loyalty, since he came from Picenum,
a region dominated by Pompey’s family. Past service with Pompey has been
conjectured, as well as support in his career. All of this is plausible enough,
but personal dissatisfaction may have been just as important. Successful
generals have throughout history tended to display supreme self-confidence,
often combined with a readiness to denigrate the skill of others, and jealousy
of other men’s fame – Napoleon’s marshals and the Allied senior
commanders in the Second World War spring to mind, but many examples
could be found. Labienus had given a large chunk of his best years to Caesar
and seems to have felt that this had not been sufficiently recognised. On
several occasions during the campaigns he may well have felt that it was his
ability and deeds, and not Caesar’s, which had won the day. Our sources
give the impression that he had an abrasive character and was by no means
a likeable man. Resentment at having always to come second to another
man, and the conviction that his real worth had not been recognised, may
well have contributed to his decision. He may also have judged that Caesar
was likely to lose the war, especially once the proconsul was deprived of his
own talent. Hearing that Labienus had defected, Caesar decided on another
gesture and gave instructions that all of his baggage should be sent after
him.5
The prospect of gain and personal advantage from picking the right side
were evidently important for many men faced with the prospect of war. As
early as August 50 BC Cicero’s correspondent Caelius Rufus had expressed
his own cynical view:
You won’t forget of course, that in a domestic squabble, carried on
constitutionally and without resort to armed conflict, then men ought
to espouse the more honourable cause; however, when it’s a war and
the military camp, espouse the stronger, and hold the side to be best
which is strongest. In all this strife I can see that Pompey will be backed
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by the Senate and the ‘lawyers’ – all those with plenty of fear and little
hope will join Caesar, whose army is incomparably better.6
True to his word, Caelius joined the side with the better army rather than
the one championed by most distinguished men and with the better cause.
Not everyone agreed with his judgement on the balance of power. Caesar had
ten legions, all veterans of the campaigns in Gaul, along with the equivalent
of two more in the twenty-two independent cohorts raised in Transalpine
Gaul, and auxiliaries and allies from Gaul and Germany. Losses to battle,
accident and disease make it unlikely that any of the legions – especially
the ones with longest service – had anything like their paper strength of
soldiers. A generous estimate would give Caesar something like 45,000
legionaries at the beginning of 49 BC, but the figure could as easily have been
as low as 30,000–35,000. Man for man these soldiers were better than any
of the troops available to the enemy. There were the two legions that had been
taken from Caesar and were now camped in southern Italy. One of these, the
First, had on its formation taken an oath to Pompey, but the other – originally
the Fifteenth, now renumbered the Third – had been raised by and for Caesar.
Both units had served for three campaigns in Gaul. Pompey swiftly realised
that the optimistic reports of their disaffection with their old commander
were little more than a fantasy. For the moment at least, he did not feel
confident enough to lead these men into battle against their former comrades
and general. He did have seven fully formed and trained legions in the Spanish
provinces, but these had little or no experience of actual warfare and so
lacked the confidence Caesar’s men possessed after years of victory. Even
more importantly they were far away, unable to play a part in the initial
stages of the conflict. In the long term Pompey and his allies could call on
far greater resources of manpower, money, animals and equipment than
Caesar. A flood of recruits in all parts of Italy was confidently predicted, and
with the consuls on their side they had access to the wealth of the State.
Overseas, Pompey had clients and connections in Spain, North Africa and
throughout the East, all of whom could be called upon to supply soldiers and
contribute financially to the cause. It would take time to mobilise all these
resources, to raise an army or armies, equip them and provide logistic
support, as well as turning raw recruits into soldiers. One of the reasons
why Pompey and his allies had adopted such an inflexible line in the months
building up to the war was their absolute confidence that they possessed
the military might to crush Caesar. On balance this was probably a fair
assessment, as long as their opponent gave them time to prepare.
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The Italian Campaign, January to March
The news that Caesar had crossed the Rubicon stunned his opponents.
January was a difficult time to keep an army supplied in the field. In spite
of earlier rumours, they may well have known that the bulk of his forces
were still north of the Alps. It was probably also an indication that, even after
passing the senatus consultum ultimum and beginning to mobilise, many of
them really did expect him to back down in the face of their unity and
obvious strength. Perhaps there was an assumption that he would wait for
the campaigning season and carefully mass his forces before acting, maybe
even remain on the defensive in the hope of continued negotiation. In the days
following 7 January the Senate had convened on several occasions outside
the boundary of the city, so that Pompey could reassure the senators. His
father-in-law Metellus Scipio was given command of Syria, while Domitius
Ahenobarbus was to go to Transalpine Gaul as proconsul. Caesar notes in
the Commentaries that they did not deign to ratify all these appointments
with a vote in the Popular Assembly in the usual way. However, both men
did perform the normal ceremonies for a magistrate setting out for a
command, and then rushed off to their provinces, as did the propraetors
appointed to other commands. One of the latter was given Cisalpine Gaul.
Caesar’s opponents had openly decided to make use of force against him,
but they were not yet ready. Levies were underway, arms and equipment were
being gathered, but by no stretch of the imagination could Italy have been
described as prepared to meet an invasion. Caesar was not ready either, in
the sense that he would surely have liked to have a stronger force at his
immediate disposal before acting. He had sent orders to several other
formations instructing them to move to join him, but they would not all
arrive for some time. His opponents were still unprepared, and waiting
would only give them a chance to grow stronger. Never one to delay unless
this would bring him clear advantage, Caesar advanced with only the
Thirteenth.7
Ariminum, already infiltrated by his men, did not resist him. For a while
he remained there but sent Antony with five cohorts to occupy Arretium
(modern Arrezo), despatching three more to Pisaurum, Fanum (modern
Fano) and Ancona respectively. There was no fighting. News of the crossing
of the Rubicon seems to have reached Rome on about 17 January. Pompey
and his leading allies promptly left the city, for Pompey quickly realised that
at present he simply did not have the forces to stop Caesar. This meant that
Rome had been abandoned by all senior magistrates and so the public life
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of the Republic for the moment ceased to be conducted in the proper way.
Many uncommitted senators went with them, remembering the bloody
entries into Rome made by Marius and Sulla. Others simply left Rome and
went to their country houses, planning to keep a low profile. Around this
time a number of unofficial envoys came to Caesar at Ariminum. One was
Lucius Julius Caesar, son of the former consul who had served as his legate
for a number of years. He brought a message from Pompey, assuring Caesar
that his actions were not motivated by personal hostility, but were dictated
by his duty to the Republic. His old ally urged Caesar to lay down his
command voluntarily and prevent civil war. A similar request was brought
by the praetor Lucius Roscius. Caesar replied by stating that all he wished
was to exercise the rights legally granted to him by the Roman people. His
enemies had been raising troops for some time. If they wanted peace then
386
0 100 miles
0 200 km
TRANSPADANE
GAUL
VENETIA
ISTRIA
CISPADANE
GAUL
LIGURIA
PICENUM
CAMPANIA APULIA
CALABRIA
ILLYRICUM
A D R I A T I C S E A
L I G U R I A N
S E A
CORSICA
SARDINIA
T Y R R H E N I A N S E A
Caesar’s route
Po
Placentia
Ravennna
Ariminum
Ancona
Sulmo
Rome
Luca Florentia
Arretium
Iguvium
Tiber
Via Flaminia
Via Cassia
Arno
Aternus
Capua
Brundisium
Auxium
Asculum
Corfinium
The Italian campaign 49 BC
Blitzkrieg: Italy and Spain, Winter–Autumn, 49 bc
Pompey should go to his province, then both of them could lay down their
commands and disband their armies – along with all the other troops in
Italy – at the same time. Not for the last time he also asked Pompey to come
and meet him in person. By 23 January Lucius Caesar the Younger reached
Pompey, who was now at Teanum in Apulia. According to Cicero writing two
days later, Caesar’s:
terms were accepted with the proviso that he must at once withdraw
all his garrisons from the towns which he had occupied outside his
province. Once that was done, they replied that we should return to the
city and settle the matter in the Senate. I hope at present that it will be
possible for us to have peace. For one leader regrets his rash folly and
the other his lack of forces.8
Letters were sent to Caesar informing him of the offer – as he himself
put it, that he should ‘go back to Gaul, abandon Ariminum and disband
his forces’. To him this was an ‘unfair deal’. No date was given for Pompey’s
departure to his provinces or his laying the command down and giving up
his armies. It was obvious that he was effectively being asked to give up the
military advantage he had gained by his sudden invasion. His opponents
wanted him to withdraw and then trust to their giving his demands a
sympathetic hearing in future meetings of the Senate. There was no reason
for Caesar to believe that things would go better for him than they had in
the debates of the last eighteen months. Pompey and his allies did not trust
Caesar enough to stop raising troops in expectation that he would accept
their terms. In return Caeser did not trust them sufficiently to take the first
step towards peace and go back to his province. Caesar does seem to have
been especially frustrated by Pompey’s reluctance to agree to a face-to-face
conference. In the past the two men had got on well and he seems to have
been confident that he could reach a genuine agreement with his former
son-in-law. Pompey may have been unsure about whether or not he could
resist Caesar’s persuasiveness. For a man with a morbid fear of assassination
and memories of an earlier and very brutal civil war, it is possible that he
was reluctant to risk such a meeting. Yet in the end it was probably more a
question of his relationship with Cato and his other new allies. Their alliance
was recent, his friendship with Caesar older and of longer duration.
Whatever he felt himself, Pompey knew that these men simply would not
believe in his good faith and constancy if he privately met Caesar. Cato had
already urged the Senate to appoint Pompey as supreme commander until
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the crisis was over and the rebellious proconsul defeated. This was rejected
by the consuls and ex-consuls who were too proud to be commanded by
anyone else. Jealousy and suspicion between allies was as much a hindrance
to a negotiated settlement as mistrust between enemies.9
Caesar resumed his advance. A report reached him that Iguvium was held
by a garrison of five cohorts under the command of the propraetor Quintus
Minucius Thermus, but that the townsfolk favoured him. The two cohorts
with him at Ariminum were added to the one stationed in Pisarum and sent
under Curio to the town. Thermus retreated, his raw recruits deserted and
went home, and Curio’s men were welcomed at Iguvium. Trusting in local
goodwill, Caesar pushed on to Auxinum and had soon overrun Picenum,
supposedly the heartland of Pompey’s family. There was one small skirmish
in which a few prisoners were taken, but the general population was
displaying no enthusiasm for rising up against Caesar and his men. The
cause against Caesar had little popular appeal and his army was not
plundering or doing anything else that might have created hostility. A few
of the Pompeian soldiers even chose to join him. Many communities also
remembered the gifts Caesar had distributed to them from the profits of
Gaul – he took particular satisfaction in reporting that even the town of
Cingulum, which had been especially favoured by Labienus, now willingly
opened its gates to him.10
By this time it was February and Caesar had reunited the detachments of
the Thirteenth and been joined by the Twelfth. At Asculum another
Pompeian garrison fled before him, and it was not until he reached Corfinium
that he encountered any serious opposition. In command there was Domitius
Ahenobarbus, who had not yet managed to get anywhere near his province.
Together with his subordinates he had managed to muster a force of more
than thirty cohorts, but these were entirely raw recruits. Pompey had not
wanted Ahenobarbus to defend the town, as he had no doubt of the inevitable
outcome when such inexperienced troops came up against Caesar’s veterans.
He was himself much further south in Apulia with the First and Third
legions, as well as a number of recent levies. However, he had no power to
issue orders to Ahenobarbus and could do no more than send letters urging
him to abandon the town and join him. Domitius Ahenobarbus was not a
man to change his mind too readily and wrote replies imploring Pompey to
come to him. There were no similar divisions over strategy for Caesar. He
closed on Corfinium, driving off some enemy cohorts which attempted to
break down the bridge outside the town. Soon afterwards Antony was sent
with a quarter of the army to Sulmo in response to an appeal from the town.
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In another bloodless victory the Pompeian commander was captured, taken
to Caesar and promptly allowed to go free. In the meantime the Caesarean
army gathered food in preparation for the siege of Corfinium. After three
days it received a major boost to its strength when it was joined by the Eighth
Legion and the twenty-two cohorts raised from Transalpine Gaul and trained
and equipped as legionaries. The troops were set to building a line of
circumvallation strengthened by forts to surround the town.
Before the blockade was complete, Domitius Ahenobarbus received a
final letter from Pompey making it clear that he had no intention of marching
to relieve Corfinium. Deciding now that the town’s prospects were not good,
he publicly announced that help was on its way, while privately planning
his own escape. However, his increasingly furtive manner soon revealed the
truth to his legionaries. A council was organised consisting of the tribunes,
along with the centurions – almost two hundred of these if the thirty-three
cohorts were at full strength – and representatives of the ordinary soldiers
to debate the matter. Some of the troops were Marsi, who had a close tie to
their commander through his family’s estates in the region. At first they
were staunchly loyal, even threatening to use force against the other
legionaries, but their mood changed when they became convinced that their
leader planned to abscond. Ahenobarbus was placed under arrest by his
own men, who immediately sent envoys to surrender themselves and the
town to Caesar. This was welcome news, since although he had little doubt
of the outcome of the siege it would clearly pin him down for several weeks.
Instead the matter had been resolved in only seven days. However, he was
reluctant to enter the walls immediately, for night was falling and he did
not trust his legionaries not to misbehave once they got into the dark streets
of the town. So far his army had not plundered or laid waste the lands they
passed through, as they had so often done in the past. Instead he had the
troops stand to arms in the lines around Corfinium throughout the night to
prevent any fugitives from slipping out. Near dawn one of the senior
Pompeians, Publius Cornelius Lentulus Spinther, who had been consul in
57 BC, surrendered himself and was soon followed by the remaining senior
officers.
Caesar’s portrait of Ahenobarbus is scarcely flattering, but our other
sources were even less kind. It was claimed that he had decided to commit
suicide and demanded that his physician supply him with poison. However,
when he heard that Caesar was not executing his important prisoners, he
immediately repented of his rashness and was delighted to be informed by
his doctor that he had only taken a harmless draught. Domitius Ahenobarbus
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then went out to surrender to the man whose bitter opponent he had been
for at least a decade. Altogether there were fifty senators and equestrians
amongst the Pompeians who surrendered, probably on 21 February. Caesar
had them brought before him, repeated the charges that he had been unfairly
and illegally treated and forced into war, reminding some of them of personal
favours he had done them in the past. After that, all were allowed to go free.
Caesar had already followed the same policy earlier in the campaign, but
never up to this point had so many or so distinguished a group received the
benefit of his clemency. Ahenobarbus had brought 6 million sestertii of
public money with him to provide pay for his troops. This was handed over
to Caesar by the town’s magistrates, but he ordered that it be sent back to
his enemy, lest it be thought that ‘he was more restrained in dealing with
men’s lives, than their wealth’. The surrendered soldiers were asked to take
an oath to him. Soon, these legions would go under Curio’s command to fight
for Caesar in Sicily and Africa.11
The clemency of Corfinium became famous, and his moderation formed
a central part of Caesar’s propaganda campaign. Everyone had expected
him to behave like Sulla or Marius – or even, though few would dare to say
it, like the Pompey who had earned the nickname of the ‘young butcher’.
Instead his soldiers were kept under tight discipline, did not plunder and
only fought when they were themselves resisted. Even his bitterest enemies
were allowed to go free, although both Lentulus and Ahenobarbus went
straight off to fight against him again. The overwhelming majority of people
in Italy were apathetic to the issues about which the Civil War was being
waged. Amongst the wider population both Pompey and Caesar were highly
respected and seen as great servants of the Republic. If Caesar’s legions had
come marauding and slaughtering their way through Italy, then this might
well have turned more of the population against him. His policy of clemency
made practical sense. Armies failed to spring from the soil of Italy as Pompey
had promised just a few months before. One senator acidly suggested that
maybe it was about time the great man started stamping his foot. Very early
on Pompey had decided that Rome was indefensible. At some point he
reached the further conclusion that Caesar could not be beaten in Italy with
two veteran, but possibly unreliable, legions, supported by the rawest of
recruits. Instead he planned to shift the war away, taking his forces across the
sea to Greece where they could be trained and a massive army gathered with
the support of the eastern provinces. It was not a popular decision with
other senators, and for this reason, as well as wanting to conceal his
intentions from Caesar, he at first kept the idea to himself. The stand at
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Corfinium wasted the equivalent of three legions, but Pompey managed to
concentrate the remainder of his forces at Brundisium (modern Brindisi).
Merchant vessels were requisitioned and the process of shipping men and
equipment over the Adriatic begun. It was a long and complex task, but
Pompey had always excelled at organisation on a massive scale and set about
the task with all his accustomed skill.12
Caesar arrived outside Brundisium on 9 March. He had six legions, the
veteran Eighth, Twelfth and Thirteenth, along with some new recruits and
presumably the cohorts from Transalpine Gaul, some of whom were soon
to be formally converted into a legion, the Fifth Alaudae – the name meant
the ‘Larks’, probably from its distinctive feathered crest or shield design.
Pompey had only a rearguard of two legions awaiting shipment. Caesar set
his men to building booms to close off the narrow entrance to the harbour.
The defenders put their own engineering skills to good use to prevent this.
There were further attempts at negotiation, but none came to anything.
Pompey once again refused Caesar’s plea for a personal meeting. Then,
when they were at last ready, the Pompeians evacuated the town during the
night of 17 March. Pompey escaped with virtually all his men, apart from
two ships that ran aground on the boom built by Caesar’s men. The
townsfolk – at last able to express their resentment against the Pompeians
according to Caesar, but doubtless also through a keenness to avoid rough
treatment at the hands of the legionaries – pointed out the traps built by the
enemy to cause casualties amongst Caesar’s men. Pompey had got away
with a substantial force, around which he could in time build a great army.
Then, when he was ready he could invade Italy from Greece just as Sulla
had done so successfully. As Pompey so often declared, ‘Sulla did it, why
shouldn’t I?’13
Rome
For the moment Caesar could not follow. The Pompeians had gathered up
and taken most of the merchant ships from the region, and it would take a
long time to collect and bring vessels from elsewhere. Caesar was not inclined
to wait, sitting on the defensive and handing the initiative back to his
opponents. It was now spring, the opening of the proper campaigning season
when armies found it easier to operate. The bulk of his own army – some
seven legions along with numerous allies and auxiliaries – was still north of
the Alps. Pompey’s best legions were in the Spanish Peninsula, cut off from
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their commander and led by his legates. At the moment they were still passive
but it was unlikely that this would last forever, especially if Caesar massed
all his forces and prepared for a seaborne invasion of Greece. He did not need
a fleet of ships to reach Spain, neither would the enemy forces there have
much difficulty marching on Gaul or Italy. In contrast it would take many
months for Pompey to form and train an army, so that there was no real
prospect of his trying to invade Italy from Greece during 49 BC. Yet Pompey
was not inactive and he and his allies planned to cut off the food supplies
going to Italy from the provinces. Defeating the armies in Spain would
deprive Pompey of his best troops and weaken him, even if it would not be
the decisive encounter of the war. It was beneficial and, most important of
all, it was possible. Without hesitation Caesar decided to attack the
Pompeians in Spain. He joked that he was going to fight ‘an army without
a general’, and that then he would deal with ‘a general without an army’
when he went to confront Pompey in Greece. In the meantime Curio would
go to secure Sicily and ensure that it continued to ship its surplus crops to
Italy. Another force went to take Sardinia.14
Caesar had military control of all of Italy, for not a single walled town
or city resisted him. He was eager to hasten to Spain since time was not on
his side, and as every month passed Pompey would only continue to grow
stronger. Most of the magistrates had gone with his opponents, as had some
distinguished senators. Many more remained in Italy but had yet to commit
themselves to either side. Caesar wanted the Senate to meet and hoped to
give every impression that the organs of the State continued to function
even at this time of crisis. His enemies claimed that they represented the
true Republic. Caesar wanted to challenge this and show that the State
continued to function in Rome, where it was supposed to be, and so to make
clear that his cause was legitimate, that he did not fight against the Republic,
but against a faction that had usurped power. As a result he wanted as many
senators as possible to attend the meeting that was called for 1 April. Cicero
was still in Italy, and in a series of letters Caesar’s associates tried to persuade
him to attend. The orator had worked hard to avoid the situation developing
into war in the first place and had been dismayed by the militant enthusiasm
he had seen in others. When war began, he was appalled by the speed with
which Rome was abandoned, and then even more disgusted when he realised
that Pompey planned to evacuate Italy altogether. Cicero felt an old and
deep loyalty to Pompey as a man, and from the beginning his instinct and
judgement had dictated that whatever happened, he must in the end be on
the same side. Pompey had often disappointed him, not always giving him
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the praise he wanted, forming the alliance with Crassus and Caesar and,
most of all, abandoning him to his fate when Clodius had forced Cicero
into exile. Nevertheless, the deep affection remained, along with the hope
that the great man would one day live up to what the orator believed was his
full potential to be a force for good within the Republic. Yet since his return
from exile Pompey and others had encouraged him to develop a friendship
with Caesar. Apart from the warm correspondence, the involvement in
Caesar’s building plans and Quintus’ service in Gaul, Cicero himself had
received a major loan from Caesar. In the months leading up to the war this
had greatly exercised him, as he had no wish to be seen as having been
bought by Caesar, still less of fighting against him in order to avoid the
debt.15
Cicero had not welcomed his posting as governor of Cilicia, but had
taken care to perform his duties well. In a campaign against the tribes of
Mount Amanus he – or in truth his more experienced legates – had won a
minor victory. Though scarcely a military man, the orator was desperately
eager to be awarded a triumph for this success. In 50 BC the Senate had
voted him a public thanksgiving, a common preliminary to the greater
honour. Cato had opposed the motion and later primly informed Cicero that
this was because he felt it would be better to honour him for his good and
honest administration, since this was of far more worth to the Republic.
Curio had at first also been hostile. Days of thanksgiving prevented public
business from being conducted and he may have been worried that Caesar’s
opponents would seek to gain advantage through manipulating the calendar
in this way. However, Caesar swiftly instructed the tribune to back the claim
and in the end the motion passed easily. Salt was rubbed into the wound
when Cato successfully put forward a vote awarding twenty days of
thanksgiving to Bibulus, who had campaigned in the same mountains as
Cicero, which bordered Cilicia and his own province of Syria. Cato’s sonin-
law had achieved little and had in fact suffered at least one serious defeat.
Granting him an honour at all was questionable, but one of this length was
absurd, yet presumably it was felt that he should be granted a number of
days surpassing those ever given to Pompey and only equalled by Caesar.
Cicero accepted the hypocrisy necessary for success in politics. His
predecessor in Cilicia had been Appius Claudius, who had plundered the
province for his own gain. Privately Cicero described his actions as those
of a ‘wild beast’, but he was invariably scrupulously polite, even warm, in
his dealings with Claudius himself. Nevertheless Cato’s actions left a bitter
taste. Caesar wrote to Cicero after the vote congratulating him, doubtless
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encouraging his hopes for a triumph, and crowing over his old adversary’s
double standards.16
Cicero was in a difficult position when the Civil War began. He had not
yet laid down his proconsular imperium for he could not do this until he
celebrated his longed for triumph. Therefore he was still attended by lictors
and had the right to command troops. Much as he disapproved of the attitude
and behaviour of Pompey, Cato, Domitius Ahenobarbus and their associates,
he did not feel that he could side against such men or fail to support the
legally elected consuls of the year. He was given the task of raising troops,
but soon gave this up as impractical and played no active part in the
campaign. Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon he thought an appalling crime,
but his attitude softened a little when he heard of the clement treatment of
the captured Pompeians. Cicero wrote to commend him, especially in the case
of Lentulus, who had supported him in 63 BC. Cut off from Pompey at
Brundisium – admittedly Cicero made no great effort to reach him since he
hated his strategy of leaving Italy – he waited events at one of his country
villas. In early March, probably before Brundisium fell, Caesar had written
a brief letter to the orator, urging him to:
have no doubt that I have many times been grateful to you, and look
forward to having even more reason to be grateful to you in the future.
This is no more than you deserve. First, though, I implore you, since I
expect that I shall swiftly come to Rome, that I may see you there, and
draw on your counsel, goodwill, dignity, and assistance of every kind.
I will close as I began. Please excuse my haste and the brevity of this
letter.17
Cicero responded on 19 March, writing to ask exactly what Caesar meant
by his ‘goodwill’ and ‘assistance’. He repeated his willingness to work for
peace, as long as this protected ‘our mutual friend Pompey’, for the Republic
would benefit most if the two men were reconciled. On the 26th Caesar
wrote again, thanking Cicero for commending his clemency, and noted that
‘there was nothing further from my nature than cruelty’. Again Caesar urged
him to come to Rome, this time saying that he wanted his ‘counsel and
resources’. Another incentive was the presence with the Caesarean army of
the orator’s son-in-law Publius Cornelius Dolabella, and Caesar assured the
orator of the favour in which the young man was held. Two days later the
two men met at Formiae. Cicero was determined not to be used and staunchly
resisted the pressure to come to Rome:
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He kept saying that my refusal was a condemnation of him, which would
make others less likely to come, if I did not go. After a lot of talk, [Caesar
said] ‘Well come then, and talk about peace.’ ‘As a free agent?’ I asked.
He said, ‘Should I tell you what to say!’ ‘In that case,’ I said, ‘I will argue
that the Senate cannot approve your taking an army to Spain or
transporting one to Greece. And more than that,’ I went on, ‘I shall
deplore Cnaeus’ [i.e. Pompey’s] fate.’ So then he said, ‘I really do not
want you to say that.’ ‘That’s what I thought, but I do not want to go
there, because I will either have to say that and more besides, about
which I cannot hold my tongue, if I am present, or else I cannot go.’
Caesar urged Cicero to think the matter over. The latter was convinced
that Caesar had no great love for him at present, but felt that he had regained
some self-respect. There was a definite hint of menace when Caesar
concluded by saying brusquely that if Cicero would not advise him, he would
seek guidance from others. The commander’s officers were a motley crew
in the orator’s opinion, making the threat seem more ominous.18
The Senate met on the appointed day, summoned by the tribunes Antony
and Cassius, and convened outside the formal boundary of the city so that
the proconsul Caesar could attend. In itself this was proper, although
subsequently Cicero at least was unwilling to accept it as a proper meeting
rather than an informal gathering. The turnout was poor, and most notable
of all was the absence of distinguished men. Even so Caesar used this as a
public opportunity to repeat his grievances – that all he had wanted was the
right to exercise privileges granted to him legitimately by the tribunes, but
that Pompey’s attitude had changed over time. It was the bitter hatred of
his personal enemies who had forced him to war. More practically Caesar
requested that senatorial envoys be sent to negotiate with Pompey and effect
a reconciliation. Caesar declared his own ambition was to display the same
gifts in ‘justice and equity’ as he displayed in action. The motion was
approved, but no one was willing to go. Always a popularis, Caesar did not
confine his attentions to the Senate. Antony summoned the Concilium Plebis
to vote on a number of measures. Before the meeting Caesar addressed a
gathering of the people, again explaining his actions and blaming his
opponents for the war. He assured them that the city would continue to
receive the grain it needed, and even promised to give every citizen a gift of
300 sestertii. As in the Senate, the reception seems to have been muted. The
memories of the vicious reprisals inflicted by Marius and Sulla still lingered
and the way the war would develop was unclear. In the Commentaries Caesar
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claims that Pompey had threatened to treat even those who stayed in Italy
as if they had sided with Caesar. In the end, most people of all classes felt
no strong attachment to either side, wanted to be neutral and simply hoped
to survive the Civil War unscathed. Some were convinced by Caesar’s words
and attitude, but most remained wary. The only open resistance to Caesar
came from one of the tribunes, Lucius Caecilius Metellus, who began by
hindering him in the Senate.19
The main confrontation came when Caesar decided to make use of the
State Treasury. The conquest of Gaul had made him wealthy, but he had
never been one to hoard his money and had spent freely to win the loyalty
of his army and men like Curio and Aemilius Paullus. He was now faced with
the cost of supporting a truly enormous war effort. In just a few months he
had added three new legions and numbers of recruits to the ten legions,
independent cohorts and auxiliaries that he had controlled at the start of the
year. In time additional forces would be raised. All of these men had to be
paid – it was especially unwise to give any cause for discontent to soldiers
who had once served with the enemy. More than that these armies needed
to be equipped and fed. In Gaul Caesar had relied heavily on allied
communities to supply him with food, but the conditions of civil war were
different. Not all provincial and allied communities would side with him, but
it was important to avoid treating those who did not too harshly, for in the
end he must hope to win them over to his cause. Where necessary Caesar
would have to pay for a good deal of his armies’ requirements. Crassus had
boasted that only a man who could raise an army from his own resources
could truly call himself rich. Caesar was rich, but he was now being called
upon to fund a conflict on a massive scale, and no individual possessed that
much money.
However, when he went to the Treasury – or perhaps sent men, since this
would otherwise have meant crossing the boundary of the city – Metellus
stood in front of the doors and imposed his veto. The Treasury was housed
in the Temple of Saturn in the Forum. The consuls had left the door locked
and barred, taking the key with them, but the soldiers ignored the tribune
and chopped it down with axes. In Plutarch’s version blacksmiths had to be
summoned to perform this task, and there was a confrontation between
Caesar and Metellus outside the building. As the tribune repeatedly tried to
halt the work, Caesar’s temper flared up and he threatened to kill him. As
Metellus at last backed down, Caesar declared that it was harder for a man
of his natural clemency to make such a threat than it would be for him
actually to do the deed. The man who had proclaimed that he was
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championing the rights of the tribunes in January was now as ready as his
opponents had been to override and threaten one of these magistrates. He
had never hidden the fact that his greatest aim was to protect his own
dignitas. Now that war had come the only way to do that was to win, and
in order to win he needed cash. The money was taken – 15,000 gold bars,
30,000 silver bars and no less than 30 million sestertii. In addition, Caesar
took a special fund kept over the centuries in case there was a repeat of the
Gallic attack on Rome in 390 BC. Caesar announced that there was no longer
any need of this since he had permanently dealt with the threat from the
Gauls. Even so, he made no mention of any of this in the Commentaries,
merely noting that Metellus, spurred on by his enemies, was generally
obstructive.20
Caesar had returned to Rome for the first time in nine years. At most, he
stayed for a couple of weeks and then pressed on to join the army massing
for the Spanish campaign. Mark Antony was left in charge of Italy. From
Cicero’s correspondence we know that men like Curio, Caelius and Dolabella
were all confident that the campaign in Spain would be both swift and
successful. Sardinia and Sicily were soon taken without meeting any serious
resistance. Caesar had won a victory in the Italian campaign, but it was a
hollow one in the sense that Pompey and his army had escaped. The war
would go on and was already widening. In time it would spread to virtually
all the lands around the Mediterranean. Caesar’s enemies were still powerful
and would grow stronger. In Italy people were relieved that he had not turned
out to be a Sulla, but few had so far been turned into his enthusiastic
supporters.21
The Ilerda Campaign, April to August, 49 BC
Caesar described the Pompeians in Spain as an army without a general.
Three legates commanded the seven Pompeian legions in the Spanish
Peninsula, but they did not prove an effective team. One, Marcus Terentius
Varro, was widely respected as a scholar and during his lifetime wrote a
long list of books on an exceptionally broad range of subjects. He had a long
political association with Pompey, having in 70 BC written a manual for him
on the procedures of the Senate. He had served as his legate before and in
49 BC had charge of Further Spain, but seems to have had only modest
military ability. During the campaign his army did not join the main
Pompeian force and played no significant role. Most of the fighting was
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done by the remaining five legions under the command of Marcus Petreius
and Lucius Afranius. Petreius was the more experienced of the two. He had
been in effective control of the army that defeated Catiline in 63 BC.
According to Sallust he had already served for thirty years at that time. It is
possible that he was the son of one of Marius’ senior centurions. By the
time of the Civil War he must have been about sixty and, although a very
experienced campaigner, had mainly acted as someone else’s subordinate.
Afranius was the consul for 60 BC, better known as a dancer than for any
other talents. He had taken part in several of Pompey’s campaigns and so
had some military experience, but had never held an independent command.
As an ex-consul he was senior to Petreius, but it is unclear whether he took
charge or the two men acted as if they had joint authority. In addition to their
five legions they had substantial auxiliary forces, including some 10,000
cavalry and eighty cohorts of Spanish infantry. The latter were predominantly
heavy infantry (scutati), but also included units of light infantrymen (caetrati)
armed with javelins and small circular shields.22
Caesar sent orders for his legate Caius Fabius to take the three legions in
the west of the Transalpine province at Narbo and secure the passes of the
Pyrenees. Once this was done, Fabius pushed on to close with Afranius and
Petreius who had concentrated near the town of Ilerda (modern Lérida).
Messengers went to three other legions instructing them to march and join
Fabius, along with 5,000 auxiliary infantry and 6,000 allied and auxiliary
cavalry. Caesar himself followed, but paused en route outside Massilia. This
ancient Greek colony was one of Rome’s oldest allies. As proconsul of Gaul
he had taken care to honour and favour the community, but the place also
had a strong connection with Pompey dating back to the war against
Sertorius. Now the city closed its gates to Caesar’s men and refused to let
him enter. The Massilian magistrates claimed that they did not understand
the intricacies of Roman politics, but felt that they could not side with either
Caesar or Pompey against the other. This plea of neutrality soon rang a
little hollow when they let Domitius Ahenobarbus sail into their harbour with
a force raised from his own household and slaves. The latter’s family
connections with the region may also have encouraged them to welcome
him. Unabashed by his recent surrender and release, Domitius Ahenobarbus
had finally reached the province he had craved for so many years. The
Massiliotes immediately gave him command of the defence and readied
themselves to face a siege. Caesar moved three legions to the town and placed
them under the command of Caius Trebonius. In support was a squadron
of warships under the command of Decimus Brutus, the same man who
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had led the fleet against the Veneti. After moving them into place and
beginning the siege, Caesar left his subordinates to the task and pressed on,
escorted by a personal bodyguard of 900 German auxiliary horsemen. It
was a busy time, with plans having to be made and appropriate orders
despatched. The loss of Massilia to the enemy was a blow, for it was a major
port and its facilities and merchant fleet would have been a great asset in
supplying the army fighting in Spain. Yet time was not on Caesar’s side and
he could not afford to wait. However, in spite of the pressures of command
he still found time to write letters to prominent men. Cicero received one from
him that had been written just a few days before he reached Massilia. In it
Caesar urged the orator against any rash act such as joining Pompey.23
By the time Caesar joined Fabius in June, the six legions were already
concentrated in one force along with most of the allies and auxiliaries. The
units were probably the Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and Fourteenth.
In numbers the enemy may – or may not, since we do not know the strengths
of individual units on either side – have had a slight numerical advantage.
Spirit and experience were very much in Caesar’s favour. In spite of the money
taken from the Treasury it remained a struggle to meet all the costs of fighting
the war. Therefore, ‘at this time he borrowed money from the military tribunes
and centurions; and distributed the cash to the soldiers. By doing this he
achieved two things at once, since he took a security for the loyalty of the
centurions and won the enthusiasm of the legionaries with his largess.’ Caesar’s
army was confident, but the enemy had taken up a strong defensive position.
Their main camp was situated on the same ridge as the town of Ilerda itself.
A smaller force controlled the bridge over the River Sicoris (modern Segre),
which separated the two armies. Before Caesar arrived Fabius had constructed
two bridges some 4 miles apart and crossed over to the enemy-held west bank.
With two substantial armies sitting in position close to each other over the
following days and weeks supply soon became a problem, and both sides
regularly sent foraging expeditions to the east side of the river as food and
forage became increasingly difficult to obtain. Two of Fabius’ legions were out
on such an expedition when the bridge they had crossed suddenly collapsed.
Fortunately, a relief force crossing by the more distant remaining bridge was
able to reach them before they were too badly handled by four legions and a
strong force of cavalry sent by Afranius to attack them.24
Caesar arrived two days after the skirmish. The broken bridge was almost
repaired and under his orders the work was completed during the night. That
same day he carried out a thorough reconnaissance, looking particularly at
the terrain. The next morning he led out the entire army, save for six cohorts
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left behind to protect the camp and the bridge, and advanced to form up in
battle order at the bottom of the slope in front of the Pompeian camp.
Afranius and Petreius responded to this challenge, but deployed their line no
more than halfway down the slope, not too far from the rampart of his own
camp. In the manner typical of warfare in this period, the two armies then
stared at each other for some time, neither wishing to go forward any further
and force a battle. Caesar was reluctant to risk fighting with the ground in
the enemy’s favour. At some point in the day he claims to have learnt –
presumably from prisoners or deserters – that it was Afranius’ caution that
was holding the enemy back. He decided to establish a new camp on the
spot, but as on similar occasions in the past was careful to make sure that his
troops did not become vulnerable to attack by the nearby enemy during the
construction. The legions were formed in the normal triplex acies, so Caesar
withdrew the cohorts of the third line and set them to digging a 15-foot wide
ditch. As an added precaution they did not construct a rampart, since this
would have been too visible. Even without its protection, such a wide ditch
would seriously obstruct an enemy charge. By the evening it was ready, and
Caesar withdrew the rest of the army behind the line of the ditch. During the
night he kept the men under arms, but the enemy made no hostile move. On
the following day three legions formed up for battle facing the enemy, while
the remaining units, sending parties out to fetch the necessary material for
a rampart, in the meantime dug ditches leading back at right angles from
the first to create a greater semblance of a camp. The covering force easily
repelled enemy harassing attacks and the work was completed. The next day
ramparts were finally added behind the ditches.25
Caesar next attempted to occupy a hillock that dominated the ground
between the Pompeian camp and the town of Ilerda. He took three legions
with him and sent the leading elements of one of them to seize the hill.
Afranius had observed the column marching out and his own men were able
to beat them in the race to get there first, driving back Caesar’s men as they
tried to scramble up the slope. The Commentaries lay some of the blame for
this failure on the enemy fighting in the same style as the Spanish tribes,
moving at speed and caring little about their formation. While this may well
be true – Caesar notes that troops stationed in one place for a long time
tend to be influenced by local fighting styles – it may also have been intended
to depict his enemy as less Roman than his own men. It was harder to excite
an audience by a description of fighting against fellow countrymen than
against the wild tribes of Gaul. The fighting went on for much of the day,
as each side fed in reserves. The position was narrow and no more than three
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cohorts could fit into the space and form a fighting line. Losses were heavy
on both sides, but after five hours men of the Ninth Legion had enough
energy left to charge sword in hand and close one last time with the enemy.
The Pompeians gave way for long enough to allow Caesar’s men to withdraw.
Caesar lost seventy dead, including a senior centurion of the Fourteenth
Legion and some 600 wounded, while the enemy suffered around 200
casualties including one primus pilus and four other centurions. Both sides
believed that they had won, but the basic truth was that Caesar had failed
to capture the position he had attacked.26
The weather then took a hand, heavy rain causing the river to flood and
wash away both of Fabius’ bridges. For the moment Caesar and the army
were cut off from the supplies brought by allies as well as reinforcement.
One party of Gauls coming to join Caesar was attacked by a large enemy
raiding force and took some losses before it was able to pull back to a defensive
position. All attempts to repair the bridges at first failed and the basic ration
had to be cut to a level that could not long be sustained without the soldiers’
health suffering badly. After some days the legionaries were set to making
simple leather-covered, timber-framed boats of the type they had seen in
Britain. Under cover of darkness these were carried in carts to a spot 22
Roman miles away and a small camp was built behind a hill next to the river.
Later a legion was sent there and, after sending detachments across to the far
bank, was able to build a new bridge in just two days. The Gauls, along with
the supply convoy they were escorting, were then able to use the bridge and
join the main army. For the moment the crisis was over, but Caesar was no
nearer to defeating the enemy. There were encouraging signs when a number
of Spanish communities, sensing that the odds were shifting in his favour,
sent envoys promising to defect to him. All were asked to supply him with the
wheat he so desperately needed. The new bridge was a vital lifeline, but the
distance did not make it convenient for all purposes. Caesar’s legionaries
now dug canals to channel the water of the Sicoris and so create a crude ford.
By this time the two Pompeian legates felt that they were too exposed, for the
enemy cavalry had grown in numbers and confidence and was making their
own foraging difficult. They decided to withdraw to the region occupied by
the Celtiberians who were especially well disposed towards Pompey.27
They prepared carefully, ordering ships and barges to be gathered all
along the River Ebro and brought to the town of Octogesa, some 30 miles
from their camp. The craft were used to create a pontoon-style bridge over
the wide Ebro. The work did not go unnoticed by Caesar’s scouting patrols,
and by coincidence the project was completed on the same day as the
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improvised ford in the Sicoris was felt to be usable. Afranius and Petreius had
a route across the biggest obstacle in their path. They knew that once over
the Ebro they would be free from immediate pursuit, at least for a few days.
However, they also knew that they first needed to get the army as far as
Octogesa. Two of their legions crossed the Sicoris by the bridge outside the
town and camped on the eastern bank. During the night the rest of the
Pompeian army, save for two cohorts left to garrison Ilerda, marched across
to join up with the two legions and the entire force then set off towards the
Ebro. Caesar’s outposts reported the movement, and Caesar sent out cavalry
to harass and slow down the enemy column. When the sun rose he could see
from the high ground near his camp that the Pompeian rearguard was hard
pressed by his own horsemen and was having to stop and form up repeatedly
to drive the pursuers back. The legionaries knew what was happening and
via the tribunes and centurions urged Caesar to let them risk the man-made
ford and go across the river to fight. Encouraged by their enthusiasm, he
led out five legions, leaving the remaining unit to guard the camp. The cavalry
formed a screen above and below the crossing point, and the troops managed
to wade through without suffering any losses. In spite of their later start, the
advance guard came up with the Pompeian rearguard by late afternoon.
Both armies deployed facing each other, but the Pompeians had no wish to
fight and remained on high ground, while Caesar’s men were tired. Both
armies camped for the night. Ahead of the Pompeians was a line of hills
and the two legates planned another night march in order to reach the pass
through these before the enemy. The plan failed when it was revealed to
Caesar by some prisoners. Though it was still dark he ordered the trumpet
call to be sounded that would raise his men. Hearing this, and realising that
surprise was lost, the Pompeians went back to camp.28
The next day both sides sent out small reconnaissance patrols to
investigate the routes through the hills and confirm the presence of a pass
some 5 miles away. Whoever gained possession of this would be able to
deny the route to the enemy. The night march having failed, the Pompeians
decided to move at dawn. Their camp was between Caesar and the pass, but
they were encumbered by a baggage train, whereas the Caesareans had only
basic equipment and minimal rations. Caesar set out before dawn, surprising
his enemies by heading off in a different direction. Relief turned to dismay
as his column slowly began to swing to the right and head round towards
the pass. The Pompeians set out and the two sides raced to get there first.
Caesar’s men had a more difficult route, but had started earlier and were
more lightly burdened. His cavalry also continued to harass the enemy
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column and slow it down. The Caesareans won the contest, and Afranius
and Petreius halted their despondent troops. The officers and men in
Caesar’s army were all keen for battle with the enemy at such a disadvantage
of position and morale, and pressed him to give the order to attack. Caesar
refused, believing that the enemy, cut off from all supplies, would have to
surrender anyway. He saw no need to waste the lives of any of his soldiers,
or even of the citizens fighting for the enemy. This provoked some muttering
from his veterans and half-hearted talk of not fighting whenever he finally
did give the order.
Over the next days the two sides began building lines of fortification, the
Pompeians to secure a water supply and Caesar to hem them in and deny
them this. During the work large numbers of men on both sides began to
fraternise with the enemy, seeking out relatives, friends and neighbours.
403
0
0 2 km
1 mile
Upper
Bridge
Fabius’
Camp
Lower
Bridge
Segre (Sicoris)
Stone
Bridge
Afranius’
Camp In retreat
In pursuit
CAESAR
Caesar’s Camp
Ilerda
AFRANIUS
Artificial
ford
First attempt
to escape
Route of retreat
leading to surrender
Battle of Ilerda
CIVIL WAR AND DICTATORSHIP 49–44 BC
Some Pompeian officers were already speaking of capitulation, and Afranius’
own son sent a friend to treat with Caesar. His father’s will to go on seems
to have collapsed, but Petreius was still determined and led out his bodyguard
of Spanish cavalry and light infantry to massacre every Caesarean soldier they
found mingling with their own troops. Some managed to fight their way
out, while others were hidden by Pompeian troops and allowed to slip away
during the night. Caesar let all the enemy troops in his own lines either go
freely or stay as they wished. Petreius begged his soldiers to remain loyal
and took an oath never ‘to desert or betray the army and its officers, or to
think of personal safety before the common good’. He cajoled Afranius into
taking the same oath, followed by the senior and then the more junior
officers, and finally the ordinary soldiers.29
The Pompeians made one last attempt to break out of the encirclement.
Caesar followed, continually harrying the retreating column. The enemy was
again hemmed in, this time in an even worse position with no water supply
at all. Caesar still wished to avoid battle and both sides again set to building
lines of fortifications. An attempt by the Pompeians to recross the Sicoris
was blocked and with their forage almost exhausted Afranius sought peace
terms from Caesar. The latter berated the enemy generals for needlessly
wasting lives. Nevertheless, as at Corfininium and throughout the war so
far, all of them were allowed to go free. Their army was disbanded, Caesar
carefully supervising the process. By this time in Further Spain, the
remaining legate Varro had been so encouraged by Afranius’ earlier, highly
optimistic reports, that he decided to prove himself a keen agent of Pompey
and the cause. He held levies and massed supplies. After the surrender at
Ilerda was complete Caesar headed towards the Further province. Varro’s
confidence had by this time ebbed as news reached him of Caesar’s success
and it became apparent that the population of his province was generally
well disposed to the victor. His troops deserting him, he swiftly sent word
to Caesar and surrendered. All of Spain was now under Caesar’s control.
Although there were difficult moments, his expectation of rapid success
had proved to be justified. By the end of the summer the resistance at
Massilia also ended. This time Domitius Ahenobarbus managed to escape
by ship shortly before the city surrendered and so was not captured for a
second time. He would fight against Caesar again. So would Afranius and
Petreius, who like him were ready to accept their enemy’s mercy, but did not
hate him any the less for it. Nor was there any sign that Pompey and his
more senior allies were any more eager for peace other than through victory.
The war would go on.30
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Macedonia,
November 49–August 48 BC
‘Look at Cnaeus Pompey’s position, when neither the glory of his name
or past deeds, nor even his client kings and states, of which he has so
often boasted, can keep him safe, and even the chance of an honourable
escape, which even the humblest possess, is denied him; chased out of
Italy, Spain lost, his experienced army captured, and now on top of it all
blockaded, something which I do not think has ever happened to another
general [imperator].’ – Publius Cornelius Dolabella, writing to Cicero from
Caesar’s camp outside Dyrrachium, May–June 48 BC.1
‘But fortune, which has great power in all matters and most of all in war,
causes great shifts in human affairs with just a little disturbance.’ – Caesar.2
Caesar left Quintus Cassius Longinus in command in Spain. It was an
unusual post for a tribune of the plebs, but these were exceptional times, and
Cassius had already served in Spain during his quaestorship so had some
experience of the region and its peoples. The choice was not to prove a
happy one. Caesar welcomed any man who came to him, rewarding loyalty
with honours, office and wealth – he once said that he would faithfully
reward even a bandit if the man had done him a service. Cicero and others
were scornful of the band of dissolute wastrels who had flocked to join
Caesar. They saw them as people who had squandered their own inheritance
and now expected to govern the Republic. Suetonius claims that in the years
before 49 BC, Caesar often jokingly told such men that they needed a civil
war. Certainly there were many desperate men for whom Caesar’s victory
offered a last chance of wealth and success in public life, but it would be a
mistake to take the sweeping judgements of Cicero and Pompeian
propaganda at face value. It is true that Caesar’s legates and senior
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subordinates during the Civil War were, with a few exceptions, not notable
for their great ability or good character. Several made serious misjudgements.
However, the competence and honesty of many of the senior Pompeians
were equally questionable, even if these possessed more distinguished names.
A high proportion of the ex-consuls in Pompey’s camp had faced charges of
electoral bribery in the past. Caesar had the advantage of being able to issue
orders and did not have to deal with wilfully independent men like Domitius
Ahenobarbus. However, it was certainly the case that things tended to go
better when Caesar was present. Trebonius and Decimus Brutus had handled
the siege of Massilia efficiently. Curio had secured Sicily without fighting,
for Cato, sent by the Pompeians to command the island, had no significant
forces at his disposal and had seen no point in wasting any lives in a hopeless
defence. After this success Curio took legions to North Africa in the summer
of 49 BC. At first he did well, routing a strong Pompeian force, but he was
then lured into an ambush by the Numidian army of King Juba. Curio died
fighting along with many of his soldiers. Others were slaughtered as they fled
or surrendered only to be executed on the king’s orders. Only a handful
escaped, including Asinius Pollio, and it may well have been Caesar’s flattering
portrayal of Curio that made Pollio later question the reliability of some
passages in the Commentaries. A smaller defeat was suffered by Mark
Antony’s younger brother, Lucius, who surrendered in Illyricum along with
fifteen cohorts.3
News of these setbacks reached Caesar as he returned from Spain. They
were unfortunate, but the initiative still lay with him and he was determined
to confront Pompey and the main enemy army as soon as possible. Perhaps
more worrying was a mutiny that broke out amongst his legions when they
had camped at Placentia (modern Piacenza) in northern Italy. The trouble
began amongst the Ninth, who had fought well for Caesar in Spain, and
like many mutinies throughout history had a range of causes, with festering
grievances coming to the surface during a period of rest and inactivity. With
the war far from decided their general needed them, and many legionaries
must have guessed that this placed them in a strong position to bargain for
favours. Some of the men had now served their full term and wanted to be
discharged. More complained that they had not yet received the bounty of
500 denarii that he had promised them at Brundisium earlier in the year.
There was also resentment that the mildness and clemency with which he was
waging war was delaying their victory and – and this was probably most
important – depriving them of plunder. Caesar was still at Massilia when
he received a report of the mutiny, but at once hastened to the spot and
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confronted the mutineers. The proconsul’s tone was stern and unrelenting
as he explained that such a great conflict could not be hurried. He then
announced that he intended to decimate the Ninth, an ancient punishment
that involved selecting by lot one out of every ten men to be beaten to death
by his comrades. The remainder of the legion would be dishonourably
discharged from the army. The veteran soldiers were dismayed and their
officers began to beg their stern commander for mercy. Caesar knew how to
work a crowd and gradually gave ground, finally saying that only 120
ringleaders would need to draw lots to choose twelve men to be executed.
The selection is supposed to have been rigged to ensure that the names of
the main troublemakers were drawn. However, Appian claims that one man
who had not even been in the camp during the mutiny was included in the
twelve. As soon as Caesar discovered this, he released the soldier and replaced
him with the centurion who had tried to arrange the death of an innocent
man in this way. It was the first time since 58 BC that Caesar had faced any
serious disobedience on the part of his soldiers, but the outbreak was quickly
suppressed. The Ninth would fight with great distinction for Caesar in the
forthcoming campaign, as would his other troops. The Commentaries make
no mention of the whole affair.4
Since he had slipped away from the enemy at Brundisium in March,
Pompey had been exercising all his organisational skill to create the army
with which he would win final victory. At the same time he used his
connections in the region – nearly every community and certainly all major
rulers were amongst his clients – to mobilise the manpower and resources
of the eastern Mediterranean, to provide his soldiers with pay, food and
equipment, and to supplement their numbers with allies and auxiliaries. He
had nine legions, a mixture of the troops he had brought with him and
newly levied units from the citizens settled or resident in Greece and Asia.
Metellus Scipio had gone to Syria and would in time bring two legions that
had been stationed on the border with Parthia. Frantic diplomatic activity
had ensured that the latter would not threaten the province, but it is hard
to know whether our sources are correct to claim that serious attempts were
made to seek military aid from the Parthians. Pompey certainly did make
extensive use of foreign troops and amassed a particularly strong force of
cavalry. The raw material of a great army was there and as the months went
by Pompey dedicated himself to training the inexperienced soldiers. He was
fifty-seven, and until the Civil War began had not served in the field for
more than thirteen years, but everyone is said to have been impressed with
his energy. Their commander trained with the men, going through the drills
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with legionary equipment or mounting a horse and demonstrating to the
cavalry how they were to fight. Plutarch says that he could throw a javelin
further, more accurately and with greater force than many a younger man.
Inspired by his example, a strong and effective army began to take shape. As
the year went on, the Pompeians grew steadily more powerful.5
During Caesar’s absence there had also been a slow trickle of senators
leaving Italy and deciding to end their neutrality and join the Pompeians.
Some went because they judged that Pompey would win and wished to join
the victors. For others it was a matter of conscience or persuasion by family
and friends. It was a strange feature of the Civil War that letters continued
to be exchanged freely and men remained in regular contact with
correspondents on both sides. The most distinguished of those who decided
at this stage to play a more active role in the conflict was Cicero, who had
sailed to Greece after much soul searching. He still felt the Civil War
unnecessary and hated Pompey’s plan of abandoning Rome and Italy.
Caesar’s clemency had cheered him, although he was not sure how long this
would last and whether Caesar would prove himself as cruel as Cinna had
been in the eighties BC as soon as his dominance was secure. Curio had paid
him a visit on his way to invade Sicily and done little to assuage his fears.
The tribune had openly said that he thought Caesar’s moderation was purely
a matter of policy, which conflicted with his naturally cruel disposition. In
time the veil would be drawn aside and his true nature revealed. These were
somewhat strange words from an ally, but Curio had never been one to
restrain his speech. However, he did not know Caesar well, having only
joined him a year before, so his judgement may be questioned. Latter events
would show that Caesar did not abandon his merciful treatment of his
enemies and never attempted to rule by fear. Throughout his life it is hard
to see any real trace of cruelty. He could be utterly ruthless if he felt that this
was advantageous, and had a coldly furious temper, but was never cruel
simply for the sake of cruelty. Cicero was unsure about how Caesar would
behave in the long run. His feelings about Pompey were similar and he judged
that whoever won the Civil War would then be effectively a dictator,
possessing royal power or regnum. Yet always there remained his deep
attachment to Pompey and his respect for the distinguished men who fought
alongside him. In each case it was often more respect for the sort of men he
felt they ought to have been, rather than necessarily the ones they actually
were, but it was no less strong for that. He also hated inactivity, but did not
feel willing to join in the politics of a Republic controlled by Caesar. In spite
of letters from his friends and family in Caesar’s camp, and from Caesar
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himself, Cicero eventually decided that he must stand with the Pompeians.
His brother Quintus, in spite of his years as Caesar’s legate in Gaul, did the
same.6
There were defections, but the bulk of the Senate still remained neutral,
and Caesar continued to maintain at least a façade of normal public life at
Rome. He wished now to become consul for 48 BC, but there was no existing
consul to preside over elections. A praetor was available, but a praetor had
never supervised the appointment of new consuls, and when Caesar proposed
this it was rejected by the college of augurs. Instead the praetor Marcus
Lepidus appointed Caesar dictator so that he could hold the elections. There
was a single precedent for this, dating back to the darkest days of the Second
Punic War. Caesar returned to Rome, summoned the Comitia Centuriata and
was duly made consul for the following year with Publius Servilius Vatia
Isauricus as his colleague. It was unorthodox, though strictly speaking legal,
although it is perfectly possible that there were no other candidates in the
elections then held. Caesar would be consul again in 48 BC, the proper ten
years after his first consulship. His colleague was the son of the man under
whom he had served in Asia during the seventies BC, and was very much a
member of the established elite, married to a niece of Cato. It was another
indication of how complex and confusing loyalties were during the Civil
War.
Elections were also held for the other magistracies – Caelius Rufus became
praetor – and then afterwards Caesar used his powers as dictator to pass a
series of laws. One recalled from exile all of those condemned by Pompey’s
extraordinary courts in 52 BC. Milo was specifically excluded, so that in the
main those benefiting from this were men associated with Clodius. Caesar
also recalled men such as Sallust, who had been expelled by Appius Claudius
during his censorship, as well as Gabinius, the Syrian governor who had
restored Ptolemy to the Egyptian throne. Both would fight for him during
the war. Full political rights were also finally restored to the children of the
victims of Sulla’s proscriptions. Such measures were mainly intended to
confirm the loyalty of his supporters and win him new ones. Of more general
concern was the problem of debt, as the value of property had in some cases
plummeted since the war began. There was pressure for an abolition of debt,
especially from those – many of whom had joined him – who owed huge
sums of money. The cry of ‘new tablets’ (novae tabulae) – meaning rubbing
out all account books and starting from scratch – had been a frequent one
in recent decades, and a major rallying call of Catiline’s rebels. Many feared
that Caesar, well known as a popularis and a frequent debtor himself –
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would seek support in the same way. However, the dictator refused to employ
such a drastic measure and instead sought a compromise. Assessors were
appointed to value all property at its pre-war value, and debtors were then
made to give this to their creditors in payment. An old regulation was also
revived which stipulated that no one was supposed to have more than 15,000
denarii in hard cash. The aim was to deter hoarding, which was bound to
have an impact on the economic life of Rome and Italy. Such a measure was
inevitably difficult to enforce.7
The Great Clash
After just eleven days Caesar resigned the dictatorship and left Rome. He did
not wait for January to take up his consulship in the normal way, but hastened
to Brundisium where he had ordered his army to concentrate. Despite the
best efforts of his officers during the last six months, there was still a serious
shortage of transport vessels. Caesar had twelve legions – probably some
25,000–30,000 effectives, for they had suffered casualties, and many stragglers
and convalescents had been left behind on the march back from Spain – in
or near Brundisium, but there were only enough ships to transport 15,000
infantry and 500 cavalry. Even these troops would have to travel with the
barest minimum of baggage, while the low proportion of horsemen was
simply a reflection of the much greater space required by their mounts. It was
obvious that more than one crossing would need to be made, but there was
a great risk that the troops landed first would be overwhelmed by the enemy.
Even the initial voyage would be dangerous, for the Pompeians had amassed
a very large fleet of some 500 warships and many smaller vessels used for
scouting. The bulk of this was under the command of Bibulus and was
stationed in ports along the eastern Adriatic shore to intercept any invasion
force. Caesar had only twelve war galleys, certainly not enough to protect
the transport ships if they were caught by the enemy navy, and every trip
needed to ferry his army across the Adriatic faced this serious threat. Caesar
understood these factors, but also knew that they were unlikely to change
in the immediate future. He was eager to strike at the heart of the enemy,
knowing that waiting would only give Pompey time to grow stronger and
better prepared. Bad weather delayed him for some weeks and it was not
until 4 January 48 BC that he set sail. Twelve months earlier no one had
expected him to attack in the winter months when armies normally rested.
The same was true this time. Pompey’s legions were dispersed in winter
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quarters and Bibulus’ fleet was not ready. Caesar was able to cross and
disembark at Paeleste on the coast of Epirus without any opposition. This
was done quickly and the ships sent back to Brundisium on the same night,
but by this time the enemy had realised what was happening and managed
to catch a few vessels. Caesar claims that Bibulus was so enraged that he
ordered these ships to be burned along with their crews. The vast majority
of the transports got back safely, but it was clear that the next convoy would
face a warned and waiting enemy.8
For the moment Caesar was cut off from reinforcements and supply
convoys. He had seven legions, each with an average strength of about 2,140
men, as well as the 500 cavalry, but there had been no room to carry
significant quantities of food and they would need to rely on obtaining this
locally. The Roman calendar was currently running weeks ahead of the
natural seasons, so in reality it was late autumn, and he would need to find
some way of keeping the army concentrated and fed during the coming
winter months while still operating against the enemy. On the night after the
landing Caesar marched against Oricum, which quickly surrendered when
the townsfolk turned against the small Pompeian garrison. The
Commentaries report that they were unwilling to fight against a man holding
legal imperium on behalf of the Roman people. A rational calculation that
the Pompeians were unlikely to win this encounter may also have contributed
to their decision. With much of the population of Italy not strongly
committed to either side, it was unsurprising that there was little trace of any
stronger sentiment in most of the provinces. The garrison commander,
Lucius Manlius Torquatus, was as usual spared by Caesar and chose to
remain with him. After this success Caesar pushed on to Apollonia, and
once again the population refused to fight against him, forcing the Pompeians
to flee. Most of Epirus soon followed the example of these towns and went
over to Caesar. He had secured a base in Greece and for the moment the
towns were able to keep his army supplied. Some food stores gathered by the
enemy had been captured, although one convoy of grain ships anchored
near Oricum was scuttled by the Pompeians sailing as escort. Pompey’s main
supply depot was at the great trading port of Dyrrachium (modern Durazzo
in Albania), further north along the coast. Caesar made a drive to capture
this great prize, but by this time the enemy was beginning to react. Pompey
ordered his legions to concentrate, force-marched the men to Dyrrachium
and arrived before Caesar, who promptly withdrew. The enemy had nine
legions, each much closer to their proper strength, and must have
outnumbered Caesar by more than two to one. Yet the morale of the
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Pompeians seems to have been shaken by the unexpected enemy landing
and their initial successes. Labienus made a public profession of his faith in
Pompey, taking an oath never to desert him and to share his fortune. He
was followed by the tribunes and centurions, and finally all of the legionaries
collectively made the same vow.9
Caesar retired to Epirus. Although he controlled the ports of Apollonia
and Oricum, Bibulus’ fleet was now very active, imposing a tight blockade.
One convoy carrying reinforcements of legionaries and cavalry was forced
to turn back to Brundisium, and lost a single ship. Bibulus had all the men
on board executed, regardless of their rank. Perhaps he hoped that such a
display of brutality would help to deter further attempts to get through to
Caesar, but his deep-seated hatred of his former colleague as aedile, praetor
and consul doubtless fed his anger. Personal sorrow probably also played a
part, for his two eldest sons had recently been murdered in Egypt. Bibulus
fought with a dreadful savagery, but was not unique in this. From the
beginning of the war few of the Pompeians had shown any inclination to
compete with Caesar in displays of clemency and moderation. If anything,
his policy, with its obvious implication of his personal superiority, seemed
only to increase their rage and stir them to further atrocities. Cicero had
been shocked by the attitudes he encountered in Pompey’s camp. Most of the
leading Pompeians declared that men who had remained neutral were almost
as bad as Caesar’s active partisans, and there was talk of widespread
punishment when they finally led the army back to Italy.10
Caesar camped near the River Apsus, not far from Apollonia. Pompey’s
larger army took up a position on the opposite bank but showed no
inclination to attack and force a battle. There was another attempt at
negotiation, initiated when Caesar sent back one of Pompey’s officers,
whom he had captured for the second time. He suggested that both he
and his opponent take an oath to dismiss their armies within three days
– a seemingly fair if probably impractical measure – and then rely on the
Senate and People to arbitrate in their dispute. No response came from
Pompey at first, but Caesar was content to wait, in the hope that more of
his troops would be able to join him from Italy. In the meantime he put
pressure on Bibulus’ fleet by denying them landing places on the coast. War
galleys had very large crews for their size, since they relied on the strength
of many rowers for their speed and manoeuvrability. There was little space
for carrying food and fresh water, and even less space for the rowers to
move around or rest, since their combined body weight acted as ballast
to keep the ship stable. Therefore, it was necessary to land at regular
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intervals – at the barest minimum every third day – so that they could
resupply and allow the rowers and crew to recover. Ancient fleets acted best
when they had bases nearby or when closely supported by land forces.
Caesar’s men controlled the harbours and watched the coast, attacking any
ships that tried to land, forcing Bibulus’ men to return to their bases on
the island of Corcyra more regularly than they would wish. Added to the
severe winter weather, imposing the blockade became a great strain for the
Pompeian fleet. Bibulus asked for a truce, but sent his senior subordinate
Lucius Scribonius Libo to the talks, excusing his own absence by saying
that his personal animosity towards Caesar and his natural hot temper was
likely to hinder agreement. Libo’s daughter was married to Pompey’s
younger son Sextus, again showing the close family links between many
of the leading Pompeians. Caesar went to the meeting, but was
disappointed when Libo simply asked for a truce, during which the
Pompeian ships would be free to land as they wished, and promised only
to refer anything else to Pompey for his consideration. Caesar replied by
stating that he would only permit such a truce if the enemy ended their
blockade. He asked Libo to give safe conduct to envoys he would send to
Pompey. Neither request was granted and, as the Commentaries put it,
‘when Caesar understood that his entire speech was framed with a view
to the present danger and the shortage of supplies, and that he offered no
hope or serious offer of peace, he returned to his plans for continuing
the war’.11
Bibulus succumbed to disease and fatigue soon afterwards. No one was
appointed to replace him as overall commander of the fleet, but still the
Pompeians maintained the blockade in spite of the difficulties. At the Apsus,
the rival armies continued to stare at each other from the opposite banks.
There were more negotiatons. At one point Vatinius went to the river bank
and called out to the enemy outposts until finally he was told that an officer
would come for a meeting the next day. This occurred, but was interrupted
by the angry intervention of Labienus and ended in a shower of missiles.
Caesar’s former legate shouted out afterwards that they could, ‘Stop all talk
of peace terms; there was no possibility of peace until Caesar’s head was
brought to them!’ Shortly before this Pompey himself is supposed to have
said that he would not even consider peace if it looked as if he was holding
on to life through ‘Caesar’s generosity’. The stand-off continued and Caesar
grew increasingly desperate as the weeks and months went by without any
reinforcement from Italy. Several sources claim that he grew suspicious of the
determination and loyalty of his subordinates in Italy. Deciding that only his
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own presence could impart the necessary energy, he decided to go to
Brundisium in person. He did so in disguise, pretending to be one of his
own slaves who were often employed as messengers, aboard a small merchant
ship anchored near the mouth of the River Aous. As the craft headed down
river to the sea the crew had to struggle against a strong wind blowing in from
the sea. After a while, the sailors decided to give up the attempt and turn
back, but Caesar suddenly threw back his cloak and told them not to be
afraid because they carried ‘Caesar and Caesar’s good fortune’. The rowers
and helmsman redoubled their efforts, trying to force the craft out to sea,
but in the end were forced to give up. It is extremely questionable whether
a general should have left his army in such circumstances, even if this was
to fetch reinforcements, and it was probably for this reason that no mention
of the incident is made in the Commentaries. However, Plutarch claims that
when his legionaries discovered what had happened, they did not feel
abandoned, but merely offended that their commander did not feel confident
in winning with them alone. As he returned to camp the men are supposed
to have clustered around him, imploring him to have more faith in them. It
was a mark of the incredible bond and trust between general and soldiers
that had grown up since the early days in Gaul.12
Dyrrachium
Eventually, on 10 April, Mark Antony was finally able to bring the bulk of
the troops across from Brundisium to Greece, landing near Lissus in the
north with four legions and 800 cavalry. Pompey was too slow to prevent
the two Caesarean forces from joining together. Caesar now had a more
powerful army at his disposal. He was still outnumbered, especially in cavalry,
but could rely on the better quality of his veteran legionaries to
counterbalance this. However, the arrival of more troops increased the
problems of supply, especially if the army was forced to remain in one place
for any length of time. A number of large detachments were sent away from
the main army to protect his allies in Thessaly and Macedonia. With the
remainder Caesar offered battle to Pompey, who refused to be drawn. He
remained convinced that the Caesareans could be worn down by depriving
them of food. Caesar was aware of the danger and decided to try once again
to capture Pompey’s main supply base at Dyrrachium. This time he managed
to get there before the enemy, although not quickly enough to capture the
town and its supplies. Instead he pitched camp between Dyrrachium and
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the Pompeian army, which took up position on a hill called Petra, overlooking
a natural harbour. With ready access to the sea, Pompey was able to keep in
easy communication with the town itself and his forces elsewhere. He sent
orders instructing grain convoys to be brought directly to the army from as
far afield as Asia. Caesar’s camp was on high ground inland and his troops
would have to rely on gathering food and forage from the surrounding lands.
He decided to construct a line of fortifications on the hills, both to protect
his own foraging parties and to hinder those sent out by the Pompeians,
who had far more cavalry mounts and supply animals and so even greater
requirements than his own forces. In addition ‘he wished to reduce Pompey’s
prestige (auctoritas) amongst foreign nations, when the story spread around
the world that he was besieged by Caesar and was afraid to fight a battle’.
Pompey could not afford to withdraw and allow Caesar to capture
Dyrrachium and its depots. Therefore, he set his own men to constructing
a fortified line facing Caesar. Skirmishes were fought to secure key points
along the high ground, and in one instance a detachment of the Ninth had
to be ordered to retire from a position where it was too exposed to enemy
archers and slingers. At one point the legion turned around and, led by Mark
Antony, charged and routed their pursuers to demonstrate that they were not
retiring because they had been defeated, but through choice. When
completed, the Pompeian line was 15 Roman miles long and strengthened
by twenty-four forts. Caesar was on the outside, and inevitably his line had
to be larger, especially since he hoped to hem the enemy in completely, and
his siegeworks eventually stretched for some 17 miles.13
Caesar’s men were short of food, for it was still winter by the natural
seasons even if by the calendar it was well into spring. Livestock was
reasonably plentiful, so that meat was usually available and came to form a
greater than usual proportion of the diet. Grain was hard to come by and
often the men had to be content with barley – usually reserved for animal
feed – rather than wheat. Even this could not always be found and sometimes
they had to make do with the root of a plant called charax, which could be
mixed with milk and baked into a sort of loaf. When Pompey saw some of
these loaves his rueful comment was that they were fighting beasts rather than
men. Caesar’s men had good access to water supplies, but he ordered them
to divert or dam the streams that flowed through their lines into the enemy
position. The Pompeians had plenty of food, since supplies were constantly
coming in by sea, but began to run short of water. Pompey ordered them to
dig new wells, but this was only partially successful. A very large number of
men were concentrated in a small area within their siege lines and apart
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from the soldiers and servants there were many animals. Priority for fodder
and water was given to cavalry mounts, and large numbers of baggage and
pack animals started to die or were deliberately killed. In the crowded camps
disease – perhaps typhus, but the descriptions in our sources are somewhat
vague – also broke out. Both sides were suffering, for this was effectively a
siege carried out on an enormous scale, but now that they were committed
neither commander wished to back down, and the enemy’s problems only
encouraged them to persist. Caesar felt that his own confidence was shared
by his soldiers. At times they threw loaves of charax into the enemy lines to
taunt them with this sign of their determination. As the weeks went by and
the crops in the fields started to ripen there was further encouragement with
the prospect of plentiful grain. Caesar anyway claims that some of his
sentries were overheard saying that they would eat the bark from trees before
letting Pompey escape.14
The building of the fortified lines went on, Caesar still hoping to complete
his encirclement so that Pompey would be forced either to escape by sea, to
break through Caesar’s lines or to watch his army wither. Skirmishes and
raids continued. The Pompeian archers and slingers took to shooting at or
near the fires visible in Caesar’s lines. In response the soldiers sat or slept away
from the flames, preferring to be concealed and cold rather than warm but
at risk. Pompey then launched a series of major attacks on a number of
sections of Caesar’s fortifications, testing their strength and probing for
weak spots. One attempt to capture a key hill was repelled when Publius
Cornelius Sulla – the dictator’s nephew, for his son Faustus Sulla was with
the Pompeians – brought up two legions to reinforce the threatened fort.
The Pompeians were routed, but Sulla chose not to counter-attack and
exploit the situation. Caesar approved his caution as appropriate for a legate,
since such decisions were the prerogative of the commander-in-chief. The
Commentaries proudly reported the bravery of Caesar’s legionaries. In one
sector three cohorts of the Ninth held off an entire legion supported by
large numbers of allied archers and slingers. After a day of bitter fighting
virtually every one of the defenders was wounded, although clearly a good
number were still able and willing to fight. Most of the wounds were caused
by missiles – 30,000 arrows are said to have been picked up within the fort
after the last attacks had been beaten off. Four out of the six centurions in
one cohort were hit in the face and lost an eye. The shield of one centurion,
a man named Scaeva, had been hit by no less than 120 missiles. Other sources
tell us that he was one of the men hit in the eye, but in spite of this wound
and others to the thigh and shoulder, kept fighting. At one point he feigned
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a willingness to surrender and then, when the enemy rushed forward, killed
one and lopped the arm off another. Scaeva and his men then stood their
ground, their defiance so intimidating the Pompeians that none dared to
advance against them. Scaeva may have served with Caesar for many years,
possibly having been with him during his time as propraetor in Spain as
well as the years in Gaul. Their commander now rewarded the entire cohort
lavishly, doubling their pay, awarding decorations to many of them, issuing
them with new clothes and – at the time this may have been the most valued,
although we should never doubt the importance of pride for good soldiers
– an extra grain ration. Scaeva was promoted to primus pilus, the senior
centurion of the legion, and given a bounty of 200,000 sestertii. It was not
his last service to Caesar, and in later years he seems to have become an
equestrian and for a while led a unit of auxiliary cavalry that took his own
name – the ala Scaevae.15
417
0
0 2 km
2 miles
Dyrrachium
Caesar’s
Camp
Petra
Pompey’s
Camp
Caesar’s old camp
occupied by Pompey
Caesar’s siege line
Caesar’s uncompleted siege work
Pompey’s siege line
Caesar’s unsuccessful attack on
his abandoned camp
Pompey’s successful counter-attack Pompey’s
Camp
CAESAR
POMPEY
The lines at Dyrrachium
CIVIL WAR AND DICTATORSHIP 49–44 BC
The attacks had been repulsed, but it was difficult for Caesar with fewer
troops to hold a longer line than the enemy. The Commentaries claim that
the Pompeians suffered around 2,000 casualties, including a number of
centurions, one of whom was the son of a former praetor. In contrast Caesar
lost only twenty dead, although even he implies that the number of wounded
was substantial. It is questionable how soon Scaeva and many of his men
would have been able to return to duty. After this burst of fighting Pompey’s
men spent several days working hard to strengthen vulnerable parts of the
line of fortification, raising the rampart to a height of 15 feet. Caesar
countered by leading his army out for battle each morning and deploying in
a line just out of catapult range of the enemy fortifications. Pompey felt
that it would have lowered his own prestige and the confidence of his men
if he did not respond, but formed his legions with the rear line of cohorts
of the triplex acies only just in front of his rampart. He had no desire to fight,
feeling that it was better to starve the enemy into submission. A battle was
more likely to favour Caesar’s veterans than his own inexperienced
legionaries, especially in the rough ground between the lines where it would
have been difficult to exploit his superiority in cavalry. Caesar refused to
give the order for an attack. The slope favoured the Pompeians, who would
have had the additional benefit of support from missiles thrown or shot
from the rampart behind them. Caesar contented himself with the knowledge
that his soldiers would see this as a reluctance on the part of the Pompeians
to face them on anything like equal terms. For the moment Caesar seems to
have despaired of successfully negotiating with Pompey, but he made an
indirect approach by sending an envoy with a personal letter to Metellus
Scipio, who had arrived in Macedonia with the legions from Syria. In the
meantime, to add to the pressure on Pompey, Caesar’s legionaries extended
their fortifications to block the two approaches to Dyrrachium itself. Pompey
had sent a force of cavalry by sea to land near the town. Around the same
time he may have made an attempt to capture the town with a surprise night
attack, possibly after a traitor had offered to admit his men. The attempt
failed, but the additional fortifications made it even harder for Pompey’s
cavalry to find sufficient fodder and after a few days they were taken by ship
back to his main position within his own fortifications. By this time the
horses were being fed mainly on leaves and reeds, since not enough proper
feed could be brought by ships from Corcyra or even further afield.16
Pompey realised that his own army was suffering as much, perhaps even
more than the enemy, and decided that he needed to seize back the initiative
once again. An opportunity came with the desertion of two Gaulish
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noblemen, the brothers Roucillus and Egus. They were the sons of one of the
main chieftains of the Allobroges from Transalpine Gaul and had served
with Caesar for many years, leading a contingent of tribal cavalry with some
distinction. Characteristically he had rewarded their loyalty well, making
them senators, probably within their own tribe, although some have preferred
to take the more natural reading of this passage to suggest that he had
actually enrolled them in the Senate at Rome. It is certainly probable that
the men were citizens. However, more recently the brothers had taken to
siphoning off much of their men’s pay and also sending in false returns of
the number of warriors they had to claim extra money and rations. In the
end their own troopers went and complained to Caesar, who delayed making
a formal decision, but privately spoke to them and warned them to stop
these corrupt practices. The brothers realised that they had become
unpopular and feared punishment in the future, so soon began to plan their
escape. They borrowed substantial sums of money – the rumour was that
they wished to make recompense to their men – and started buying up
horses. A plan to murder the overall commander of Caesar’s cavalry was
abandoned as impractical, so Roucillus and Egus then simply rode over to
the enemy lines. With them went their household warriors, whose oaths of
loyalty ensured that they must always follow their chieftains. Pompey was
pleased, for up until this point no one had deserted from Caesar’s army
during the entire campaign. He had them paraded around his lines and
shown to the troops as a sign that the enemy must be weakening when two
distinguished men chose to abandon them. Even more usefully the brothers
had held senior positions and so were well acquainted with Caesar’s lines
of fortification and the routine of his army.17
Armed with this information, Pompey prepared for another major attack
that was intended to break through Caesar’s lines and end the blockade.
During the day his legionaries made wicker coverings for their helmets.
These reduced the chance of the bronze glinting and so revealing their
position when it caught the light, but also added further protection, taking
some of the force out of a missile. This was especially important for stones
flung from a sling or thrown by hand, which could concuss a man even
without penetrating his helmet. The point chosen for the attack was the
southernmost sector of Caesar’s lines where these came closest to the sea.
Knowing that these were vulnerable, he had ordered the construction of an
additional line behind the first, but work on this and on a wall at right angles
to join the two together had not yet finished. Archers and light infantry,
along with equipment for filling the enemy ditch and scaling the wall, were
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sent to the spot in boats. At midnight Pompey himself led out the main force
of sixty cohorts. The attack began just before dawn and fell heavily on the
Ninth, which was on duty in this sector. The Pompeians’ helmet covers
proved very effective against flung stones, while the incomplete fortifications
allowed the lines to be outflanked and quickly infiltrated. The two cohorts
on the spot were driven off, and other units sent up in support failed to stem
the rout and were quickly put to flight themselves. All save one of the
centurions of the legion’s first cohort were killed and the eagle standard
was only saved when its bearer flung it over the rampart of the nearest fort.
It was not until Mark Antony brought up twelve cohorts from further along
the line that the situation began to stabilise. Messages – many through a
system of smoke signals that had been arranged to allow communication
between the different forts in the line – summoned more reserves,
accompanied now by Caesar himself. The fort was held, but the Pompeians
controlled the positions closest to the sea and were building a camp there.
They had punched a hole in Caesar’s line and would now be able to forage
more freely over a wide area.18
Caesar built a new camp for a strong force facing the one built by Pompey’s
men. In this area was another fort about half a mile from Pompey’s main
camp. It had originally been built by the Ninth, but was subsequently
abandoned when the layout of this sector of the fortifications was changed.
Later, the site had then been occupied and modified by the enemy, but these
had also left after a few days. Now, Caesar’s scouts reported that a Pompeian
force, roughly equivalent to a legion in size, was moving towards this position.
Later patrols confirmed that the old fort now housed a legion. Caesar felt
that his opponent had left this unit exposed and sensed an opportunity to
win a local victory that would help to balance the recent enemy success. He
left two cohorts to guard his own lines and took the rest of the immediately
available troops – some thirty-three cohorts, although these included the
Ninth, which was still shaken and had lost many centurions – on a march
that took them to the fort by a roundabout route. The deception was
successful and Pompey was unaware of the threat until Caesar’s men had
actually begun their attack. After a stiff fight the fort was stormed, the
legionaries hacking apart the barrier of stakes that blocked its main gateway.
However, things then started to go badly wrong. Although Caesar’s men
were past the outer wall of the fort, there was another smaller enclosure
within this and the garrison managed to cling on within this protection.
Meanwhile, the cohorts of the right wing were unfamiliar with this stretch
of the line and got lost, following a rampart that led away from their objective
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when they mistook this for one of the walls of the fort. Although puzzled
that they had not encountered a gateway, the units kept going, and were
followed by Caesar’s cavalry. By this time Pompey had responded, launching
an immediate counter-attack with the five legions working to fortify his new
camp, their approach inspiring the survivors of the garrison to renewed
enthusiasm. A large body of Pompeian cavalry also headed towards Caesar’s
right wing, and the Caesarean horsemen dissolved into panic, fearing that
their line of retreat back to their own lines would be cut off. The situation
was confused, the panic quickly infectious. The right wing crumbled first,
but as men saw this happening the rest of the attacking force also began to
flee. Some men were trapped in the ditches around the camp as the cohorts
dissolved into a mob and each man tried to force his way past his comrades.
As the Commentaries put it, ‘everywhere there was chaos, terror and flight,
so much so that when Caesar took hold of the standards carried by fleeing
men and ordered them to stop, some spurred their horses past him without
stopping and fled, while others in their fear even dropped their standards,
and not a single one halted.’ This time Caesar was unable to steady the line
as he had done at the Sambre and on many other occasions. The accounts
from other sources report an even less heroic incident, claiming that one of
the fleeing men actually tried to stab Caesar with the spike at the butt end
of his standard. The commander was only saved because one of his
bodyguards was faster and sliced off the man’s arm with his sword.19
The attack had ended in costly failure, Caesar losing 960 soldiers, 32
tribunes and centurions, and a number of other senior officers. The
Pompeians captured 32 standards as marks of their success, along with a
number of prisoners. However, Pompey contented himself with repulsing the
attack and made no attempt to assault Caesar’s lines. This was widely felt
to have been a mistake, since his men were elated at a time when the
Caesareans were badly demoralised. Caesar himself declared that the enemy
‘would have won today, if only they were commanded by a winner’. In the
aftermath Labienus asked to be given charge of the captured legionaries
and, mockingly calling them ‘comrades’, had them all executed in clear sight
of the enemy lines. On the next day Caesar paraded his men and spoke to
them, just as he had done after Gergovia. He reminded them of that earlier
defeat and how that had been followed by their great victory. He encouraged
them with just how much they had achieved, confining a bigger enemy army
for so long, and urged them to make up for yesterday’s failure by fighting all
the harder in the next encounter. His reprimands were mild, as were his
punishments, contenting himself with demoting a number of the standard-
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bearers. The soldiers greeted his appeal with enthusiasm and some of his
officers even urged him to risk a battle. Caesar was less confident that his
men had recovered sufficiently from the defeat, and may also have realised
that there was no reason why Pompey should accept his challenge. It was clear
now that the attempt to blockade the Pompeians had failed. The enemy
had captured one end of his encircling line of fortifications and he did not
have the resources to construct a new, inevitably longer line to box them in
once more. Pompey’s army could now supplement the supplies brought by
sea with those foraged locally. Caesar knew that he had failed in his objective,
but as he had told his men was determined to make sure that the campaign
still ended in victory. He decided to withdraw, marching away from the sea
where it was so easy for his enemy to resupply. During the night he sent one
legion to escort his baggage train and large numbers of wounded men to
Apollonia. An hour or two before dawn he set out with the rest of the army,
apart from two legions who formed the rearguard and remained in the lines.
These men sounded the normal trumpet calls that woke the army to a new
day. The Pompeians were deceived, and the rearguard was able to follow
and rejoin the main force. Pompey sent his cavalry in pursuit, but these were
held off by Caesar’s outnumbered horsemen closely supported by 400
legionaries marching in battle order. After a few skirmishes the two armies
broke contact, as Pompey did not chose to follow Caesar straightaway.20
Pharsalus, 9 August, 48 BC
As Caesar’s army marched away from the enemy it moved into regions that
had not yet been visited by foraging parties from either army. By this time
it was summer and the new grain crops had ripened sufficiently to be
harvested by the hungry soldiers. Caesar was also rejoined by some of the
detached troops, which helped to replace some of his losses. However, as
news spread of his defeat at Dyrrachium, some communities decided that
it would be a mistake to aid a leader who looked likely to lose the war. At
Gomphi the city’s magistrates closed the gates and refused to admit his men.
Caesar refused to tolerate this challenge. His army stormed the town, which
was then sacked, the drunken soldiers killing, raping and plundering at will.
The magistrates committed suicide. When the army moved away on the
following day, some sources claim that its progress was more of a drunken
revel than a disciplined march. Curiously, it was also claimed that the debauch
greatly improved the health of many of the men who had suffered during the
food shortages and heavy labour in the lines outside Dyrrachium. It was the
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first time since the start of the Civil War that Caesar had permitted his men
to mistreat the population of a captured town, and was clearly a deliberate
display of ruthlessness. Fear of suffering the same fate as Gomphi ensured
that other cities and towns in the region all welcomed Caesar’s army.21
Dyrrachium was undoubtedly a victory for the Pompeians and a mood of
elation spread throughout their camp, for this was the first time since the
beginning of the Civil War that Caesar had suffered a reverse. Most confident
of all were the senior officers, who now felt that only decisive action was
necessary to end the war. Afranius urged Pompey to use his naval power to
take the army back to Italy, so that they could reoccupy Rome and take from
Caesar any pretence that he represented the true Republic. Others,
particularly men like Domitius Ahenobarbus, argued that Caesar was now
at their mercy and should be brought to battle and crushed as soon as
possible. Pompey remained more cautious and still had great respect for the
fighting power of Caesar’s veterans. He had always planned to return to
Italy at some point, but with Caesar still at large, he was nervous that it
might seem as if he had been forced into another evacuation by sea. More
importantly this would leave his father-in-law Scipio, who with his Syrian
legions had still not yet reached the main army, at the mercy of Caesar’s
larger army. Pompey preferred to stay in Greece, but still believed that fighting
a battle was both unwise and, at least at the moment, unnecessary. Better to
shadow the enemy and wear them down by depriving them of supplies.
This caution was not popular with his more distinguished allies.
Ahenobarbus took to calling him Agammemnon – the King of Mycenae
who had led the Greeks in the ten-year struggle at Troy – or ‘King of Kings’
and accusing him of prolonging the war to maintain his own supremacy. If
Cicero, who had a deep affection for Pompey, openly spoke of the Civil War
being a question of whether Pompey or Caesar would hold supreme power,
then it is unsurprising that others were even more suspicious of his motives.
With victory now eagerly expected in the near future, many men were looking
to secure for themselves a generous share in the spoils. Some sent agents to
Rome to buy them a grander house closer to the Forum – especially one that
was owned by one of Caesar’s partisans. Domitius Ahenobarbus, Metellus
Scipio and Lentulus Spinther were already bickering over who would succeed
Caesar as Pontifex Maximus. Many of the leading Pompeians had themselves
benefited from Sulla’s victory decades before, and now hoped to escape their
debts and thrust themselves even further into the forefront of public life.
Cicero found the mood of the camp sickening, and later made a grim pun
on Cato and his associates’ name for themselves – the ‘good men’ or boni
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– by saying that there was ‘nothing good about them, apart from their cause’.
He doubtless exempted Cato himself from this judgement, but the latter
was not with the army, having been left in command of the garrison
protecting Dyrrachium. Malicious rumour said that Pompey had given Cato
this task so that he would be unable to influence events when Caesar was
defeated. There was much in-fighting between the various leaders as well as
their suspicion of Pompey. Afranius was accused of betraying the army
during the Spanish campaign. Others squabbled over who should be
permitted to stand for election in the next year. Domitius Ahenobarbus was
more concerned with punishing not only Caesar’s supporters, but also those
who had remained neutral in Italy. Pompey had never enjoyed the same
unquestioned authority with which Caesar directed his own war effort.
In the days after Dyrrachium, the mood amongst the senior officers in the
Pompeian camp became a volatile mixture of overconfidence and pride,
greed and ambition, jealousy and mutual suspicion. The pressure on Pompey
to provoke a final encounter with the enemy grew. He had never coped well
in the face of hostility and, like every other participant in the war, was
concerned for his own position when peace returned. Since his third
consulship he had drawn closer to the established elite of the senate, and now
had to be careful not to alienate these men. After Dyrrachium Pompey was
less decisive and more readily influenced by the advice of others. Beginning
to place too much trust in his own legions, Cicero said that after this success
Pompey ‘was no longer a general’.22
Pompey waited until Scipio had joined him before advancing into Thessaly
and closing with the enemy. It was early August and for a number of days
the two armies manoeuvred close to each other in the familiar style of warfare
in this period. Caesar felt that his men were now in both better health and
spirit than they had been at the start of the retreat, and formed them up to
offer battle. Pompey declined, which does show that he had certainly not been
pressured to the point where he was determined to fight under any
circumstances. He remained enough of a general to wait for a better
opportunity on more favourable ground. The cavalry of the two armies
skirmished, and once again Caesar’s outnumbered horsemen were able to
hold their own with the aid of picked infantrymen providing them with
close support. The Pompeians were camped on a hill and Pompey deployed
them on the slope in front of this, inviting Caesar to attack at a disadvantage.
The supply situation had greatly improved, but even so Caesar was reluctant
to keep his army in one locality for too long unless there was good reason
for this. After several days of this stand-off, on the morning of 9 August he
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gave the order to strike the camp and march away, hoping to find a better
opportunity for battle elsewhere. As this was underway, he was surprised
to observe the Pompeian army advance down off the slope and onto the
open plain. With part of his own column already formed up for the march,
Caesar gave the order to halt, declaring that, ‘We must postpone our march
and think instead of battle, as we have always craved; let us ready our spirits
for the struggle; we will not readily get another opportunity.’ The legionaries
set down their packs and moved out with only their armour and weapons.
The greatest battle of the war, fought by armies commanded by the ablest
generals of the age, was about to occur and inevitably sources recounted
the great omens that foreshadowed this massive shift in fortune. Appian
tells us that Caesar spent the night performing sacrifices to Mars and his
ancestor Venus, vowing to build the goddess a temple in Rome if he prevailed.
As usual his own account makes no mention of such concerns and deals
with more practical matters, although as is so often the case, there is not
enough detail for us to locate the battlefield with absolute certainly.23
The plain of Pharsalus was wide and open, bounded on one side by the
River Enipeus. Pompey deployed his army with his right flank resting on
the river. A small force of 600 cavalry were on this flank, probably with the
support of some light infantry and allied troops. Next to them was the main
force, eleven legions deployed in the usual triplex acies. The best legions
were divided between the flanks and the centre – the First and Third, the
two that had once fought for Caesar, now held the left of the line. Each
cohort was formed ten ranks deep, a much thicker formation than was usual.
Deep formations made it harder for the men in the front rank to flee and so
helped to keep inexperienced soldiers in the battle line as they struggled to
cope with the stress of combat. The chief disadvantage was that only a small
proportion of the men in such a formation were able to fight, and it would
have been difficult for the men in the rear ranks even to throw their pila
effectively. Altogether Pompey had 110 cohorts, making up a total of some
45,000 legionaries according to the Commentaries, although some other
sources made the figure smaller by several thousand. The right wing was
placed under the command of Afranius (or Lentulus in Appian’s version),
while Metellus Scipio had charge of the centre and Domitius Ahenobarbus
the left wing. The legions were ordered to stand their ground rather than
advance to meet the enemy – their task in the battle was essentially to pin
and occupy the enemy foot. Pompey expected to win the battle with his
cavalry, some 6,400 of which were massed on the left flank under the direct
command of Labienus. They were supported by thousands of light
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infantrymen, but it was the horsemen who were expected to overwhelm
Caesar’s outnumbered cavalry and then attack the flank and rear of his
legions. It was a simple plan, but reasonable enough, exploiting their
advantage in numbers and especially the great superiority in cavalry that
would have room to manoeuvre on the open plain. Its main disadvantage was
that there was no thought for what might happen if the cavalry attack failed.
Yet Pompey was confident that it would not and that his own legions would
be able to resist Caesar’s men for long enough to allow the mounted troops
to roll up the enemy line. Labienus harangued the army after Pompey had
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MARK ANTONY
CILICIAN LEGION AND
SPANISH COHORTS
LUCIUS
DOMITIUS
AHENOBARBUS
SYRIAN
LEGIONS
AFRANIUS
III
I
LABIENUS
POMPEY
SCIPI0
CAVALRY CAVALRY
PUBLIUS SULLA
CAESAR
VIII
IX
Fourth Line
Enipeus
CNAEUS
DOMITIUS
CALVINUS
The Battle of Pharsalus
Macedonia, November 49–August 48 bc
encouraged them, assuring his listeners that there were hardly any of the
tough veterans of Gaul left in the ranks of Caesar’s army.24
Caesar formed his army up with the river on his left. He had eighty
cohorts, but these were much smaller than those in Pompey’s legions and
amounted to no more than 22,000 men. Both sides left some additional
forces to guard their camps – seven cohorts in Caesar’s case. The legions
formed up in three lines just like their opponents, but of necessity the cohorts
were in shallower formations, perhaps some four, five or six ranks deep.
Also like their opponents, the flanks were entrusted to the best units. The
427
MARK ANTONY
CILICIAN LEGION
AND SPANISH COHORTS
LUCIUS
DOMITIUS
AHENOBARBUS
SYRIAN
LEGIONS
AFRANIUS
III
I
LABIENUS
POMPEY
SCIPIO
CAVALRY
CNAEUS
DOMITIUS
CALVINUS
PUBLIUS SULLA
CAESAR
VIII
IX
Fourth Line
Enipeus
The Battle of Pharsalus
CIVIL WAR AND DICTATORSHIP 49–44 BC
Tenth was on the right of the line, in the place of greatest honour, while the
left was held by a combined formation of the Ninth, which had suffered
particularly heavy casualties at Dyrrachium, supported by the Eighth. Mark
Antony was given charge of the left wing, Cnaeus Domitius Calvinus had
the centre and Publius Sulla the right. The last appointment was in some
respects nominal, since Caesar himself took station with the Tenth and
remained with the right wing throughout the battle, having guessed rightly
that the key tactical moves would occur in this sector. He had only 1,000
cavalry and seems to have stationed all of them next to the Tenth to face the
mass of enemy horsemen on their left. Pompey’s plan was obvious, since
such a great force of cavalry was clearly not intended to act defensively. To
counter it Caesar took six cohorts from the third line of his army and
brought them into a position behind his own right wing to form a short
fourth line set back at an oblique angle. Shielded from view by the troopers
ahead of them, and doubtless also masked by the clouds of dust inevitably
thrown up by so many men and horses moving on the plain, the enemy
commanders failed to notice this redeployment.25
It must have taken hours for the two armies to move into their positions,
their front lines probably less than a mile apart. Battles have always been
confusing, those in a civil war doubly so, and to reduce the chance of
mistaking friend for enemy and vice versa, each side issued a password.
Caesar took the name of his divine ancestor in the form that associated her
with military success – ‘Venus, the Bringer of Victory’ – while the Pompeians
used ‘Hercules the Unconquered’ as their sign. Some of the later sources
spoke of a time of hesitation, when the two sides balked at the prospect of
slaughtering fellow citizens, but this is most likely mere romantic invention.
Both armies seem to have been confident. Caesar was encouraged by the
spirit of his men as he rode along the lines, talking to them and checking that
the units were in their appointed place. He does claim to have recounted to
them once again the wrongs done to him and all the efforts he had made to
arrange a peaceful settlement. He had gone all along the line and was with
the Tenth when he gave the signal for the advance. As the trumpets blared
out, close to him was Crastinus, a retired primus pilus of the legion, who
called out,
‘Follow me, my old comrades, and give your general true service. Only
this battle remains; when it’s over he will regain his dignity and we our
freedom.’ At the same moment he turned to Caesar and said, ‘Today,
general, I shall earn your gratitude whether I live or die.’ After saying
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this he charged forward from the right wing, and about 120 handpicked
soldiers from the same century – all serving as volunteers – followed
him.26
Caesar’s infantry advanced in good order, keeping to a steady pace to
preserve their formation. When they came closer to the enemy, the front line
of cohorts charged forward ready to throw their pila when they came within
effective range of about 15 yards. The normal tactic was to keep silent, save
for the orders and encouragement of the centurions and other officers, and
only to raise a cheer when they flung their heavy javelins and ran forward to
close with the enemy. This time the Pompeians stayed rooted to the spot,
not advancing to meet them. The centurions had judged the moment to
order the charge on the assumption that the enemy would also come forward.
Now they realised at the last minute that this was not going to happen, and
that there was the danger they would launch their volley of pila too soon and
have lost formation by the time they reached the enemy. In a frightening
display of their discipline, Caesar’s veterans halted, calmly redressed their
ranks and then came on again in good order. At the right moment they then
accelerated for a second time, hurled their pila, raised a shout and charged
sword in hand at the Pompeian line. Caesar felt that Pompey’s order for his
troops to remain stationary was a mistake, since it denied them the
enthusiasm of the charge. However, helped no doubt by their numbers and
deep formation, the enemy legionaries for a while managed to resist the
charge and heavy fighting developed all along the line.
Pompey did not need his legionaries to beat the enemy, merely to keep
them occupied and allow the cavalry attack time to succeed. As the battle
began Labienus led his men forward against the massively outnumbered
Caesarean horse. The latter gave ground, perhaps deliberately retiring to
draw the enemy onwards. Over 6,000 cavalry were concentrated in a small
area. They were a mixed bag of many different races, inexperienced and
led mainly by enthusiastic but equally raw, young aristocrats. Pompey’s
cavalry had had few opportunities to operate en masse in the campaign so
far. Their horses can only have been in a poor state after the hardships
endured at Dyrrachium, which may well have meant that the charge
occurred at no faster rate than a trot. In the beginning such a large body
of cavalrymen should have been divided into several lines and care taken
to make sure that reserves were kept back to exploit any success or give
support as required. However, as the cavalry advanced and drove back
Caesar’s horsemen this good order seems to have vanished, as the riders
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and mounts both became carried away by the exhilarating sense of power
derived from the close presence of so many others. Labienus and his officers
lost control, and instead of an ordered body the force seems to have
degenerated into a great disordered mass. At this point Caesar gave the
order for the six cohorts in his fourth line to attack. The legionaries came
forward, infantry attacking horsemen in a way that has been rare
throughout history. They kept their pila in their hands and used them as
thrusting spears. Labienus’ men had lost order and momentum. It may
well be that they had halted, perhaps because he was trying to regain
control before moving against the flank of Caesar’s infantry. Whatever the
cause, the result was a rout in which the entire mob of cavalry stampeded
to the rear and played no further part in the battle. Their supporting light
infantrymen fled or were cut down.
Caesar kept his fourth line under tight control. Rather than pursuing too
far, they swung round to strike the left flank of the Pompeian infantry. All
along the rest of the front, the cohorts of Caesar’s first and second line were
already heavily engaged – these two lines usually worked closely together.
They had made some headway and more progress was made as the enemy
line was turned. Now Caesar gave the order for his final reserves, the fresh
cohorts of the third line, to advance into the fighting line. The Pompeians
gave more ground, and then their line collapsed and degenerated into
flight. Caesar kept some troops in hand and led them on to storm the
enemy camp. He and his officers exhorted the men to spare fellow citizens
whenever possible, but it is claimed that they also told them to massacre
the enemy auxiliaries to make it clear that their mercy was a special favour.
Caesar claims that 15,000 enemy were killed and 24,000 captured along
with the eagles of nine legions and 180 other standards. Asinius Pollio
gave the lower figure of 6,000 for the Pompeian dead, which may well be
more accurate. Domitius Ahenobarbus was killed in the fighting, but most
of the other leading Pompeians escaped. Servilia’s son Brutus soon joined
the prisoners, and Caesar is alleged to have sent men out looking for him
and been delighted when he was found to be still alive. His own losses had
been comparatively small considering the scale of his victory, amounting
to 200 men and 30 centurions – the latter tended to suffer
disproportionately high casualties because of the aggressive leadership
expected of them. Crastinus was amongst the dead, killed by a sword
thrust that went through his mouth and came out of the back of his neck.
This was only after he had performed great heroics. Appian tells us that
Caesar gave him an honoured burial and even decorated him, which was
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Macedonia, November 49–August 48 bc
unusual since the Romans did not normally give posthumous decorations.
Caesar himself tells us that he and his men were disgusted by the lavishness
of the enemy camp and the arrogance shown by the tents and shelters
already decorated with symbols of victory. Asinius Pollio recorded the
more revealing comment made as Caesar looked across the field strewn
with enemy dead. ‘They wanted it; even after all my great deeds I, Caius
Caesar, would have been condemned, if I had not sought support from
my army.’27
Even allowing for hostile sources, Pompey had not done well at Pharsalus
and had little impact on the course of the battle after it had begun. Soon
after the cavalry attack failed, he returned to camp. A little later, as he
saw the signs of collapse, he took off his general’s insignia and fled. It
might not have made any difference if he had remained with his soldiers,
but it was very poor behaviour for a Roman commander, who was never
supposed to admit defeat and, even if things went badly, should try to get
as much of his army away in as good order as possible. A battle might be
lost, but the general’s task was to make sure that the war would eventually
be won. At Pharsalus Pompey despaired, perhaps because for most of the
campaign he had wished to avoid fighting such a pitched battle at all. He
made no real effort to re-form an army in Greece, but with his advisors soon
thought of fleeing overseas. There were rumours that he even considered
seeking refuge and aid from the Parthians, but in the end Pompey chose to
go to Egypt, where the throne was being fought over by the children of
King Ptolemy. Egypt had supplied him with military aid in the recent
campaign and was wealthy, so may well have seemed a likely base for
rebuilding his fortune. Along with his wife Cornelia, some officers and
attendants, Pompey sailed into Alexandria. Openly, the young king – or
rather his advisors since the boy was only in his early teens – sent messages
of welcome. Pompey got into a boat sent out from the shore. On board were
several Egyptians, but also two Roman officers who had served with him
years before, and then subsequently been part of Gabinius’ army, remaining
in Egypt after the restoration of Ptolemy. As his wife and friends watched
from the deck of the ship, these officers stabbed Pompey to death. Thus
ended Pompey the Great, a man who had celebrated three triumphs and
been consul three times. He was just one day short of his fifty-ninth
birthday. His head was cut off and kept to present to Caesar in the hope
of gaining the goodwill of the victor, but the rest of the body was left on
the beach until one of his own freedmen came and buried it.28
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XX
Cleopatra, Egypt
and the East,
Autumn 48–Summer 47 BC
‘Caesar also had affairs with queens . . . most of all with Cleopatra, with
whom he often feasted until first light, and he would have sailed through
Egypt on her royal barge almost to Aethiopia, if his army had not refused
to follow him.’ – Suetonius, late first/early second century AD.1
‘Cleopatra . . . was a woman of surpassing beauty, and at that time, when
she was in the prime of her youth, she was most striking; she also possessed
a most charming voice and a knowledge of how to make herself agreeable to
every one. Being brilliant to look upon and to listen to, with power to subjugate
every one, even a love-sated man already past his prime, she thought that
it would be in keeping with her role to meet Caesar, and she reposed in
her beauty all her claims to the throne.’ – Dio, early third century AD.2
Caesar followed up his success at Pharsalus with his usual vigorous pursuit
and arrived in Alexandria just three days after Pompey’s murder. It was
important to complete the victory by preventing the enemy from
regrouping. Pompey’s skill, reputation and huge array of clients made him
still the most dangerous opponent even after his defeat, and Caesar had
focused his main attention on hunting down his former father-in-law. He
travelled quickly, taking with him only a small force. At one point he came
across a far larger squadron of enemy warships, but such was his confidence
that he simply demanded – and promptly received – their surrender. Caesar
paused for a few days on the coast of Asia, settling the province and
arranging for the communities, especially those that had strongly supported
the Pompeians, to supply him with the money and food he needed to
support his ever-growing armies. At this point news arrived that Pompey
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was on his way to Egypt and Caesar immediately resumed the hunt, taking
with him some 4,000 troops and reaching Alexandria at the beginning of
October. Almost immediately he learned of Pompey’s death, and soon
afterwards the latter’s signet ring and head were presented to him by envoys
of the young king. Caesar wept when he saw the first and would not look
at the second. His disgust and sorrow may well have been genuine, for
from the beginning he had taken great pride in his clemency and willingness
to pardon his enemies. Whether Pompey would have accepted this is
another matter, having earlier in the year declared that he had no intention
of living on indebted to ‘Caesar’s generosity’. A cynical observer might
say that it was very convenient for Caesar to be able to transfer to foreign
assassins the guilt for killing one of the greatest heroes in the history of the
Republic. Yet in the past there does seem to have been some genuine
affection between the two men as well as political association. Even when
they came to see each other as rivals, it is extremely unlikely that Caesar
ever wanted to kill Pompey. His aim was to be acknowledged by everyone,
including Pompey himself, as Pompey’s equal – and perhaps in time as his
superior. A dead Pompey was far less satisfying.3
Nevertheless, the murder made it clear that the local authorities were
keen to please the newcomers, and Caesar decided to land with his troops.
With him were the Sixth Legion, reduced by constant campaigning to
under 1,000 men, and one of Pompey’s old formations that had now been
renumbered the Twenty-Seventh and mustered some 2,200 legionaries.
Supporting these were some 800 auxiliary cavalry, at least some of whom
were Gauls and others Germans. It is possible that this was the bodyguard
unit that had accompanied Caesar in the recent campaigns. It was not an
especially strong force, but Caesar did not expect to face serious
opposition. He disembarked and marched to take up residence in one of
the palaces in the royal quarter of the city. As consul, he was preceded by
twelve lictors carrying the fasces which symbolised his imperium as a
Roman magistrate. The sight provoked a hostile reaction from the royal
troops in the city and from many of the Alexandrians. The Romans were
jeered and over the next few days a number of legionaries caught alone
in the streets were attacked and killed by mobs. Caesar had stumbled into
the middle of Egypt’s own civil war and would soon be besieged and
fighting for his life, completely out of touch with events in the rest of the
Mediterranean. Before describing what became known as the Alexandrian
War, it is worth pausing to consider Egypt in the fading years of the
Ptolemaic dynasty.4
Cleopatra, Egypt and the East, Autumn 48–Summer 47 bc
CIVIL WAR AND DICTATORSHIP 49–44 BC
Ptolemaic Egypt and its Queen
Alexander the Great had taken Egypt from the Persians in 331 BC, founding
Alexandria that same year – one of a number of cities bearing his name,
although in time it outstripped all the others. When he died his massive
empire was torn apart by his generals as they struggled to carve out kingdoms
of their own. One of the most successful was Ptolemy, son of Lagus, who
became Ptolemy I Soter, or ‘saviour’, and took Alexandria in Egypt as his
capital, even managing to divert Alexander’s funeral cortege so that the
body of the great conqueror was interred in the city. The dynasty Ptolemy
founded would rule for almost three centuries, controlling an empire that at
times included not just Egypt, but also Cyrenaica, Palestine, Cyprus, and
parts of Asia Minor. Its extent varied, outlying territories being lost to
rebellion or the renewed vigour of the other great successor kingdoms of
Antigonid Macedonia and the Seleucid Empire. The balance of power
between the three rivals fluctuated over the years, but by 48 BC both of the
others had gone. Macedonia had become a Roman province in 146 BC, while
Pompey had deposed the last Seleucid king in 64 BC and taken Syria under
Roman rule. The Macedonians and Seleucids had chosen to fight Rome and
had lost. In contrast the Ptolemies formed an alliance with the Roman
Republic even before it began to extend its power into the region. The
kingdom survived, but it gained few benefits from Roman expansion and
during the second century BC this was a contributory factor in its steady
decline. As important were the almost unending dynastic struggles within
the royal family. Ptolemy II had married his sister, inaugurating a tradition
of incestuous marriages – brother to sister, nephew to aunt and uncle to
niece – which persisted to the end of the dynasty. Such unions, broken only
by occasional marriages to foreign, usually Seleucid princesses, prevented the
aristocratic families from gaining claims to the throne. The price was to
make the pattern of succession very unclear. Factions grew up surrounding
different members of the royal family, all eager to advance them to become
king or queen and so gain influence as their advisor. Civil wars were frequent,
and over time it became more and more common for Rome to act as arbiter,
formal recognition by the Romans helping greatly to legitimise a monarch’s
rule. The kingdom’s independence was gradually eroded.
Egypt remained very wealthy. In part this was through trade, Alexandria
being one of the greatest ports in the ancient world, but more than anything
else it rested on agriculture. Every year the Nile flooded – as it still did until
the construction of the Aswan dam. When the water receded the farmers were
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able to sow their seeds in fields rendered very fertile by the moisture. The scale
of the annual inundation varied and, as in the Book of Genesis, there could
be years of famine as well as years of plenty, but in general the harvest
produced a substantial surplus. Many centuries before the unrivalled fertility
of the Nile valley had allowed the civilisation of ancient Egypt to flourish
and create its awesome monuments. More recently it had made the region
an attractive conquest for the Persians and after them the Macedonians.
The power of the Ptolemies was always based firmly on Egypt. Through a
sophisticated bureaucratic machine, much of it inherited from the earlier
periods, they were able to exploit this productivity. An important component
within the system was the temples – many of which preserved the worship
and rites of the old Egyptian religion and were little influenced by imported
Hellenic ideas. The temples were major landowners, but also centres for
industry and craft, and had privileged status, exempting them from most
taxation. Roman visitors to Egypt were amazed by the fertility and wealth
of the country, as much as they claimed to have been shocked by the intrigue
and opulence of the royal court. By the first century BC Egypt seemed to
offer the prospect of massive wealth to a number of ambitious Romans.5
The career of Cleopatra’s father illustrates both the instability of Egyptian
politics and its ever more blatant dependence on Rome. He was Ptolemy XII,
illegitimate son of Ptolemy IX and (most probably) one of his concubines. His
father had become king in 116 BCwhen his mother chose him as joint ruler and
husband, but was later rejected in favour of another brother, the massively
obese Ptolemy X. He eventually returned to oust them both by force and
remained on the throne until his death at the end of 81 BC. Ptolemy IX was
succeeded by his nephew Ptolemy XI, who was taken as husband and consort
by his stepmother, promptly murdered her and was himself in turn assassinated
soon afterwards. Ptolemy XII was then recognised as King of Egypt by Sulla.
He styled himself the ‘New Dionysus’ (Neos Dionysus), but was often known
less flatteringly as Auletes or the ‘flute player’ – some would argue that oboe
player would probably be a better translation, but the other version is more
commonly used. In 75 BC rival claimants to the throne had gone to Rome to
lobby the Senate, but eventually left without achieving anything.
Yet the wealth of Egypt remained a great temptation to ambitious
Romans. A decade later Crassus hoped to use his censorship to annex Egypt
as a province, probably on the basis that Ptolemy X had bequeathed it to
Rome in his will, a copy of which had been sent to the city. As noted earlier,
Caesar was credited with similar plans (see p.114–5). Neither man succeeded,
but as consul in 59 BC Caesar did share with Pompey the staggering 6,000
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talent bribe that Ptolemy XII promised as payment for having him formally
acknowledged as ‘friend and ally’ of the Roman people. Collecting this sum
proved difficult and probably contributed to the uprising that forced him
to flee from Egypt in the following year. He went to Rome in the hope of
winning the support that would restore him to power, and it is just possible
that he took his eleven-year-old daughter Cleopatra with him. The issue
became a fiercely contested one, since many craved the chance of a campaign
in Egypt and the rewards likely from a grateful king. In 57 BC the consul
Publius Lentulus Spinther – the same man who later surrendered to Caesar
at Corfinium – was given the task of restoring Ptolemy to the throne, but
political opponents managed to ‘discover’ an oracle that was interpreted as
meaning that he would not be allowed an army for this task. Eventually, in
55 BC, Gabinius took it upon himself to do this, inspired by Auletes’ promise
of 10,000 talents. In the event the bulk of the money could not be found, and
Gabinius returned to trial and condemnation at Rome, before reviving his
fortunes by joining Caesar in 49 BC.6
After his expulsion in 58 BC, Ptolemy’s daughter Berenice IV had been
made ruler, at first with her sister the elder Cleopatra VI as co-ruler, but
following the latter’s death she married a son of Mithridates of Pontus, a
connection that only increased the pressure on Rome to act. On his return
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Alexandria
Cleopatra, Egypt and the East, Autumn 48–Summer 47 bc
Auletes had Berenice killed, but his efforts to raise the money owed to
Gabinius and other Roman creditors were generally unsuccessful. He
remained deeply unpopular, but even greater hatred grew up for the Romans
who had backed him and who now wished to exploit the country so
shamelessly. Alexandria in particular witnessed frequent rioting and attacks
on Romans. In 51 BC Auletes finally died, leaving the throne jointly to his third
daughter, the seventeen-year-old Cleopatra VII, and his elder son, the tenyear-
old Ptolemy XIII. He had already sent a copy of his will to be kept at
Rome, a measure that made clear his acknowledgement of the Republic’s
power. Brother and sister were promptly married in the usual way. In spite
of her youth, Cleopatra was evidently already a forceful character, and
decrees issued at the beginning of her reign make no mention of Ptolemy. The
boy was not old enough to assert himself, but his ministers and advisors, led
by the eunuch Pothinus and the army commander Achillas, soon began to
oppose his older sister. Alexandria had been turbulent for some time. A
series of poor harvests added to the discontent of the wider population – the
Nile was at its lowest recorded level in 48 BC. In 49 BC Pompey sent his son
Cnaeus to Egypt to secure support for the forces he was gathering in
Macedonia. Cleopatra welcomed him – much later there were rumours of
an affair, but this may well be no more than gossip or propaganda – and sent
a contingent of the soldiers left behind by Gabinius along with fifty ships.
This compliance with the Romans was sensible, given their power and the
debt of her father to Pompey, but it may well have been unpopular.
Controlling much of the army, and with a good deal of support from the
Alexandrians, the regents were able to drive Cleopatra from the country.
The queen took refuge in Arabia and Palestine, and was supported by the
city of Ascalon – one of the former Philistine cities from the Old Testament
period, which in recent centuries had usually been under Ptolemaic control.
By the summer of 48 BC she had gathered an army and had returned to
reclaim the throne. This force and those loyal to her brother were warily
shadowing each other from opposite sides of the Nile Delta when Pompey,
and then Caesar, arrived in Egypt.7
Cleopatra is one of a handful of figures from the ancient world whose
name still commands instant recognition, but it must be emphasised that we
know far less about her early life and her liaison with Caesar than might be
supposed. More is known of her later life and subsequent affair with Mark
Antony, although even then most of our sources were written long after her
death and are tainted by the propaganda inspired by Augustus, against whom
the couple had fought and lost. Yet the queen has fascinated generation after
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generation, and over the centuries she has been often portrayed in art,
literature, drama and, more recently, cinema and television, all of which
have freely embellished the ancient sources. It is difficult for anyone looking
at the period to step back entirely from these popular images of Cleopatra,
but it is useful to begin with what can more confidently be said. When Caesar
arrived in Egypt Cleopatra was nearly twenty-one years old and had been
queen for almost four years. She was highly intelligent and extremely well
educated in the Greek tradition. Later, she would be credited with writing
books on a very broad range of subjects, from cosmetics and hairdressing
to scientific and philosophical subjects. Cleopatra was a noted linguist, who
it was claimed rarely needed an interpreter when conversing with the leaders
of the neighbouring countries. The Ptolemies were a Macedonian dynasty
who had imposed themselves by force on Egypt, but they had found it
expedient in the past to present themselves to their native subjects as true
successors to the pharaohs. Cleopatra was not the first to support the
traditional cults of the land, but she does seem to have taken an especially
close interest in the details of ceremonies. Later in her life she would style
herself as the New Isis, choosing an Egyptian goddess – though admittedly
one whose cult had spread to much of the Mediterranean world – rather
than a Greek deity after her father’s example. Plutarch tells us that she was
the first of the Ptolemies who was able to speak the Egyptian language. All
of this made sound political sense, for a monarch aware that challenges to
her rule were likely needed as broad a base of support as possible, and the
temples played a vital economic as well as spiritual role in the country’s life.
Ptolemaic Egypt was internally divided and was faced with the overwhelming
power of Rome. This could not be ignored, but might be placated. No ruler
could ever be secure, and it is in this context that we must place Cleopatra’s
undoubted ruthlessness. By this stage, it was unlikely that any of the
Ptolemies could be anything else.8
Some of the most frequently asked questions about Cleopatra are what
did she look like, and was she really beautiful? It is unlikely that we will
ever be able to answer either of these with any real certainty. On coins her
image is rather severe, probably because it was intended to project an image
of power and authority, rather than a flattering portrait of her features. In
some cases corrosion has rather emphasised the long, curved nose and
pointed chin. Some coins minted at Ascalon show a more youthful and
slightly softer featured woman. Over the centuries many portrait busts have
been identified as Cleopatra, but few of these are now generally accepted as
such. Depictions of her in the traditional Egyptian style, for instance in
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Cleopatra, Egypt and the East, Autumn 48–Summer 47 bc
temple reliefs, followed a different set of conventions, but are equally
unhelpful for showing us Cleopatra’s true appearance. The coins and busts
invariably show her hair tied back in a bun – a style that academic convention
rather unflatteringly describes as melon shaped – and wearing the diadem
of a Hellenistic monarch. She does appear to have had high cheekbones,
but her most powerful feature was her nose, high at the bridge, rather long
and probably somewhat hooked – hawk-like would doubtless be the term
used by a romantic novelist. Dio tells us that she was exceptionally beautiful.
A passage from Plutarch is sometimes mistakenly understood to contradict
this, for he says that it was not so much her beauty that first struck an
onlooker but her charm, personality and the gently musical tones of her
voice. Thus he did not deny her beauty, but rather said there were other
reasons for the powerful impact she had on men. Beauty proverbially is in
the eye of the beholder, and different generations have had very different
ideals of its perfection. It is not difficult to think of famous film stars who
have captivated audiences and clearly possessed huge sex appeal without
being unusually pretty. A person’s liveliness and animation have always been
very difficult for a sculptor to capture, while such things are extremely
unlikely to be conveyed by a coin portrait.
On balance it seems reasonable to say that Cleopatra was an extremely
attractive woman, and would probably have been seen as such had she lived
in any generation. To her good looks she added intelligence, sophistication,
wit, vivacity and enormous charm. Add in the glamour of being a queen,
along with her real political importance, and it is not difficult to understand
how she captivated two of the greatest Romans of the age. The colour of her
hair and her complexion are unknown. There is a tradition popular in some
circles that she was black, but there is not a shred of evidence to support this.
The Ptolemies were Macedonians, although there was some Greek and,
through marriages to Seleucids, also a little Persian blood in their recorded
family line. We do not know the identity of Cleopatra’s grandmother. There
is also a little doubt over her mother, although most accept that it was
Auletes’s full sister, which would then increase the significance of the
grandmother even further. The accepted conjecture is that the latter was a
concubine, which makes it possible that she was not of Macedonian stock,
but perhaps an Egyptian or from even further afield. Therefore it is not
absolutely impossible that there was some more specifically African blood
in Cleopatra, but there is no actual evidence to support this. Equally, it is not
absolutely impossible that she was a blonde, since some Macedonians had
fair hair (which is again a rather subjective term), but equally none of our
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sources claim this. This uncertainty will continue to allow different people
to imagine very different Cleopatras.9
Alexandria was a young city compared with Rome. It was probably smaller
– one estimate puts its population at something like half a million people –
but still vastly bigger than any other city in the Greco-Roman world with the
exception of Syrian Antioch. It was certainly more splendid than Rome, its
deliberate foundation ensuring that it had been laid out neatly in the best
traditions of Hellenistic architecture. The two main roads, which lay at right
angles to each other, may well have been as much as 100 feet wide. The
harbour was enormous, and on the island at its edge lay the massive Pharos
lighthouse, one of the Wonders of the World. Facing the sea was the royal
quarter, which consisted of numerous lavish palaces, since there was
apparently a tradition of each new ruler building his or her own complex.
This region of the city is now largely underwater, but in recent years
archaeologists have begun a programme of investigation that has already
revealed a good deal. One surprise was the number of ancient Egyptian
monuments that had been moved and brought to decorate the city. Clearly
many of the Ptolemies wished to emphasise the great antiquity of the country
that they had come to rule. However, Alexandria was founded by a
Macedonian king and most of its original colonists had been Macedonians
or Greeks. Since then the population had become more mixed and the city
contained the largest Jewish community outside Judaea itself. It was also a
bustling port, and trade in spices, ivories and other luxuries from India
seems to have increased during Cleopatra’s lifetime. However, for all this
coming and going of peoples, in cultural terms Alexandria remained overtly
Greek and had become one of the greatest centres of learning in the Hellenic
world. Its Library was massive, filled not only with books, but also with
curiosities and scientific wonders – a model able to move by steam power is
mentioned in one source – and the Ptolemies had a long tradition of
encouraging philosophers to come to the city to study and teach.10
The Alexandrian War
There is no evidence that Caesar had ever visited either Alexandria or Egypt
before he landed there in October 48 BC. He does seem to have been surprised
by the hostility provoked by the sight of his lictors and the swagger with
which he and his legionaries processed through the city. For the moment the
weather prevented him from leaving and moving on, and he decided to keep
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himself busy. A great part of the money promised to him by Auletes over a
decade before had never been paid, and Caesar announced that he intended
to collect 10 million denarii of this debt. The victory at Pharsalus had only
increased his already massive financial commitments, for he now had to
provide for the tens of thousands of Pompeian soldiers who had surrendered
to him. Around the same time he also announced that as the man who had
secured recognition for Ptolemy Auletes, he would now arbitrate in the
succession dispute. Pothinus the eunuch, acting as regent for Ptolemy XIII
(who was still no more than thirteen or fourteen) made no public protest, but
secretly sent orders summoning Achillas and the army to the city. The
Commentaries claim that Achillas had 20,000 men, consisting mainly of a mix
of Gabinius’ former soldiers, who had remained behind and taken local
wives, and mercenaries, many of whom were runaway slaves from the Roman
provinces. Caesar was seriously outnumbered and soon found himself
blockaded in the walled palace compound and a number of other buildings
that he had occupied in the royal quarter. At first there was an uneasy truce,
but soon Achillas launched an all-out attack. In repulsing one assault Caesar’s
legionaries set light to some buildings and the fire got out of hand, according
to some sources spreading to the Library, although it is unlikely that this
caused serious damage to its books and it remained a centre of learning for
several centuries afterwards. Most of the population of the city supported the
royal army or was neutral, and there was much talk of the need to stand up
to the Romans if Egypt was not simply to be absorbed. Caesar sent messengers
summoning aid and reinforcements, but it would be some time before any
could arrive and it is clear that he was in serious danger of defeat and death.11
At the beginning both Ptolemy XIII and his sister Arsinoe were within
Caesar’s lines along with many of their attendants, including Pothinus. The
latter was deliberately insulting, feeding the Romans poor food in rough
vessels and brusquely telling them that all the gold and silverware was going
to pay Caesar the money he demanded. At this point Cleopatra made her
startling appearance on the scene, smuggling herself into the palace at dusk.
She came with only a single member of her household, Apollodorus of
Rhodes, who rowed her across the harbour in a small skiff. He then carried
her into Caesar’s presence, not rolled up in a carpet in the best Hollywood
tradition, but inside a laundry bag. The bag was untied and the queen
revealed, perhaps standing up as it dropped down – it is hard to resist the
analogy of a dancer appearing from a cake. Dio claims that the queen had
learnt of Caesar’s womanising reputation and had dressed herself carefully
to excite both his pity for the loss of her throne and his passion as a well-
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known rake. The two became lovers, and around this time Caesar decreed
that the terms of Auletes’ will were clear and that Cleopatra and her brother
should rule jointly. The boy was unimpressed and probably already aware
that his sister was closer to the Roman consul than he could ever be. He
spoke to a crowd of Alexandrians, who responded by rioting. Tension within
the palace compound grew and there were rumours of plots to assassinate
Caesar. In the past he had never been a heavy drinker, but now he took to
staying with his officers after dinner and drinking well into the night. It was
claimed that he did this for protection. One of Caesar’s personal slaves
overheard Pothinus plotting and a watch was set on the eunuch, who was soon
proved to be in communication with the besiegers and was promptly
executed. At some point Arsinoe escaped and joined the Egyptian army,
who promptly proclaimed her queen. With her former tutor, the eunuch
Ganymede, she arranged the murder of Achillas and took control of the
troops. The two men most responsible for killing Pompey had both suffered
a similar fate within a short space of time.12
The siege continued with renewed intensity. At one stage the besiegers
contaminated the water supply to the area held by Caesar’s men, forcing
the latter to order his legionaries to dig for wells. A third legion, the Thirty-
Seventh, formed from surrendered Pompeians, managed to reach him by
sea, bringing with it a convoy of supplies as well as artillery and other
equipment. It was vital for Caesar to maintain his access to the harbour
exits, since if he became cut off from the sea then it would be very difficult
for any more aid to reach him. A series of small-scale naval battles were
fought in and around the harbour between the small squadron of warships
that had accompanied Caesar and an Egyptian navy hastily put together
from the boats that policed the Nile and warships that had been discovered
half-forgotten in the old royal shipyards. Beams were taken from the ceilings
of great buildings to be turned into oars. In most of these encounters Caesar’s
vessels gained the advantage and this encouraged him to launch an attack
to secure all of Pharos island, named after the lighthouse that stood on it.
This was connected to the mainland by a bridge almost a mile in length.
Caesar already controlled a small section of the island, but he now launched
an attack, landing ten cohorts by boats, while other warships made a
diversionary attack on the far side of the island. On the next day a second
attack was sent to secure the approach to the bridge. This began well, but
ended in chaos when a party of sailors who had disembarked from their
ships were panicked by an enemy counter-attack. The confusion spread and
soon even the legionaries were fleeing for their lives, swarming aboard the
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closest boats in their desperation to escape. Caesar managed to keep some
of the men fighting for a while, but soon realised that this small band would
be overwhelmed and so joined the retreat. His own craft was swamped by
panic-stricken soldiers so that it was impossible for the crew to push away
from the shore. Seeing what was going to happen, the consul took off his
cuirass and general’s cloak and dived into the sea. Then, holding his left
hand above the water to preserve some important documents he was carrying,
he calmly swam to safety. Suetonius maintains that he also managed to carry
his famous cloak with him, but elsewhere it is claimed that the enemy
captured and subsequently paraded this trophy. By this time the boat he had
left had foundered, but he was able to send other vessels back to save a few
of the trapped men. It was the most serious defeat of the whole campaign
and cost him some 800 casualties, just under half of which were legionaries
and the remainder sailors. However, his men’s morale remained high and they
continued to repulse any attacks on their positions.13
Soon afterwards – it was probably by this time late January or early February
47 BC – a deputation came from the Alexandrians asking Caesar to release
Ptolemy to them, claiming that they were weary of the despotism of Arsinoe
and Ganymede. Caesar agreed, but first urged the boy to stop the attacks,
which were not in the interest of his people, and remember his loyalty towards
Caesar and Rome. The boy burst into tears and begged Caesar not to send him
away, prompting the consul to say that if he truly felt that way then he should
swiftly end the war and return. Once outside the Roman positions, Ptolemy
cheerfully joined his sister and began inciting his soldiers to redouble their
efforts to destroy the invaders. According to the author of the Alexandrian War,
‘a lot of Caesar’s legates, friends, centurions, and soldiers were delighted by
this, because Caesar’s excessive kindness had been made absurd by the deceit
of a boy’. Yet personally he doubted that Caesar had been naive, and in his
account each of the parties felt that they were tricking the other in this episode.
The renewed assaults against the Roman position made no headway, and
things were beginning to turn in Caesar’s favour, for a relief army had come
overland from Syria under the command of Mithridates of Pergamum. It was
a force of allies rather than Romans, and included a contingent of 3,000 Jews
contributed by the High Priest Hyrcanus II and led by Antipater, the father of
Herod the Great, as well as various Syrians and Arabs. The involvement of
Hyrcanus encouraged the Jewish population of Alexandria to become far
more sympathetic to Caesar. Mithridates stormed the town of Pelusium, and
news of this success prompted Ptolemy and the other leaders to shift the bulk
of their forces eastwards to try and stop the enemy before they had completed
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crossing the waterways of the Delta. A messenger from Mithridates reached
Caesar at about the same time. Taking some of his troops he sailed round
the coast and was able to join up with the relief army before it came into
contact with the Egyptians’ main force. In the ensuing battle Ptolemy’s army
was utterly routed. He fled down the river, but was drowned when his boat was
swamped by fugitives and capsized – an episode reminiscent of Caesar’s narrow
escape some weeks earlier.14
The war was over and now it was a question of settling Egypt. Arsinoe
was a prisoner and would march in Caesar’s triumph before being permitted
to live on as an exile. She would later be killed on the orders of Mark Antony,
almost certainly with the encouragement of her older sister. Cleopatra now
took her remaining brother, Ptolemy XIV, as co-ruler, although it was obvious
that real power lay with her. In the early negotiations Caesar had granted
Arsinoe and this same younger brother joint rule of Cyprus, which was a
major concession given that it had recently been turned into a Roman
province. This may have been a reflection of his military weakness at that
stage, or perhaps was an attack on Cato, who had overseen the process.
However, Cyprus was again included in the realm granted to Cleopatra and
her brother. It is not entirely clear whether Caesar was able to secure the
money he had demanded on arrival in Alexandria, but probable that he did
so. The Alexandrian War implies that he left Egypt soon after the victory,
but it is clear that this is incorrect and that he remained there for some time
– perhaps as much as three months. He and Cleopatra took a cruise along
the Nile in her luxurious royal barge. Appian claims that 400 vessels and
most of the army accompanied them, which suggests that it was not entirely
a pleasure cruise. Part of the purpose may well have been to parade through
the country the newly confirmed ruler and the Roman might that supported
her. The political dimension was rarely far from the mind of Caesar, or
indeed of Cleopatra, but in itself it does not quite explain the episode. The
situation in Egypt no longer truly required Caesar’s personal attention and
there were many other issues that ought to have concerned him more. He had
now been away from Rome for well over a year, and for the months of the
siege itself he had been virtually cut off from events in the world outside
Alexandria. Suetonius claims that Caesar would happily have kept on going
ever further south along the Nile, had the army – probably most of all the
senior officers – not refused to follow him. There is an echo in this story of
the mutiny that brought Alexander the Great’s conquests to an end, but this
does not necessarily mean that it was an invention.15
None of the theories put forward to explain this trip have been entirely
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Cleopatra, Egypt and the East, Autumn 48–Summer 47 bc
adequate, and in the end it is very hard to avoid the conclusion that Caesar
simply wanted a rest. He had been almost constantly on campaign for over
a decade, and since crossing the Rubicon had enjoyed no significant break
from his labours. For all his restless energy, it is difficult to believe that he was
not tired, and perhaps somewhat empty. In his view he had been forced to fight
a civil war he had not wanted, and since Pharsalus and the death of Pompey
his world had changed forever. His greatest rival, a man who had only been
his enemy for a short time, had gone and there was no one now in the Roman
world against whom he could compete. Fatigue and perhaps also depression,
as much as fear of plots, might also explain the late-night drinking parties
that had begun in the months at Alexandria. His fifty-third birthday was
approaching in July 47 BC, while his hairline was rapidly receding, something
that upset a man who had always been very conscious of his appearance.
Looked at in this context, the attractions of a life of luxury and ease cruising
along the Nile at a steady pace and not rushing on to the next task become
more obvious. Added to these there was Cleopatra as companion and lover.
She was young, which was surely especially attractive if Caesar was beginning
to feel old age encroaching, and she was also clever, witty and well educated.
As well as sexual pleasure, there was the joy of the affair, of conversation both
frivolous and learned, and of simply being with a sophisticated woman.
Many of these things he had enjoyed in the past with the aristocratic ladies
of Rome, but Cleopatra added the glamour of royalty, the charm of Greek
culture and probably some sense of Egypt’s exotic past. In many ways she was
much like him, perhaps more his equal than many of his other mistresses. It
was a heady mix, and from a personal perspective the Nile cruise was probably
just what Caesar needed. Spending time with a Hellenistic monarch may
even have revived memories of his first travels abroad. There is no reason to
disbelieve sources that state that he was in love, although his past and future
record make it clear that this never meant that he felt any obligation to be loyal
to one particular lover. Cleopatra’s attitude can only be guessed. She owed
her throne to Caesar, and had doubtless seen enough of Rome’s influence
over the destiny of Egypt to know that it was wise to gain the favour of the
most powerful Roman alive. Yet she may also have genuinely been in love.
Caesar was much older, but he possessed the great attraction of wielding
great power, added to the personal charm that had captivated so many women
in the past. Some sources, and particularly the imagination of later
generations, have tended to depict the court of the Ptolemies as rife with
sexual intrigue and excess, and portray the queen as highly knowledgeable
and experienced in all the sensual arts. Yet we really know so little about her
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early life that it is hard to confirm or deny any of this. It is equally possible,
perhaps even rather more likely, that the affair with Caesar was her first
romantic experience and that she was a virgin when she met him.16
In the end news of a crisis in Asia persuaded Caesar to leave Egypt. There
was surely an element of political thinking in his association with the queen,
but in the long run his prolonged stay in Egypt was to cause him considerable
problems. Three legions remained behind to ensure that Cleopatra was
secure and also to prevent any surviving Pompeians from trying to occupy
the country and make use of its wealth and resources. By this time he had
received enough information to force him to accept that the Civil War was
not yet over and that more campaigns would be needed. Interestingly he
chose an officer named Rufio, who was the son of one of his freedmen, to
command the three legions. It would later be the policy of Rome’s emperors
to have an equestrian as governor of Egypt, and to forbid any senator even
to visit the country without express permission. Caesar’s choice of a man
who was not a senatorial legate has often been seen as foreshadowing this,
but alternatively he may have thought this more tactful to the sensibilities
of the Alexandrians. A senatorial legate could well have been seen as
effectively a governor rather than simply the commander of troops of an
ally eager to support the monarch. The legions were probably not the only
thing that Caesar left behind, for by the time that he set out for Asia the
sources suggest that Cleopatra was pregnant.17
The Quickest Victory – Zela, 2 August 47 BC
Caesar was now aware that the Civil War would go on, but the news that
finally dragged him from Egypt concerned a foreign threat. King Pharnaces
of Bosporus was a son of Mithridates of Pontus, but had managed to change
sides and ally with Rome early enough not to share in his father’s defeat. In
his Eastern Settlement, Pompey had left him monarch of just a small part
of his father’s domains. Pharnaces saw the Civil War as a grand opportunity
to reclaim the lost territories, and in a rapid offensive had soon overrun
Cappadocia, Armenia, Eastern Pontus and Lesser Colchis. He was
particularly cruel in his victory, ordering the castration of any captured
Roman. The majority of these prisoners were probably civilians, since the
whole region had been stripped of troops by the Pompeians, and there was
little serious opposition until Caesar’s legate Cnaeus Domitius Calvinus
moved against him in December 48 BC. His army was a motley collection of
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Roman and foreign legions, most of whom had originally been raised by
the Pompeians and all lacking in experience. Some fought well, but two
legions raised from his subjects by the Galatian king and organised and
equipped in the Roman manner fled after very little fighting. Its line broken
in the centre, Calvinus’ army was swiftly routed.18
Caesar does not seem to have left Egypt until the summer – the actual
timing remains disputed. On his way to Asia he paused at Antioch in Syria
and Tarsus in Cilicia. We know that Hyrcanus the high priest and Antipater
were both rewarded for their part in the Egyptian campaign. Still hard
pressed for the money to meet his ever-growing expenses, he also levied
money from many communities in the region, and especially those who had
supported Pompey. There was bad news of political squabbles and
misbehaviour amongst his subordinates in Italy, but even so Caesar pushed
on into Cappadocia to confront Pharnaces. His prestige would have suffered
badly if a foreign enemy had been allowed to go unpunished. He had brought
the veteran, although badly depleted, Sixth Legion with him from Egypt. To
this he added one legion of Galatians and two others that had also shared
in Calvinus’ defeat. Pharnaces sent envoys to Caesar, seeking a peace that
would allow him to keep his conquests, and reminding him that the king had
refused to send aid to Pompey. They presented the Roman commander with
a golden wreath as a mark of his victory. Caesar offered no concessions,
reminding the ambassadors of the mutilation and torture of captured
Romans. He demanded that Pharnaces should immediately withdraw from
Pontus, return the spoils taken from the Romans and release his prisoners.
The Roman army continued to advance and came up against the enemy
forces near the hilltop town of Zela. Expecting the usual gradual build-up
to a battle, Caesar was surprised when Pharnaces launched an all-out attack
as the Romans were entrenching their camp on high ground. Such an assault
was against the military wisdom of the age, but at first the surprise caused
some confusion. Yet Caesar and his men quickly recovered, put together a
fighting line, and drove the enemy back down the hill. The veterans of the
Sixth broke through on the right and soon the entire enemy army dissolved
into rout. Pharnaces escaped, but was killed by a rival when he returned to
his kingdom. The whole campaign was decided in just a few weeks, and
Caesar imposed a settlement on the region. The speed of his success was
summed up in a letter to one of his agents at Rome with a laconic tag later
displayed on placards carried in his triumph: VENI, VIDI, VICI –‘I came, I saw,
I conquered.’ At the time he also mocked Pompey, commenting on how
lucky generals were who made their name fighting against such fragile foes.19
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Africa,
September 47–June 46 BC
‘No one reports that Caesar has left Alexandria, and it is known that no
one at all has left there since 15th March, and that he has sent no letters
since 13th December.’ – Cicero, 14 June 47 BC.1
‘“For if,” said he [Cato], “I were willing to be saved by grace of Caesar, I
ought to go to him in person and see him alone; but I am unwilling to be
under obligation to the tyrant for his illegal acts. And he acts illegally in
saving, as if their master, those over whom he has no right at all to be
their lord.”’ – Plutarch, early second century AD.2
Caesar reached Italy near the end of September. It was twenty months
since he had left to begin the Macedonian campaign and more than a year
since his victory at Pharsalus. For most of 48 BC he remained in regular
contact with his deputies and other prominent men, although according
to Dio he sent no official despatch back to Rome to report Pompey’s defeat,
feeling that this would have been in poor taste. During the Alexandrian
campaign his normal flood of correspondence ceased altogether. At first
this was due to the blockade imposed by the enemy, but even when this
had been broken he remained silent for some time. In June 47 BC Cicero
wrote that nothing had been heard from Caesar for six months. It was
uncharacteristic behaviour and adds to the impression that fatigue had
taken its toll on him. There is no doubt that the lengthy stay in Egypt
caused Caesar great problems, giving his enemies time to regroup and
creating a dangerous mood of uncertainty in Rome and Italy. Caesar’s
supporters had little to unite them apart from their loyalty to him, which
was often reliant mainly on gratitude for past favours and lively expectation
of more in the future. As the Macedonian campaign went on, few could
448
be sure who would win, for they were aware of the odds against Caesar.
Cicero’s lively correspondent Caelius Rufus had quite cynically joined
the side with the better army at the start of the Civil War. Caesar rewarded
him with a praetorship in 48 BC, but Caelius was annoyed when the most
senior post of urban praetor was given to someone else, the Legate Trebonius
who had taken Massilia the year before. Disaffected, Caelius tried to rally
support for himself by declaring plans to abolish all existing debts. This
was a radical measure intended to appeal to those who felt that Caesar’s
moderate law had not gone far enough. With a gang of followers he led riots
against both Trebonius and Caesar’s consular colleague Servilius. The Senate
promptly passed the senatus consultum ultimum and, in spite of vetoes by
two tribunes, the consul diverted a draft of soldiers on their way to
Brundisium and brought them into Rome. Caelius was driven from the city.
For a while he hoped to join up with Milo, who had returned to Italy from
his exile in Massilia in spite of Caesar’s refusal to pardon him. Now he tried
to raise rebellion in Pompey’s name, backing the man who had ensured that
he went into exile in the first place. He did not make much headway and was
soon defeated and killed before Caelius could reach him. The praetor met
a similar fate shortly afterwards. The use of the senatus consultum ultimum
was ironic, though it should be said that Caesar had never challenged its
validity, merely the appropriateness of its use against him.3
In October 48 BC Caesar was appointed dictator again, but unlike the
first time this was not simply to permit him to oversee elections. No consuls
or other magistrates apart from the tribunes of the plebs were elected for the
following year. Probably this was because Caesar was unable to return and
did not wish to delegate the task of overseeing the elections to anyone else.
The dictatorship traditionally lasted for only six months. Sulla had ignored
this and held the office until he chose to lay it down. While Caesar did not
wish to be seen to be aping the author of the proscriptions, he needed official
power. The consul Servilius named him dictator for a year, thereby imposing
some limit on his power, even if this was to last for double the normal term.
A dictator had a subordinate rather than a colleague and this officer was
titled the Master of Horse (Magister Equitum) – when originally created it
had been considered important for the dictator to stay with the heavy infantry
of the legions and so his deputy was given the task of leading the aristocratic
cavalry. Mark Antony was named as Caesar’s Master of Horse. For a while
the priestly college of augurs, of which Antony himself was a member,
protested that it was improper for a Master of Horse to remain in the post
for more than six months, but this rather bizarre objection was soon
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CIVIL WAR AND DICTATORSHIP 49–44 BC
withdrawn. Antony returned to Italy after Pharsalus and was effectively the
supreme authority there from January 47 BC until Caesar’s return in the
autumn. He was a gifted subordinate, but his behaviour became less and
less restrained during these months when he was largely left to his own
devices. He feasted often, both lavishly and very publicly. His drinking was
on a staggering scale – later in life he wrote a book on the subject, which
seems to have contained many boasts about his prowess – and he is supposed
to have conducted much public business while only partly sober or at the very
least suffering from a hangover. On at least one occasion he had to interrupt
a meeting in the Forum in order to vomit in sight of all. At times he processed
around the country in a great caravan, riding himself in a Gallic – presumably
British – chariot, followed by carriages containing a famous actress who
was currently his mistress, while another carried his mother. The whole
column was incongruously preceded by his lictors. Apart from dressing up
as Hercules, some sources even claim that he experimented with a chariot
pulled by a team of lions. Apart from this mistress, he had a number of
scandalously public affairs with senators’ wives. Mark Antony revelled in
power, and his conduct was scarcely likely to convince moderate opinion
that Caesar’s victory would bring anything other than tyranny in the long
run.4
Antony did not deal well with the problems that confronted him in 47 BC,
which were considerable and all directly or indirectly caused by Caesar’s
long absence. The reports of Pompey’s death were not generally believed
until his signet ring was sent back to Rome and displayed. Many Pompeians
had surrendered at Pharsalus, and others in the weeks that followed. Cicero
had not been at the battle, but immediately decided that the war was lost.
He turned down the offer of supreme command made to him by Cato, who
then had to restrain Pompey’s son Cnaeus from killing the orator on the
spot. Cicero returned to Italy, but was informed by Antony that he could not
be pardoned and allowed to return to Rome without specific instructions
from Caesar. Yet for months there was no word from Caesar, and indeed no
assurance that he would prevail and survive the war in Egypt. In the
meantime Cato had taken the garrison of Dyrrachium by sea to Cyrenaica,
and then overland to the province of Africa, where he joined up with Metellus
Scipio, Labienus, Afranius, Petreius and many other die-hard Pompeians,
all determined to continue the war. They were backed by the Numidian
King Juba – the man whose beard Caesar had once pulled during a court case
and who more recently had played the key role in the defeat of Curio. As time
passed their strength grew, and by the summer there were fears that they
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Africa, September 47–June 46 bc
might be able to attack Sicily or Sardinia, and even Italy itself. It was a
nervous time for men like Cicero, who began to wonder if they had
surrendered too soon and remembered the bitter hostility of many leading
Pompeians even to those who had remained neutral. All the orator hoped for
was a return to some semblance of normal public life, and his nervousness
fuelled his anger at Caesar for not finishing the war off more quickly.
Caesar’s veteran troops were equally frustrated, for most of the
experienced legions, including the Ninth and Tenth, had been sent back to
Italy after Pharsalus. There they waited, with little to do for month after
month except think of their grievances. There were still time-expired soldiers
wishing for discharge, and all recalled the promises of bounties and land
grants that Caesar had made to them during the last few years. Led by some
of their centurions and tribunes the legions were soon in a mutinous state
and stoned the officers sent to restore order. Antony himself was forced to
go to the camp, but failed to resolve the situation and restore order. While
he was away from Rome, there was trouble instigated by some of the tribunes
of the plebs. One of these was Cicero’s son-in-law Dolabella, who now
renewed Caelius’ cry of the abolition of debt. There was rioting in the Forum
once more as a number of men scented the chance to carve out a stronger
personal position at this time of uncertainty. Eventually Antony returned with
some troops who had not joined the mutiny and used force to restore order,
backed by a Senate that had once again passed its ultimate decree. He did
this efficiently, but this action only reinforced the perception of a regime
based solely on military might. His dislike of Dolabella was intense and
reciprocated. It doubtless did not help that Antony believed that the tribune
was having an affair with his wife, whom he divorced soon afterwards.5
Mutineers, Debtors and Former Enemies
Caesar met Cicero on his way from Brundisium and the nervous orator was
relieved and gratified by the warmth of his greeting, which was followed by
an immediate pardon and encouragement to return to Rome. In the dictator’s
absence he had been awarded the right to deal with his enemies as he saw
fit, granting some formal legitimacy to what he had been doing since the start
of the Civil War. Similarly, he was awarded the power to declare peace and
war, and also to preside over – indeed virtually control – elections to all the
senior magistracies. Although Caesar did not get back to Rome until the
beginning of October, he decided to make use of this last right and appoint
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magistrates for the remaining weeks of the year. As consuls he chose Quintus
Fufius Calenus and Publius Vatinius – the man who as tribune in 59 BC had
secured him the Gallic command. Both men had served as his legates. The
other magistracies, as well as a number of priesthoods made vacant by the
casualties of the last few years, similarly went to his supporters. It is doubtful
that the new magistrates had much time to do anything, but there were
many men to reward for their loyalty and Caesar did not wish to lose any
of his reputation for generosity. For the next year he created ten praetors
instead of the usual eight. For the moment he chose not to continue as
dictator and was instead elected consul for the third time – another of the
honours voted by the Senate during his absence was the right to hold the
supreme magistracy for five consecutive years. As colleague he chose Marcus
Aemilius Lepidus, a man who seems to have been more notable for his loyalty
and reliability than any great talent or imagination. It is tempting to see the
choice as an indication that Mark Antony had fallen from favour following
his behaviour in the last year. There may be some truth in this, but it should
be noted that Caesar had other men to reward and may have been reluctant
to seem to mark out any one individual as a permanent second-in-command.6
The mutiny in the army had not been calmed by news of Caesar’s return
to Italy, for the resentment had had too long to fester. He sent Sallust – the
future historian and recently made praetor for the following year – to
confront the troops, but he was attacked by a mob and barely escaped with
his life. The mutineers began to march from their camp in Campania towards
Rome itself. By this time the tribunes and centurions who were the ringleaders
seem to have aimed at gaining some concessions and promises of even greater
rewards in future. They were aware that Caesar was soon to go to Africa to
confront the Pompeians and felt that his need for his best soldiers would
make him more pliant. It seems doubtful that the bulk of the troops, and
indeed most of their officers, had any such clear aims, but simply a strong,
if unfocused, sense of grievance. Caesar made some preparations to defend
Rome if the worst came to the worst, but outwardly remained calm and, in
spite of the advice of some of his staff, went in person to meet the legions.
The latter had camped on the outskirts of Rome, when without warning
Caesar quietly rode into their lines and climbed up onto the podium that was
usually constructed near the headquarters. As news of his arrival spread
the soldiers clustered around to hear what he had to say. He asked them
what they wanted and they replied, recounting their long and difficult service
and reminding him of the promises he had made to them over the years.
Finally they demanded that they all be discharged, which seems to have been
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Africa, September 47–June 46 bc
intended to remind him that he wanted them for his new campaign, but
could not take their loyalty for granted. Caesar’s reply began calmly, which
made it all the more shocking. In the past the soldiers had always been his
‘comrades’, but now he addressed them as ‘citizens’ (Quirites), and told
these mere civilians that he willingly released them from service since that
was what they wanted. The soldiers were stunned by this casual dismissal
and their commander’s gentle reassurance that he would in time give them
all the rewards that he had promised.
Just as on campaign, Caesar had seized back the initiative and now it was
his soldiers who struggled to regain their confidence and determination. Men
began calling out that they volunteered for further service with him, and then
one of the leaders of the mutiny repeated this request more formally. Caesar
declined the offer, but then repeated his promise to assign land and the
promised gifts of money to all of them – by this time it seems he had adopted
a tone of gentle reproach, as though he was saddened that his own men had
doubted the truth of his promises. Perhaps at this point he turned to leave,
making the mutineers even more desperate as they begged him to take them
back and lead them to Africa, assuring him that they would win the war for
him without any need for other troops. Now Caesar relented, but in a complete
reversal of his speech at Vesontio in 58 BC, he said that he would take all of
them except for the Tenth Legion. He reminded the veterans of the Tenth of
all his past favours, and said that for their ingratitude he would now discharge
them, but that each man would still get all that he had been promised after
his victory in Africa. Their immense pride in their unit challenged, and their
devotion to their old commander reignited, the legionaries of the Tenth begged
Caesar to decimate them as long as he took them back. Gradually, and with
feigned reluctance, he allowed himself to be persuaded and announced that
this time there would be no executions. However, he had made a note of the
tribunes and centurions who had provoked the outbreak and is said to have
arranged for most of them to be placed in the most exposed and dangerous
positions during the coming campaign.7
Caesar had emphasised to his soldiers that he would not follow Sulla’s
example of seizing land throughout Italy to give to his veterans. Instead he
would provide for them from publicly owned or publicly purchased land.
This, and the continuing cost of the war, added to his already massive
financial burden, and much of his effort during the autumn of 47 BC was
devoted to meeting these costs. He took loans – supposedly voluntary, but
no community was likely to risk disappointing him – from the towns of
Italy and clearly had no intention of repaying them, at least in the short
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CIVIL WAR AND DICTATORSHIP 49–44 BC
term. After the defeat of Pompey he had often been sent crowns and wreaths
of gold or silver by the inhabitants of the eastern provinces, both as a sign
of victory and a donation to his expenses. The same gesture was now
encouraged in Italy. The activities of Caelius and Dolabella had made it
clear that there was still much discontent amongst the many debtors. Caesar
now relented a little, copying one of the latter’s laws by setting a relatively
low limit on the rent due to landlords for the current year. However, he still
refused to abolish all existing debts, saying now that he could not consider
this since he had recently taken out so many loans himself and therefore
would be the chief beneficiary. Some property owned by leading Pompeians
who were either dead or still fighting against him was auctioned off. Antony
bought Pompey’s great house in Rome, anticipating that he would have to
pay only a fraction of its worth. Sulla had allowed many of his partisans –
Crassus, Pompey and Lucullus chief amongst them – to acquire valuable
estates and houses in this way, and clearly many of Caesar’s men expected
to benefit in a similar fashion. If so, then they were rudely disappointed,
for Caesar insisted that the full value, assessed at pre-war market rates, must
be paid for everything. In part this was doubtless to lessen comparison with
Sulla, but at root it was simply a reflection of the massive financial burden
he faced. Only a few people got bargains. One was Servilia, his long-time
lover. Caesar clearly still had a deep affection for her, although we have no
idea whether or not their relationship remained a physical one. Around
about this time he also had an affair with one of her daughters, Tertia or
‘Third’, without this seeming to weaken the bond between them. The gossip
even claimed that she had arranged the liaison. In addition she was the
mother of Brutus, one of the most distinguished – and certainly one of the
most widely respected – of the Pompeians to defect to Caesar after Pharsalus.
Servilia was now able to purchase some valuable estates at a fraction of their
true price. Cicero joked that people did not realise how much of a bargain
this really was, for there was a ‘Third’ taken off the price.8
The African Campaign
Caesar remained in Rome for only as long as was essential to restore order
and prepare for an attack on the Pompeians in Africa. Troops and supplies
were ordered to concentrate at the port of Lilybaeum in Sicily, where the
invasion force was being prepared. There were still serious shortages of
ships, especially transport ships, and once again it would prove impossible
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Africa, September 47–June 46 bc
to carry the entire army in one go. It was also now winter, which meant bad
weather and all the problems of supply familiar to the Macedonian
campaign. The diviners who accompanied the army declared that the omens
were unfavourable for launching a campaign in the near future, but Caesar
had never been too concerned about such things and ignored them. He was
impatient to set off, hoping that defeat of the enemy in Africa would finally
bring the war to an end. When he arrived at Lilybaeum on 17 December
47 BC, he had his own tent pitched almost on the beach itself, as a gesture
to convey his sense of urgency, warning his men to be ready to move ‘at any
day or hour’. The apparent lethargy of Egypt had long gone and his familiar
energy returned, perhaps sharpened with an even greater edge of impatience.
Caesar had brought only a single legion with him, but during the next week
five more arrived. Only one was a veteran unit, the Fifth Alaudae, which he
had raised in Transalpine Gaul and given citizenship. The other five legions
– the Twenty-Fifth, Twenty-Sixth, Twenty-Eighth, Twenty-Ninth and
Thirtieth – had all been raised during the war, and most likely all contained
many men who had originally been levied by the Pompeians.
As it arrived each unit was embarked and crammed into the waiting
transport ships. Strict orders were issued that no one was to take any baggage
or equipment that was not absolutely essential. The legions were accompanied
by 2,000 cavalrymen and their mounts, but there was little room to carry
substantial supplies of food and fodder, or for the pack and draught animals
to transport them after the landing. Caesar trusted that he would be able to
obtain all of these things in sufficient quantities once he arrived in Africa. On
25 December he set sail, but the operation was not well planned. In the past,
it had been his custom to issue sealed orders that would be opened at a set
time and provided such essential details as where to land on the hostile shore.
This time he had insufficient information to know where the army could
land and simply trusted that a suitable spot would be discovered once the
fleet arrived off the coast of Africa. Strong winds added to the confusion
and the convoys of ships became scattered, straggling along individually or
in small groups. Only a small fraction of the fleet was with Caesar when he
sighted land on 28 December. For a while he sailed parallel to the coast,
looking for a good landing spot and also hoping that more ships would catch
up with him. He eventually landed near the enemy-held port of
Hadrumentum. He had only 3,500 legionaries and 150 cavalry with him. It
is said that when he disembarked he stumbled and fell on the beach, but
those around him were able to laugh off the bad omen when he grabbed two
handfuls of shingle and declared, ‘I have hold of you, Africa!’9
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The forces arrayed against him were considerable. Before leaving Sicily
reports had reached him claiming that Scipio led no less than ten legions –
doubtless under strength and inexperienced, but the same was true of a
large part of his own army – backed by a strong cavalry force, as well as the
troops of King Juba, which now included four ‘legions’, organised, trained
and equipped in Roman style. The Numidians were famous for their
numerous light cavalry and infantry skirmishers – the horsemen having an
especially high reputation – and Juba fielded very many of these. There
were also no less than 120 war elephants, which were something of a rarity
by this period. Elephants were frightening, but were dangerous to both sides
as they were liable to panic and stampede through friendly troops. Later in
the campaign Metellus Scipio took some care to try and train his animals
to cope with the chaos and noise of battle. Caesar was hugely outnumbered,
and would remain so even when over the following days he was joined by
most of the rest of his ships. This was not achieved without considerable
effort, officers being despatched with small squadrons of warships to hunt
for the scattered parts of the convoy. At one point Caesar himself had secretly
left the army to look for the lost ships, but they appeared before he was
actually under way. Yet, as in Macedonia in 48 BC, he did enjoy the great
advantage of surprise, for once again the enemy had not expected him to
move so soon and to arrive in winter. Their forces were widely dispersed
and it would take them some time to gather in sufficient numbers to
overwhelm him. In the meantime he sent his fleet back to Sicily with orders
to return as soon as possible with more troops, but the Pompeians still
possessed a strong navy and as in the earlier campaign there was no guarantee
that later convoys would reach him. For the moment his main priority was
to secure sufficient supplies to support his forces in the meantime. He could
not go too far afield in his search for these, since not only would the enemy
seek to hinder him, but it was vital that he stay near the coast if there was
to be any chance of reinforcement. The Pompeians had already gathered
up much of the available food. In addition, the widespread conscription of
local farm labourers to serve in their forces had seriously disrupted the
agriculture of the region. In the opening weeks of the campaign Caesar’s
main concern was supply, and orders were despatched to other provinces,
including Sardinia, to gather supplies of grain and send them to him with
all urgency.10
Soon after landing an unsuccessful attempt was made to persuade the
garrison commander at Hadrumentum to surrender. Caesar was in no
position to begin a siege and so moved on, establishing his main base at
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Africa, September 47–June 46 bc
Ruspina. On 1 January 46 BC he reached the town of Leptis, which welcomed
him. As at Corfinium he took the precaution of posting guards to prevent
any of his men from entering the town and looting it. Six cohorts were left
to garrison the town when he returned next day to Ruspina. On 4 January
he decided to mount a large-scale foraging expedition, taking out thirty
cohorts. Just 3 miles out from the camp an enemy force was spotted, so
Caesar sent orders to bring up the small force of 400 cavalry and 150 archers,
which were all that were then available. In person he went out with a patrol
to reconnoitre, leaving the column of legionaries to follow. The Pompeian
force was led by Labienus and included 8,000 Numidian cavalry, 1,600
Gaulish and German horsemen, as well as numerous infantry. However, he
had formed them in a dense line, far closer together than horsemen would
normally deploy, and from a distance Caesar mistook them for a conventional
battle line of close order infantry. Acting on this mistaken premise, he brought
up his troops and formed them into a single line of cohorts. It was rare for
the Romans to deploy in this way, for normally at least a second line was
employed, but the legionaries were badly outnumbered and he decided that
it was better to match the length of the enemy line rather than risk being
outflanked. His small force of cavalry – many had not yet disembarked – were
divided between his wings and his few archers sent out to skirmish in front
of the line. He was ready, but did not choose to attack the enemy line, since
he had no wish to provoke a fight unless it was necessary. Suddenly Labienus
began to move and ordered his cavalry to extend on both flanks. Numidian
light infantrymen swarmed forward from the main line as Caesar’s legionaries
advanced to meet it. So far in the campaign there had only been some smallscale
actions and this was the first time that the Caesareans encountered
the characteristic tactics of the local troops. Sheer weight of numbers forced
their cavalry back, but in the centre the legionaries struggled to cope with
an enemy that fled before they could come to grips, but quickly rallied and
came back, all the while harassing them with a hail of javelins. They were
especially vulnerable to missiles aimed at their unshielded right side. It was
dangerous to pursue too far, for the agile enemy could easily overwhelm
any individuals or small group that became separated from support. Caesar
sent orders along the line that no one was to go more than four paces away
from the main line occupied by his cohort.11
The pressure was great, with probably more wounds being inflicted than
fatalities. Caesar’s men found themselves surrounded and unable to strike
back at an enemy who slowly whittled them down. Most of the legionaries
were inexperienced and nervousness spread throughout the army. Caesar as
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CIVIL WAR AND DICTATORSHIP 49–44 BC
usual took care to remain calm and to encourage them. It was probably
during this action that he had more success dealing with a standard-bearer
who was about to flee. Caesar grabbed the man, physically turned him
around, and said, ‘Look, that’s where the enemy are!’ As he strove to steady
his wavering men, Labienus was haranguing them from just behind the
enemy front line. The author of the African War describes how:
Labienus was riding about bare headed in the front line, urging on his
own men, and sometimes calling out to Caesar’s legionaries: ‘What
are you up to, you raw recruit? Really ferocious aren’t you? Are you
another of those taken in by “his” fine words. He’s taken you into a
tough spot. I feel really sorry for you.’ Then one of our soldiers said,
‘I’m no recruit, Labienus, but a veteran of the Tenth Legion.’ ‘I don’t
see the insignia of the Tenth,’ said Labienus. Then the soldier retorted,
‘You will soon know what sort of man I am.’ At the same moment he
pulled off his helmet, so that the other would recognise him, and threw
his pilum with all his might, aimed square at Labienus, struck deep
into the chest of his horse, and said, ‘That will show you, Labienus, that
it’s a soldier of the Tenth attacking you.’12
Yet overall there were few veterans with the force, and the many recruits
were struggling to cope with the pressure. As at the Sambre more than a
decade before, the nervous troops were tending to bunch together, restricting
their own ability to fight and making themselves a better target. Caesar
ordered the line to extend, and then had alternate cohorts face about, so
that half now confronted the cavalry that had surrounded his rear, and the
rest the infantry and skirmishers to the front. Once this was done, the cohorts
charged simultaneously, hurling a concentrated volley of pila. It was enough
to drive the enemy back for a while, and Caesar quickly halted the pursuit
and began to withdraw back to his camp. Around the same time the enemy
was reinforced by Petreius who brought with him 1,600 more cavalry and a
large number of infantry. Their enthusiasm revived, the Pompeians began to
harry Caesar’s men as they retreated. After only a short distance he was
once again forced to turn into battle order and face them. Caesar’s legionaries
were tired, and the mounts of his cavalry – not fully recovered from the
voyage and now wearied by prolonged manoeuvring and in some cases
wounds – were close to exhaustion. Yet most of the enemy were also far
from fresh as it was nearing the end of a long day of fighting. Caesar urged
his men to make one last effort and then, waiting for the enemy pressure to
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Africa, September 47–June 46 bc
slacken a little, he launched one last determined counter-attack and drove
them back over and past some high ground. Petreius was wounded and
Labienus may well have been carried from the field after falling from his
wounded horse, so it is possible that the enemy for a while lacked their most
aggressive and experienced leaders. Whatever the precise cause, this success
was enough to permit Caesar to withdraw the rest of the way unmolested.
The action outside Ruspina – it is sometimes described as a battle – was
without doubt a defeat for Caesar, who had been prevented from his aim of
gathering the supplies that his army required. Yet the outcome could have
been far worse, and he had managed to fight his way to safety. On balance
it was a setback, but certainly not a decisive one. Curio’s army had been
destroyed by an enemy fighting in much the same style and Caesar had
managed to escape the same fate.13
In the aftermath Caesar heavily fortified the camp at Ruspina and took
sailors from the fleet to serve as light infantry on land, while craftsmen in
the army were set to manufacturing sling bullets and javelins of various
sorts. More despatches went off ordering grain and other supplies to be
gathered and brought to him. In the meantime some soldiers were very
imaginative in finding substitutes for the things so desperately needed. Some
of the veterans gathered seaweed, which was washed in fresh water, dried and
then fed to the horses, keeping them alive if not in the best of health or
condition. Metellus Scipio had brought his forces to support the Pompeians,
and the combined army camped 3 miles away from Caesar’s position. King
Juba was also on his way to join them, but was forced to turn back when his
lands came under attack from the forces of his rival, Bocchus of Mauretania,
whose troops were led by a Roman mercenary, Publius Sittius. The latter
had fled to Africa after being implicated in Catiline’s rising. Caesar had not
arranged for Bocchus to open a second front in this way, and it was extremely
fortuitous that he and Sittius acted so effectively on their own initiative. It
was obviously attractive for the king to ally with the enemy of his own great
enemy Juba, for the support of the Pompeians had increased the latter’s
power. Caesar made great use of this in his propaganda, announcing that
the Pompeians were behaving shamefully for Roman senators in allowing
themselves to side with and serve under a foreign monarch. In the African
War it is claimed that when the enemy forces finally did combine, Metellus
Scipio stopped wearing his general’s cloak because it displeased Juba. It was
also claimed that the Pompeians had alienated most of the province by their
brutal rule. As the word spread that Caesar himself, and not simply one of
his legates, had come to the region, there were a few defections from local
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CIVIL WAR AND DICTATORSHIP 49–44 BC
communities. Some are said to have remembered their obligation to his uncle
Marius, whose name still provoked great loyalty in the region sixty years
after his victory in Numidia. There was a steady stream of deserters coming
across from the Pompeian lines, but none of Caesar’s soldiers went over to
the enemy. From the beginning of the campaign the Pompeians regularly
executed prisoners, although in one case this was after the centurion in
charge had refused to change sides and join them. Neither side made any
serious attempt to end the war by negotiation. The Pompeians still fighting
loathed Caesar bitterly. In turn he despised them. When the rumour had
spread that the family of the Scipiones would always be victorious in Africa,
Caesar attached to his staff an obscure member of the line named Scipio
Salvito or Salutio, who was generally felt to be worthless in every respect save
for his famous name.14
Outside Ruspina the two armies continually probed and skirmished with
each other, the Pompeians frequently attempting to ambush any enemy
detachments that strayed too far from Caesar’s camp. Metellus Scipio often
deployed in battle order just outside his camp, and when after several days
Caesar made no move to match this, he ordered them to advance closer to
the enemy. Even then he was not confident enough to launch an all-out
attack. Caesar sent orders to withdraw any patrols or foraging parties that
might find themselves exposed, and told his outlying pickets to pull back only
if pressed. All this was done with great nonchalance, for he did not bother
to go up onto the rampart of the camp and observe the enemy, but was
content to remain in his headquarters tent, calmly receiving reports and
issuing appropriate orders, ‘so remarkable was his expertise in and knowledge
of warfare’. His estimation of his opponent’s caution proved accurate, for
Scipio did not launch an attack, deterred by the formidable defences of the
camp, the ramparts and towers well manned and mounting artillery. In
addition the Pompeians found the enemy inactivity unnerving and worried
that Caesar was trying to lure them into a trap. However, Scipio was able to
encourage his men by claiming that Caesar was afraid to fight them. Shortly
afterwards a convoy arrived from Sicily, bringing the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth legions, along with 800 Gaulish cavalry and 1,000 light
infantrymen. In addition to these experienced troops the ships also carried
enough grain to relieve Caesar’s immediate concerns over food. Defections
and desertions from the enemy continued, and on the night of 25 January,
Caesar suddenly moved onto the offensive, leading out his main force from
the camp. At first they marched away from the enemy, back past the town
of Ruspina, but then they swung round and moved to seize a line of hills,
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Africa, September 47–June 46 bc
occupation of which threatened the lines of the Pompeians. There was some
fighting to secure these, and the next day a larger cavalry combat, which
Caesar’s men won. Most of Labeinus’ Numidians escaped, but their retreat
exposed the German and Gallic warriors serving with him and many of
these were killed. The sight of the fleeing horsemen demoralised the rest of
the army. The next day Caesar advanced on the town of Uzitta, the main
water source for the Pompeians at this time. Metellus Scipio responded by
advancing in battle order to confront him, but neither side chose to press the
issue and force a battle.15
The Battle of Thapsus, 6 April 46 BC
Metellus Scipio had also been reinforced by this time, for Juba had left one
of his officers and a strong force to contain Sittius and had brought three of
his ‘legions’, 800 heavy cavalry and large numbers of Numidian horsemen
and light infantry to join up with the Pompeians. Rumours of the king’s
arrival had spread throughout Caesar’s camp, with the numbers and
formidable fighting power of his men growing with each telling of the tale.
Suetonius tells us that Caesar decided to address the men, in a matter of
fact way, saying:
Let me tell you that in a couple of days the king will be here with ten
legions, 30,000 horsemen, 100,000 skirmishers, plus 300 elephants.
Right then, some of you can now stop asking questions or guessing
and can believe me, because I know all about it. If not, then you can
be sure that I will order them put on some old hulk of a ship and blown
away to whichever land the wind takes them.
The tone was similar to Vesontio, with a combination of utter self-confidence
and mild annoyance that their faith in him and their respect for discipline
had wavered. It may also have helped that he exaggerated the numbers of
royal troops, so that when the real size of the enemy reinforcement became
known it probably came as a relief. There followed a period of manoeuvring
around Uzitta. Both sides contested some high ground between their
positions, but an attempt by Labienus to ambush Caesar’s vanguard failed
because of the poor discipline of some of his troops who refused to wait
patiently for the enemy to arrive. The Caesareans easily routed them and
constructed a camp on the hill. When the main force withdrew back to camp
461
CIVIL WAR AND DICTATORSHIP 49–44 BC
at dusk, the Pompeians launched a sudden cavalry attack, but this was beaten
off. Skirmishing continued, and Caesar’s men began work on lines of
fortification designed both to restrict the enemy’s freedom of movement
and to threaten the town.
Shortly afterwards news arrived that another convoy of reinforcements
had been sighted approaching Ruspina. There was a delay of several days,
because they mistook some Caesarean warships waiting to escort them for
an enemy force, but eventually the confusion was sorted out and the Ninth
and Tenth legions disembarked. Remembering the latter’s role in the mutiny
in Italy, Caesar saw the opportunity of making an example of some of the
ringleaders. One of these, the tribune Avienus, had selfishly insisted on
filling an entire ship with his personal household and baggage – an especially
crass act when space was needed for fighting men and vital supplies.
He was now dismissed from the service and sent home in disgrace, along with
another tribune and several centurions who had been guilty of similar
misbehaviour. Each man was permitted only one slave to accompany him.
Caesar now had ten legions, half of which were veteran formations. There
were more desertions to him, and he was able to persuade some Gaetulian
leaders to rebel against King Juba, who was then forced to detach some
more of his troops to oppose them.16
The fortifications facing Uzitta were now complete, but although a few
days later both sides formed up in battle order with their front lines little more
than a quarter of a mile apart, neither chose to force the issue. There was a
skirmish between the cavalry and light troops, in which the Pompeians gained
the advantage. The armies continued to face each other outside the town
and Caesar set his men to extending the lines of fortification. A third convoy
of reinforcements was now reported to be approaching Africa, but this time
the Pompeians had warning of its approach and captured or destroyed some
of Caesar’s warships, which had been sent to escort the transports on the last
part of their journey. Hearing of this Caesar left the army at Uzitta and
galloped with all haste the 6 miles to the coast at Leptis. Taking charge of
one of his own naval squadrons he chased down and defeated the enemy
warships. Although this is not made clear, the original rumour may have
been false and the Seventh and Eighth legions may not have reached Caesar
before the campaign was decided.
Securing enough food for the army continued to be a great problem.
Learning that it was the local custom to bury food stores, Caesar led out two
legions on an expedition to find as many of these hidden sites as possible. He
had also learned from deserters that Labenius was planning an ambush, so
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Africa, September 47–June 46 bc
over the course of a few days he sent out other parties to hunt for food along
the same routes, in order to make Labenius complacent. Then one morning
before dawn he sent out three veteran legions supported by cavalry to hunt
down the ambushers. The enemy was checked, but the supply problem had
not eased. The successive reinforcements had greatly strengthened Caesar’s
army, but had also inevitably added to the number of mouths needing to be
fed. He had been unable to force the Pompeians to fight a battle in
circumstances of his choosing, and there was no immediate prospect of taking
Uzitta and depriving the enemy of their main water supply. Caesar decided
that there was nothing to be gained by remaining where he was. Having set
fire to their own camp, his army marched away in the early hours of the
morning, halting near the town of Aggar, where he sent out numerous foraging
parties who managed to bring in considerable quantities of grain – though
mostly barley rather than wheat – and other types of food.17
463
CAESAR
SCIPIO
Thapsus
Caesar’s
siege
works
Cavalry
Cavalry
Legio V Legio V
Cavalry
Elephants
XIII XIV IX X
Elephants
Cavalry
Scipio’s
Camp
Kake/marsh of
Moknine
Battle of Thapsus
CIVIL WAR AND DICTATORSHIP 49–44 BC
An attempt was then made to surprise an enemy foraging party – the
Pompeians were also finding it difficult to feed such a large concentration
of troops – but Caesar withdrew when he saw that enemy reinforcements
were already approaching. As Caesar’s army continued its march it was
constantly harassed by Numidian horse, so that it was often necessary to halt
and repulse them. These attacks were wearying and seriously impeded the
march. At one point the column was only able to cover 100 paces (about 33
yards) in four hours. Caesar withdrew most of his cavalry behind his infantry,
and found that the legions were able to make steadier progress since the
enemy cavalry would always withdraw when they came too close. He pressed
on, but even so only managed to reach a suitable camp site after night had
fallen. Over the following days he gave thought to training his men and
developing new drills to cope with this style of fighting. In spite of his
withdrawal, towns were still defecting to him, although in one case Juba
learned of this and had stormed the place and massacred the inhabitants
before Caesar could send a garrison. On 21 March Caesar’s army carried out
a lustratio, the ceremony of ritual purification that the army performed
each year, which the author of the African War chose to mention, unlike
Caesar himself in the Commentaries. The day after this he offered battle,
but this was declined, so he continued on his march.
As part of his new standing orders Caesar instructed each legion to keep
300 men moving in battle order ready to act as close support for the cavalry,
and these troops helped to fend off the Numidian horsemen who pursued
them. He reached the town of Sarsura and stormed it, capturing considerable
stocks of grain that had been gathered there by the enemy. Scipio made no
effort to hinder him. The next enemy-held town was too strong to be taken
without a formal siege, so Caesar swung back and camped again near Aggar,
winning a cavalry action in spite of the fact that his men were heavily
outnumbered. Again he offered battle, but the Pompeians refused to come
down from the high ground they occupied and Caesar was not willing to
place his men at a disadvantage by attacking them in this position. On 4
April he once again set out in the early hours and was able to cover the 16
miles that brought him to the coastal town of Thapsus and began to besiege
it. Scipio followed and divided his force between two camps some 8 miles
from the town. With the sea on one side and a large salt water lagoon on
another, the two main approaches to the town were narrow. Anticipating
the enemy, Caesar had already placed a fort to block the most obvious route.
Thwarted, Scipio led his men on a wide night march around the lake to
approach the town from the other side, using a narrow spit of land no more
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Africa, September 47–June 46 bc
than a mile and a half wide. He arrived on the morning of 6 April. Juba
and Afranius seem to have remained in camp with their forces to keep Caesar
boxed in.18
Caesar left two legions of recruits in his siege lines and led out the rest
to form in normal triplex acies battle order facing Scipio. He placed veteran
formations supported by archers and slingers on the flanks – the Tenth
and Ninth on the right and the Thirteenth and Fourteenth on the left. As
added protection, especially against the enemy war elephants, he divided
the Fifth Alaudae into two and used them to make an additional fourth line
of five cohorts behind each of his wings. Three of the less experienced
legions – we are not told which ones – formed the centre. The cavalry were
as usual on the wings, although in this narrow spit of land there was little
room to manoeuvre. This was a greater restriction on the Pompeians whose
horsemen were more numerous, although presumably the bulk of the
Numidians had remained with Juba. In a rather unusual move, Caesar
gave instructions for some of his warships to use the channel to threaten
the rear of the enemy army once the battle had begun. Our sources give
few details for the Pompeian deployment, nor any reliable figure for the
number of troops with Scipio, as opposed to those left behind with Juba
and Afranius. Probably the deployment was conventional, with the cavalry
on the wings, legions in three lines and the elephants in advance,
presumably massed on each flank. It was a good opportunity for Caesar.
The Pompeians had divided their forces, and chosen to take station on
terrain that would only permit a simple head-to-head encounter in which
his more experienced troops were likely to prevail. His legionaries were
keen to attack and confident of victory. Most of his officers urged him to
give the signal to advance straightaway. Caesar could see their enthusiasm
as he went along the line to urge them on. Even so, the author of the
African War tells us that:
Caesar was doubtful, resisting their eagerness and enthusiasm, yelling
out that he did not approve of fighting by a reckless onslaught, and
holding back the line again and again, when suddenly on the right
wing a tubicen [trumpeter], without orders from Caesar, but
encouraged by the soldiers, began to sound his instrument. This was
repeated by all the cohorts, the line began to advance against the enemy,
although the centurions placed themselves in front and vainly tried to
restrain the soldiers by force and stop them attacking without orders
from the general.
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CIVIL WAR AND DICTATORSHIP 49–44 BC
When Caesar perceived that it was impossible to restrain the soldiers’
roused spirits, he gave the watchword ‘Good Luck’ [Felicitas], and spurred
his horse at the enemy front ranks.19
The confidence of the army proved justified, for the Pompeians failed to
cope with this sudden attack and were quickly routed. Plutarch presents
another version of the story in which he claimed that as the battle was about
to begin Caesar felt an epileptic fit coming on and had to be taken away to
shelter, hence the confused start to the advance. There are very few stories
of specific epileptic attacks suffered by Caesar, and this is the only one that
claims that his epilepsy interfered with his ability to command.20
The elephants attacking Caesar’s right flank were panicked by the hail of
missiles from his skirmishers and stampeded back through their own lines.
The whole Pompeian left wing soon collapsed and all attempts at rallying
the army failed in the face of a ferocious pursuit. Caesar’s legionaries were
in a grim mood and killed more freely than they had done after Pharsalus.
They wanted the war over and had no wish to see men being pardoned and
let free to fight them again. Caesar himself had already ordered the execution
of one Pompeian whom he had pardoned during the surrender in Spain in
49 BC, but who had now been captured for a second time. This was his
normal policy, forgiving a man once but killing him if he had chosen to
continue fighting in spite of this pardon. At Thapsus his soldiers had no
concern for such distinctions and many Pompeians died as they tried to
surrender. The legionaries even cut down several of Caesar’s own officers
when they tried to stop the killing. By the end of the day 10,000 Pompeians
had been killed for little more than fifty casualties on Caesar’s side. The
main enemy leaders escaped, but most would die in the following weeks.
Afranius and Sulla’s son Faustus were captured by Sittius and handed over
to Caesar, who then had them executed, in response to the clamour of his
soldiers. A few other prisoners were executed but in some cases – for instance,
that of Lucius Caesar, the son of his cousin and legate – it is unclear whether
he ordered the deaths or whether the decision was taken by his subordinates.
Petreius and King Juba arranged a somewhat bizarre suicide pact, fighting
a duel to the death. The versions of the outcome vary from source to source,
but the most likely seems to have been that the Roman killed the Numidian,
and then with the help of a slave ran himself through. Metellus Scipio
escaped by sea, but killed himself when his ships were intercepted by a
pursuing Caesarean squadron. Of the few who escaped, Labienus managed
to make his way to Spain where he joined up with Pompey’s sons Cnaeus and
Sextus.21
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Africa, September 47–June 46 bc
Cato was in command of the city of Utica throughout the African
campaign and so had not been present at the defeat. Indeed it is striking how
minor a role he played in the military operations in the entire Civil War.
Fugitives soon brought news of the disaster and word that Caesar’s men
would soon arrive. Cato consulted with the Romans in the city, three hundred
of whom he had formed into a council, but realised that whatever their resolve
there was little prospect of continuing to fight. The choice then became either
to flee, to surrender or to commit suicide. After dinner, which since Pharsalus
he had refused to eat reclining in the proper manner and so had taken sitting
down, he retired to his chamber. (It was not the first such gesture he had
made, for he is supposed to have refused to be shaved or have his hair cut
once the Civil War began.) He complained when he noticed that his son and
servants had removed his sword, and insisted that they return it, but then
went back to his reading. His choice of work was significant, Plato’s Phaedo,
a discussion of the immortality of the soul, but throughout his life he had
pursued the study of philosophy. Finally, without warning, he stopped reading,
took up his sword and stabbed himself in the stomach. The wound was bad,
but not immediately mortal, and once they heard the commotion his son
and slaves rushed to him. A doctor was brought and Cato’s wound cleaned
and bound up. However, he had never lacked determination or courage, and
once they had gone the forty-eight-year-old tore open the stitches and began
ripping out his own entrails. He was dead before they could restrain him.
When Caesar heard the news he said that he bitterly begrudged the
opportunity of pardoning his most determined opponent, but to a great
extent Cato had acted out of a desire to avoid his enemy’s mercy.
Less than three and a half years after crossing the Rubicon most of the
leading men who had forced Caesar to take that step were dead, and of the
survivors nearly all had given up the fight. The bloodshed was not quite over,
for a year later there would be another campaign in Spain, fought with even
greater savagery. When the Civil War began his opponents had been wrong to
think that Caesar would not fight, and then mistaken to believe that the greater
resources under their control meant that their victory was assured. Against
the odds, Caesar had won the Civil War and it now remained to be seen whether
or not he could win the peace and create a lasting settlement. That was the
priority, but first, as in Asia, he had to settle the region. As usual communities
that had supported the Pompeians were subject to punitive fines, while those
who had supported him were rewarded. It was probably around this time that
he had an affair with Eunoe, the wife of the Moorish King Bogudes. It was not
until June that he left Africa, almost five and a half months after he had landed.22
467
XXII
Dictator, 46–44 BC
‘It is always the same at the end of civil wars, and it is not just the wishes
of the victor which are carried through, for he also needs to humour those
who have helped him to win.’ – Cicero, December 48 BC.1
‘As victor Caesar returned to the city and, in a way that almost exceeded
human belief, pardoned all those who had carried arms against him.’ –
Velleius Paterculus, early first century AD.2
Caesar reached Rome near the end of July 46 BC. The Senate had already
voted him the staggering total of forty days of public thanksgiving for his
latest victory – tactfully considered to be over King Juba and not his Roman
allies. This was double the number awarded even for the defeat of
Vercingetorix. Fourteen years earlier Caesar had given up the right to
celebrate a triumph in his quest for the consulship. Now, after weeks of
frantic preparation, he celebrated no less than four triumphs, over Gaul,
Egypt and the Nile, Asia, and King Juba and Africa. In his long career
Pompey had triumphed three times, and it is likely that most were aware
that Caesar was now also commemorating victories won on the continents
of Europe, Africa and Asia, just as his great rival had done. The celebrations
began on 21 September, but were not held on consecutive days and so lasted
until 2 October. The scale was lavish, with parades of prisoners, including
Vercingetorix, the infant son of Juba, and Cleopatra’s sister Arsinoe. The
latter is said to have inspired pity in the crowd and she and the boy were
spared the fate of the Gaulish war leader, who was ritually strangled at the
end of the Gallic triumph in the traditional way. Tradition – certainly recent
tradition – was altered in a number of special privileges granted to Caesar.
One of the most conspicuous was the right to be preceded by no fewer than
seventy-two lictors. A consul was normally attended by a dozen of these
men and a dictator by twenty-four, and the number seems to have been
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Dictator, 46–44 bc
intended to show that Caesar had held the latter office three times – six
times the number who normally attended a consul and treble the amount
given to a dictator. In addition, following precedents found only in the distant
past of the Republic, Caesar rode in a chariot pulled by a team of white
horses. However, if Suetonius and Dio are to be believed, early on in the
first triumph – the one over Gaul – the axle on his chariot broke and he had
to finish the procession in a hastily summoned replacement. Perhaps in
expiation of this bad omen, at the end of the ceremony Caesar climbed on
his knees up the steps of the Temple of Jupiter on the Capitol. Pliny tells us
that Caesar always uttered a magical formula before setting out anywhere
in a chariot because of some earlier accident, but clearly this did not have
the desired effect on this occasion.3
In each of the processions were carts carrying the spoils taken from the
enemy, usually weapons and armour as well as silver, gold and other precious
objects. Others mounted placards carrying slogans – including the famous
Veni, Vidi, Vici – or lists of achievements. It has often been suggested that
Pliny’s figure of 1,192,000 enemies killed by Caesar during his campaigns was
derived from adding up the numbers of enemy casualties proclaimed during
his triumphs. Quantifying victory had always been important for the
competitive aristocracy of Rome. Another tradition was to show paintings
of notable scenes from the campaigns, and Caesar’s triumphs included many
of these. Officially he was celebrating the defeat of foreign enemies of the
Republic, and there was no mention or depiction of Pompey and Pharsalus.
There were said to be pictures of Metellus Scipio stabbing himself to death
and Cato tearing open his own wound. The sight provoked groans from the
crowd, and has sometimes been seen as crass exultation over the defeat of
his enemies that contrasted with his usual emphasis on clemency. Yet the
sources do not suggest that the sight encouraged hostility to Caesar, and
the reminders of the waste of life and horror of the Civil War were certainly
encouragement to accept the new regime simply to avoid further conflict. The
soldiers who marched in the procession wearing their decorations and finest
equipment certainly had no qualms about causing offence. Long-standing
tradition gave them licence to sing not just about their own deeds in the
war, but to chant bawdy rhymes at the expense of their commander, for on
a day of triumph normal military discipline was relaxed. Caesar’s veterans
sang of his mistresses in Gaul, claiming that he had squandered on them
the funds granted to him by the Republic, and warned the Romans to ‘lock
up their wives’ because they brought with them the ‘bald adulterer’. They
joked about how wrongdoing normally brought punishment, but that instead
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Caesar had made himself master of Rome through defying the Senate.
Another verse recalled the old gossip about his time in Bithynia:
Caesar subdued Gaul – but Nicomedes subdued Caesar:
Behold now Caesar triumphs, who has conquered Gaul –
Nicomedes does not triumph, although he conquered Caesar.4
This was the only slur that annoyed Caesar and soon afterwards he took a
public oath denying that there was any truth in the allegation. Dio says that
this only made him look ridiculous.5
In the days between the triumphal processions there were great feasts
open to all, with no fewer than 22,000 tables laid out with the finest foods
and wines. At nightfall after the final banquet, Caesar walked home in a
procession whose progress was illuminated by twenty elephants that carried
great torches. There were also theatrical performances, and at one of these
he insisted that the famous equestrian playwright Decimus Laberius actually
perform on stage. The latter resented this, but obeyed and had the
satisfaction when he uttered the line ‘He whom many fear, must therefore
fear many’ of seeing the audience all turn to face Caesar. After the
performance Laberius was rewarded with 500,000 sestertii and a gold ring
to signify restoration to the equestrian status that he had been forced to
forfeit by appearing on stage – acting was not considered a proper activity
for a wealthy citizen. Apart from the drama, there were sporting and athletic
competitions, and – since Caesar finally celebrated the funeral games to
Julia he had promised years before – gladiatorial fights. Chariots raced in
the Circus, while special temporary venues were constructed for the athletics
on the Campus Martius and some of the gladiatorial fights in the Forum.
However, the scale of these was so massive that a few combats were staged
elsewhere. Five days were devoted to beast fights, in which 400 lions were
killed, as were a number of giraffes, animals never seen in Rome before.
Apart from the usual matched pairs of gladiators, there was a battle between
two armies each composed of 500 men on foot, 30 cavalry and 20 elephants.
Another version claims that the twenty elephants and their riders fought each
other separately. In addition there was a naval battle fought in a specially
flooded lake dug on the right bank of the Tiber. All of these celebrations
were intended to be bigger and more spectacular than anything Rome had
ever seen before.
The city was packed with hordes of people who had come to see the
celebrations. Many lived in tents pitched wherever there was open space,
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and Suetonius claims that a number of people, including two senators, were
crushed to death in the crowds that thronged the great events. The cost was
staggering, not simply for staging the entertainments and processions, but
also through the more direct largesse that accompanied them. At the end of
the triumphs Caesar gave 5,000 denarii to each of his soldiers – more than
a legionary would earn even if he served a full sixteen-year term in the army.
Centurions each got 10,000, while the tribunes and prefects, most of whom
were equestrians, received 20,000 apiece. In each case this was probably
more than he had promised the men during the Civil War. Yet he also now
chose to extend his generosity to the civilian population and especially the
poorer inhabitants of Rome, each of whom was given 100 denarii, as well
as gifts of wheat and olive oil. Some of the soldiers were angered by this
gesture, which they saw as an unnecessary sharing of the wealth that they
had earned. Doubtless drink and the atmosphere of holiday also contributed
to this discontent, which led to an outbreak of rioting. Caesar had not been
willing to back down in the face of mutiny and was no more inclined to do
so now. He had one of the rioters led off and executed. Two more were
ceremonially beheaded by the college of pontiffs and the Flamen Martialis
(the priest of Mars). The ritual, whose precise meaning escapes us, took
place on the Campus Martius, but the two heads were taken into the Forum
and displayed near the Regia. Order was restored and the period of
celebration was overwhelmingly successful. Caesar had always been a good
showman and had given thought not only to the displays but also to the
comfort of the crowds. At several performances silk awnings were erected
to provide shade for the audience.6
Rewards and Settlements
In general the crowd had delighted in Caesar’s triumphs, celebrations and
games, although Dio claims that some people were shocked by the scale of
the bloodshed during the gladiatorial fights. The dictator’s habit of reading
letters and dictating to his secretaries while watching these shows was disliked
by the people, but gave indication of the sheer amount of business that
required his attention. Caesar had not fought the Civil War in order to
reform the Republic, and in spite of what Cicero and others later claimed,
there is no evidence that he had been aiming at supreme rule for much of his
life. He had wanted a second consulship and doubtless had planned a
programme of legislation for his twelve-month term of office. Instead, he
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had – at least in his own mind – been forced to fight the Civil War, and his
victory brought him far greater power. His third consulship in 46 BC was
followed by a fourth and fifth term in 45 and 44 BC respectively, and for most
of this period he was also dictator and had a number of additional rights
granted to him by the Senate. He was not in Rome for the entire time, since
the last campaign of the Civil War took him to Spain in November 46 BC and
he did not return to Italy until the following summer. This makes the sheer
scale and scope of his legislation and reforms all the more astonishing.
Caesar was constantly at work and, though his assistants such as Oppius and
Balbus clearly undertook a good deal of the detailed work of framing laws,
the basic concepts seem always to have been his. Given the comparatively
short time period it is unsurprising that some projects were never actually
begun, while many more were uncompleted at his death. It is also not always
easy to establish what precisely he did do, and even harder to discern his
intentions. His assassination was followed by renewed civil war between his
partisans and assassins, during which it was clearly in each sides’ interest to
put forward radically different claims of his long-term aims.
To add to the confusion, the civil wars would finally be ended when
Caesar’s adopted son Octavian – later named Augustus – became Rome’s first
emperor. Following the adoption his name was formally Caius Julius Caesar
Octavianus. This meant that whether Caesar himself or his adopted son
passed a law or founded a colony, each would be known as a lex Julia or
colonia Julia respectively. Therefore, if only the name is preserved without
any indication of date, it is often impossible to know which of the two was
responsible. It is especially confusing since it is known that in some cases
Augustus implemented a design of Caesar’s, whereas on other issues his
thinking was very different. Detailed discussion of each possible measure
introduced by Caesar would require immense space and take us too far from
our main purpose. Instead what follows is an overview, concentrating on
the more generally accepted acts.7
It is obvious that Caesar wielded immense power, but there has been little
consensus amongst scholars about his overall aims. Some would like to see
him as a visionary who discerned the problems facing the Republic, realised
that its system of government could simply no longer cope with the changed
circumstances of empire, and understood that a form of monarchy was the
only answer. His plans included not only political change but a radical shift
in the relationship between Rome and the rest of Italy, and of both to the
provinces. A comment in a letter to Metellus Scipio in 48 BC, that Caesar
wanted only ‘tranquillity for Italy, peace for the provinces, and security for
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[Roman] power’ has sometimes been taken as a clear programme. Critics of
this view would instead see it as a vague slogan employed in the midst of civil
war. For them Caesar was not a radical reformer or visionary, but a deeply
conservative aristocrat who won power in a quest for personal glory and
status within the Republic. Motivated by such traditional ambitions, he had
little idea of what to do once he took control of Rome. In this view his
numerous reforms dealing with such a wide range of different issues were
the sign not of a coherent programme, but of the total absence of any
broader design. Caesar tinkered with so many things simply because he did
not know what to do and instead just kept himself busy, mistaking activity
for achievement. Both views are extreme, and most scholars have more
reasonably adopted a position somewhere between the two, but before
returning to this question it will be useful to review the evidence.8
Caesar did not take over a Republic that was functioning effectively. The
Civil War had disrupted the entire Roman world, but even before that the
institutions of the State had been struggling for many years to cope with
turbulent and often violent political struggles. Respect for tradition – and
the extent to which Caesar himself felt this need not concern us too much,
since he was aware of its importance to others – had to be balanced against
the practical importance of providing effective government as soon as
possible. There was also always the central importance of dealing with
individuals, both those who had fought for him and deserved reward and
those who had opposed him, and who now required either generosity to
win them over or stern judgement. In the autumn of 46 BC Caesar began
the colonisation programme to provide farms for his veteran soldiers. His
intention was to employ public land or properties confiscated from dead or
incorrigible Pompeians, but where this was insufficient land was to be bought
at a fair rate. As he had told the mutineers, Caesar was anxious to avoid
the upheaval and hardship caused when Sulla gave land to his troops. At
first it seems that only the men who had served their full term of service
were discharged – we do not know what proportion of the army this was –
and the remainder were to wait until they were demobilised at the proper
time. The focus was mainly on Italy, but there were also veterans settled in
North Africa and in Transapline Gaul, where, for instance, the colony at
Narbo seems to have been expanded. In the same way that he had given
money to the people of Rome as well as the soldiers to commemorate his
triumphs, Caesar now also included civilians in his colonisation programme.
A number of colonies were created in the provinces, and even more planned
as part of a programme that would see the resettling of 80,000 people. Caius
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Gracchus’ plan of a colony on the site of Carthage was revived, and another
new settlement was set down at Corinth, which like Carthage had been
destroyed by the Romans in 146 BC. In some cases the selection of locations
was intended to punish communities that had sided against him in the war,
but even so this was not intended to be especially harsh. The whole
programme of colonisation required immense effort, surveyors going out
to all the regions under consideration, and correct ownership of land being
investigated before lots were marked out and the process of allocating them
to individuals begun. At every stage Caesar and his staff appear to have
been open to pleas from interested parties. Cicero successfully secured an
exemption for the community of Buthrotum in Epirus on behalf of his friend
Atticus, who owned an estate and had interests there. As far as possible the
intention was to satisfy the discharged veterans and civilian settlers without
causing too much hardship to the regions where the colonies were set down
– especially when these had influential friends.
There was a great tradition of distribution of land to citizens by popularis
politicians, stretching back far beyond the Gracchi. Caesar’s agrarian law had
been the cornerstone of his legislative programme in 59 BC, and now with
greater freedom of action he had resumed his activity on a far greater scale.
He rewarded his soldiers, and also removed a potentially volatile section of
Rome’s population and gave them the means to support themselves and
their families. Politically he gained from this, and placed very many people
in his debt, but at the same time it greatly increased the number of affluent
citizens. There is no reason to doubt that Caesar – and indeed many
contemporaries – did not feel that the programme of colonisation was good
for the State as well as in his own interest. In 59 BC even Cato had felt that
the only thing wrong with Caesar’s agrarian law was the man who presented
it. Yet the scale of these projects was enormous and could not be rushed. Only
a small part of his plans in this respect were complete by Caesar’s death.
Ambitious plans to drain the Pomptine marshes and so provide a fresh supply
of good farmland do not seem to have moved beyond the theoretical stage,
but do suggest plans for further distributions and so a major attempt to
provide livelihoods for more poor citizens. Another project that does not
seem to have been started was the plan to alter the course of the Tiber,
improving river access and protecting parts of the city vulnerable to flooding.9
Army officers, especially tribunes and centurions, also benefited from
the land distribution. Caesar’s more distinguished followers were rewarded
with high office, and this resulted in a number of alterations to the traditional
pattern of magistracies. In 47 BC he had increased the number of praetors
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from eight to ten. In the autumn of the following year there was insufficient
time between returning from Africa and going to Spain for most elections
to be held. Therefore, when he returned from Spain in October 45 BC he
promptly had fourteen praetors and forty quaestors elected for what
remained of the year, with sixteen praetors and another forty quaestors to
take up office on 1 January 44 BC. At the same time he resigned his own
consulship for 45 BC, which he had held without a colleague, just like Pompey
in the opening months of 52 BC. His legates Fabius and Trebonius were duly
elected replacement or suffect consuls for the rest of the year. Although the
Senate had granted him the right to appoint magistrates, Caesar contented
himself with sending recommendations to be read aloud at the relevant
voting assembly – ‘Caesar the dictator to [the name of the tribe]. I commend
to you such and such to hold the dignity of office by your vote.’ These seem
always to have been successful, and it may well be that no rivals bothered to
put their names forward. To some extent this preserved the proper formalities,
but Caesar’s obvious desire to grant to numerous followers the dignity and
status of the high magistracies acted against this. When Fabius Maximus
went to watch a play and was announced as consul, the audience is said to
have yelled out, ‘He is no consul!’ He died on the morning of his last day in
office. Caesar received the news while presiding over a meeting of the Tribal
Assembly, which was going to elect quaestors for the next year. Instead, he
had the people reconvene as the Comitia Centuriata and vote for a new
consul. Just after midday another of his legates from Gaul was chosen, Caius
Caninius Rebilus, whose spell as consul therefore lasted no more than a few
hours. A few days later Cicero joked that ‘in the consulship of Caninius
nobody ate lunch. However, nothing bad occurred while he was consul –
for his vigilance was so incredible that throughout his entire consulship he
never went to sleep.’ At the time he is supposed to have urged everyone to
rush and congratulate Caninius before his office expired. Privately he thought
the affair more a matter for tears than wit.10
Caesar’s replacement consuls can rarely have had time to achieve much
during their term of office, even supposing that they were granted any
freedom of action and not simply expected to put through his legislation.
Yet they gained the dignity and symbols of the office. Caesar actually granted
ten former praetors consular status without ever holding the senior
magistracy, for he had many followers to reward and limited time. Resigning
and appointing replacements in this way was not illegal, but was
unprecedented and scarcely added to the dignity of the office. In a similar
way the dramatic increase in the numbers of other posts inevitably devalued
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these to some extent, but in this case there was more practical justification.
Sulla had fixed the number of praetors at eight because this was adequate
to provide enough governors for the provinces then controlled by the
Republic. Since his day, Rome’s empire had increased markedly by conquest
and annexation and there was a real need for more magistrates to
administrate the new provinces. Men elected to the quaestorship were
automatically enrolled as senators, so that the House would be augmented
by at least forty new members each year. Caesar was also granted the power
to create new senators, and to grant patrician status as he felt necessary.
Even before the disruption and losses of the Civil War the censorship had
failed to function properly in practice, often because of squabbles between
the colleagues holding the post. Thus the ranks of the Senate were depleted.
Caesar appointed hundreds of new senators, compensating for the losses
and then expanding the House dramatically. Sulla had doubled the Senate
in size to around 600, but by the time of Caesar’s death there were somewhere
between 800–900 members. A few of these were men who had been expelled
from its ranks in previous years, or whose families had been barred from
public life because of their Marian sympathies. Most of the new members
were from established equestrian families, including many who came from
the local aristocracies of Italy, but they may also have included a few former
centurions. There were also a few from citizen families outside Italy, including
a number of Gauls from the Cisalpine, and probably also Transalpine,
provinces. There were jokes at the time of the ‘barbarians’ taking off their
trousers to put on a toga, and someone daubed up a slogan in the Forum
proclaiming that it would be a good deed not to tell any of the new senators
the way to the Senate House. It is unlikely that any of the ‘foreigners’ added
to the Senate were not fluent in Latin, well educated and in cultural respects
little different from genuinely Roman aristocrats.11
A few of the appointments may have been unsuitable – as we have seen,
Caesar is supposed often to have said that he would reward even criminals
if they had helped him. A number of the men he appointed to provincial
commands were subsequently charged with and condemned for corruption
and extortion. One was the future historian Sallust, who had been left behind
to govern Africa after Thapsus. In his writing he protested his innocence
and it is just possible that he was more naive than corrupt. Another loyal
follower with an established reputation for cruelty was refused a province by
Caesar, who instead let him have a gift of money. Yet in general Caesar’s
new senators were probably little different from other members of the House.
Corruption, pettiness, incompetence and many other vices had all in the
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past been displayed frequently by the scions of many of the oldest and
noblest families of Rome. A more serious charge might be that in enlarging
the Senate in this way Caesar made it too big to function effectively as a
forum for debate. This is certainly possible, but there was so much business
to conduct that only a small proportion was actually debated in the House
during these last years of Caesar’s life. More often matters were decided by
Caesar and his advisors behind closed doors, who then issued a decree as if
produced by the Senate, even including an invented list of attendees at the
meeting. Cicero was surprised to receive a number of letters from rulers or
communities in the provinces thanking him for voting to grant their petitions,
since in most cases he had not even heard of them before and had certainly
not taken part in any meeting to discuss the matter. So many things needed
attention that there was simply not time to deal with them in the proper
way, although it is interesting that Caesar ensured that his decisions were
presented in the correct traditional form, especially to distant communities
who would have no idea that this was a sham. Oppius and Balbus were his
two main assistants in such work and both remained outside the Senate
during his lifetime. Although the manner in which it was conducted was
unprecedented and unconstitutional, it is notable that even his critics did not
claim that Caesar and his associates generally did not make good and sensible
administrative decisions.12
Cicero was one of a large number of former Pompeians who had been
pardoned by Caesar and now sat in the Senate – at least when it actually
met – alongside his partisans. At first he resolved to take no part in debates,
devoting his energies to writing instead of public life. Servilia’s son Brutus
was another such man, although he chose to be more active and was sent
by Caesar to govern Cisalpine Gaul, probably as propraetor although he had
not yet held the magistracy. His brother-in-law Cassius also accepted a post
as legate around this time. Other Pompeians had ceased to fight, but had
not formally surrendered themselves to Caesar for judgement and could
not return to Italy without his permission, so waited in exile, hoping that
family and friends would be able to persuade him to be lenient. It was
rumoured that he took some pleasure in responding slowly in the case of
his most vitriolic opponents, feeling that the nervousness this engendered
was some small payment for the trouble they had caused him. One of these
was Marcus Claudius Marcellus, the consul for 51 BC, who had begun the
concerted attack on Caesar’s position and flogged the magistrate from
Novum Comum (see p.363). He had not taken much active part in the Civil
War that his actions had helped to precipitate, but still refused to write to
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Caesar directly. Instead his case was raised by Caesar’s father-in-law Piso,
backed by Marcellus’ cousin, the consul for 50 BC and the husband of
Caesar’s great-niece, as well as the other senators present at the meeting.
Caesar granted their request, prompting Cicero to break his silence and
launch into a speech of praise for the man who preferred to place the
‘auctoritas of the Senate and the dignity of the Republic before personal
wrongs and suspicion’. Not long afterwards he made another speech – this
time in the Forum rather than in the Senate – urging the recall of Quintus
Ligarius. Plutarch says that before he began Caesar openly declared that
Ligarius was an enemy who did not deserve mercy, but that, although his
mind was already made up, he would still listen to Cicero for the sheer
pleasure of hearing his oratory. In the event the speech moved him to tears
and prompted an immediate pardon. Gradually a trickle of Pompeians,
some of them very distinguished, returned to Rome and some at least to
public life. Marcellus was not amongst them, for he was murdered by one
of his household in a domestic dispute before he was able to enjoy his
pardon. In addition a growing number of men who had remained neutral
were persuaded to take office under Caesar, such as the noted jurist Sergius
Sulpicius Rufus, who went out as governor to Greece. Cicero continued to
be active publicly and for a while at least was optimistic, advising Caesar
to do more to restore the Republic to a proper condition.13
Tidying Up
Caesar’s programme of colonisation removed a significant part of Rome’s
population, but he was also very concerned to improve and regulate the
living conditions of those who remained. He looked closely at the system for
giving out free grain to citizens and judged that it was subject to abuse and
badly run. A new calculation of those eligible to receive this was made,
based on a survey of the city’s population conducted on a street-by-street
basis, and making use of information provided by landlords for those living
in their tenements. The overall number of recipients was reduced from
320,000 to 150,000 names. The new figure was fixed and arrangements made
for the praetors to add new names when the deaths of recipients created
vacancies on the lists. Some of those taken from the list are likely to have
found work and a wage in Caesar’s continuing and massive building projects
focused around the saepta on the Campus Martius and his new Forum
complex. Apart from his lavish shows and games, Caesar also found other
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ways to benefit Rome and seems likely to have been influenced by what he
had seen in Hellenistic cities, most of all Alexandria. He granted citizenship
to any doctor or teacher willing to come and work in Rome. In direct
emulation of the famous Library at Alexandria, he gave orders for the
creation of a similar centre of learning at Rome, placing Terentius Varro, the
famous scholar – and former Pompeian commander in Spain – in charge of
the task of gathering the works of Latin and Greek literature. Another plan
involved the thorough codification of Roman law, but this may not have
even begun and was not actually achieved for several centuries.14
One of Caesar’s most lasting projects was the reorganisation of the
calendar, and again this showed Hellenistic influence with the Alexandrian
astronomer Sosigenes playing a leading role in the calculations. Rome’s
existing calendar consisted of 355 days, was based originally on the lunar
cycle and needed constant modification. The college of pontiffs – of which
Caesar was the most senior – were charged with adding extra or intercalary
months at their discretion in an effort to keep the official year at least
vaguely connected to the seasons of the natural year. It was a confusing
system and one open to political manipulation, for instance, extending the
year of office of an associate. During his time as proconsul of Cilicia,
Cicero had been very nervous that someone would do this and thus postpone
the date on which he could leave and return to Rome. By the time of the Civil
War the calendar was running some three months ahead of the actual
seasons. Caesar’s system was far more logical and was intended to function
without any need for annual changes. One intercalary month of about
three weeks had already been inserted into 46 BC at the end of February. Two
more were now added between November and December so that the year
eventually consisted of 445 days. This was to allow the new calendar to
begin on 1 January 45 BC at what was thought to be the proper time in the
solar cycle. The Julian calendar had months that varied in length but added
up to a total of 365 days. Every fourth year a single day, rather than an
entire month, was added after 23 February. It does not seem to have been
given its own number. This system remains in use with the Orthodox
churches, but in the sixteenth century it was slightly modified under the
auspices of Pope Gregory XIII and this Gregorian calendar is the one
followed today. Caesar’s reform was practical and removed confusion and
the possibility for political abuse. It also added ten days to the year, each
of which was considered to be fas or a day on which public business, such
as summoning the Senate or the Assemblies, could be conducted. Even so
there is some sign that the change – or more accurately the fact that Caesar
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imposed it – was resented. When someone mentioned to Cicero that the
constellation of Lyra was due to rise on the next day, he remarked snidely
that obviously it did so in accordance with official command.15
Caesar was certainly concerned with regulation, much of it well within
Roman tradition. In the past many sumptuary laws had been passed with
the aim of restricting excessive luxury amongst Rome’s elite. Caesar brought
in one of his own, forbidding the use of litters and the wearing of purple
clothes or pearls, save by certain named individuals or groups on specific days.
Various exotic and expensive foods were banned and men set around the
Forum to watch what the shops were selling. There were even stories of
soldiers breaking into houses and confiscating forbidden foods from the
dinner table. In the long run his law had as little impact as earlier legislation.
The purpose behind it was in part political, to deny potential rivals – or at
least potentially disruptive politicians – the chance to display their wealth
or win support through lavish entertainment. There may also have been a
desire that the merchants in the city should devote more effort to providing
essential goods rather than the exotic. Even Caesar does not seem to have
had much hope that the rules would be obeyed as soon as his back was
turned. Perhaps there was also a desire for a return to traditional frugality,
so often praised, if rarely emulated, by the Romans, although if this was
the case then it was more than a little ironic that it came from Caesar, the
noted collector of pearls and fine art. Dio also claims that he wished to
encourage the birth rate by offering incentives for families with three or
more children. Yet his restrictions were not simply felt by those well enough
off to want luxuries. The collegia, the guilds of particular trades or regions
of the city that men like Clodius had turned into political gangs, were now
banned. The only exceptions to the law were legitimate associations – the
synagogue meetings of Rome’s Jewish population were expressly given an
exemption. Roman citizens between the ages of twenty and forty were
forbidden to spend more than three consecutive years abroad, unless serving
as a soldier or in another official capacity. Particular attention was paid to
senators’ sons, who were barred from going abroad at all other than on the
staff of a governor or with the army. The aim of such laws is unclear,
although presumably the restriction on young aristocrats may have been
intended to stop them joining armed opponents and so compromising the
rest of the family. Other bills were far more practical, dealing with keeping
the streets of Rome clean and the administration and infrastructure of the
city in good working order. There was a popularis tone to many of Caesar’s
measures, but the reforms themselves were not extreme. He tried to improve
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the lot of many different sections of society and there was a clear effort not
to indulge any one group at the expense of others.16
It was not simply Rome that concerned Caesar. Probably with memories
of Spartacus’ rebellion, he passed a law that stipulated that at least onethird
of the workforce on the great ranching estates of southern Italy must
be free rather than servile labour. It has sometimes been suggested that he
laid down a template for the constitutions of the towns or municipia of
Italy, although this question is fiercely debated. He may have taken an interest
in such things, and it does seem that much of his legislation was intended
to apply also in Italy and the provinces. Much of his time during the
campaigns fought around the Mediterranean had been spent in settling
disputes and confirming or modifying the regulations covering communities
and monarchs in the provinces. As we have seen, raising funds was a major
concern on such occasions, but he was also eager to leave behind stable and
peaceful regions, if only because discontent could readily lead to rebellions
that would aid his Roman enemies. Early in his career he had made a name
in prosecutions against corrupt provincial governors, and during his first
consulship had passed a law regulating the behaviour of these magistrates.
As dictator he added further restrictions, one of the most significant of
which was to set their term of office at no more than two years for a
proconsul and just twelve months for a propraetor. Dio felt that this was
intended to prevent anyone else from following his own example, but even
critics saw the measure as sensible.17
The Spanish Campaign, Autumn 46–Spring 45 BC
An unwise appointment as governor precipitated the last major episode of
the Civil War. Quintus Cassius Longinus had served in Spain as quaestor and
was left to govern the Further Spain province after the defeat of Afranius and
Petreius. Through a combination of greed and his own unpleasant
temperament, he managed to make himself loathed by provincials and his
own troops alike. This led to rebellion and mutiny, with many openly
declaring their defection to the Pompeians. Cassius survived one assassination
attempt, but subsequently decided to flee and was eventually drowned when
the ship carrying him and his plunder foundered. Before this Caesar had
heard of his misbehaviour and assigned a replacement, but the damage had
already been done. Pompey’s sons Cnaeus and Sextus soon arrived in Spain
to rally support in this region that had so many connections with their
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father. After Thapsus, Labienus and other refugees joined them. Caesar at
first felt the problem was a minor one and hoped that his legates could deal
with the Pompeians without requiring him to go to Spain in person. By the
end of November 46 BC he judged that this was not sufficient and set out to
take charge. As noted earlier, no senior magistrates had been elected and
instead he left Rome in the charge of Lepidus as Master of Horse, aided by
eight appointed prefects, although much of the day-to-day decision making
was in the hands of Oppius and Balbus. In less than four weeks – Suetonius
says twenty-four days, but several other sources say twenty-seven – he reached
the theatre of operations in Further Spain. To keep himself occupied he not
only conducted his normal business from the carriage, but also composed
a poem entitled The Journey (Iter). Cnaeus lacked his father’s talent as a
soldier, but he was an extremely determined individual who now found
himself at the head of an army consisting of thirteen legions as well as
numerous auxiliaries. After Caesar left for Spain there was concern that
even after all his victories he might be defeated, for he could muster only eight
legions, just two of which – the Fifth Alaudae and the Tenth minus its timeexpired
men – were considered veteran. Amongst the former Pompeians
who had come to terms with Caesar there was also much nervousness, for
Cnaeus was known to be an irascible man. In January 45 BC Cassius – the
brother-in-law of Brutus and future conspirator – wrote to Cicero and
expressed his concern:
Now to return to matters affecting the Republic, report what’s
happening in Spain. I am really worried by this, and would rather stick
with the old clement master than have a new and cruel one. You know
how fatuous Cnaeus is; you know how he mistakes cruelty for courage,
and how he thinks we always mock him. I am afraid he’ll repay our wit
with the sword in peasant fashion.18
An account of the campaign known as the Spanish War was written by
one of Caesar’s officers, but is by far the least satisfactory of the books
added to his Commentaries. Many of the details of these operations elude
us and a brief summary will suffice. When Caesar reached Spain he learned
that the enemy had been besieging the town of Ulia for some months, and
that this was the only important community in the immediate area that had
remained loyal to him. To relieve the pressure on the town, he immediately
marched against Corduba, the capital of the province. It was defended by
Sextus Pompeius, and his pleas for help soon drew his older brother and the
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main army away from Ulia. Cnaeus shadowed and harassed Caesar’s army
as he settled down to a winter siege of Corduba, but he refused to be drawn
into a pitched battle. Conditions were difficult and from the very beginning
the campaign was fought with extreme savagery by both sides. Deciding
that the city was too strong to take and that no useful purpose was served
by staying where he was, Caesar withdrew and instead besieged the smaller
town of Ategua. Pompey followed, but still declined to fight a battle.
Considerable progress was made in the siegeworks and it soon became clear
that a substantial part of the population wished to surrender. Subsequently,
the commander of the Pompeian garrison had all those suspected of this
brought up to the walls and slaughtered along with their families. Even so
Cnaeus was unable to aid them and eventually the garrison surrendered on
19 February 45 BC. Defections of provincial communities to Caesar were
now becoming common, as were desertions from the Pompeian legions.
Cnaeus responded with executions of suspects. Near the end of the month
Caesar’s men captured four enemy scouts and crucified three of them because
they were slaves. The remaining man, a legionary, was beheaded as befitted
a citizen. As Pompeius retreated Caesar followed, and approached the town
of Urso (modern Osuna). The enemy camped near the town of Munda some
6 miles away.19
On the morning of 17 March, Cnaeus led his men out of camp and
deployed in battle order on the ridge outside Munda. Caesar judged that this
was the chance to fight the battle that he had desired since the beginning of
the campaign and ordered his own army to take positions on the plain in
front of the enemy. He expected the Pompeians to come down and fight on
level ground, since they were showing every sign of confidence. However,
Cnaeus kept his men on the slope, but Caesar decided to attack anyway, in
spite of the disadvantage his troops would face. Numbers were probably
also against them, although it is doubtful that all thirteen of the Pompeian
legions were present in full strength, given losses earlier in the campaign
and the need to detach troops as garrisons. Caesar did have significantly
more cavalry than the enemy, but the ground was not immediately favourable
for its use. Caesar trusted to his luck, ability and the bravery of his troops,
who as at Thapsus expressed their frustration at any delay. As usual the
Tenth was on the right, the Fifth and Third – possibly the unit that had
served him in Gaul and then been taken over by Pompey – on the left flank,
with five more legions forming the centre. Caesar gave the order to advance,
but the enemy did not match the movement until the last minute when they
launched a counter-attack. The fighting was bitter and for a while seemed
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to be going Cnaeus’ way. At one point some of the Caesareans began to
waver and there was a danger that his line might collapse. As at the Sambre
years before, Caesar was a match for the crisis and rushed to the spot. He
is said to have advanced to within 10 paces of the enemy line. At first he
was alone, dodging the missiles or catching them in his shield, but he was
then joined by the nearest officers, and finally by the legionaries. The tale
is not included in the Spanish War, and doubtless grew in the telling, but gives
some indication of the desperate struggle at Munda. According to Plutarch
Caesar later said that he had often fought for victory, but that this was the
first time he had fought for his very life. The Tenth were the first to break
through, punching a hole in the enemy left and exploiting it in spite of their
small numbers. Cnaeus ordered Labienus to take a legion and plug the gap,
but Caesar’s cavalry were already enveloping the Pompeians’ other flank.
As they struggled to meet this crisis the whole army swiftly collapsed into
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CAESAR
Munda
Cavalry
Cavalry Cavalry
Cavalry
Legio V
Alaudae
Legio III Legio X
Battle of Munda
Dictator, 46–44 bc
flight. The toughness of the fighting was shown by the fact that Caesar lost
around 1,000 men, more than at Pharsalus, and a high proportion from an
army that is unlikely to have numbered much more than 25,000–30,000.
Pompeian casualties are said to have numbered over 33,000, although this was
probably an exaggeration. Caesar’s legionaries erected a grisly trophy topped
with severed heads outside Munda, which resisted siege for some time.
Labienus was killed in the battle. Cnaeus Pompeius was wounded, but
escaped only to be caught some weeks later. He was beheaded and the head
sent to Caesar. Sextus escaped in command of a small squadron of ships,
but for the foreseeable future he was in no position to pose any significant
threat. Although a few Pompeians still kept on fighting, the Civil War was
effectively over.20
News of the victory reached Rome about a month later, and prompted
the Senate to decree fifty days of thanksgiving. Caesar was also granted
the title of ‘Liberator’, and a Temple of Liberty was to be set up. In addition
he was given the title Imperator permanently – in the past a general had only
been hailed in this way by his soldiers immediately after a victory. He
remained in Spain for some time, mopping up the last strongholds that
remained loyal to the Pompeians and also resettling the province. However,
he still found time for his usual flood of correspondence, and we know that
near the end of April he wrote to Cicero to offer condolences at the death
of his beloved daughter Tullia. Cicero was an important public figure whose
political friendship Caesar greatly desired to encourage, but in this case it
may have been more than just a question of formality since he knew what
it meant to lose a daughter. Cicero was far fonder of Tullia than of either
his wife or son, and he never truly recovered from the loss. In Spain, Caesar
was busy re-forming a number of towns as colonies, which included existing
inhabitants as well as parties of discharged veterans or other settlers. He
was eager to reward the loyalty of both soldiers and civilians, provincials
and citizens. During his return journey he paused for several weeks in
Transalpine Gaul, carrying out similar administrative tasks and looking at
the progress of veteran settlement at Narbo and Arelate (Arles). The Gaulish
towns of the province were granted Latin status, which meant that their
magistrates automatically received full Roman citizenship after their term
of office. Mark Antony met him in Gaul and the rift between the two was
clearly healed.
Caesar did not return to Italy until late in the summer, and then seems to
have remained outside Rome until he celebrated another triumph at the
beginning of October. This time there was no doubt that he was
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commemorating a victory over a Roman foe. In an unprecedented act he
also permitted two of his legates, Quintus Pedius and the Fabius whom he
would shortly make consul for the remainder of the year, to celebrate
triumphs for the Spanish campaign. None of this was popular with critics
in the Senate. During his own triumph Caesar was annoyed when the tribune
Pontius Aquila, alone of the college of ten, refused to stand as he passed.
Aquila was a former Pompeian who had suffered the confiscation of some
of his property, but had evidently been permitted to pursue a public career.
The sight so angered Caesar that he lost his temper and called out mockingly,
‘Come on, Tribune Aquila, take the Republic back from me!’ Unwilling to
let the matter drop easily, for the next few days he is said to have not made
a promise to anyone without adding the sarcastic caveat, ‘That is, as long
as Pontius Aquila lets me.’21
Caesar’s honours were now exceptional. He was made dictator for ten
years and all magistrates were formally subordinate to him. To this he
added the consulship, for as much of each year as he chose to retain it.
Soon this was extended to the formal right to hold the office for ten years.
According to Dio he was also given the powers and rights of a tribune of
the plebs, although this is not mentioned in other sources. In addition, he
controlled the entire Roman army, as well as the Republic’s Treasury. The
honours accepted by him – which Dio tells us represented a small fraction
of those awarded him by a sycophantic Senate, being merely the ones he
chose to take – were staggering. At formal meetings in the Senate or Forum
he sat on a special chair of office between the two consuls. An ivory statue
of him was included with the statues of the gods and carried in a special
carriage at the ceremonies opening the games. There was also a statue of
him set up on the Capitol near those of the kings, and one in the Temple
of Quirinus, another name for Rome’s mythical founder Romulus. This
amused Cicero, since there was a story that Romulus had been torn to
pieces by senators and he joked that he was happier to see Caesar with
Quirinus than with Salus, the personification of good health and safety.
By this time he had become less optimistic than he had been a year before
when Caesar had pardoned Marcellus and other leading opponents. It was
clear that Caesar held supreme power and showed no sign of returning
complete freedom of action to the Senate. Most key decisions were made
privately, by men like Oppius and Balbus when the dictator himself was
absent. It was not that the decisions themselves were bad, but what bothered
him was how and by whom they were taken. For a senator, especially one
who had held high office and was used to a prominent role in its debates,
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important matters should only ever be dealt with in the proper manner by
the Senate. The Senate should in turn be guided by its best and most
distinguished members, composed primarily of the established aristocracy,
joined – so he had always desired – by a handful of talented new men like
himself. That was the tradition, and Caesar’s position was a clear violation
of this senatorial ideal.22
Many senators were willing to tolerate Caesar’s exceptional power as
long as the crisis and the threat of renewed civil war remained, but as soon
as this was removed were desperate for a return to normality and the
prominence of their own class. Brutus met Caesar as the latter passed
through Cisalpine Gaul on his way back to Italy and felt that he ‘was going
over to the good men’ – one of those expressions like ‘best men’, which
always meant those allied and of like mind to the speaker. Cicero thought
the view absurdly naive. It is probable that Caesar had at the same meeting
promised Brutus the praetorship for 44 BC and the consulship as soon as he
was old enough in 41 BC, which may have contributed to his enthusiasm.
Brutus had always shown great respect for his uncle Cato, but this had
grown markedly since his uncle had chosen to die rather than accept
clemency like his nephew. He divorced his wife, who was a daughter of
Appius Claudius – the man himself had died of natural causes early on in
the Macedonian campaign – and instead married Cato’s daughter Porcia.
Marriage between cousins was not that uncommon amongst Rome’s elite.
Porcia was the widow of Bibulus and thus had an even greater association
with Caesar’s most bitter opponents. In 46 BC Brutus wrote a book entitled
Cato, which was a fiercely eulogistic work in praise of his uncle. Cicero
claimed it was sloppily researched and was annoyed that Cato’s role in the
debate over the Catilinarian rebels was exaggerated and his own part played
down. Nevertheless, at Brutus’ urging, Cicero was persuaded to write his
own Cato, which focused on the latter’s personal virtue and steadfastness
rather than his political career, for he was eager not to cause Caesar too
much offence. This was also easier in other respects, since in the past Cicero
had often doubted Cato’s judgement in public life. He was subsequently
delighted when he was shown a letter from Caesar in which the latter
declared that through studying Cicero’s book he had improved his own
literary style. In contrast he said that reading Brutus’ Cato made him feel
like a better writer himself.23
Within months of his suicide, one of Caesar’s bitterest opponents was
being held up as the ideal of aristocratic virtue in books which were openly
circulated and widely praised. One was written by an ex-consul who was
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acknowledged as Rome’s foremost living orator, and the other by Brutus,
widely believed to be the foremost of the up and coming men of his
generation. When Sulla was dictator no-one would have dared to praise one
of his enemies in this way. Yet from the beginning Caesar had declared that
he would not emulate Sulla, and did not deviate from this now. When the
books were released he found time to read them, but was too busy with the
campaign against Cnaeus Pompeius to do anything about it. Instead he
ordered Hirtius to collect material and produce his own book criticising
Cato. After defeating the Pompeians, Caesar then used this as a basis for
writing his own Anticato. The work has not survived, but it was clearly
highly abusive. It claimed that when Cato cremated his half brother he had
adorned the body in fine clothes and precious metals, but subsequently had
the ashes sieved to retrieve the melted gold. This may have been simple
invention, but Cato’s lifestyle had been highly eccentric and did offer much
material for Caesar to work with. One of the oddest episodes of his life was
his decision to divorce the wife who had given him a number of children, so
that his friend the famous orator Hortensius could marry her and have
offspring of his own. Hortensius was fabulously wealthy, and when he died
a little later, Cato remarried the widow, and thus resumed what had always
been a successful marriage and at the same time brought a lot of property
and money into the family. Such behaviour was at best strange, or – as Caesar
averred – deeply cynical.
It is tempting to see flashes of personal anger in the Anticato, although
it is worth remembering that political invective at Rome was often wildly
exaggerated and frequently vulgar. Cato had hated Caesar bitterly, had
frustrated him in a number of their public encounters and, finally, had played
a major part in causing the Civil War. ‘They wanted this’ – Caesar’s comment
at Pharsalus could most of all be applied to Cato, the man whose implacable
hostility had, he felt, forced him to cross the Rubicon, to fight and to kill so
many fellow citizens and tear the Roman world apart. From his point of
view there was reason enough to loathe Cato, or if not the man himself,
then what he felt the man had made him do. Perhaps there was an emotional
element adding to the invective of the Anticato, but the most significant
part of the whole episode was that Caesar contented himself with simply
writing this response. He did not in any way withdraw his friendship from
either Cicero or Brutus, but sought instead to persuade educated Romans
not to idolise Cato. In this he failed, for as an ideal of stern virtue and
unflinching constancy Cato was much easier to revere than he had been as
a living, active politician.24
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Caesar’s regime was not repressive and, for all his flashes of temper and
jibes at the dead Cato, or the living Pontius Aquila, it did not become any
more harsh after Munda. Yet discontent remained widespread. Cicero wrote
a draft letter of advice on how to reform and restore the Republic, but took
care to show it to Oppius and Balbus before sending it to Caesar. They
suggested so many alterations that he felt unable to complete the task. When
he heard of Brutus’ optimism about Caesar’s intention to join the good
men, with black humour he wondered how this would be achieved ‘unless
he hangs himself’. The Civil War was over, problems long neglected were
being addressed so that large numbers of people were better off than they
had been for a long time. Rome itself now enjoyed a peace and stability that
had rarely been its lot for more than a decade. Yet the scars of the war were
deep. So many had died – especially amongst the famous names of the Senate
– and some of those who lived had to cope with the consequences of their
decisions during those turbulent years. Caesar had employed clemency and
political skill to win over the neutrals and his defeated opponents, but
ultimately his position had been gained through military force. In a way the
situation had much in common with the creation of a settlement in
conquered Gaul. Caesar had to persuade his fellow citizens, especially the
aristocratic elite, that tolerating his dominance was preferable to opposing
it. This was the final test.25
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‘Caesar gave the impression to some of his friends that he did not wish to
live any longer, and took no precautions due to his failing health. . .. Some
also say that he declared that it was more important for the Republic than
himself to go on living; for he had already ample glory and power; however,
if anything happened to him, there would be no peace for the State, which
would relapse into civil war of a much worse kind.’ – Suetonius, early second
century AD.1
‘I have lived long enough for either nature or glory.’ – Caesar, 46 BC.2
At the beginning of 44 BC Caesar was fifty-six. It would be surprising if the
effort of so many years on campaign had not taken some toll on his system,
and Suetonius speaks of failing health. However, there is no good evidence
to suggest that his epilepsy had grown worse and certainly his great energy
does not seem to have declined. By Roman standards he was well past the
prime of life, but there was no particular reason why he should not have
lived on for another fifteen or twenty years, and perhaps even longer. Caesar
did not expect to die in March 44 BC and the men who killed him were
obviously not confident that nature would do their work for them in the
near future. The dictator’s death was sudden and unanticipated by all but
the conspirators. Therefore, to look at Caesar and the regime he created is
inevitably to examine something that was incomplete and still developing.
Augustus would hold supreme power for over four decades and the system
he created had time to evolve very gradually. It is ultimately impossible to
know what Caesar planned to do and how successful this might have been.
Rumours – often very wild ones – about his intentions were rife during his
lifetime and after his death even more confusion was added by the energetic
propaganda campaigns maintained by the opposing sides during the ensuing
civil wars. It is especially unfortunate that Cicero’s letters for the first three
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The Ides of March
months of 44 BC were never published, leaving no contemporary literary
evidence from this vital period.
Inevitably some doubt must remain over many of Caesar’s long-term
aims, but one thing that is clear is that he expected to be away from Rome
and Italy for at least three years. The conspirators struck when they did
because they knew that the dictator was to leave the city in a few days
time to set out for fresh campaigns. This time his opponents would be
foreign and so the glory won by their defeat unambiguous. First he would
strike against the Dacians under their King Burebista, fighting the Balkan
war which he had probably anticipated in 58 BC. He may well have hoped
to complete this campaign by the end of the year. After that he would
move against the Parthians, for Crassus’ defeat at Carrhae was still
unavenged. More recently the Parthians had again invaded Syria and given
support to a renegade Pompeian who was intent on reviving the Civil War.
The Parthian war was envisaged on a massive scale, for Caesar had given
orders for sixteen legions supported by 10,000 cavalry to be massed. A
planned canal through the isthmus of Corinth, although also expected to
foster trade, seems to have been intended to help maintain supply lines to
the theatre of operations. Plutarch tells us that a Greek architect had been
appointed to this project, but it seems unlikely to have progressed beyond
the theoretical stage before it was abandoned on Caesar’s death. It appears
that the defeat of Parthia was widely considered to be desirable – there had,
of course, been speculation that either Pompey or Caesar should be sent
there in the build-up to the Civil War. Caesar is said to have planned to
begin cautiously, learning as much about the enemy and their way of
fighting as possible before launching an attack in earnest. It is not clear
whether he planned to conquer Parthia or merely inflict a serious defeat
on its king, which would force him to accept peace on Roman terms. There
were fantastic stories that he planned to return by a wide circuit, marching
around the Caspian Sea through what would become southern Russia and
conquering the German tribes on his way back to Gaul, but this conflicts
with the otherwise methodical tone of the planning. It is also obvious that
this would inevitably have taken longer than three years. It is possible that
the idea of an eastern war was made more attractive to Caesar by its
associations with Alexander the Great, but there is simply no good evidence
to suggest that he had become prey to such megalomaniac dreams. It is
obviously impossible to say whether or not his Parthian campaign would
have succeeded. Caesar’s past military achievements suggest that it would,
as long as his energy and skill – not to mention his good fortune – had not
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altogether abandoned him. Yet the Parthians were formidable opponents
and gave Mark Antony a severe mauling when he attacked them six years
later. Augustus preferred diplomacy, backed by threat of force, to open
warfare and achieved a satisfactory peace on his eastern frontier. His
success – and the failure of later emperors to win a complete victory over
Parthia – does not necessarily mean that Caesar’s planned operation was
doomed to failure.3
Caesar did not stay in Rome all the time in the months following his
triumph, but wherever he was he remained very busy. In December 45 BC he
was on the coast of Campania, accompanied by a large staff that included
Balbus and an escort, so that altogether he had some 2,000 men with him.
He stopped for a night at a villa near to Cicero’s outside Puteoli and the
latter wrote a detailed account of the dinner he gave on 19 December. It is
interesting that he thought it necessary to borrow guards – probably
gladiators – from a neighbour, for he seems to have been suspicious that
otherwise his house might be looted by the soldiers camped outside. In the
morning Caesar remained in the neighbour’s villa until:
the seventh hour [i.e. early afternoon], admitting no one; I understand
he was busy at his accounts with Balbus. Later he walked along the
shore. After the eighth hour he bathed. Then he listened to the matter
of Mamurra without altering his expression [it is unknown what this
was, but a likely speculation is that the latter had breached the
sumptuary law]. He was rubbed down, and had dinner. He was taking
a course of emetics. And so he ate and drank freely and without concern
– the dinner was grand and well presented, and not merely that, but
‘well cooked, and properly seasoned, and if you ask, all went well.’
At the same time his followers, including slaves and freedmen, were
entertained, the most senior in some style. At the main dinner ‘there was no
talk of the affairs of state, and plenty of discussion of literature. To answer
your question, he was happy and enjoyed it.’ For all the success of the dinner
Cicero ruefully declared that Caesar was not the sort of visitor you would
encourage to pop in again, although obviously he felt that he was in no
position not to invite Caesar when he was nearby. In the last months of his
life Caesar seems always to have been busy, but remained an easy and
charming companion at the dinner table. Yet he was not always as accessible
as he might have liked. At some point in 44 BC Cicero went to visit him at
his house in Rome and was kept waiting for some time before being ushered
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into his presence. Later he recalled Caesar saying, ‘Can I have any doubt
that I am deeply loathed, when Marcus Cicero has to sit and wait and cannot
simply come to see me as he wishes. If ever there is an easy mannered man
then it is he. Yet I have no doubt that he hates me.’
Caesar was prone to flashes of temper, but in the same way that the
evidence does not support the view that his health was rapidly declining, there
is no reason to believe that his character had changed profoundly. He was
occupied with a vast amount of work, the load added to because of his plan
to set off on campaign in the near future, and so gave the impression of
being in a hurry. As a person Cicero and most other senators still found him
pleasant, and his behaviour was moderate and inclined to be generous. It was
not so much Caesar the man they hated, but the position that he had acquired
and what it meant for the Republic. In late 45 and early 44 BC this position
was still being defined, and at the same time as his power and status
developed, attitudes towards it were changing. This brings us back to the
fundamental question of what Caesar intended for the long term.4
King, God or Caesar?
There is no doubt that by late 45 BC Caius Julius Caesar was effectively a
monarch, in the literal sense that he enjoyed far greater power than any
other person, group or institution within the Roman Republic. He had
gained this position through victory in the Civil War, but his specific powers
had been awarded him by the Senate and People. Traditionally a dictator had
been limited to a six-month term of office. Sulla, in similar circumstances
to Caesar, had held greater power without any time limit, resigning and
retiring to private life only when he chose. Caesar thought him a political
illiterate for doing this. He was already consul and dictator for ten years, a
time period far longer than anything imagined in the traditions of Rome’s
constitution. Early in 44 BC this would be extended to a permanent
dictatorship (dictator perpetuo). In addition he was awarded the censorship
– whose powers he had anyway effectively been employing– for the rest of
his life. Many of his honours were more symbolic. He was named ‘Father
of his Country’ (parens patriae), although he was not the first to be addressed
in this way for Cicero had been proclaimed as such after the exposure of
the Catilinarian conspiracy. Caesar was also to be permitted to perform the
only ritual more prestigious than the triumph, the right to dedicate the
‘highest spoils’ (spolia opima), an honour that was properly won by a
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commander who killed the enemy leader in personal combat. There is no
evidence that he actually had time to celebrate this rite. Another exceptional
award was permission to sit with the tribunes of the people at the theatre.
On other formal occasions his chair was already placed between the consuls
– when he was not actually holding the magistracy himself – but now his
ivory chair of office was replaced with one decorated with gold. His birthday
became a public festival and the month itself was renamed Julius. He was
also the first Roman to be depicted on coinage minted during his lifetime.
His head only appeared on some coins, and it was left to Augustus to make
this practice universal. (Hence in the Gospels Jesus could ask whose head was
on a silver coin, knowing that all carried a depiction of an emperor.)5
Caesar’s honours clearly belonged to a tradition of celebrating the
achievements of other famous Roman aristocrats, like Scipio Africanus the
Elder and the Younger, Marius and Sulla, and most of all Pompey. Yet in his
case everything was taken much further and the sheer scale and number of
privileges awarded to one man was unprecedented. The inclusion of his
statue in the procession of those of the gods at the opening ceremonies of
the games, and the placing of more statues in and around the temples on the
Capitol, suggested a status that was somewhat more than human. When
news had reached Rome of the victory at Thapsus, a statue of Caesar had
been set up showing him standing on a globe, with an inscription on the
pedestal reading ‘To the Unconquered God’, but he ordered this erased after
his return. However, in late 45 and early 44 BC this impression was reinforced
when Caesar was given further honours. His house was to be given a
pediment or high-pointed front supported by pillars, just like those on the
great temples. A Julian college of priests was created and associated with the
colleges that oversaw the ancient festival of the Lupercalia. This was taken
further when it was decided to dedicate a temple to Caesar and his clemency
– or perhaps strictly Caesar’s clemency for the sources are unclear. The cult
was to be the charge of a new priest or flamen, resembling the ancient post
of Flamen Dialis or priest of Jupiter, and Mark Antony was named as the
first of these. Dio goes so far as to claim that Caesar was now to be
worshipped as Jupiter Julius, but there is no other evidence for such a specific
identification with Rome’s most important divinity. After Pharsalus, Caesar
had already been formally referred to as a god in the honours and decrees
of Hellenistic communities in the provinces. There was nothing new about
this – other Roman commanders in the last century and a half had been
honoured in much the same way. There was a long tradition of divine
kingship in the East and a tendency to extend this to powerful Romans who
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The Ides of March
appeared in the region. Yet in the past no one had attempted to extend these
ideas to Rome.6
After his death Caesar was declared a god – the Divine Julius (divus
Julius) – and his adopted son would style himself the son of a god. However,
Augustus himself was not deified in Rome until after his death and this
remained the pattern with his successors. The process became effectively
automatic, so that the Emperor Vespasian’s last words are supposed to have
been a macabre joke – ‘I think I am becoming a god.’ Only megalomaniac
emperors were ever declared living gods, and the knowledge of this later
pattern has added to the dispute over whether or not Caesar accepted such
status. Roman religion was complex and polytheistic, with a huge number
of different gods and goddesses, some far greater than others, as well as a
great variety of demi-gods and heroes. Legends, both Greek and Roman,
told of humans who had become divine – Hercules/Herakles being probably
the most famous. Caesar’s family boasted of their descent from Venus and
other aristocrats claimed that their line went back to other deities. The clear
division between God and human, maintained in the monotheistic tradition
more familiar to the modern mind, was much less simple for the Romans.
In a speech delivered just a few weeks after Caesar’s death, Cicero referred
to Antony and his appointment as Caesar’s flamen, so we can be confident
that this was announced, although it is unlikely that he had actually been
inaugurated. This does mean that it is very hard to argue against the view
that Caesar was declared at least semi-divine during his lifetime, and perhaps
was said to be a god. However, the cult does not seem to have received great
prominence, if indeed there was time for it to be properly set up, and it is
best to think of Caesar as at most a minor addition to Rome’s pantheon. Dio
presents this episode as one purely of politics, with a sycophantic Senate
praising the dictator. It is notable that he follows it by reporting that Caesar
was also given the right to be buried inside the city – Roman custom dictated
that burials should take place outside the formal boundary of Rome. The
decree was to be inscribed in golden letters on a silver tablet and to be placed
beneath the statue of Capitoline Jupiter. Dio says that this was intended as
a clear reminder to the dictator that he was mortal.7
Apart from his formal powers Caesar stood out in many ways. His family
claimed descent from the kings of Alba Longa, a city that no longer existed
since the Romans had absorbed it early on in their history. On formal
occasions he now took to wearing what he claimed was the costume of these
monarchs, notably calf-length boots in red leather. The reddish-purple tunic
and toga of a triumphing general, which he now wore at festivals and formal
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meetings, also had regal associations. To this he added a laurel wreath – an
honour that he is said to have especially relished because of his growing
baldness – and in 44 BC this seems to have been replaced with a gold version.
His formal power was massive, and his informal control even greater and
sometimes blatant. Probably in late 46 BC Cleopatra, her brother-husband
Ptolemy and their court arrived in Rome. They were accommodated in one
of Caesar’s houses on the far bank of the Tiber and remained there till after
his death. It is not known whose idea the visit was, but it does seem unlikely
that she would have travelled to Italy and remained so long if Caesar had been
opposed to the idea. Cleopatra owed her throne to her Roman lover, and
may well have felt safer near him and away from Egypt, hoping that time
would help the more hostile elements in Alexandria and elsewhere to grow
used to her rule. She may also have felt that there were political advantages
and concessions that could only be won from Caesar himself. Perhaps the
news of his affair with Queen Eunoe during the African campaign caused
her concern that his support for her might prove fickle. From his point of
view, it was obvious that Egypt and its rich grain harvests would play an
important part in the supply effort required by his projected war against
Parthia. Political concerns were rarely far from the mind of either Caesar or
Cleopatra, but her arrival less than a year after he had left Egypt, and the
length of her subsequent stay, strongly suggest that he wanted her with him
and there is no reason to doubt that they resumed their affair. Cleopatra
certainly continued to stand high in his affections. The Temple of Venus
Genetrix was the centrepiece of his new Forum. Caesar had a gold statue of
the Queen made and placed next to that of the goddess. Appian says it was
still there in his day, over a century and a half later. Caesar was still married
to Calpurnia and Plutarch’s account suggests that the couple continued to
sleep together. It seems inconceivable that she was not aware of his infidelities,
or that the Egyptian Queen living across the river was his mistress. During
her time in Rome Cleopatra was often visited by distinguished Romans,
eager perhaps for a gift, for a favour concerning one of their clients with
business in her realm, or maybe in the hope that she would influence Caesar
on their behalf. Cicero seems to have been disappointed and complained of
the queen’s arrogance, but the main point is that he had visited in the first
place.8
At least one of the honours voted to Caesar was expressly to be handed
on to his son and grandson, but as yet he had no son, or at least not a
legitimate child. His only daughter was dead and her baby, if indeed it was
a boy, had not survived her by more than a few days. When Cleopatra gave
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birth she named her son Caesarion, apparently with Caesar’s permission. His
year of birth is not absolutely established, but sometime late in 46 BC seems
most likely. Although it is probable that the infant came with her to Rome,
Caesarion is not mentioned by any sources written before Caesar’s death.
This has sometimes led to the suggestion that he was not the dictator’s son,
but a child produced only when Antony and Cleopatra wanted to diminish
the prominence gained by Octavian as Caesar’s heir. One argument in favour
of this view is the simple fact that Caesar, for all his three marriages and
frequent affairs, had not fathered another child since Julia, who had been
conceived decades earlier. The claim of at least one Gaulish aristocrat over
a century later to be descended from Caesar may or may not have had any
basis in fact. However, it is worth remembering that Caesar’s marriage to
Pompeia ended in divorce and may well have been unhappy, while for the vast
majority of the years he was married to Calpurnia he was away on active
service. It was not usual for wives to accompany or visit provincial governors
in the Republic and so their chances of having a child were severely limited.
It does seem unlikely that Antony and Cleopatra could produce a child that
had never been heard of during Caesar’s lifetime and have expected his claim
to be accepted, so it seems probable that the boy was already in Rome before
March 44 BC. Whether or not Caesar was actually his father is impossible
to say with absolute certainty and would require far more intimate knowledge
of the queen’s life than we possess. The majority of the ancient sources who
comment on the matter seem to have accepted that Caesarion was the
dictator’s child, but then these authors all wrote considerably later. Suetonius
does mention that after Caesar’s death his long-time assistant and confidant
Caius Oppius wrote a book to refute this claim.9
On balance, a better case can be made for assuming that Caesar was (or
perhaps at least believed that he was) the father of Caesarion, but he was
illegitimate, not a Roman citizen and only an infant. The boy was not even
mentioned in a will drawn up by the dictator in the last months of his life.
The most prominent position was given to the grandson of his sister, the
eighteen-year-old Caius Octavius, in whom he had taken some interest in
recent years. It seems likely that Caesar discerned some of the great talent
in the youth who would become in time Emperor Augustus. His father and
namesake had held the praetorship, but had died in 59 BC. Aged only twelve,
Octavius had delivered the oration at the funeral of Caesar’s daughter. In
47 BC Caesar had admitted him to the college of pontiffs, taking up the
vacancy caused by Domitius Ahenobarbus’ death at Pharsalus. This was an
exceptional honour for one so young. Octavius was to have accompanied him
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on campaign in Spain, but due to ill health only joined the dictator when the
fighting was over. In the will Octavius was his main heir and was formally
adopted as Caesar’s son, but it would be unwise to exaggerate his importance
before the Ides of March. He was still very young, the son of a new man, and
his public role was minor. Mark Antony and Dolabella were much more
prominent as Caesar’s favourites. After Antony had met Caesar in Gaul in
45 BC, he rode with the dictator for the rest of the journey, while Octavius
travelled in a second carriage alongside Decimus Brutus. Mark Antony was
to be Caesar’s colleague as consul in 44 BC, but his continuing feud with
Dolabella threatened to disrupt the dictator’s plan to resign in his favour
when he left Rome. The provision for Octavius’ adoption in the will does not
seem to have been widely known. It seems extremely unlikely that, had the
dictator suddenly died of natural causes, the youth would have been able to
inherit anything more than his fortune and property. He was not marked
out as successor to Caesar’s powers and honours, and politically other men
seemed much closer to the dictator. Both Antony and Dolabella were in fact
technically too young to hold the consulship, but they were well established
in public life.10
The Gracchi had been suspected of craving royal rule (regnum) – there was
a rumour that Tiberius had been sent a diadem by an Asian king. Since the
expulsion of the last king and the creation of the Republic, the Roman
aristocracy maintained a deep hatred of monarchy and it was a common
aspect of political invective to accuse rivals of seeking kingship. The powers
of the dictatorship were effectively monarchical, and to these Caesar had
added other rights, so that in practice he ruled as a monarch. He also dressed
like the kings of Alba Longa. In the Hellenistic world rulers were both kings
and gods, so that some have chosen to see the divine or semi-divine honours
voted to him as steps towards establishing a formal monarchy after this
model. In the first months of 44 BC the question of whether or not Caesar
should take the name of king was brought firmly into the public eye. On 26
January he celebrated the traditional Latin festival on the Alban Hill outside
Rome, and the Senate had granted him special permission to celebrate an
ovation – the lesser form of triumph – and ride back into Rome accompanied
by a grand procession. During the parade some of the crowd hailed him as
king. Rex was the Latin for king, but it was also a family name, Marcius Rex,
and Caesar turned it into a joke by replying that he was ‘Not King, but
Caesar.’ A few days before two of the tribunes, Caius Epidius Marullus and
Lucius Caesetius Flavus, had ordered the removal of a royal diadem or
headband from one of his statues in the Forum. Now the same pair ordered
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The Ides of March
the arrest of the man who had first raised the shout. Caesar was annoyed,
suspecting that the two tribunes were trying to cause him trouble and
deliberately raising the spectre of monarchy to blacken his name. He
protested at their action and they responded by issuing a statement that he
was preventing the tribunes of the people from carrying out their lawful
function. Summoning the Senate, Caesar condemned the men, saying that
they had placed him in the impossible position of either accepting an insult
or acting harshly against his true nature. Someone seems to have suggested
the death penalty, but he did not want this, and was content to have them
removed from office following a motion put forward by another tribune.
Caesar asked Flavus’ father to disinherit his son, who had two more gifted
brothers, but when he refused to do this the dictator let the matter drop.
Once again the man who had talked of tribunes’ rights when he went to
war had ridden over opposition from tribunes, although his punishment
was far milder than that Sulla had been wont to dispense.11
On 15 February 44 BC Rome celebrated the Lupercalia, an ancient festival
whose main associations were with fertility. As part of the rituals the Lupercal
priests, naked save for loincloths made of hide, ran through the streets,
flicking passers-by with goatskin whips. It was considered lucky to be touched
in this way, especially for women hoping to conceive or for those already
pregnant who hoped for an easy and successful delivery. The thirty-nineyear-
old consul Antony was the leader of these runners, since he was head
of the Julian college of priests. Caesar watched, clad in his wreath, the
purple robes of a triumphing general, the long-sleeved tunic and high boots
of the Alban kings, sitting on his gilded chair of office. Antony ran up to him
and presented him with a royal diadem, urging him to take it and become
king. At the sight the crowd went silent. When Caesar refused they cheered
and, when Antony repeated the offer and the dictator again declined, the
acclamation grew even louder. Caesar ordered the diadem to be sent to the
Temple of Jupiter on the Capitol, because Rome had only one king. It was
– and is – very hard to believe that this episode was not carefully staged,
although to what extent Antony added his own touches to the performance
is impossible to say. Cynics then and subsequently said that Caesar wanted
to accept the crown, and would have done so if only the watching crowd
had seemed more enthusiastic. If so, then this was a very clumsy way of
going about this, and it should be noted that his earlier honours were all
proposed first in the Senate. More probably he wanted the glory of refusing
such an offer and perhaps also hoped to put an end to the talk encouraged
by the episode of the tribunes. In this he did not succeed, for a rumour soon
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CIVIL WAR AND DICTATORSHIP 49–44 BC
began to circulate that an oracle had been discovered that revealed that the
Parthians could only be defeated by a king. As an augur Cicero later stated
that the story was false and no such oracle existed, but many seem to have
believed it, which does give some indication of the mood of the times. From
this story grew another claiming that it would be proposed in the Senate
that Caesar become king everywhere save in Italy. Caesar already had regnum,
in the sense of absolute supremacy, and none of the contemporary evidence
suggests that he also wanted the name of king. Indeed, even most of the
later accounts do not claim that this was true, merely that it was rumoured.
He had seen Hellenistic monarchy in his youth in Bithynia, and more recently
in the far greater kingdom of Egypt, but there is no good evidence that he
wished to impose something similar on Rome, perhaps encouraged by the
influence of Cleopatra. His position within the Republic was personal, and
as yet he had no real successor to inherit the kingship.12
The Conspiracy
Some sixty senators eventually joined together in the plot to assassinate
Caesar. There had been rumours of similar conspiracies for several years, but
nothing had come of them. Until early 44 BC Caesar had been protected by
a bodyguard of Spanish auxiliaries, but he very publicly dismissed them
after the Senate had taken an oath of loyalty to him and had also offered to
form a new guard composed of senators and equestrians. Similar bodies
had been raised at times of crisis – Cicero had been attended by armed
equestrians in 63 BC – but in this case it was never formed. The motives of
the conspirators were many and varied, but underlying everything was a
sense that to have one man possessing as much permanent power as Caesar
was incompatible with a free Republic. The State should be led by elected
magistrates holding office for a limited term and guided by a Senate whose
debates were open and dominated by the most distinguished former
magistrates. Under Caesar many decisions were made behind closed doors
by the dictator and his close advisors, and even though they were often good
ones, this was not the way the Republic was supposed to work. Tradition
permitted the suspension of the normal way of doing things during a crisis,
but only for a short time until the danger was over. Sulla’s rise had been far
more savage than Caesar’s, but he had eventually resigned the dictatorship.
Caesar was clearly not intending to emulate him and the grant of perpetual
dictatorship emphasised the permanence of his power. The Republic had
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changed and it was not so much what Caesar was doing as the way he was
doing it that bred discontent amongst the aristocracy. Caesar did make
considerable efforts to maintain at least a façade of the traditional
constitution. His magistrates were elected following his recommendation
and not appointed. The Senate continued to meet and debate, and it was in
the House that most of the honours awarded to him were first proposed. In
addition, the courts continued to function in the traditional way and Caesar
gained the reputation for a strict application of the law. On one occasion he
annulled the marriage of a former praetor, who had married his wife only
a day after she had been divorced by her previous husband. Juries were now
composed solely of senators and equestrians, for he removed the third group,
the tribunii aerarii, from which Sulla had decreed that a third of jurors
should be drawn.13
Caesar, although usually charming and mannered, had always been prone
to impatience and bursts of temper. For the last fourteen years he had spent
the majority of his time in supreme command of an army, never in the
company of anyone possessing equal authority. He had constantly been
required to exert himself, planning campaigns and leading the army in the
field, administering his provinces and, from 49 BC onwards, also an area
that grew in size to encompass all of Rome’s empire. In addition, he had
found that matters often went badly unless he was present to supervise in
person. During these years he had taken very little rest and there was no
opportunity to do so in the last months of his life. Caesar continued to be
very busy and it is more than likely that, long accustomed to command, he
became less patient with the often ponderous and inefficient conventions
of public life, especially since many had now become more than a little
hollow. Late in 45 or early in 44 BC the Senate met to vote him many of the
honours mentioned already. He was absent, since it was felt better to preserve
the illusion that the debate was entirely free. At the end of the meeting the
entire body of senators, led by the consul Antony – or Fabius and Trebonius
if it occurred in 45 BC – then trooped out to inform Caesar of their decision.
They found him sitting on his ceremonial chair conducting business, either
near the Rostra or outside the Temple of Venus in his own partially
constructed Forum. Caesar did not get to his feet to greet them when they
arrived to offer him the new honours. This created a bad feeling, since it
seemed that he was contemptuous of the consuls and the dignity of the
senatorial order. Technically, as dictator, he was senior to a consul and so
was quite at liberty to remain seated, but many senators took offence. It
was rumoured that he had begun to rise, but had been stopped by Balbus who
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thought that it was unfitting for him to show such respect to inferiors.
Another source claims that Caesar later explained the incident by claiming
to have felt an epileptic attack coming on and was afraid to disgrace himself
in public, since these often made him dizzy and caused his bowels to open.
This had not actually occurred, and we are told that he walked back to his
house without any difficulty once his business was complete. His actual
reply to the senators was moderate, for he declined a number of the honours
voted to him as excessive and only accepted a minority. A handful of senators,
one of whom was Cassius, had actually spoken or voted against the new
powers and honours in the Senate itself, but as usual no direct action was
taken against such men. However, now – or perhaps in subsequent days –
many of those senators who had supported the motions came to resent
Caesar’s failure to treat them with sufficient respect and the incident was
blown out of all proportion. It is notable that no one seems to have been
concerned that Caesar had failed to stand when approached by the consul
Antony on the Lupercalia.14
Most of Caesar’s closest associates also disliked the fact that the Republic
was now effectively controlled by one man. This was true even of many who
continued to declare themselves utterly loyal to him after his murder. Yet
for all this general disquiet, it is striking how far most senators went about
their business adapting to the new situation. All had obligations to their
clients and, since many favours or concessions ultimately depended on
Caesar, they went to the dictator – or to friends who were believed to be
able to influence him – to gain these. This aspect of senatorial life went on,
even if politically there was little freedom. The assassination plot was
eventually large, but still involved only some 7 per cent of the Senate. The
majority of the conspirators had been Caesareans during the Civil War and
a few had held high rank. Caius Trebonius had served for most of the years
in Gaul as a legate and had presided over the siege of Massilia during the
Civil War. He had been rewarded with a suffect consulship in 45 BC after
Caesar’s return from Spain. Decimus Junius Brutus, the son of the Sempronia
who was said to have been so heavily involved in Catiline’s conspiracy, had
also served with distinction in Gaul. Caesar had a great fondness for him and
had named him consul for 42 BC. He was also listed amongst the secondary
heirs in the dictator’s will. Servius Sulpicius Galba was another legate from
the Gallic Wars, but he had failed at the consular elections for 49 BC, probably
because of his association with Caesar, and seems to have borne him a
grudge as a result. Another disappointed man was Lucius Minucius Basilus,
whom Caesar had refused a provincial command probably because of
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The Ides of March
justified suspicion over his character. To a greater or lesser extent all of these
men had done well as a result of choosing the winning side in the Civil War,
as had many of the more obscure conspirators. Yet evidently some felt that
they ought to have done even better, and all had now decided that they would
prefer to continue their careers in a Republic without Caesar. In some cases
they had arrived at this decision some time ago. Almost a year earlier
Trebonius had sounded out Mark Antony about joining the conspiracy. This
was at the time when the breach between the latter and Caesar still seemed
very wide. Even so he declined and remained loyal, but he did not betray the
confidence and perhaps expected that the plot would come to nothing in
the end.15
Although there were many of Caesar’s long-term supporters in the
conspiracy, the two men who became its principal leaders were both former
Pompeians. Brutus had surrendered after Pharsalus and his influence with
Caesar helped to persuade the victor to welcome Cassius as well. In 44 BC
both men were praetors and Brutus had already been marked down for the
consulship. According to Plutarch, Cassius was secretly bitter because Caesar
had given the prestigious post of urban praetor to Brutus. The dictator is
supposed to have said that Cassius had the better case, but that his own
fondness for Servilia’s son meant that the prize should go to him instead.
Other sources mention an older grudge against Caesar, who is said to have
confiscated some animals Cassius had gathered with a view to putting on
games. The latter certainly seems to have lost his enthusiasm for the man he
had described as the ‘old clement master’ now that the threat of the brutal
Cnaeus Pompey had been removed. Cassius was married to one of Brutus’
three sisters, the Junia Tertia, whom gossips claimed had had an affair with
Caesar. There may have been no truth in the story and certainly none of the
sources attribute such a personal motive as jealousy to him. Even with Brutus,
though he can scarcely have been unaware of the talk about and the actual
affair between his mother and Caesar, there is little suggestion that this
played any significant part in his actions. He does seem to have been one of
the last to join the conspiracy, spurred on by anonymous pamphlets and
slogans painted on walls asking whether Brutus was asleep. Rome’s last king
had been deposed and expelled by a Brutus, and the family boasted of descent
from this man, although even amongst the Romans there was considerable
doubt over the veracity of this claim. A keen student of philosophy, especially
Stoicism with its emphasis on stern duty, he was well aware of the praise
given to tyranicides in Hellenistic literature. Family pride also encouraged
him to act, reinforced by his growing adulation of his uncle Cato. Porcia
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appears to have been a forceful, if rather unstable, woman – several sources
report the tale that she deliberately stabbed herself in the thigh to prove
that she could cope with pain and so was worthy to be taken into her
husband’s confidence. It would be surprising if guilt did not play a part.
His hero Cato had gone on fighting long after he had surrendered. By the
time his uncle was tearing apart his own wound at Utica, Brutus was
governing Cisalpine Gaul on Caesar’s behalf. There was every indication
that he would continue to do well under the dictatorship. Caesar once
commented that ‘Whatever Brutus wants, he wants badly’, and his character
does seem to have been somewhat obsessive. Once he decided to join the
conspirators his determination to follow the act through was unshakeable.
The influence of his uncle and wife, and the burden of living up to his own
and his family’s reputation, all pushed him on, but in the end he was moved
to act because he felt that it was inappropriate for a free Republic to contain
one man with so much power. Whatever his other personal motives, the
same belief was foremost in Cassius’ mind.16
The conspirators spoke of liberty, and believed that this could only be
restored by removing Caesar. Most, perhaps all, felt that they were acting
for the good of the entire Republic. With Caesar dead the normal institutions
of the State ought to function properly again and Rome could be guided by
the Senate and freely elected magistrates. To show that this was their sole
aim they decided that they would kill the dictator but no one else, including
his fellow consul and close associate Antony. Brutus is said to have persuaded
them to accept this, against the advice of some of the more pragmatic
conspirators. Of the whole group, he had the greatest reputation, at least
amongst Rome’s elite. Yet although these men believed that they were doing
what was right for the Republic, they would not have been Roman aristocrats
if they did not also crave the fame and glory that they felt would be attached
to such a deed. It should also be noted that the conspirators, especially the
most distinguished of them like Cassius, Marcus and Decimus Brutus,
Trebonius and Galba, were bound to do very well politically if the venture
succeeded. They were men likely to be foremost amongst those senators
who would guide the restored Republic, especially since it was scarcely likely
that those who had remained staunchly loyal to Caesar would prosper after
his death. Both Marcus and Decimus Brutus gave up certain consulships, but
could confidently predict that they would win the magistracy by election.
The disappointed among them could expect to win the offices and postings
they craved. Liberty and the cry of a return to the Republic also meant a
return to the dominance of few well-established families, and the opportunity
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The Ides of March
to bribe the electorate and make fortunes by exploiting the inhabitants of
the provinces. Brutus was widely respected and in much of his life seems to
have justified Shakespeare’s phrase the ‘noblest Roman of them all’. However,
on one occasion it is known that he had ordered his agents to extort by any
means possible 48 per cent interest from a community in Crete that had
unwisely taken a loan from him at four times the legal rate. The Republic
that the conspirators believed in was one that maintained the privilege of the
senatorial elite. Faith in the system was no longer so deeply entrenched
amongst the rest of society as they supposed.
The Assassination
The conspirators resolved to act quickly, since they knew that Caesar planned
to leave Rome on 18 March and would not return for years. They were
probably also encouraged by the hostility he had encountered due to his
treatment of Flavus and Marullus, and also the controversy over the episode
of the Lupercalia. Cicero later claimed that Antony was Caesar’s true killer
because he had raised the spectre of kingship on that day. Then came the
false rumour of the prophecy and wild tales that Caesar planned to move
the capital of the empire to Alexandria or even Troy. It was also claimed
that one of the tribunes, Helvius Cinna, had told friends that he planned to
propose a bill granting to Caesar the right to marry as many women as he
liked with a view to producing a son and heir. This story may not have
spread until after the murder, since Cinna was lynched in the aftermath of
Caesar’s funeral and was not able to deny it. Anyway good gossip has always
tended to be passed on even when people do not actually believe it. Aware
that the dictator was about to leave Rome, the conspirators decided to strike
on 15 March when Caesar was expected to attend a meeting of the Senate,
for it was felt that he would be less on his guard and easier to approach on
such an occasion. Reports and rumours of plots certainly reached the
dictator, but these were vague and as often implicated men like Antony and
Dolabella as any of the real conspirators. Caesar dismissed them all, although
he is said to have stated that he was far more inclined to suspect the lean
Cassius with his serious nature than the wild-living Antony and Dolabella.
On another occasion he is supposed to have declared that Brutus had enough
sense not to be impatient for his death.17
Caesar was a rational man and judged that Rome needed him, because
without him it would simply relapse into civil war. He was dictator and he
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was effectively a monarch, but he was not a cruel one and used his powers
for the general good. The Republic had peace, and was better run than it had
been for decades, even if things were not being done in the traditional way.
This last point mattered little to a man who had declared the Republic no
more than an empty name, but perhaps he did not realise how much the old
ideal meant to others, or simply felt that the benefits of his rule must
overcome any nostalgia for the past. Despite repeated requests from his close
associates, Caesar refused to re-form his bodyguard or take other precautions
for his safety, replying that he did not wish to live in fear or permanently
under close guard. Perhaps the weariness of years of hard effort, combined
with the prospect of unending labour governing the Republic and its
provinces, made him less inclined to worry. For him the nature of public life
had changed and now consisted almost entirely of dutiful effort, for all the
men with whom he had once competed for supremacy – Crassus and Pompey
most of all, but also Catulus, Cato and even Bibulus and their generation –
had gone. There was no question that he had won, that he was the first man
in the Republic, whose glory and achievements outstripped all of Rome’s
other great men, both past and present. Now he could only seriously compete
with himself. Yet Caesar had always taken duty seriously and continued to
throw himself and all his great energy into service of Rome. The planned
wars against the Dacians and Parthians would certainly have brought him
more glory – and clean glory since the enemy was foreign – but few even of
his critics would not have felt that the conflicts themselves were against
enemies who deserved to be humbled by Rome. Caesar may have been tired,
and perhaps he found his victory a little hollow. He probably did not fear
death, but that is not to say that he courted it. If his new regime was to
succeed then it could not permanently be maintained by fear, but needed to
rest on the acceptance that it was better than the alternatives. Showing that
he was unafraid of his own class, both his allies and former enemies,
demonstrated his own confidence. He knew he was disliked for his
dominance, but hoped that this would be tolerated, and so he trusted to the
good fortune that had in the past helped to win so many victories, to his own
ability and just rule, and to the pragmatism of others. Three years spent on
campaign and new victories would hopefully help Rome’s elite get used to
his rule – perhaps it would also remind them that Caesar was a better master
than some of his subordinates. We do not know whether on his return he
would have developed his position further, and possibly begun to mark out
a successor to his powers. He is supposed to have intended to employ
Octavius as his Master of Horse for at least one year of the campaign, but
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another man was also named so there was certainly as yet no final indication
of succession. This is impossible to say and it could well be that he had not
yet devised any specific plans. In the winter of 53–52 BC Caesar had badly
misjudged the mood of the Gaulish aristocracy. Now he had done the same
in Rome.18
Our sources are filled with prodigies warning of the death of Rome’s
most powerful man. One of the most famous claims that on the night of
14 March Calpurnia suffered a nightmare in which she is variously claimed
to have seen either the pediment of the house collapsing or that she was
holding his murdered body in her arms. Then the morning sacrifices on the
15th were repeated several times, but the omens were always unfavourable.
Caesar is supposed to have been surprised because his wife was not normally
given to superstition and eventually Calpurnia persuaded him to remain at
home. He sent word to inform the Senate that ill health prevented him from
leaving his house to perform any public business. It is possible that there
was some truth in this and that he was unwell. Antony was to have carried
the message to the Senate, but before he left Decimus Brutus arrived – it
was normal for friends to greet an important senator early in the morning
so there was nothing unusual in that. Both men had dined on the previous
night at the house of Lepidus, where after the meal the question of what was
the best death is supposed to have been raised. Caesar had been taking little
part in the discussion, but quickly looked up to say that the answer was an
end that was sudden and unexpected. On the following morning Brutus was
able to convince Caesar to reverse his decision. Plutarch says that he mocked
the warnings of the soothsayers and lured Caesar with the claim that the
Senate was going to offer him kingship outside Italy, but this is probably a
later invention. There were plenty of reasons why Caesar should wish to
attend the Senate when he was due to leave the city in three days. Whatever
the details, eventually the dictator got into a litter and was carried through
the Forum to where the Senate was meeting in one of the temples that formed
part of Pompey’s theatre complex. A few months before Caesar had won
praise for ordering the restoration of the public statues of and monuments
to Sulla and Pompey, and so a statue of his former son-in-law would look
on during the debate. After he left his house, a slave arrived claiming to have
vital news for the dictator. The man was given permission to stay and await
his return.19
It was late morning by the time Caesar arrived and the time had passed
nervously for the conspirators, prey to fears that their plot had been exposed.
Apart from Decimus Brutus, the conspirators had gathered early using the
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CIVIL WAR AND DICTATORSHIP 49–44 BC
pretext that Cassius’ son was formally becoming a man by publicly assuming
the toga virilis. Then they went to the temple and waited outside for Caesar’s
arrival. Their daggers were concealed within the cases in which senators
habitually kept their long stylus pens. In Pompey’s theatre itself was a troop
of gladiators owned by Decimus Brutus, who were armed and ready, but
had reason to be there since it was to be the venue for some fights to be
staged in the near future. One man greeted Brutus and Cassius in a rather
cryptic manner, which they first interpreted as a sign that someone had given
them away. Their tension increased when the same man went up to the
dictator as he arrived and spoke to him for some time, but they soon realised
that he was presenting a petition. En route Caesar had been handed a scroll
by the Greek teacher Artemidorus, who had spent time in Brutus’ household
and seems to have known of the conspiracy. Through choice or lack of
opportunity the dictator did not read it. None of the sources suggest that
he was in any way suspicious and he cheerfully called out to a soothsayer,
who had previously warned him to fear the Ides of March, in an exchange
so familiar from Shakespeare – ‘The Ides of March are Come.’ ‘Aye, Caesar,
but not gone.’ The conspirators greeted him as he stepped down from the
litter. Trebonius – or in Plutarch’s version Decimus Brutus – took Antony
aside and kept him talking while Caesar and the remainder went in. They
were aware that Caesar’s fellow consul was both loyal and a burly individual,
and would normally have sat beside the dictator, close enough to aid him.
The senators already inside the hall rose when Caesar entered. The dictator
then went to his golden chair, which presumably was next to Antony’s curule
chair since he was the only consul apart from Caesar.20
Before the meeting could formally begin the conspirators clustered around
the dictator. Lucius Tillius Cimber, who had served under Caesar in the
past, asked for the recall of his brother, who presumably had been an ardent
Pompeian. The others pressed round to implore Caesar to grant the plea,
touching and kissing his hands. Publius Servilius Casca Longus moved round
to stand behind Caesar’s chair. The dictator refused to be moved by the
pleas, replying calmly to refute their arguments. Suddenly Cimber grabbed
Caesar’s toga and pulled it down from his shoulder. This was the agreed
signal and Casca now drew his dagger and stabbed, but in his nervousness
only managed to graze the dictator’s shoulder or neck. Caesar turned and
seems to have said something like, ‘Bloody Casca, what are you playing at!’
In some accounts he grabbed Casca’s arms and tried to wrench his dagger
away, although in Suetonius’ version he used his own pen as a weapon and
stabbed his assailant. Casca – Plutarch says specifically using Greek and not
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The Ides of March
the Latin Caesar had employed – called out to his brother for help. The
other conspirators stabbed and slashed at Caesar. Several, including Brutus,
were accidentally wounded by the others in the confused mêlée that
developed around the dictator. Only two senators tried to help Caesar, but
they could not break through to him. The dictator struggled with them to
the end, trying to fight or force his way out. Marcus Brutus stabbed him
once in the groin, and some claimed that when he saw Servilia’s son he
stopped struggling and spoke one last time, saying ‘You too, my son’ – sadly
there is no direct evidence for Shakespeare’s version of et tu Brute. Then the
dictator covered his head with his toga and collapsed, falling next to the
pedestal of Pompey’s statue. There were twenty-three wounds on his body.21
The attack had been so sudden and unexpected that the hundreds of
watching senators had first been too shocked to react. When the deed was
done and the conspirators stood, their clothes dishevelled, some wounded
and all spattered with blood, Brutus called on Cicero, who had not been
privy to the secret, to take the lead. Even as he did so panic spread throughout
the hall and all of the other senators, including the famous orator, fled away
as fast as they could. This was not quite the reception they had wanted, but
still full of the success of their enterprise, the conspirators trooped out and
walked up to the Capitol, carrying on a pole one of the caps that a freed slave
traditionally wore, symbolising the liberty they had brought to the State.
Antony for the moment was in hiding, and a little later three of Caesar’s
slaves dared to enter the hall, lifted the body and put it in his litter, then
carried it back to his house. For a while all of Rome was stunned and an
uneasy truce developed. Cicero eventually went to the Capitol and
congratulated the assassins, but when Brutus and Cassius went down and
spoke from the Rostra in the Forum, the crowd that gathered showed no
sign of enthusiasm. Antony was alive, as was Lepidus, who held command
of the troops camped just outside the city. For a while they seemed
conciliatory, Antony met the conspirators privately and then on the next
day in the Senate. The House passed a motion to recognise all of Caesar’s
acts and appointments, since too many people, including a number of the
conspirators, had benefited from these to desire their repeal.
In the mood of reconciliation, the Senate voted to give Caesar a public
funeral, which was held in the Forum on 18 March. Antony ordered a herald
to read out the text of the honours so recently voted to the dictator by the
Senate and the oath taken by every senator to preserve his life, and then
gave a short speech – Shakespeare’s famous version probably gives the best
modern reflection of the power of Roman oratory. He also read out Caesar’s
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CIVIL WAR AND DICTATORSHIP 49–44 BC
will, which included the gift of extensive gardens near the Tiber to the people
of Rome, and an additional award of 300 sestertii (75 denarii) to each citizen.
His purple robe, rent and bloodstained from his wounds, was put on display,
and some sources also claim that there was a wax effigy of Caesar showing
his injuries. A large crowd had gathered – Cicero later dismissed them as the
rabble of the city, but this was no more than conventional abuse of opponents,
and it seems to have consisted of a broad range of different groups. A group
of magistrates and former magistrates began to lift the byre on which the
body was laid, for it was intended to carry it to a spot next to his daughter’s
tomb on the Campus Martius and cremate it there. The angry crowd would
have none of this. Just as their hero Clodius had been burnt in the Senate
House, so Caesar would also be cremated inside the city, in the Forum at its
very heart. The seats and benches used by the magistrates and the courts were
smashed and used to feed the fire. The mood was hysterical. The actors
hired to dress in the triumphal and magisterial regalia of Caesar and his
ancestors now tore these off, ripped them into pieces and tossed them into
the flames. His veteran soldiers threw their weapons and armour into the
blaze, while women added their finest jewellery. Occasionally crowds had
protested against Caesar, but this had always been over a specific grievance.
Their affection for him, as a man who throughout his career had consistently
advocated measures for the benefit of the wider population and not simply
the narrow elite, had never seriously wavered. In 49 BC the vast bulk of the
wider population of Italy had not been inclined to take up arms against
Caesar. Then and now they had found it much harder than his senatorial
opponents to see Caesar as an enemy of the Republic, a term that anyway
meant different things to different people. After the funeral came rioting
and attacks on the houses of the conspirators and those who had supported
them. The dictator’s loyal supporter Helvius Cinna was murdered by a mob
who mistook him for one Cornelius Cinna, who was a prominent critic of
Caesar. It was not just Roman citizens who lamented Caesar. At the funeral,
and for a number of nights afterwards, Suetonius tells us that there were
many foreigners joining in the lamentation after the fashion of their culture.
Especially prominent were members of Rome’s Jewish population.22

A few weeks after the assassination one of Caesar’s still loyal associates
gloomily concluded that if Caesar ‘with all his genius could not find a way
out, then who will find a way?’ The same man’s predictions of immediate
rebellion as soon as the news reached Gaul proved utterly unfounded, but
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he was correct in assuming that civil war would soon erupt again. Antony
chose to fight against the conspirators. Octavius, now, since the will, formally
adopted and thus named Caius Julius Caesar Octavianus, would show truly
remarkable initiative and confidence for a youth of eighteen, rallying Caesar’s
veterans to his cause and making himself an important figure who, no one
could afford to ignore. First he fought for the Senate against Antony, and
then, guessing rightly that they would discard him as soon as victory was
secured, he joined with Antony and Lepidus to form the Second Triumvirate.
In its brutality the ensuing war kept no hint of Caesar’s clemency and
resembled more the struggle between Marius, Cinna and Sulla. Within three
years virtually all of the conspirators had been defeated and were dead,
often by their own hands. The senatorial and equestrian orders were purged
by proscriptions on a larger scale even than Sulla had enforced. In time
Lepidus was marginalised and left to live out his life as an obscure exile,
while Antony and Octavian fought for supremacy. The latter was only thirtytwo
when the defeated Antony and Cleopatra killed themselves and left him
unchallenged ruler of the Roman world. Rome became a monarchy once
again, although the hated name of king was not employed, and this time the
change proved permanent. Octavian became Augustus and showed more
skill in veiling his power than his adopted father had done. This was part of
the reason for his success, but his ruthlessness in disposing of enemies and
the fatigue of a population that had endured over a decade more years of
bloodshed helped to convince Rome’s elite that it was better to accept his rule
than return to civil war.23
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Epilogue
‘Blood and destruction shall be so in use, and dreadful objects so familiar’
– Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Act III Scene 1.
Caesar was born into a Republic already prone to sudden outbreaks of
savage political violence. The scale of the bloodshed grew worse during his
life and his own murder was just one episode in an extremely turbulent
period of Rome’s history. Caesar’s death was gruesome and spectacular, but
very few of the men who have figured prominently in his story died of natural
causes. The women fared rather better, although Cleopatra was an exception
in this respect as in so many other ways. Saturninus’ followers were massacred
when Caesar was a baby, the Social War erupted when he was a child,
followed by the civil war that raged as he matured into a man. Between them
Sulla and his enemies caused losses to the Roman elite on a scale not seen
since the darkest days of the war with Hannibal. It did not stop there.
Lepidus soon rebelled in Italy and was swiftly suppressed, while Sertorius
waged war with grim efficiency in Spain and was only defeated after years
of struggle. Later there was Catiline, then Clodius and Milo, and many
lesser figures willing to employ violence in pursuit of their ambitions, even
before Caesar crossed the Rubicon. All the time foreign wars remained
common, while the staggering initial successes of Spartacus awoke deep
fears in a society so dependent on slave labour. However, far more senators
and equestrians fell in disputes between Romans, and the bloodletting was
probably even greater when Antony and Octavian first hunted down the
conspirators and then turned against each other.
Caesar lived in a brutal and dangerous era. This should be an obvious
truth, but it is sometimes easy to forget because it was also an extremely
civilised age. Caesar’s own Commentaries, Cicero’s vast output of letters,
speeches and philosophical treatises, along with Sallust’s histories and the
poetry of Catullus, represent some of the greatest works of Latin literature.
Combined with the later sources they also ensure that these years are better
known that any other period of the Roman Republic’s history. Indeed, it is
extremely difficult today to avoid looking at the earlier periods of the
Republic through the prism of the first century BC, and especially the copious
512
writings and ideas of Cicero. The wealth of detailed information for these
years, the day-to-day gossip or detailed discussions of elections and debates
– once again so much of all this comes from Cicero – can lend an air of
normality and stability that is deeply misleading. Roman public life in the
first century BC was anything but stable. Violence was not ever present, but
it was always a possibility, lurking just beneath the surface. The constraints
that had restricted competition between earlier generations of senators no
longer functioned as well. In most years the round of public life proceeded
properly enough, with meetings of the Senate and Assemblies occurring,
courts convening and dispensing verdicts, magistrates going about their
business, and elections being held. Sometimes jurors were bribed or otherwise
persuaded to change their view, or the voters manipulated, but on the whole
the life of the res publica continued in a way that was acceptable, if not
ideal. Rioting, orchestrated violence, murder – and still more open warfare
– remained occasional exceptions that interrupted this pattern. The
Republican system was remarkably resilient and sprang back into something
like overt normality after each crisis. Yet none of these things was now
unimaginable, as they had been to generations before the Gracchi. Men like
Marius, Cinna and Sulla had shown that supreme power could be seized by
force, while the early career of Pompey demonstrated that an able
commander with his own army could force his way into the forefront of
public life in a way never possible before.
Caesar’s generation had essentially the same ambitions as the senators of
earlier periods, craving high office, wealth and glory to enhance their own
and their families’ position. From the second century BC onwards, the profits
of empire meant that there was ever more money around, and spending on
monuments, entertainments, and other means of buying fame and popularity
grew at a staggering rate. By the first century BC it cost far more to have a
successful public career. Like many others, Caesar plunged himself into debt
in pursuit of his career, trusting to future success to meet the demands of his
creditors. Had he failed at any stage, then his ruin would have been complete
and irrevocable – hence his comment to his mother on the day of the election
to the post of Pontifex Maximus, that he would return as a winner or not
at all (see p.125). Caesar kept on winning, but other men were not so lucky
and failed, losing everything. Some succeeded for a while, until their rivals
were able to secure their public condemnation in the courts or elsewhere. In
63 BC Cicero executed the former consul Lentulus, who had already been
expelled from the Senate and had had to start his career afresh. Just a few
years later the orator was himself forced into exile by Clodius and only the
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epilogue
changing balance of politics allowed his subsequent recall. The risks of
public life were greater than they had ever been before and very few men
could ever feel entirely secure from attack. Those who failed swelled the
ranks of the desperate, willing to join any enterprise led by a man promising
to restore their funds and prospects. Many such men joined Catiline and
died. Others rallied to Caesar in 49 BC and prospered, so long as they survived
the Civil War. The violence of the times ensured that failure might not simply
bring political and financial ruin, but death. Yet the new dangers of public
life were set against the far fewer limits on success. It was possible, at least
for a few men, to bend or break the rules and conventions supposed to
regulate office-holding, and it was also possible to gain unprecedentedly
large and long provincial commands. So many men had prospered by fighting
for Sulla to make it clear that fortune and position could be won in civil
war. Caesar’s opponents in the Civil War presented themselves as the
defenders of a traditional Republic, but the majority had done rather well
out of Sulla’s victory.
The combination of high risks and the potential for almost limitless
success fuelled both ambition and fear amongst Caesar’s generation. All
had seen some men rise spectacularly high and others fall to ruin or death.
Most men had neither the inclination nor favourable opportunity to advance
their career through intimidation or open violence, but no one could ever be
sure that his rivals would not choose such methods. Senators were very ready
to believe rumours of revolution or assassination plots. Once civil war
actually broke out even remaining neutral was not always a safe option as
the proscriptions had shown. The higher a man rose and the greater the
risks he took, the harder his fall was likely to be, and the more he worried
that his enemies would turn savagely on any sign of weakness. The
overweaning ambition of so many of the famous figures in the Late Republic
is obvious, but it is all too easy to forget the nervous climate in which they
lived and struggled for power. Each success made it harder for a man to turn
back and the only real safety lay in more successes. Caesar has gone down
in history as the man who crossed the Rubicon, plunging the Roman world
into chaos in a gamble whereby he would either win or lose all. It is a mistake
to see him as all that different from his opponents or most of the other
prominent Romans of the first century BC. It is equally unwise to see the
key players in this and other crises as acting only on rational considerations.
All were gamblers in their way, and all certainly were afraid of the
consequences of defeat and reluctant to trust personal enemies. The spectre
of military dictatorship and the proscriptions was always there, as was the
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memory of other less well-organised massacres and executions. Nor was
there much within the mentality of the Roman elite to encourage
compromise. Young aristocrats were raised to aspire to virtus, an important
part of which was the absolute resolution never to give in even in the face
of defeat. In foreign wars this had served the Republic well, baffling Pyrrhus
and Hannibal, neither of whom could understand why the Romans would
not give in when they were obviously beaten. In the age of civil wars it made
sure that these internal conflicts were waged with relentless ruthlessness.
Once the struggle began the men on both sides knew that they must win or
die. It was exceptionally rare for Roman aristocrats to commit suicide when
defeated in a foreign war, for it was their job to rally the troops and rebuild
their strength until they were ready to fight with greater success. In civil
wars the ordinary soldiers could usually expect mercy, but the leaders could
not, and so killed themselves in great numbers, whether in despair or
defiance.
Caesar tried to change this. In 49 BC he feared falling into the hands of his
rivals, just as they were terrified of his returning at the head of an army. In
each case the fears may have been ungrounded, but that did not make them
less real. Once the war began Caesar paraded his clemency, sparing defeated
enemies and in time allowing them to resume their careers. This was
calculated policy, intended to win over the uncertain and deter the enemy
from fighting to the death, but that does not reduce the contrast with his
opponents or earlier victors. After he had won, the pardoned Pompeians
were allowed back into public life and some treated very well indeed. Once
again he clearly felt that this was more likely to persuade them and others
to accept his dictatorship. Regardless of his motives, there was a generosity
about Caesar’s behaviour that was matched by no other Roman who came
to power in similar circumstances. In the same way, while his lifelong backing
for popular causes was intended to win support, at the same time he did
implement a number of measures that were in the interest of a wide part of
the population.
Caesar was determined to rise to the top. Shakespeare’s Mark Antony
said of Caesar that ‘ambition should be made of sterner stuff’. In truth
there can rarely have been a sterner or more determined ambition than
Caesar’s. At times he was utterly ruthless, although this was far more marked
in Gaul than in the Civil War. He seems to have had few scruples and was
coldly pragmatic in his willingness to order atrocities. Yet he was never
wantonly cruel and used victory for a wider good as well as his own.
Ultimately we return to the essential ambiguity of Caesar and his career
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with which we began. He was an exceptionally talented individual, but he
was also a product of his age. Roman politics in the Late Republic was
precarious, with increasingly few restraints on behaviour. The Republican
system relied heavily on precedent and convention, but these were breaking
down, not helped by the readiness with which the authorities employed the
senatus consultum ultimum with its temporary suspension of law. The rules
of the political game had changed and it would have been difficult, perhaps
impossible, to return to the old system. Caesar’s ambition, talent,
determination and his much vaunted good fortune led him on as he rose to
supremacy, and prevented him from ever giving up or backing down. Had
he been born in another, less troubled age, his reputation might easily have
been far less controversial. He could have been another Scipio Africanus,
winning unambiguous glory by saving Rome from defeat by a foreign foe.
(Perhaps then he would have ended like Africanus, bitter and disappointed
living in self-imposed exile after being forced out of public life.) For all his
faults, Caesar was undoubtedly a patriot and a very able man. Instead,
Caesar fought and won the Civil War, became dictator and was stabbed to
death by conspirators. Whatever the rights and wrongs of his actions, it is
hard to imagine that in any way his life could have been more dramatic.
‘Always I am Caesar’ – Caesar through the ages
Caesar the general has been widely admired down the ages. His
Commentaries were rediscovered and began to be published again in the
late fifteenth century. In the coming centuries as more organised states began
to develop increasingly sophisticated professional armies, military thinkers
often turned to Caesar’s writing for inspiration. Perceptions of the Greek and
Roman art of war had a profound influence on the theory and practice of
European warfare in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Until
comparatively recently the Commentaries, along with other ancient texts,
continued to play a significant part in the education of officers in Western
countries. Napoleon often claimed to have been inspired by Caesar and even
during his exile on St Helena produced a critique of the latter’s campaigns.
His emulation of the Romans was obviously not just confined to generalship,
for he modelled himself on such great men in his own rise to consul and
then emperor in a French Republic that had from the beginning drawn much
inspiration from Republican Rome. Much of the iconography and language
of Napoleon’s empire was overtly Roman, and drew particular inspiration
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from Caesar and his heirs. Later, Napoleon III sponsored the first major
archaeological programme examining the sites associated with Caesar’s
conquest of Gaul. Admiration for Caesar combined with a romanticism for
the Gauls – children in French schools are still taught to think of these Iron
Age tribes as ‘their ancestors’. In the nineteenth century the association was
strengthened because the great rival and potential enemy was Prussia, later
Germany, mirroring Caesar’s depiction of Gaulish peoples separated by the
Rhine from hostile Germans.
As a military leader Caesar has been widely admired, though sometimes
with some critical reservations, but attitudes to him as a statesman have
been far more mixed from the very beginning. Octavian rose to power as
Caesar’s heir, rallying his veterans and supporters to avenge the dictator’s
murder. After Caesar’s deification, he styled himself ‘son of the divine Julius’.
He did not emulate his adopted father’s clemency and, whilst he could not
also match the latter’s military skill, he was an extremely gifted political
operator. When the civil wars were over and his rule unchallenged Octavian-
Augustus also shielded the reality of his supremacy from the public gaze in
a way very different to Caesar. His divine father was now less useful and
appears little in the propaganda of the new regime. Authors such as Livy seem
to have been very uncertain about how to view Caesar and his deeds, and
certainly did not eulogise him. Given that many of his contemporaries had
struggled to make up their mind about Caesar this is perhaps unsurprising.
It is likely that Asinius Pollio’s lost history was at the very least not entirely
uncritical of Caesar. Under Augustus and his successors, Cato, and to some
extent Brutus and Cassius, were more often the objects of praise, idealised
as noble defenders of the Republic. During the reign of Nero the poet Lucan
produced his epic Pharsalia about the struggle between Pompey and Caesar,
and the latter is most definitely not the hero of the piece. Yet nor is he quite
an undoubted villain and at times comes across more as some mysterious
elemental force than anything entirely human. Later in the century Suetonius
began his biographies of the first twelve rulers of Rome with Caesar. Of
the twelve men Augustus was clearly held up as closest to the ideal ruler,
but in some ways the biography of Caesar stands apart from the rest, since
although dictator he was not an emperor or princeps in the style created by
his adopted son. Suetonius does criticise Caesar, but also reports in detail
his many achievements. In many ways the uncertainty about Caesar and
how to judge him began with the Romans, who admired his great conquests,
but deplored other aspects of his life and career and continued to revere
some of his opponents.
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This uncertainty continued and has allowed many different Caesars to be
depicted over the centuries. The most famous is probably the Caesar of
Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar. Despite its title, the focus is far more on Marcus
Brutus, and Caesar appears relatively briefly before being murdered early
on in the third act. Shakespeare’s Caesar has few obvious traces of greatness,
being somewhat pompous, boastful and readily flattered, but is certainly
no tyrant. A greater sense of his power and dominance comes from the
attitudes of the other characters, both before and, in many respects, after his
death. Shakespeare was not the first playwright to take Caesar as a subject,
and he was certainly not the last, many, including Voltaire, writing plays or
operas looking at some or all of his life. The assassination has probably
attracted most attention due to its inherent drama, and after that the affair
with Cleopatra with all the hints of the exotic East and eroticism. However,
the latter aspect is wholly absent from Shaw’s Caesar and Cleopatra. This
is a gentler, more obviously benevolent Caesar, and his relationship with
the queen – made to be a ‘child’ of sixteen rather than the woman she
actually was in 48 BC – is essentially avuncular. More recently there have
been a number of cinematic portrayals of Caesar, of which probably the
most memorable comes from Rex Harrison’s performance in Cleopatra
(1963).1 His Caesar has more of the man of action about him, with the quiet
but firm authority of a proven leader. He also has something of the quick
intelligence and, in that actor’s practised and precise delivery, a strong hint
of the powerful orator. The relationship with Cleopatra – Elizabeth Taylor
looking very beautiful, even if, for all we know, little or nothing like the
actual queen – perhaps has more of politics than passion about it. Television
has also had a go, with the film Julius Caesar (2002) starring Jeremy Sisto
in the title role. This presented another largely sympathetic Caesar, but
faced the massive problem of compressing his life’s story into a little more
than two and a half hours. Crassus is not mentioned at all, and matters of
chronology are left extremely vague, with Cato already in the Senate at the
time of Sulla’s dictatorship, but it did try to give a broader view than simply
Egypt and the Ides of March.
Caesar did a lot in his life, and the period in which he lived was very
eventful and well documented, so that such attempts to cover all of his career
have been almost as rare in novels as on celluloid. In recent years the largest
and most detailed version has come from Colleen McCullough’s Masters
of Rome series, the six novels of which tend to weigh in around the 700–800
page mark. These are detailed, racy accounts that begin with Marius and
Sulla and go through to the aftermath of Caesar’s assassination. The author
518
epilogue
did her research well on these and sticks closely to the real events. Inevitably,
given the scale of the books and the interest in the personal lives of the
protagonists, the vacuums left by the many gaps in our evidence have been
filled by invention. The novelist does not possess the historian’s luxury of
being able to state that we simply do not know something. Rather lighter –
in sheer physical size if nothing else – is Conn Iggulden’s Emperor series,
adventure stories in which Caesar is the hero. These are fast paced with the
emphasis on action, and with these priorities the author plays rather fast and
loose with the facts. Both McCullough and especially Iggulden present
Caesar in a favourable light, although still showing his ruthless streak. Alan
Massie’s Caesar is a much more critical and more serious novel. Its main
character and narrator is Decimus Brutus and to a great extent it is a
subversion of Shakespeare, with Marcus Brutus as a pompous fool rather
than noble hero. Caesar is a great man, but his cynicism and ambition are
far more to the fore. Caesar also appears in a number of Steven Saylor’s
Roma sub rosa mystery novels, and these also present him as a less admirable
figure, more selfish destroyer of the Republic than hero. That the Republic
in these stories is flawed and tottering does not reduce his responsibility for
speeding its end.
Historical facts are only one concern to dramatists, scriptwriters and
novelists alike, and have to be balanced against the demands of storytelling.
Some have been far more faithful than others, but it would be unreasonable
for an historian to criticise too much any deviations from the recorded fact
(which itself is problematic at times) in works of fiction. Between them they
have presented many different views of Caesar, but then it should also be
noted that over the last two centuries serious historians have depicted his
character, aims and importance in very different ways. In this book I have
attempted to look at the evidence we have and to try and reconstruct his
life. There are some things we do not know and are unlikely ever to know.
The aim has been to treat each episode in his life without assuming the
inevitability of subsequent events. Some aspects of his character, for instance
his emotions in public and private life, his beliefs and particularly his
ambitions in his final years, remain mysterious. They can be guessed at, but
not known, and each person will inevitably shape their own Caesar, in
admiration or condemnation – often perhaps a mixture of both. Over two
thousand years later his story still fascinates. One thing is certain – these will
most certainly not be the last words written about Caius Julius Caesar.
519
Chronology
753 BC Traditional date for foundation of Rome by Romulus.
509 Expulsion of Rome’s last king, Tarquinius Superbus.
201 Rome wins the Second Punic War with Carthage.
146 Third Punic War ends with destruction of Carthage.
133 Tribunate and death of Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus.
123–122 Tribunates and death of Caius Sempronius Gracchus.
c.112 Birth of Crassus.
106 Birth of Pompey.
105 Cimbri and Teutones destroy a large Roman army at Arausio.
102–101 Marius defeats the Cimbri and Teutones.
c.100 Birth of Julius Caesar.
91–88 The Social War, the last great rebellion by Rome’s Italian allies.
The socii are defeated only after a hard struggle.
88 Sulla marches on Rome when Marius takes the command
against Mithridates from him.
86 Death of Marius.
c.85 Death of Caesar’s father.
84 Caesar marries Cornelia.
82–79 Dictatorship of Sulla.
81 Caesar refuses Sulla’s order to divorce Cornelia and goes on the
run. He is subsequently pardoned following appeals from his
mother’s relatives.
80–78 Caesar undergoes military service in Asia and wins the corona
civica at Mytilene.
77 Caesar appears in the courts at Rome, unsuccessfully
prosecuting Cnaeus Cornelius Dolabella.
76 Caesar unsuccessfully prosecutes Caius Antonius.
75 Caesar travels to Rhodes to study and is captured and ransomed
by pirates.
74 On his own initiative Caesar goes to Asia, raises local troops
and defeats an invasion or raid led by one of King Mithridates’
commanders.
520
chronology
73 Caesar returns to Rome and is admitted to the college of
pontiffs.
73–70 Rebellion of slaves led by Spartacus.
72 or 71 Caesar elected as military tribune and probably serves against
Spartacus.
69 Caesar elected to the quaestorship and serves in Further Spain.
Death of his aunt Julia and wife Cornelia, both of whom are
given public funerals.
67 Lex Gabinia: Pompey given extraordinary command to clear
the Mediterranean of pirates, and succeeds in a brief, but highly
organised campaign. Caesar spoke in favour of the law. Around
this time he married Pompeia.
66 Lex Manilia: Pompey given extraordinary command to complete
the war with Mithridates. Caesar also supported this bill.
65 Caesar is curule aedile with Bibulus, who complains about
being outshone. He also gives gladiatorial games in honour of
his father.
64 Caesar placed in charge of one of the extraordinary courts
required to deal with Cato’s investigations into debts to the
Republic left unpaid by Sulla’s supporters.
63 Caesar appointed judge in prosecution of Rabirius. Conspiracy
of Catiline. Caesar elected Pontifex Maximus.
62 Caesar is praetor. He supports the tribune Metellus Nepos and
temporarily resigns after the latter has fled. Bona Dea scandal
leads him to divorce Pompeia.
61–60 Caesar sent to govern Further Spain. He reforms administration
and leads a highly aggressive punitive campaign. On his return
to Rome he gives up the prospect of a triumph to stand for
election for the consulship.
59 Caesar’s consulship and the formation of the First Triumvirate
between Caesar, Pompey and Crassus. Determined obstruction
by his colleague Bibulus and supporters including Cato
produces repeated disorders. Caesar forces through his
legislation, but leaves himself vulnerable to future prosecution.
Pompey marries Caesar’s daughter Julia. Caesar marries
Calpurnia.
58 Caesar takes command of his province and defeats the
migrating Helvetii at Bibracte. Then he defeats the Germanic
King Ariovistus.
521
57 Caesar defeats the Belgic tribes, winning the battle of the
Sambre.
55 Caesar bridges the Rhine for the first time and leads an
expedition to Britain.
54 Second and larger invasion of Britain. Death of Julia and her
infant child. Death of Caesar’s mother Aurelia.
54–3 First major Gallic rebellion against Caesar, leads to defeat and
death of Cotta and Sabinus. Caesar bridges the Rhine a second
time.
53 Crassus defeated and killed by Parthians under Surenas at
Carrhae.
52 Second major Gallic rebellion led by Vercingetorix. Caesar
storms Avaricum, is defeated at Gergovia, but besieges Alesia
and forces the Gaulish rebels to surrender. Clodius murdered
outside Rome. Pompey appointed sole consul and allowed to
bring troops into the city to restore order.
51 Caesar fights a number of campaigns in Gaul, culminating in
the siege of Uxellodunum.
51–50 Growing pressure to terminate Caesar’s command.
49–45 The Civil War starts when Caesar crosses the Rubicon. He
overruns Italy quickly. Afterwards he defeats the Pompeians in
Spain.
48 Caesar is briefly dictator and consul for the second time. He
crosses to Greece and is checked at Dyrrachium, but defeats
Pompey at Pharsalus. Pompey flees to Egypt and is murdered.
Caesar pursues to Egypt and intervenes in the power struggle to
place Cleopatra on the throne.
48–47 The Alexandrian War. Caesar has an affair with Cleopatra.
47 Caesar leads a swift campaign to defeat Pharnaces, King of the
Bosporus, at Zela.
46 Caesar is consul for the third time, but early in the year takes an
expedition to Africa. Caesar suffers a near defeat at the hands
of Labienus at Ruspina in North Africa, but finally defeats
Pompeian army at Thapsus. Suicide of Cato. Caesar is given the
dictatorship for ten years.
45 Caesar’s fourth consulship. He wins final victory at Munda in
Spain. He is granted the dictatorship for life.
522
chronology
chronology
44 Assassination of Caesar a few days before he planned to set out
for a series of campaigns against the Dacians and Parthians.
Caesar deified.
44–42 Caesar’s assassination provokes a further cycle of civil war
between the conspirators and Caesar’s supporters led by Mark
Antony, later joined by Octavian, Caesar’s nephew and adopted
son.
42 Brutus and Cassius defeated in twin battles of Philippi.
31 Antony defeated by Octavian in naval battle at Actium.
Octavian becomes effectively the sole ruler of the Roman
Empire.
30 Suicide of Antony and Cleopatra.
523
Glossary
Aedile: The aediles were magistrates responsible for aspects of the dayto-
day life of the city of Rome, including the staging of a number of
annual festivals. Usually held between the quaestorship and the
praetorship, there were fewer aediles than praetors and the post was
not a compulsory part of the cursus honorum.
Aquilifer: The standard-bearer who carried the legion’s standard
(aquila), a silver, or gilded statuette of an eagle mounted on a staff.
Auctoritas: The prestige and influence of a Roman senator. Auctoritas
was greatly boosted by military achievements.
Auxilia (auxiliaries): The non-citizen soldiers recruited into the army
during the Late Republic were known generally as auxiliaries or
supporting troops.
Ballista: A two-armed torsion catapult capable of firing bolts or stones
with considerable accuracy. These were built in various sizes and most
often used in sieges.
Bona Dea: Annual festival to the ‘Good Goddess’, the rituals were
celebrated exclusively by women and held in the house of an elected
magistrate. In 62 BC the rites were performed in Caesar’s house and
were the subject of scandal.
Cataphract: Heavily armoured cavalryman often riding an armoured
horse. These formed an important component of the Parthian army.
Centurion: Important grade of officers in the Roman army for most of
its history, centurions originally commanded a century of eighty men.
The most senior centurion of a legion was the primus pilus, a post of
enormous status held only for a single year.
Century (centuria): The basic sub-unit of the Roman army, the century
was commanded by a centurion and usually consisted of eighty men.
Cohort (cohors): The basic tactical unit of the legion, consising of six
centuries of eighty soldiers with a total strength of 480.
Comitia Centuriata: The Assembly of the Roman people that elected
the most senior magistrates, including the consuls and praetors. It was
divided into 193 voting groups of centuries, membership of which was
based on property registered in the census. The wealthier members of
society had a highly disproportionate influence on the outcome. Its
structure was believed to be based on the organisation of the early
Roman army.
524
glossary
Comitia Tributa: The Assembly of the entire Roman people, including
both patricians and plebians. It was divided into thirty-five voting
tribes, membership of which was based on ancestry. It had power to
legislate and was presided over by a consul, praetor or curule aedile. It
also elected men to a number of posts including the quaestorship and
curule aedileship.
Commilito (pl. commilitones): Comrade. This familiar form of
address was often employed by a Roman general when speaking to his
troops, especially at times of civil war.
Concilium Plebis: The Assembly of the Roman plebs, whether meeting
to legislate or elect certain magistrates such as the tribunes of the
plebs. Patricians were not allowed to take part or attend. The people
voted in thirty-five tribes, membership of which was based on ancestry.
This assembly was presided over by the tribunes of the plebs.
Consul: The year’s two consuls were the senior elected magistrates of the
Roman Republic and held command in important campaigns.
Sometimes the Senate extended their power after their year of office, in
which case they were known as proconsuls.
Curia: The Curia (Senate House) building stood on the north side of the
Forum Romanum and had traditionally been built by one of the kings.
Sulla restored it, but it was burnt down during the funeral of Clodius.
As dictator Caesar began work on a new curia. Even when the building
was in good condition, on some occasions the Senate could be
summoned to meet in other buildings for specific debates.
Cursus honorum: The term given to the career pattern regulating public
life. Existing legislation dealing with age and other qualifications for
elected magistracies was restated and reinforced by Sulla during his
dictatorship.
Dictator: In times of extreme crisis a dictator was appointed for a sixmonth
period during which he exercised supreme civil and military
power. Later victors in civil wars, such as Sulla and Julius Caesar, used
the title as a basis for more permanent power.
Equites (sing. Eques): The ‘knights’ were the group with the highest
property qualification registered by the census. From the time of the
Gracchi they were given a more formal public role as jurors in the
courts, an issue that became extremely contentious.
Fasces (sing. Fascis): An ornamental bundle of rods some 5 feet long, in
the middle of which was an axe. They were carried by lictors and were
the most visible symbols of a magistrate’s power and status.
525
glossary
Flamen Dialis: An ancient priesthood of Jupiter, the holder of which
was subject to a great number of strict taboos. Effectively, the Flamen
Dialis and his wife, the Flaminica, were considered to be permanently
taking part in ritual observance, and so had to be kept free from any
form of pollution. The young Caesar was selected for the post, but may
never have been actually installed.
Forum Romanum: The political and economic heart of the city of
Rome that lay between the Capitoline, Palatine, Quirinal and Velian
hills. Public meetings were often held either around the Rostra, or at
the eastern end of the Forum. The Concilium Plebis and Comitia
Tributa also usually met in the Forum to legislate.
Gladius: A Latin word meaning sword, gladius is conventionally used to
describe the gladius hispaniensis, the Spanish sword that was the
standard Roman sidearm until well into the third century AD. Made
from high-quality steel, this weapon could be used for cutting, but was
primarily intended for thrusting.
Imperium: The power of military command held by magistrates and
pro-magistrates during their term of office.
Legatus (pl. Legati): A subordinate officer who held delegated
imperium rather than exercising power in his own right. Legati were
chosen by a magistrate rather than elected.
Legion (Legio): Originally a term meaning levy, the legions became the
main unit of the Roman army for much of its history. In Caesar’s day
the theoretical strength of a legion was around 4,800–5,000 men. The
effective strength of a legion on campaign, however, was often much
lower.
Lictor: The official attendants of a magistrate who carried the fasces,
which symbolised his right to dispense justice and inflict capital and
corporal punishment. Twelve lictors attended a consul, while a dictator
was normally given twenty-four.
Magister Equitum: Second-in-command to the Republican dictator,
the Master of Horse traditionally commanded the cavalry, since the
dictator was forbidden to ride a horse.
Maniple (manipulus): The basic tactical unit of the legion until it was
replaced by the cohort, the maniple consisted of two centuries. It still
seems to have had some role in administration and army routine – and
perhaps also drill – in Caesar’s day.
526
glossary
Nomenclator: A specially trained slave whose task was to whisper the
names of approaching citizens permitting his master to greet them in a
familiar way. Such a slave normally accompanied a canvassing
politician.
Ovatio (ovation): A lesser form of the triumph, in an ovation the
general rode through the city on horseback rather than in a chariot.
Pilum (pl. pila): The heavy javelin that was the standard equipment of
the Roman legionary for much of Rome’s history. Its narrow head was
designed to punch through an enemy’s shield, the long thin shank then
giving it the reach to hit the man behind it.
Pontifex Maximus: The head of the college of fifteen pontiffs, one of
three major priesthoods monopolised by the Roman aristocracy. The
pontiffs regulated the timing of many state festivals and events. The
Pontifex Maximus was more chairman than leader, but the post was
highly prestigious.
Praetor: Praetors were annually elected magistrates who under the
Republic governed the less important provinces and fought Rome’s
smaller wars.
Prefect (praefectus): An equestrian officer with a range of duties,
including the command of units of allied or auxiliary troops.
Quaestor: Magistrates whose duties were primarily financial, quaestors
acted as deputies to consular governors and often held subordinate
military commands.
Rostra: The speaker’s platform in the Forum from which politicians
addressed public gatherings.
Saepta: The voting area on the Campus Martius where the various
assemblies met to hold elections.
Scorpion: The light bolt-shooting ballista employed by the Roman army
both in the field and in sieges. They possessed a long range, as well as
great accuracy and the ability to penetrate any form of armour.
Signifer: The standard-bearer who carried the standard (signum) of the
century.
Spolia opima: The highest honour that a triumphing general could claim
was the right to dedicate spolia opima in the Temple of Jupiter
Optimus Maximus on the Capitol. The right could only gained by
killing the enemy general in single combat and was celebrated on only
a handful of occasions.
527
glossary
Subura: The valley between the Viminal and Esquiline hills was
notorious for its narrow streets and slum housing. Caesar lived in this
region until he became Pontifex Maximus.
Testudo: The famous tortoise formation in which Roman legionaries
overlapped their long shield to provide protection to the front, sides
and overhead. It was most often used during assaults on fortifications.
Tribuni aerarii: The group registered below the equestrian order in the
census. Relatively little is known about them.
Tribunus militum (military tribune): Six military tribunes were elected
or appointed to each legion, one pair of these men holding command
at any one time.
Tribune of the plebs: Although holding a political office without direct
military responsibilities, the ten tribunes of the plebs elected each year
were able to legislate on any issue. During the later years of the
Republic many ambitious generals, such as Marius and Pompey,
enlisted the aid of tribunes to secure important commands for
themselves.
Triumph: The great celebration granted by the Senate to a successful
general took the form of a procession along the Sacra Via, the
ceremonial main road of Rome, displaying the spoils and captives of
his victory and culminated in the ritual execution of the captured
enemy leader. The commander rode in a chariot, dressed like the
statues of Jupiter, a slave holding a laurel wreath of victory over his
head. The slave was supposed to whisper to the general, reminding him
that he was mortal.
Vexillum: A square flag mounted crossways on a pole, the vexillum was
used to mark a general’s position and was also the standard carried by
a detachment of troops. A general’s vexillum seems usually to have
been red.
528
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Taylor, L. Ross (1941), ‘Caesar’s Early Career’, Classical Philology 36, pp.
113–132.
Taylor, L. Ross (1957), ‘The Rise of Julius Caesar’, Greece and Rome 4,
pp. 10–18.
Taylor, L. Ross (1968), ‘The Dating of Major Legislation and Elections in
Caesar’s First Consulship’, Historia 17, pp. 173–193.
Tchernia, A. (1983), ‘Italian Wine in Gaul at the End of the Republic’, in
Garnsey, P., Hopkins, K., & Whittaker, C. (eds.), Trade in the Ancient
Economy, pp. 87–104.
Treggiari, S. (1991), ‘Divorce Roman Style: How Easy and Frequent was
it?’ in B. Rawson (ed.), Marriage, Divorce and Children in Ancient
Rome, pp. 131–146.
Tyrrell, W. (1972) ‘Labienus’ Departure from Caesar in January 49 BC’,
Historia 21, pp. 424–440.
Yakobson, A. (1992), ‘Petitio et Largitio: Popular Participation in the
Centuriate Assembly of the Late Republic’, Journal of Roman Studies
82, pp. 32–52.
533
Abbreviations
Ampelius, lib. mem = Lucius Ampelius, Liber memorialis.
Appian, BC = Appian, Civil Wars.
Appian, Bell. Hisp. = Appian, Spanish Wars.
Broughton, MRR 2 = Broughton, T., & Patterson, M., The Magistrates
of the Roman Republic, Volume 2 (1951).
Caesar, BC = Caesar, The Civil Wars.
Caesar, BG = Caesar, The Gallic Wars.
CAH2 IX = Crook, J., Lintott, A., & E. Rawson (eds.), The Cambridge
Ancient History 2nd edn,Volume IX: The Last Age of the Roman
Republic, 146–43 BC (1994).
Cicero, ad Att. = Cicero, Letters to Atticus.
Cicero, ad Fam. = Cicero, Letters to his friends.
Cicero, ad Quintum Fratrem = Cicero, Letters to his Brother Quintus.
Cicero, Cat. = Cicero, Catilinarian Orations.
Cicero, de Sen. = Cicero, de Senectute.
Cicero, Verr. = Cicero, Verrine Orations.
CIL = Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum.
Comp. Nic. = Fragment of Nicolaus of Damascus, History.
de vir. Ill. = the anonymous de viris illustribus.
Dio = Cassius Dio, Roman History.
Gellius, NA = Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights.
ILLRP = Degrassi, A. (ed.) (1963–1965), Inscriptiones Latinae Liberae Rei
Republicae.
ILS = Dessau, H. (1892–1916), Incriptiones Latinae Selectae.
JRS = Journal of Roman Studies.
Justin = Justinus, Epitome.
Livy, Pers. = Livy, Periochae
Pliny the Elder, NH = Pliny the Elder, Natural History.
Pliny the Younger, Epistulae = Pliny the Younger, Letters.
Quintilian = Quintilian, Training in Oratory.
Sallust, Bell. Cat. = Sallust, The Catilinarian War.
Serv. = Servius.
Strabo, Geog. = Strabo, Geography.
Valerius Maximus = Valerius Maximus, Memorable Doings and Sayings.
Velleius Paterculus = Velleius Paterculus, Roman History.
534
Notes
Introduction
1 M. Booth, The Doctor, the Detective and Arthur Conan Doyle (1997) p.204.
I Caesar’s World
1 Velleius Paterculus, History of Rome 2. 1. 1 (Loeb translation by F. Shipley
(1924), pp. 47–49).
2 Suetonius, Caesar 77.
3 Polybius, 6. 11. 1–18. 8, 43. 1–57. 9 for his description and analysis of the Roman
Republic, with F. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius, 1 (1970), pp.
663–746. A detailed recent discussion of the topic can be found in A. Lintott, The
Constitution of the Roman Republic (1999).
4 For a description of these campaigns see A. Goldsworthy, In the Name of Rome
(2003), pp. 126–136.
5 For Saturninus and Glaucia see Appian, BC 1. 28–33, Plutarch, Marius 28–30.
6 Suetonius, Caesar 77.
7 Valerius Maximus 3. 7. 8.
8 On population and the problems of calculating it with precision see N. Purcell,
‘The City of Rome and the Plebs Urbana in the Late Republic’, in CAH2 IX, pp.
644–688, esp. 648–656, and also K. Hopkins, Conquerors and Slaves (1978), pp.
96–98. On the importance of the Forum as the physical setting for Roman public
life see F. Millar, The Crowd in Rome in the Late Republic (1998), esp. pp. 13–48.
9 Some of the most influential discussions of Roman imperialism include E.
Badian, Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic (1968), W. Harris, War and
Imperialism in Republican Rome, 327–70 BC (1979), and Hopkins (1978), esp.
1–98.
10 See E. Badian, Publicans and Sinners (1972).
11 See in particular Hopkins (1978), passim.
12 For the careers of the Gracchi see D. Stockton, The Gracchi (1979). The principal
sources are Plutarch, Tiberius Gracchus and Caius Gracchus, and Appian, BC 1.
8–27; for the story of Caius’ head see Plutarch, Caius Gracchus 17.
13 For a detailed account of Marius’ career see R. Evans, Gaius Marius: A Political
Biography (1994).
535
Notes
536
II Caesar’s childhood
1 Velleius Paterculus 2. 41. 1.
2 Suetonius, Caesar 1. 3.
3 For a general survey of the significance of Roman names see B. Salway, ‘What’s in
a Name? A Survey of Roman Onomastic Practice from 700 BC – AD 700’, JRS 84
(1994), pp. 124–145, esp. 124–131.
4 For stories about the origin of the name see Historia Augusta, Aelius Verus 2; for
a discussion of Caesar’s family see M. Gelzer, Caesar (1968), p. 19, C. Meier,
Caesar (1996), pp. 51–55, and E. Gruen, The Last Generation of the Roman
Republic (1974), pp. 75–76.
5 Suetonius Caesar 6. 1; for uncertainty over Aeneas and his son see Livy 1. 3.
6 Plutarch, Tiberius Gracchus 1.
7 Historia Augusta, Aelius Verus 2.
8 B. Rawson, Children and Childhood in Roman Italy (2003), esp. pp. 99–113; on
the ancients’ knowledge of Caesarean section see p. 99 with references. See also
the collection of papers in B. Rawson (ed.), Marriage, Divorce and Children in
Ancient Rome (1991).
9 Plutarch, Cato the Elder 20. 3. For a more detailed discussion of this topic see K.
Bradley, ‘Wet-nursing at Rome: A Study in Social Relations’, in B. Rawson, The
Family in Ancient Rome (1986), pp. 201–229.
10 Tacitus, Dialogues 28. 6 (Loeb translation by Sir W. Peterson, revised M.
Winterbottom (1970), p. 307).
11 Plutarch, Coriolanus 33–36, Livy 2. 40.
12 See H. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity (1956), pp. 229–291, A.
Gwynn, Roman Education: From Cicero to Guintilian (1926), esp. 1–32; Cicero,
de Re Publica 4. 3.
13 Cicero, Orator 120.
14 There is a useful discussion of the client system in R. Saller, Personal Patronage in
the Early Empire (1982); for boys accompanying fathers as they went about their
business see Gellius, NA 1. 23. 4, Pliny, Epistulae 8. 14. 4–5, and on importance of
father’s influence from the age of seven see Quintilian 2. 2. 4, and comments in
Marrou (1956), pp. 231–233.
15 Rawson (2003), pp. 153–157; Suetonius, Grammaticis et rhetoribus 7 for Gnipho;
Suetonius Caesar 56. 7 for Caesar’s early works.
16 Cicero, Brutus 305, Suetonius, Caesar 55. 2.
17 Plutarch, Caesar 17, Suetonius, Caesar 57, 61.
18 Plutarch, Marius 30, 32.
19 On the question of the allies see E. Gabba, The Roman Republic, the Army and
the Allies (trans. P. Cuff) (1976), P. Brunt, Social Conflicts in the Roman Republic
(1971), pp. 101–104, A. Sherwin-White, The Roman Citizenship (1973),
pp. 119–149.
20 The fullest ancient account of the war is Appian, BC 1. 34–53, but see also
Velleius Paterculus 2. 13. 117. 3; for a modern survey see E. Gabba, ‘Rome and
Italy: The Social War’, in CAH2 (1994), pp. 104–128.
21 Appian, BC 1. 4046, Plutarch, Marius 33, Sulla 6.
22 For Sulla’s career see A. Keaveney, Sulla: The Last Republican (1982), 1–63.
Notes
537
23 Plutarch, Marius 34–35, Sulla 7–8, Appian BC 1. 55–57, and Keaveney (1982), pp.
56–77.
24 Plutarch, Sulla 9–10, Marius 35–40, Appian, BC 1. 57–59.
25 Appian, BC 1. 63–75; Plutarch, Marius 41–46, Sulla 22, Pompey 3, Velleius
Paterculus 2. 20. 1–23.3, and also R. Seager, Pompey (2002), pp. 25–29.
III The First Dictator
1 Plutarch, Sulla 31 (translation by R. Waterfield in Plutarch: Roman Lives (1999),
p. 210).
2 For the importance of the Liberalia festival see Ovid, Fasti 3. 771–788; on the
sacrifice to Iuventus see Dionysius of Halicarnassus 4. 15. 5; on the ceremonies
associated with adopting the toga virilis in general see B. Rawson, Children and
Childhood in Roman Italy (2003), pp. 142–144.
3 Suetonius, Caesar 1.1; for the sudden death of Caesar’s father see Pliny, Natural
History 7. 181; on assuming the toga virilis see H. Marrou, A History of
Education in Antiquity (1956), p. 233, A. Gwynn, Roman Education: From
Cicero to Quintilian (1926), 16, and B. Rawson, ‘The Roman Family’, in B.
Rawson (ed.), The Family in Ancient Rome (1986), pp. 1–57, 41.
4 For restrictions on the Flamen Dialis see Gellius, NA 10. 15.
5 Velleius Paterculus, 2. 22. 2, Appian, BC 1. 74. On Merula and Caesar’s
nomination for the flaminate see L. Ross Taylor, ‘Caesar’s Early Career’, in
Classical Philology 36 (1941), pp. 113–132, esp. pp. 114–116.
6 For confarreatio see S. Treggiari, Roman Marriage: Iusti Coniuges from the Time
of Cicero to the Time of Ulpian (1991), 21–24; on the name and connection with
far see Gaius 1. 112, Pliny, NH 18. 10, Festus 78L; for the rituals see Servius, Ad
G. 1. 31.
7 Velleius Paterculus 2. 22. 2 claims that Caesar was made Flamen Dialis, but
Suetonius explicitly says that he was only ‘nominated’ (destinatus), Suetonius,
Caesar 1. 1. See M. Gelzer, Caesar (1968), pp. 19–21, and Taylor (1941), pp.
115–116. Tacitus, Annals 3. 58 and Dio 54. 36. 1 both state expressly that Merula
was the last Flamen Dialis.
8 For a useful discussion of these years see CAH2 IX (1994), pp. 173–187; on the
behaviour of Cicero and his mentors during these years see T. Mitchell, Cicero:
The Ascending Years (1979), pp. 81–92.
9 Appian, BC 1. 76–77.
10 Plutarch, Sulla 2 for his appearance, failure to win the praetorship 5, and for the
epitaph 38; in general see A. Keaveney, Sulla: The Last Republican (1982). For the
single testicle see Arrius Menander Bk. 1 On Military Affairs. Keaveney (1982), p.
11 argues that the story was probably derived from a bawdy song invented by his
soldiers.
11 On Sulla’s good fortune see Keaveney (1982), pp. 40–41.
12 Appian, BC 1. 78–80, Plutarch, Pompey 5.
13 For the Civil War see Keaveney (1982), pp. 129–147.
14 Plutarch, Sulla 27–32, Appian, BC 1. 81–96.
15 Plutarch, Sulla 31.
538
index
16 On the proscriptions see Keaveney (1982), pp. 148–168, Appian, BC 1. 95, Velleius
Paterculus 2. 28. 3–4, and Plutarch, Sulla 31, which includes the anecdote about
the Alban estate.
17 Keaveney (1982), pp. 160–203. For the execution of Ofella see Plutarch, Sulla 33.
18 Taylor (1941), p. 116.
19 See Suetonius, Caesar 1. 1–3, Plutarch, Caesar 1, and also L. Ross Taylor, ‘The
Rise of Julius Caesar’, Greece and Rome 4 (1957), pp. 10–18, esp. 11–12, and
Taylor (1941), p. 116.
20 Suetonius, Caesar 74.
21 Suetonius, Caesar 1.
22 Plutarch, Sulla 1. 104, Suetonius, Caesar 77.
23 Keaveney (1982), pp. 204–213.
IV The Young Caesar
1 Cicero, Brutus 290 (Loeb translation by G. Hendrickson (1939), p. 253).
2 For Suetonius’ description of Caesar see Caesar 45. 1; Plutarch’s comments are in
Caesar 17; Caesar’s peculiar dress and Sulla’s comments are in Suetonius, Caesar
45. 3.
3 Suetonius, Caesar 45. 2.
4 For Cicero’s house see Velleius Paterculus 2. 14, and E. Rawson, ‘The Ciceronian
Aristocracy and its properties’, in M. I. Finley (ed.), Studies in Roman Property
(1976), pp. 85–102, esp. 86; for the synagogue in the Subura, see Corpus
Inscriptionum Judaicarum 2. 380.
5 Velleius Paterculus 2. 14. 3.
6 Suetonius, Caesar 46–47.
7 Suetonius, Caesar 2.
8 See L. Ross Taylor, ‘The rise of Julius Caesar’, Greece and Rome 4 (1957), pp.
10–18, and M. Gelzer, Caesar (1968), p. 22. On the corona civica see Gellius, NA
5. 6. 13–14, Pliny, NH 16. 12–13, and discussion in V. Maxfield, The Military
Decorations of the Roman Army (1981), pp.70–74, 119–120.
9 Suetonius, Caesar 2 and 49. 1–4, 52. 3.
10 Plutarch, Marius 13–14, Polybius 6. 37; on Cato as censor see Plutarch, Cato the
Elder 17.
11 Suetonius, Caesar 22 and 49. 1–4.
12 For Caesar’s public oath see Dio 43. 20. 4; Catullus 54, cf. Suetonius, Caesar 73.
13 For Cato see Plutarch, Cato the Elder 24; Plutarch, Crassus 5; for the Germans see
Caesar, BG 6. 21. For a survey of Roman attitudes see P. Grimal, Love in Ancient
Rome (trans. A. Train) (1986).
14 Suetonius, Caesar 3.
15 Catullus 10; Cicero, Verr. 1. 40.
16 Cicero, Brutus 317.
17 See Suetonius, Caesar 4. 1, 55, Velleius Paterculus 2. 93. 3, and Gelzer (1968), pp.
22–3; on provincial administration in general see A. Lintott’s Imperium
Romanum: Politics and Administration (1993); for Caesar’s high-pitched delivery
see Suetonius, Caesar 55. 2.
Notes
539
18 Plutarch, Caesar 4.
19 Cicero, Brutus 316.
20 For the pirate problem see Appian, Mithridatic Wars 91–93, Plutarch, Pompey
24–5; on Caesar’s captivity see Suetonius, Caesar 4. 2, Plutarch, Caesar 2.
21 Plutarch, Caesar 2 (Loeb translation by B. Perrin (1919), p. 445, slightly amended).
22 For the pirates’ throats being cut see Suetonius, Caesar 74.
23 Suetonius, Caesar 4. 2.
24 L. Ross Taylor, ‘Caesar’s Early Career’, Classical Philology 36 (1941), pp.
113–132, esp. p.117–118.
25 For the journey back to Rome see Velleius Paterculus 2. 93. 2; for the trial see E.
Gruen, The Last Generation of the Roman Republic (1974), p. 528; for Cicero’s
comment see Suetonius, Caesar 49. 3.
26 Taylor (1941), pp. 120-122; for the Slave War see Plutarch, Crassus 8-11, Appian,
BC 1. 116-121.
27 For Crassus and Sulla see Plutarch, Crassus 6.
28 Suetonius, Caesar 5.
V Candidate
1 Plutarch, Caesar 5.
2 For the birth of Julia see M. Gelzer, Caesar (1968), p. 21, C. Meier, Caesar (1996),
p. 105, and P. Grimal, Love in Ancient Rome (1986), p. 222.
3 Grimal (1986), pp. 112–115.
4 For the story of Praecia and Lucullus see Plutarch, Lucullus 6. 2–4; on Cethegus’
influence see Cicero, Brutus 178; for the story of Pompey, Geminius and Flora see
Plutarch, Pompey 2.
5 For Cytheris see Cicero, ad Fam. 9. 26; Cicero ad Att. 10. 10; Servius, on E10; de
vir. Ill. 82. 2. Cicero’s distaste became public in the Philippics 2. 58, 69, 77.
6 Suetonius, Caesar 47, 50. 1–52.
7 Suetonius, Caesar 50. 2, Plutarch, Caesar 46, 62, Brutus 5, Cicero, ad Att. 15. 11;
see also R. Syme, The Roman Revolution (1939), pp. 23–24, 116; on Lucullus’
divorce of Servilia’s sister Servilia see Plutarch, Lucullus 38.
8 Grimal (1986), pp. 226–237, S. Treggiari, Roman Marriage (1991), esp. pp.
105–106, 232–238, 253–261, 264, 270–275, and 299–319.
9 Sallust, Bell Cat. 25.
10 Plutarch, Pompey 55 (translation by R. Waterfield in Plutarch: Roman Lives
(1999), p. 273).
11 For a survey of Sertorius’ career see A. Goldsworthy, In the Name of Rome
(2003), pp. 137–151.
12 For Sulla’s legislation see A. Keaveney, Sulla: The Last Republican (1982),
pp.169–189.
13 For the ‘young executioner’ see Valerius Maximus 6. 2. 8; for the killing of
Brutus’ father see Plutarch, Brutus 4; for Pompey’s early career see R. Seager,
Pompey the Great (2002), pp. 20–39.
14 On the impact of military failure on a man’s career see N. Rosenstein,
Imperatores Victi (1993), passim.
Notes
540
15 For Pompey and the censors see Plutarch, Pompey 22; for Crassus’ feasting see
Plutarch, Crassus 2. 2, 12. 3; Comp. Nic. Crassus 1. 4; A. Ward, Marcus Crassus
and the Late Roman Republic (1977), pp. 101–2.
16 Suetonius, Caesar 5, Gellius, NA 13. 3. 5; on suggestions that he played a wider
role in the events of 70 BC see the discussion in Ward (1977), pp. 105–111.
17 For discussions of elections see L. Ross Taylor, Party Politics in the Age of Caesar
(1949), esp. pp. 50–75, and Roman Voting Assemblies: From the Hannibalic War
to the Dictatorship of Caesar (1966), esp. pp. 78–106, A. Lintott, ‘Electoral
Bribery in the Roman Republic’, JRS 80 (1990), pp. 1–16, F. Millar, The Crowd in
Rome in the Late Republic (1998), H. Mouritsen, Plebs and Politics in the Late
Roman Republic (2001), esp. pp. 63–89, A. Yakobson, ‘Petitio et Largitio: Popular
Participation in the Centuriate Assembly of the Late Republic’, JRS 82 (1992), pp.
32–52; inscriptions on tombs, see ILS 8205–8207.
18 See Taylor (1966), pp. 78–83, A. Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman
Republic (1999), pp. 43–49.
19 On the quaestorship see Lintott (1999), pp. 133–137; for the suggestion that
winners of the corona civica were enrolled in the Senate see L. Ross Taylor, ‘The
Rise of Caesar’, Greece and Rome 4 (1957), pp. 10–18, esp. 12–13.
20 Polybius, 6. 54. 1–2.
21 Suetonius, Caesar 6. 1, Plutarch, Caesar 5; for Cicero’s public and private attitude
to Marius see the discussion in T. Mitchell, Cicero: The Ascending Years (1979),
pp. 45–51.
22 Spanish War 42, Suetonius, Caesar 7. 1–2, Velleius Paterculus 2. 43. 4, and
comments in Gelzer (1968), p. 32; for his reaction to bust of Alexander and his
disturbing dream see Plutarch, Caesar 11, Suetonius, Caesar 7. 1–2, and Dio 37.
52. 2; for Cicero’s arrival back from his own quaestorship see pro Planco 64–66.
23 Suetonius, Caesar 8.
24 Suetonius, Caesar 6. 2, Plutarch, Caesar 5; for discussion of marriage ceremony
see S. Treggiari, Roman Marriage (1991), pp. 161–180.
25 Dio 36. 20. 1–36, Plutarch, Pompey 25–26; for a detailed discussion of the
introduction of the Lex Gabinia see P. Greenhalgh, Pompey: The Roman
Alexander (1980), pp. 72–90.
26 On Caesar’s support for the Lex Gabinia see Plutarch, Pompey 25, and also T.
Rice Holmes, The Roman Republic, 1 (1928), pp. 170–173; for the campaign
against the pirates see Appian, Mithridatic Wars 91–93, Plutarch, Pompey 26–28.
27 For Lucullus’ career see A. Keaveney, Lucullus:A Life (1992), esp. 75–128 for his
campaigns in the east; on his replacement see Plutarch, Pompey 30–31, Lucullus
36.
28 Dio 36. 43. 2–3 for Caesar’s support; pro Lege Manilia, Cicero’s speech in favour
of the Lex Manilia has survived.
29 Plutarch, Caesar 5–6, Suetonius, Caesar 10–11, Velleius Paterculus 2. 43. 4; on the
aedileship see Lintott (1999), pp. 129–133; on Caesar’s career see Gelzer (1968),
pp. 37–39, L. Ross Taylor, ‘Caesar’s Early Career’, Classical Philology 36 (1941),
pp. 113–132, esp. 125– 131, and (1957), pp. 14–15.
30 Suetonius, Caesar 10. 1.
31 Dio 37. 8. 1–2, Pliny, NH 33. 53.
32 Plutarch, Caesar 5.
Notes
541
33 Plutarch, Caesar 6, Suetonius, Caesar 11, Velleius Paterculus 2. 43. 3–4, and see also
R. Evans, Gaius Marius: A Political Biography (1994), p. 4, who suggests that the
monuments are unlikely to have been the originals but copies.
VI Conspiracy
1 Sallust, Bell. Cat. 12. 1–2.
2 Dio 36. 44. 3–5, Cicero, pro Sulla 14–17, Sallust, Bell. Cat. 18.
3 See Suetonius, Caesar 9, Sallust, Bell. Cat. 17–19. For discussions of the ‘First
Catilinarian conspiracy’ see E. Salmon, ‘Catiline, Crassus, and Caesar’, American
Journal of Philology 56 (1935), pp. 302–316, esp. 302–306; E. Hardy, The
Catilinarian Conspiracy in its Context: A Re-study of the Evidence (1924), pp.
12–20; T. Rice Holmes, The Roman Republic, 1 (1928), pp. 234–235; D. Stockton,
Cicero (1971), pp. 77–78; and M. Gelzer, Caesar (1968), pp. 38–39.
4 On the struggle between Crassus and Pompey see A. Ward, Marcus Crassus and
the Late Roman Republic (1977), pp. 128–168; Rice Holmes (1928), pp. 221–283,
esp. 242–249. For imperial views of Pompey’s return see Velleius Paterculus 2. 40.
2–3, Plutarch, Pompey 43, Dio 37. 20. 5–6
5 See Plutarch, Crassus 2–3, and Ward (1977), pp. 46–57; for the Licinia incident see
Plutarch, Crassus 1, with sceptical comments in Ward (1977), 74–75.
6 Cicero, Brutus 233.
7 Plutarch, Crassus 3, Cicero, de Officiis 1. 25, Sallust, Bell. Cat.48.5–7. For ‘Straw
on his horns’ and possible pun see Ward (1977), pp. 78.
8 Plutarch, Crassus 13, Suetonius, Caesar 11, Dio 37. 9. 3–4; Ward (1977), pp.
128–135, Gelzer (1968), pp. 39–41.
9 Plutarch, Cato the Younger 16–18, Suetonius, Caesar 11, Dio 37. 10. 1–3.
10 Suetonius, Caesar 74. On Catiline see Asconius 84C; on Ofella see Plutarch, Sulla 33.
11 Sallust, Bell. Cat.5, 14–17, Plutarch, Cicero 10, Ward (1977), p. 136, 145, Rice
Holmes (1928), p. 241, Stockton (1971), p. 79–81, 97, 100.
12 For Cato the Elder see Plutarch, Cato the Elder, and A. Astin, Cato the Censor
(1978). On Cato see Plutarch, Cato the Younger, esp. 1, 5–7, 9, 24–25.
13 See Stockton (1971), esp. 71–81, E. Rawson, Cicero (1975), T. Mitchell, Cicero:
The Ascending Years (1979), esp. p. 93 ff. The inscription that mentions a Lucius
Sergius, normally identified as Catiline, on Pompeius Strabo’s staff is ILS
8888/ILLRP 515.
14 For an excellent survey of these years see T. Wiseman, ‘The Senate and the
Populares, 69–60 BC’, in CAH2 IX (1994), pp. 327–367; on the Rullan land bill see
Gelzer (1968), pp. 42–45, Stockton (1971), pp. 84–91, Rice Holmes (1928), pp.
242–249, Ward (1977), pp. 152–162.
15 For Piso see Sallust, Bell. Cat. 49. 2, Cicero, pro Flacco 98; for Juba see Suetonius,
Caesar 71.
16 For Honours to Pompey see Dio 37. 21. 4. For a discussion of Labienus’ origins see
R. Syme, ‘The Allegiance of Labienus’, JRS 28 (1938), pp. 424–440.
17 For The perduellio see trial Dio 37. 26. 1–28. 4, Suetonius, Caesar 12, Cicero, Pro
Rabirio perduellionis, with W. Tyrrell, A Legal and Historical Commentary to
Cicero’s Oratio Pro Rabirio Perduellionis (1978); the anonymous, de viribus
illustribus contains the claim that Rabirius paraded Saturninus’ head.
Notes
542
18 See L. Ross Taylor, Roman Voting Assemblies: From the Hannibalic War to the
Dictatorship of Caesar (1966), p. 16.
19 For the election to Pontifex Maximus see Suetonius, Caesar 13, Plutarch, Caesar
7, Dio 37. 37. 1–3, Velleius Paterculus 2. 43. 3.
20 For a useful discussion of the Regia and its history see T. Cornell, The Beginnings
of Rome (1995), pp. 239–241.
21 Sallust, Bell. Cat. 23–24, Cicero, pro Murena 51–58, Dio 37. 29. 1–30. 1, Plutarch,
Cato the Younger 21. 2–6.
22 Sallust, Bell. Cat. 22. 1–4, 26. 1–31. 3.
23 Sallust, Bell. Cat. 31. 4–48. 2, Rice Holmes (1928), pp. 259–272, Stockton (1971),
pp. 84–109.
VII Scandal
1 Cicero, In Catilinam 3. 1–2 (Loeb translation by C. MacDonald (1977), p. 101).
2 Quote on canvassing with Catiline, Cicero, ad Att. 1. 2.
3 Cicero, In Catilinam 2. 22 (Loeb translation by C. MacDonald (1977), p. 91).
4 Plutarch, Caesar 4. 4 (Loeb translation by B. Perrin (1919), p. 451).
5 Sallust, Bell. Cat. 48. 5.
6 Sallust, Bell. Cat. 48. 9; Plutarch, Crassus 13.
7 Cicero, pro Murena, and Plutarch, Cato the Younger 21. 3–6.
8 Sallust, Bell. Cat. 49. 1–4, Plutarch, Crassus 13, and Cicero 20. See also D.
Stockton, Cicero (1971), pp. 18–19.
9 Sallust, Bell. Cat. 44–47, Plutarch, Cicero 19, Dio 37. 34. 1–4, Appian, BC 2. 4–5.
10 On the debate in general see Sallust, Bell. Cat. 50. 3–53. 1; For Catiline’s last
appearance in the Senate see Cicero, Cat.1. 16.
11 For Appius Claudius Caecus see Cicero, de Sen.16, Brutus 61.
12 Sallust, Bell. Cat. 51. 1–3.
13 Sallust, Bell. Cat. 51. 33.
14 Sallust, Bell. Cat. 51. 20.
15 For Caesar’s speech see Sallust, Bell. Cat. 51.
16 For discussion of Caesar’s view see Gelzer (1968), pp. 50–52, and C. Meier,
Caesar (1996), pp. 170–172.
17 See Plutarch, Cicero 20–21, Caesar 7–8, Suetonius, Caesar 14, and Appian, BC 2.
5.
18 Cicero, Cat. 4. 3 (Loeb translation by C. MacDonald (1977), p. 137).
19 On Caesar see Cicero, Cat. 4. 9–10, for Crassus, 4. 10, for scenes of horror, 4. 12.
20 Sallust, Bell. Cat. 52. 12.
21 Sallust, Bell. Cat. 52. 17–18, 24–25.
22 Plutarch, Brutus 5 and Cato the Younger 24. 1–2; For Cicero’s reaction to Brutus’
version of the debate see Cicero, ad Att. 12. 21. 1.
23 Sallust, Bell. Cat. 55. 1–6, Plutarch, Cicero 22 and Caesar 8, Dio 37. 36. 1–4,
Ampelius, lib. mem. 31; Sallust placed the threat to Caesar earlier see Bell. Cat.
49. 4.
24 Cicero, ad Fam. 5. 2. 7–8.
25 Suetonius, Caesar 15, Dio 37. 44. 1–3.
Notes
543
26 Dio 37. 43. 1–4, Plutarch, Cato the Younger 26. 1–29. 2.
27 Suetonius, Caesar 16.
28 On Catiline’s death see Sallust, Bell. Cat. 60. 7, 61. 4; on the informers see
Suetonius, Caesar 17.
29 Plutarch, Caesar 9–10.
30 Cicero, ad Att. 1. 12. 3, 1. 13. 3, Suetonius, Caesar 74. 2, Plutarch, Caesar 10. For
divorce in general see S. Treggiari, Roman Marriage (1991), pp. 435–482 and
‘Divorce Roman Style: How Easy and Frequent Was It?’ in B. Rawson (ed.),
Marriage, Divorce and Children in Ancient Rome (1991), pp. 131–146.
31 See Cicero, ad Att. 1. 13. 3, and Catulus in Cicero, ad Att. 1. 16, Dio 37. 50. 3–4.
32 Plutarch, Caesar 11, Suetonius, Caesar 18, Cicero, Pro Balbo 28.
33 See Suetonius, Caesar 18, Appian, Bell. Hisp. 102, Plutarch, Caesar 12, Dio 37.
52. 1–53. 4. For a discussion of the situation in Spain and Caesar’s operations see
S. Dyson, The Creation of the Roman Frontier (1985), pp. 235–236.
34 Spanish War 42. 2–3, Cicero, pro Balbo 19, 23, 28, 63 and 43; for the hint at
human sacrifice see Strabo, Geog. 3. 5. 3 and Rice Holmes The Roman Republic,
1 (1928), pp. 302–8.
35 Plutarch, Caesar 11.
VIII Consul
1 Sallust, Bell. Cat. 54. 4.
2 Cicero, ad Att. 2. 5.
3 Pliny, NH 7. 97, Plutarch, Pompey 45, Dio 37. 21. 1–4, Appian, Mithridatic Wars,
116–117.
4 For the eastern wars see P. Greenhalgh, Pompey:The Roman Alexander (1980),
and A. Goldsworthy, In the Name of Rome (2003), ch. 7, esp. pp. 164–179.
5 Plutarch, Pompey 42–46, Cato the Younger 30, Velleius Paterculus 2. 40. 3; R.
Seager, Pompey the Great (2002), pp. 75–76; on Crassus see Plutarch, Pompey 43,
and A. Ward, Marcus Crassus and the Late Roman Republic (1977), pp. 193–199.
6 Cicero, ad Att. 1. 13; see also ad Att. 1. 14 on Crassus.
7 Cicero, ad Att. 1. 13, 12; Seager (2002), pp. 77–79.
8 Cicero, ad Att. 1. 12, Plutarch, Pompey 42, Cato the Younger 30. 1–5, Suetonius,
Caesar 50. 1; for Cicero’s efforts to placate Metellus Celer in 62 BC see Cicero, ad
Fam. 5. 1, 2.
9 Dio 37. 49. 1–4, Plutarch, Pompey 44, Cato the Younger 30. 5, Cicero, ad Att. 1.
18, 19.
10 Cicero, ad Att. 2. 1.
11 Horace, Odes 2. 1. 1; for a perceptive overview of these years see P. Wiseman,
‘The Senate and the Populares, 69–60 BC’, in CAH2 IX (1994), pp. 327–367, esp.
pp. 358–367.
12 Cicero, ad Att. 2. 1, and 1. 17 for December 61 talk of alliance between Caesar
and Lucceius. See M. Gelzer, Caesar (1968), p. 60, fn. 1, plausibly interpreting
Suetonius’ words literally to indicate that Caesar divorced Pompeia by letter.
13 Appian, BC 2. 8, Plutarch, Cato the Younger 31. 2–3, Dio 37. 54. 1–2.
Notes
544
14 Suetonius, Caesar 19. 2; for the suggestion that this was a means of keeping the
consuls in reserve see Seager (2002), p. 84; on personal hatreds and enemies see D.
Epstein, Personal Enmity in Roman Politics 218–43 BC (1978).
15 See L. Ross Taylor, Roman Voting Assemblies:From the Hannibalic War to the
Dictatorship of Caesar (1966), esp. pp. 84–106.
16 See Taylor (1966), pp. 54–55, H. Mouritsen, Plebs and Party Politics in the Late
Roman Republic (2001), pp. 27–32; on the population of Rome at this time see N.
Purcell, ‘The City of Rome and the plebs urbana in the Late Republic’, in CAH2
IX (1994), pp.644–688.
17 Suetonius, Caesar 19. 1; Cicero, ad Att. 1. 1; on the importance of the Italian vote
see L. Ross Taylor, Party Politics in the Age of Caesar (1949), pp. 57–59.
18 Cicero, ad Att. 2. 3.
19 Suetonius, Caesar 19.
20 Suetonius, Caesar 19. 2, Dio 37. 56–58, Appian, BC 2. 9; see also Seager (2002),
pp. 82–85, Ward (1977), pp. 210–216, Gelzer (1968), pp. 67–69, C. Meier, Caesar
(1996), pp. 182–189.
21 Plutarch, Caesar 13, Pompey 47; on oaths see Livy, Pers. 103, Appian, BC 2. 9, and
Pliny, Epistulae 10. 96; for a case of two enemies each canvassing for the same
candidate see Cicero, ad Att. 2. 1.
22 Suetonius, Caesar 20. 1, cf. Plutarch, Cato the Younger 23. 3.
23 Dio 38. 1. 1–7, Suetonius, Caesar 20. 1; on the chronology of this year see L. Ross
Taylor, ‘The Dating of Major Legislation and Elections in Caesar’s First
Consulship’, Historia 17 (1968), pp. 173–193; see also Gelzer (1968), pp. 71–74,
Meier (1996), pp. 207–213, Seager (2002), pp. 86–87; on the five ‘inner’
commissioners see Cicero, ad Att. 2. 7.
24 Dio 38. 2. 1–3. 3 Suetonius, Caesar 20. 4 gives a slightly different version
apparently dating Cato’s arrest to later in the year. Plutarch, Cato the Younger 33.
1–2 also places this incident later; on Petreius’ military experience see Sallust,
Bell. Cat. 59. 6.
25 Dio 38. 4. 1–3.
26 Dio 38. 4. 4–5. 5, Plutarch, Pompey 47; for the date of the vote see Taylor (1968),
pp. 179–181.
27 Dio 38. 6. 1–3, Plutarch, Cato the Younger 32. 2; see Taylor (1969), p. 179 on
Bibulus’ intentions.
28 Dio 38. 6. 4–7. 2 , Appian, BC 2. 11, Plutarch, Cato the Younger 32. 2–6,
Suetonius, Caesar 20. 1.
29 Suetonius, Caesar 20. 2, Dio 38. 8. 2; see also Taylor (1968), pp. 177–179.
30 Suetonius, Caesar 20. 3–4, 54. 3, Dio 38. 7. 4–6, Cicero, In Vatinium 29, 38; see
Gelzer (1968), pp. 75–6, Seager (2002), p. 88; for some sense of Vatinius’ character
see his letters to Cicero, ad Fam. 5. 9, 10 and 10A; on Caesar’s law regulating
governors see T. Rice Holmes, The Roman Republic, 1 (1928), p. 319, and Cicero,
pro Sestio 64, 135, In Pisonem 16, 37, In Vatinium 12, 29, ad Att. 5. 10. 2.
31 Suetonius, Caesar 21, 50. 1–2, and on his fondness for pearls 47, Plutarch,
Pompey 47–48, Caesar 14, Dio 38. 9. 1.
32 Dio 38. 7. 3, Suetonius, Caesar 20. 3, Cicero, ad Att. 2. 15, 16, 17 and 18.
33 Dio 38. 12. 1–3, Cicero, de Domo 41, ad Att. 8. 3, de provinciis consularibus 42,
Suetonius, Caesar 20. 4, Plutarch, Caesar 14; see also Gelzer (1968), pp. 76–78.
Notes
545
34 Cicero, ad Att. 2. 9.
35 Cicero, ad Att. 2. 16 and 17; on C. Cato see ad Quintum Fratrem 1. 2. 5.
36 Cicero, ad Att. 2. 19.
37 Cicero, ad Att. 2. 21, 22 and 23.
38 Cicero, ad Att. 2. 24.
39 Cicero, ad Att. 2. 24, In Vatinium 24–26, pro Sestio 132, Dio 38. 9. 2–10. 1,
Suetonius, Caesar 20. 5, Appian, BC 2. 12–13, Plutarch, Lucullus 42. 7–8; for
Caesar as the prime mover behind these events see Rice Holmes (1928), pp.
323–324 and Gelzer (1968), pp. 90–92, Meier (1996), p. 221; for Clodius see
Seager (2002), pp. 98–99; for Pompey’s involvement see Ward (1977), pp. 236–241,
Gruen, The Last Generation of the Roman Republic (1974), pp. 95–96; for a more
complex interpretation and the suggestion that there may actually have been a
plot see D. Stockton, Cicero (1971), pp. 183–186.
40 Suetonius, Caesar 23, 73, Scholia Bobiensia on Cicero, pro Sestio 40 and In
Vatinium 15.
41 Suetonius, Caesar 22. 2 (Loeb translation); on Cicero’s fears of civil war see ad
Att. 2. 20, 21 and 22.
IX Gaul
1 Pliny, NH 7. 92.
2 Hirtius from his preface to BG 8.
3 Pliny, NH 7. 92, Appian, BC 2. 150.
4 For Theophanes see Cicero, pro Archia 24; for Caesar’s earlier works see
Suetonius, Caesar 56. 5–7; for the Commentaries in general see the collection of
papers in K. Welch & A. Powell (eds.), Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter:The War
Commentaries as Political Instruments (1998).
5 Cicero, Brutus 262.
6 ‘An orator should avoid a . . .’, see Gellius, NA 1. 10. 4; see also L. Hall, ‘Ratio
and Romanitas in the Bellum Gallicum’, in Welch & Powell (1998), pp. 11–43,
esp. p. 23.
7 For the dating of the Commentaries see M. Gelzer, Caesar (1968), pp. 170–172,
C. Meier, Caesar (1996), pp. 254–264; for the arguments in favour of annual
publication see Welch & Powell (1998), and especially the article by P. Wiseman,
‘The Publication of the De Bello Gallico’, pp. 1–9, and also T. Rice Holmes,
Caesar’s Conquest of Gaul (1911), pp. 202–209 see also Hirtius, BG 8 preface and
Suetonius, Caesar 56. 3–4.
8 Cicero, de Finibus 5. 52; see also Wiseman (1998), esp. pp. 4–7.
9 Suetonius, Caesar 56. 4.
10 Cicero, de provinciis consularibus 3. 5, ad Quintum Fratrem 2. 14–16, 3. 1–9.
11 On Labienus see R. Syme, ‘The Allegiance of Labienus’, JRS 28 (1938), pp.
113–128, esp. p. 120 and W. Tyrrell, ‘Labienus’ Departure from Caesar in January
49 BC’, Historia 21 (1972), pp. 424–440.
12 On Cotta’s book see Cicero, ad Att. 13. 44. 3, cf. Athenaeus 273b and Hall,
(1998), pp. 11–43, esp. p. 25; on the identity of Caesar’s legates see Broughton,
MRR 2, pp. 197–199.
Notes
546
13 Caesar, BG 1. 39; Cicero, ad Att. 2. 18. 3, 19. 5, de provinciis consularibus 41; E.
Gruen, The Last Generation of the Roman Republic (1974), pp. 112–116.
14 For Caesar’s legions see H. Parker, The Roman Legions (1957), pp. 47–71, esp.
55–56. On the army in this period see F. Adcock, The Roman Art of War under
the Republic (1940), P. Brunt, Italian Manpower, 225 BC – AD 14 (1971), P.
Connolly, Greece and Rome at War (1981), M. Feugère (ed.), L’Équipment
Militaire et L’Armement de la République. JRMES 8 (1997), E. Gabba, The
Roman Republic, the Army and the Allies (1976), L. Keppie, The Making of the
Roman Army (1984), Y. Le Bohec, The Imperial Roman Army (1994), J.
Harmand, L’armée et le soldat à Rome de 107 à 50 avant nôtre ère (1967).
15 For an introduction to this question with further references see A. Goldsworthy.
The Roman Army at War, 100 BC – AD 200 (1996), pp. 31–32.
16 For equipment see Goldsworthy (1996), pp. 83–84, 209–219, M. Bishop & J.
Coulston, Roman Military Equipment (1993), Connolly, (1981), and Feugère,
(1997).
17 See D. Saddington, The Development of the Roman Auxiliary Forces from
Caesar to Vespasian (1982); Caesar, BC 1. 39 for numbers of auxiliary cavalry
and infantry.
18 For a discussion of this see C. Goudineau, César et la Gaule (1995), pp. 130–148.
19 Caesar, BG 1. 1, 6. 11–20; for a good survey of Gallic society see N. Roymans,
Tribal Societies in Northern Gaul: An Anthropological Perspective, Cingula 12
(1990), esp. pp. 17–47, and B. Cunliffe, Greeks, Romans and Barbarians: Spheres
of Interaction (1988), esp. pp. 38–58 and 80–105.
20 See M. Todd, The Northern Barbarians (1987), pp. 11–13, The Early Germans
(1992), pp. 8–13, C. M. Wells, The German Policy of Augustus (1972), pp. 14–31,
and most recently the useful survey in P. Wells, The Barbarians Speak: How the
Conquered Peoples Shaped the Roman Empire (1999).
21 For Domitius Ahenobarbus see Suetonius, Nero 2; on exchanging a slave for an
amphora see Diodorus Siculus 5. 26. 3–4; on the relations between Gauls and
Romans and the history of Transalpine Gaul see S. Dyson, The Creation of the
Roman Frontier (1985), pp.126–173; on the wine trade see Cunliffe (1988),
59–105, esp. p. 74, and Roymans (1990), pp. 147–167 and A. Tchernia, ‘Italian
Wine in Gaul at the End of the Republic’, in P. Garnsey, K. Hopkins & C.
Whittaker (eds.), Trade in the Ancient Economy (1983), pp. 87–104.
22 Wells (1999), pp.49–78, Cunliffe (1988), pp. 48–49, 86–87, 96–97, 132–134, Dyson
(1985), pp. 137–139, 154, and C. Goudineau (1995), pp. 141–143.
23 On human sacrifice at Rome see Pliny, NH 30. 12–13; on head-hunting see
Polybius 3. 67, Livy 10. 26, 23. 24, Diodorus Siculus 5. 29. 2–5, M. Green,
Dictionary of Celtic Myth and Legend (1992), pp. 116–118; on human sacrifice in
Germany see Todd (1992), pp. 112–115.
24 Strabo, Geog. 4. 4. 5 (Loeb translation by H. Jones (1923), p. 247).
25 Caesar, BG 6. 15, cf. Strabo, Geog. 4. 4. 2; on Ribemont-sur-Ancre see T. Derks,
Gods, Temples and Ritual Practices: The Transformation of Religious Ideas and
Values in Roman Gaul (1998), p. 48, 234–5.
26 Caesar, BG 1. 18, 31–33; see also Dyson (1985), pp. 169–170, Cunliffe (1988), p.
94, 118.
Notes
547
27 For a more detailed discussion of Gallic armies see Goldsworthy (1996), pp.
53–60.
28 Dyson (1985), pp. 168–171; Caesar, BG 1. 36, 40, 44, Cicero, ad Att. 1. 19, 20.
X Migrants and Mercenaries: The first campaigns, 58 BC
1 Cicero, ad Att. 1. 19.
2 Caesar, BG 1. 6–7, Plutarch, Caesar 17.
3 Caesar, BG 1. 2.
4 Caesar, BG 1. 2–3, 18, cf. C. Goudineau, César et la Gaule (1995), 136–137.
5 Caesar, BG 1. 4, Pliny, NH 2. 170 records the meeting between Roman
ambassadors and a Suebian king, who was probably Ariovistus; see also S.
Dyson, The Creation of the Roman Frontier (1985), pp. 169–170. 172, B.
Cunliffe, Greeks, Romans and Barbarians: Spheres of Interaction (1988), pp.
114–117.
6 For a discussion see T. Rice Holmes, Caesar’s Conquest of Gaul (1911) pp.
218–224, and H. Delbrück, History of the Art of War, Volume 1: Warfare in
Antiquity (1975), pp. 459–478.
7 Caesar, BG 6. 11; on the desire for allied tribes around provincial frontiers see
Dyson (1985), pp. 170–173.
8 Caesar, BG 1. 5–6; for the focus on the Balkans, see Goudineau (1995), pp.
130–148; for Helvetii’s numbers and size of columns see Holmes (1911), pp.
239–240, Delbrück (1975), pp. 460–463.
9 Caesar, BG 1. 7–8, cf Appian, Mithridatic Wars 99, Plutarch, Crassus 10.
10 Caesar, BG 1. 8.
11 Caesar, BG 1. 10.
12 Caesar, BG 1. 10–11, Cicero, de provinciis consularibus 28, Suetonius, Caesar 24;
L. Keppie, The Making of the Roman Army (1984), p. 98.
13 Caesar, BG 1. 11, 16; on the logistics of the Roman army, including discussions of
the number of slaves and camp followers see P. Erdkamp, Hunger and Sword:
Warfare and Food Supply in Roman Republican Wars 264–30 BC (1998), J. Roth,
The Logistics of the Roman Army at War, 264 BC–AD 235 (1999), A. Labisch,
Frumentum Commeatusque. Die Nahrungsmittelversongung der Heere Caesars
(1975), and A. Goldsworthy, The Roman Army at War, 100 BC – AD 200 (1996),
pp. 287–296.
14 Caesar, BG 1. 12.
15 Caesar, BG 1. 13.
16 Caesar, BG 1. 13–14.
17 Caesar, BG 1. 15–16.
18 Caesar, BG 1. 16–20, cf. Goudineau (1995), p. 138.
19 See Arrian, Alexander 3. 10. 1–4 on the danger and difficulties of night attacks.
20 Caesar, BG 1. 21–22; for a discussion of this operation see Goldsworthy (1996),
pp. 128–130.
21 Caesar, BG 1. 23.
22 Sallust, Bell. Cat. 59, Plutarch, Crassus 11. 6; for a discussion of the commander’s
role before and during battle see Goldsworthy (1996), pp. 131–163; on pre-battle
Notes
548
speeches see M. Hansen, ‘The Battle Exhortation in Ancient Historiography: Fact
or Fiction’, Historia 42 (1993), pp. 161–180.
23 For the battle see Caesar, BG 1. 24–26; for discussion of the nature of battles in
this period see Goldsworthy (1996), pp. 171–247.
24 Caesar, BG 26–29.
25 Caesar, BG 1. 30–33.
26 Caesar, BG 1. 34–37.
27 Caesar, BG 1. 39.
28 Dio 38. 35. 2.
29 Caesar, BG 1. 40.
30 Caesar, BG 1. 39–41.
31 Caesar, BG 1. 41, cf. Plutarch, Sulla 5 for the fame he derived from being the first
Roman magistrate to receive a Parthian envoy.
32 Caesar, BG 1. 42–46.
33 Caesar, BG 1. 46–47.
34 Caesar, BG 1. 48, cf. Tacitus, Germania 6; for a discussion of Germanic armies
see Goldsworthy (1996), pp. 42–53.
35 Caesar, BG 1. 49.
36 For the encouragement offered by German women to their warrior husbands see
Tacitus, Germania 7–8.
37 Caesar, BG 1. 51–54; See Frontinus, Strategemata 2. 6. 3 on letting the Germans
escape.
38 Caesar, BG 1. 54.
XI ‘The Bravest of the Gaulish Peoples’: The Belgae, 57 BC
1 Caesar, BG 2. 15.
2 Strabo, Geog. 4. 4. 2 (Loeb translation by H. Jones (1923), p. 237).
3 For promotions of centurions for gallantry see Caesar, BG 6. 40; Suetonius,
Caesar 65. 1; on centurions’ command style and heavy casualties see A.
Goldsworthy, The Roman Army at War, 100 BC – AD 200 (1996), pp. 257–8, cf.
Caesar, BG 7. 51, BC 3. 99; also on the competition to show conspicuous valour
and win promotion or reward see BG 5. 44, 7. 47, 50, BC 3. 91.
4 On sudden marches and relaxed discipline see Suetonius, Caesar 65, 67; for a
discussion of Marius’ style of command see A. Goldsworthy, In the Name of
Rome (2003), pp. 113–136 (or 2004 edn, pp. 127–153).
5 Plutarch, Caesar 17 (Loeb translation by B. Perrin (1919), p. 483).
6 See Suetonius, Caesar 67. 2 for commilitones and inlaid weapons; see also
Polybius 6. 39 and Goldsworthy (1996), pp. 264–282 on individual boldness.
7 On Pompeius Trogus see Justin, 43. 5. 12; for Caesar dictating letters while on
horseback see Plutarch, Caesar 17; on receiving petitioners while in Cisalpine
Gaul for the winter, Plutarch, Caesar 20.
8 On Valerius Meto see Plutarch, Caesar 17; for dining arrangements see Suetonius,
Caesar 48; Catullus, 29.
9 Catullus, 57 (Loeb translation by F. Cornish (1988), pp. 67–69).
10 Suetonius, Caesar 73.
Notes
11 Suetonius, Caesar 51; Tacitus, Histories 4. 55; for other poems attacking
Mamurra see Catullus, 41, 43.
12 Caesar, BG 2. 1; for a summary of Pompey’s campaigns see Goldsworthy (2003),
pp. 169–179 (or 2004 edn, pp. 190–201).
13 See N. Roymans, Tribal Societies in Northern Gaul: An Anthropological
Perspective, Cingula 12 (1990), pp. 11–15, cf. Tacitus, Germania 28, Caesar, BG 2.
4, 15, 5. 12; on resistance to Cimbri see BG 2. 4, and descent from them of the
Atuatuci, 2. 29.
14 Caesar, BG 2. 2–5; on numbers see T. Rice Holmes, Caesar’s Conquest of Gaul
(1911), p. 71, and L. Rawlings, ‘Caesar’s Portrayal of Gauls as Warriors’, in K.
Welch & A. Powell, Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter: The War Commentaries as
Political Instruments (1998), pp. 171–192, esp. 175, and fn. 13. For an extremely
critical view of Caesar’s numbers see H. Delbrück, History of the Art of War,
Volume 1: Warfare in Antiquity (1975), pp.488–494. Delbrück believed that
barbarians were markedly superior fighters to civilised Romans, and as a result
consistently reduces the size of their forces, while inflating the numbers in
Caesar’s army.
15 Caesar, BG 2. 5–7.
16 For Sulla’s use of trenches to protect his flanks see Frontinus, Strategemata 2. 3. 17.
17 Caesar, BG 2. 8–11.
18 Caesar, BG 2. 11–13.
19 Caesar, BG 2. 13–15.
20 Caesar, BG 2. 16–18, cf. 28 on the strength of the Nervii at the battle.
21 For the possible significance of the site see Rawlings (1998), pp. 176–177; for the
suggestion of Maubeuge see Rice Holmes (1911), p. 76.
22 Caesar, BG 2. 19; cf. Rice Holmes (1911), p. 77 for Napoleon’s comments; on
marching camps see Goldsworthy (1996), pp.111–113.
23 Caesar, BG 2. 20; on delays before battle see Goldsworthy (1996), pp. 143–145.
24 Caesar, BG 2. 20–24.
25 Caesar, BG 2. 25.
26 See Goldsworthy (1996), pp. 154–163, esp. 160–161, and (2003), pp. 155, 176, 195
(or 2004 edn, pp. 175, 198, 219); on the nature of combat see Goldsworthy (1996),
pp. 191–227.
27 Caesar, BG 2. 27–28.
28 Caesar, BG 2. 29–32.
29 Caesar, BG 2. 33; on his reluctance to let soldiers loose in a town during the
hours of darkness see BC 1. 21, 2. 12, African War 3; on ritual offerings see BG 6.
17, Suetonius, Caesar 54. 2.
30 Caesar, BG 2. 35, Dio 39. 25. 1–2, cf. M. Gelzer, Caesar (1968), pp. 116–118.
XII Politics and War: The Conference of Luca
1 Cicero, ad Quintum Fratrem 2. 3. 3–4.
2 Cicero, de provinciis consularibus 25.
3 Publius and Claudia in the First Punic War see Livy, Pers. 19, Cicero, de natura
deorum 2. 7, Florus 1. 19. 29, Suetonius, Tiberius 2. 3, Gellius, NA 10. 6.
549
Notes
4 Plutarch, Lucullus 34, 38, Cicero, pro Milone 73; for a discussion of the family’s
position see E. Gruen, The Last Generation of the Roman Republic (1974), pp.
97–100; on the identity of Lesbia see Apuleius, Apologia 10.
5 Dio 38. 12–13, see also M. Gelzer, Caesar (1968), pp. 96–99, G. Rickman, The
Corn Supply of Ancient Rome (1979), pp. 104–119.
6 Plutarch, Cicero 30–32, Cato the Younger 34–40, see also D. Stockton, Cicero
(1971), pp. 167–193, R. Seager, Pompey the Great (2002), pp. 101–103.
7 Plutarch, Cicero 33–34, Seager (2002), 103–109.
8 Cicero, pro Sestio 71, de provinciis consularibus 43, In Pisonem 80, ad Fam. 1. 9.
9; on Pompey and the Egyptian command see especially Cicero, ad Fam. 1. 1–9;
see also Seager (2002), pp. 107–109, Gelzer (1968), pp. 117–119.
9 Cicero, ad Quintum Fratrem 2. 3. 2.
10 For Ahenobarbus see Cicero, ad Att. 4. 8b; for the Campanian land see Cicero,
ad Quintum Fratrem 2. 1. 1, 6. 1, ad Fam. 1. 9. 8.
11 Suetonius, Caesar 24. 1.
12 Appian, BC 2. 17, Plutarch, Pompey 50, Caesar 21, Crassus 14; see also Gelzer
(1968), pp.120–124, Seager (2002), pp. 110–119, C. Meier Caesar (1996), pp.
270–273, A. Ward, Marcus Crassus and the Late Roman Republic (1977), pp.
262–288.
13 Cicero, ad Fam. 1. 9. 8–10, ad Quintum Fratrem 2. 7. 2; for the accusation of
incest between Clodia and her brother see pro Caelio 32.
14 Cicero, de provinciis consularibus 32–33.
15 Plutarch, Crassus 15, Pompey 51–52, Cato the Younger 41–42, Dio 39. 27. 1–32. 3;
Seager (2002), pp. 120–122.
16 For ‘All Gaul at peace’ see Caesar, BG 3. 7, for Galba in the Alps see 3. 1–6, for
Crassus see 2. 34, 3. 7.
17 Caesar, BG 3. 8–11.
18 Caesar, BG 3. 11–16; cf. Gelzer (2002), p. 126, and Meier (1996), pp. 274–275
pointing out that Caesar’s officers were not ambassadors.
19 For Sabinus see Caesar, BG 3. 17–19; for Crassus see 3. 20–26, for Caesar and the
Morini see 3. 27–28.
13 ‘Over the Waters’: The British and German Expeditions,
55–54 BC
1 Cicero, ad Att. 4. 18.
2 Tacitus, Agricola 13.
3 Caesar, BG 4. 20, Suetonius, Caesar 47, Plutarch, Caesar 23.
4 Caesar, BG 4. 1–4, Plutarch, Caesar 22; for a detailed discussion of the incident
see A. Powell, ‘Julius Caesar and the Presentation of Massacre’, in K. Welch & A.
Powell (eds.), Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter: The War Commentaries as
Political Instruments (1998), pp. 111–137.
5 See Powell (1998), esp. pp. 124–129; on Roman resistance to peoples moving into
frontier zones see S. Dyson, The Creation of the Roman Frontier (1985), esp. pp.
172–173.
550
Notes
6 Caesar, BG 4. 5–7; in 52 BC he referred to his reluctance to trust his security to the
tribal leaders, see BG 7. 6.
7 Caesar, BG 4. 7–9.
8 Caesar, BG 4. 11–12; cf. 4. 2 on German scorn for saddles; on small size of
German horses see 7. 65, Tacitus, Germania 6.
9 Caesar, BG 4. 13–14.
10 Caesar, BG 4. 14–15.
11 Caesar, BG 4. 14–16.
12 Plutarch, Cato the Younger 51. 1–2 (Loeb translation).
13 Suetonius, Caesar 24. 3, and M. Gelzer, Caesar (1968), pp. 130–132, C. Meier,
Caesar (1996), pp. 282–284.
14 Plutarch, Cato the Younger 51. 2 (Loeb Translation).
15 On Cato’s attack see Powell (1998), pp. 123, 127–128, Gelzer (1968), pp. 131–132.
16 Caesar, BG 4. 16–18, cf. T. Rice Holmes, Caesar’s Conquest of Gaul (1911), p.
100.
17 Caesar, BG 4. 18–19.
18 Caesar, BG 4. 20, 22. For general accounts of Caesar’s expeditions and their place
within the wider context of the later Roman conquest of Britain see G. Webster,
The Roman Invasion of Britain, rev. edn (1993), pp. 43–40, and M. Todd, Roman
Britain, 3rd edn. (1999), pp. 4–22. The most detailed treatment remains T. Rice
Holmes, Ancient Britain and the Invasions of Julius Caesar (1907). See also the
excellent recent analysis by G. Grainge, The Roman Invasions of Britain (2005),
esp. pp. 83–109. It is not possible in a study of this nature to enter into the
vigorous debates over many of the details of Caesar’s expeditions.
19 Caesar, BG 4. 20–21; see the comments in N. Austin & B. Rankov, Exploratio:
Military and Political Intelligence in the Roman World (1995), p. 13, who are
critical of Caesar’s failure to discover more information and cite Polybius 3. 48 in
support. On the ports of Britain and trade with Europe see B. Cunliffe, Greeks,
Romans and Barbarians (1988), pp. 145–149; on the coastline see the survey in
Grainge (2005), pp. 17–42, 105–107.
20 Caesar, BG 4. 23–24; on the possible choice of Dover for the landing see Grainge
(2005), pp. 101–105.
21 Caesar, BG 4. 25.
22 Caesar, BG 4. 25–26.
23 Caesar, BG 4. 27–30; for ‘ . . . peace was established’, see 4. 28; see also Grainge
(2005), pp. 107–109.
24 Caesar, BG 4. 33.
25 Caesar, BG 4. 32–35.
26 Caesar, BG 4. 36–38.
27 Caesar, BG 4 . 38, Dio 39. 53. 1–2.
28 Caesar, BG 5. 1–7.
29 Caesar, BG 5. 5, 8.
30 Caesar, BG 5. 9.
31 Caesar, BG 5. 10–11; see also Grainge (2005), p. 105–106.
32 Caesar, BG 5. 11, 15–16.
33 Caesar, BG 5. 17–22.
551
Notes
34 Caesar, BG 5. 22–23. In AD 16 part of a Roman army travelling by sea off
Germany was blown off course and landed in Britain. The soldiers brought back
wild tales of its inhabitants, see Tacitus, Annals 2. 24.
35 Cicero, ad Att. 4. 17; on excitement from receipt of his brother Quintus’ account
of operations in Britain see ad Quintum Fratrem 2. 16. 4.
XIV Rebellion, Disaster and Vengeance
1 Caesar, BG 5. 33.
2 Plutarch, Pompey 53, Suetonius, Caesar 26. 1, Vellieus Paterculus 2. 47. 2, Dio 39.
64.
3 Plutarch, Caesar 23; on Trebonius’ law see Velleius Paterculus 2. 46. 2, Plutarch,
Crassus 15, Dio 39. 33. 2; on Pompey’s position at this period see R. Seager,
Pompey the Great (2002), pp. 120–132, esp. 123–124.
4 Plutarch, Crassus 15–16, Dio 39. 39. 5–7, Cicero, ad Att. 4. 13. 2, and A. Ward,
Marcus Crassus and the Late Roman Republic (1977), pp. 243–253, 262–288.
5 Cicero, ad Quintum Fratrem 2. 15a. 3; for letters to Cicero from Caesar during
the British campaign see Cicero, ad Quintum Fratrem 3. 1. 17 and 25, ad Att. 4.
18. 5; on Quintus as Caesar’s legate see M. Gelzer, Caesar (1968), pp. 138–139.
6 For letter of recommendation to Caesar see Cicero, ad Fam. 7. 5, letters to
Trebatius, ad Fam. 7. 6–19, Cicero, ad Quintum Fratrem 2. 15a. 3 for quote; see
also Gelzer (1968), pp. 138–139.
7 Caesar, BG 5. 24–25; Cicero, ad Att. 4. 19.
8 Caesar, BG 5. 26.
9 Caesar, BG 5. 26–37.
10 For a discussion see A. Powell, ‘Julius Caesar and the Presentation of Massacre’,
in K. Welch & A. Powell (eds.), Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter: The War
Commentaries as Political Instruments (1998), pp. 111–137, esp. 116–121, &
Gelzer (1968), p. 143; for it seen as Caesar’s defeat see Suetonius, Caesar 25. 2,
Plutarch, Caesar 24, Appian, BC 2. 150; for a consideration of this campaign
within the framework of Roman strategy see A. Goldsworthy, The Roman Army
at War, 100 BC – AD 200 (1996), pp. 79–84, 90–95.
11 Caesar, BG 5. 38–45, 52; on four tragedies in sixteen days see Cicero, ad Quintum
Fratrem 3. 5/6. 8.
12 Caesar, BG 5. 46–47; on the presence of Trebatius see Cicero, ad Fam. 7. 16, 11,
12.
13 Caesar, BG 5. 47–48, Suetonius, Caesar 67. 2.
14 Caesar, BG 5. 48–49, Suetonius, Caesar 66.
15 Caesar, BG 5. 49–51.
16 Cicero, ad Fam. 7. 10. 2.
17 Caesar, BG 5. 53.
18 Caesar, BG 5. 52–58.
19 Caesar, BG 6. 1–2; on plundering see J. Roth, The Logistics of the Roman Army
at War, 264 BC–AD 235 (1999), pp. 305–309; on legionary numbers see L. Keppie,
The Making of the Roman Army (1984), p. 87.
20 Caesar, BG 6. 3–4.
552
Notes
21 Caesar, BG 6. 5–8.
22 Caesar, BG 6. 9–10, 29.
23 For a wide discussion of the importance of rivers see D. Braund, ‘River Frontiers
in the Environmental Psychology of the Roman World’, in D. Kennedy (ed.), The
Roman Army in the East, JRA Supplementary Series 18 (1996), pp. 43–47.
24 Caesar, BG 6. 29–34, on the death of Catuvolcus see 6. 31.
25 Caesar, BG 6. 43.
26 Caesar, BG 6. 35–44; on the impact of Caesar’s campaigns on the region see N.
Roymans, Tribal Societies in Northern Gaul: An Anthropological Perspective,
Cingula 12 (1990), pp. 136–144 and ‘The North Belgic Tribes in the First Century
BC’ in R. Brandt & J. Slofstra (eds.), Roman and Native in the Low Countries,
BAR 184 (1983), pp. 43–69.
27 On date of release see P. Wiseman, ‘The Publication of the De Bello Gallico’, in
Welch & Powell (1998), pp. 1–9, esp. 5–6; on the elk see Caesar, BG 6. 27.
28 The main accounts of Carrhae are Plutarch, Crassus 17–33 and Dio 40. 12–30.
XV The Man and the Hour: Vercingetorix and the Great
Revolt, 52 BC
1 Caesar, BG 7. 1.
2 For a classic study of fighting ‘colonial’ wars between a regular army on one side
and irregular forces on the other see C. Calwell, Small Wars (1906); a readily
accessible introduction to the topic is D. Porch, Wars of Empire (2000).
3 On elevation of Commius see Caesar, BG 7. 76.
4 For reaction to death of Acco see Caesar, BG, 7. 1–2; importance of a retinue, BG
1. 18, 6. 15; annual meeting of druids in land of Carnutes, BG 6. 13; for Caesar’s
attitude to the Gauls see J. Barlow, ‘Noble Gauls and their other,’ and L.
Rawlings, ‘Caesar’s Portrayal of the Gauls as Warriors,’ both in K. Welch & A.
Powell (eds.), Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter: the War Commentaries as Political
Instruments (1998), pp. 139–170, and 171–192 respectively.
5 For the events of these months in Rome see M. Gelzer, Caesar (1968), pp.
145–152, C. Meier, Caesar (1996), pp. 297–301, and R. Seager, Pompey the Great
(2002), pp. 126–135; Cicero in Ravenna, ad Att. 7. 1. 4; on the role of legates see
K. Welch, ‘Caesar and his Officers in the Gallic War Commentaries’, in Welch &
Powell (1998), pp. 85–103.
6 Caesar, BG 7. 4; on friendly relations between Vercingetorix and Caesar see Dio
40. 41. 1, 3.
7 Caesar, BG 7. 5; on rebellions see A. Goldsworthy, The Roman Army at War, 100
BC–AD 200 (1996), pp. 79–95, esp. 90–95.
8 Caesar, BG 7. 6–7; for 400 German cavalry see 7. 13.
9 Caesar, BG 7. 7–9; Suetonius, Caesar 58. 1 for story of dressing as a Gaul.
10 Caesar, BG 7. 10; on initiative see Goldsworthy (1996), pp. 90–92, 94–95, 99–100,
114–115, and Calwell (1906), pp. 71–83.
11 Caesar, BG 7. 11–13.
12 Caesar, BG 7. 14.
13 Caesar, BG 7. 14–15.
553
Notes
14 Caesar, BG 7. 16–17; for the types of food eaten by Roman soldiers see R. Davies,
‘The Roman Military Diet’, in R. Davies, Service in the Roman Army (1989), pp.
187–206.
15 Caesar, BG 7. 18–21; on the problems of supplying tribal armies see Goldsworthy
(1996), pp. 56–60.
16 Caesar, BG 7. 22–25; cf. Rawlings (1998), pp. 171–192.
17 Caesar, BG 7. 28.
18 Caesar, BG 7. 26–28; Polybius 10. 15. 4–6, cf. W. Harris, War and Imperialism in
Republican Rome 327–70 BC (1979), pp. 51–53.
19 Caesar, BG 7. 32–34.
20 Caesar, BG 7. 28–31, 35.
21 Caesar, BG 7. 36.
22 Caesar, BG 7. 37–41.
23 Caesar, BG 7. 42–44.
24 Caesar, BG 7. 45.
25 Caesar, BG 7. 47.
26 Caesar, BG 7. 50.
27 For the account of Gergovia see Caesar, BG 7. 44–54, and see also the comments
on the style of this passage in A. Powell, ‘Julius Caesar and the Presentation of
Massacre’, in Welch & Powell, (1998), pp. 111–137, esp. 122–123; for ‘kicking the
enemy in the stomach’ see Plutarch, Lucullus 9. 1.
28 Caesar, BG 7. 55–56, 63–67; for Labienus’ operations see 7. 57–62.
29 Caesar, BG 7. 68–69; on this campaign see J. Harmand, Une Campagne
Césarienne: Alésia (1967), J. Le Gall, La Bataille D’Alésia (2000), and H.
Delbrück, History of the Art of War, Volume 1: Warfare in Antiquity (1975), pp.
495–507, mentioning Napoleon’s comments on p. 501.
30 Caesar, BG 7. 69, 72–73, and comments in Le Gall (2000), pp. 64–77.
31 Caesar, BG 7. 70–71, 75–78; for a discussion of the size of the relief army see Le
Gall (2000), pp. 82–84.
32 Caesar, BG 7. 79–81.
33 Caesar, BG 7. 88.
34 For the account of the final battle see Caesar, BG 7. 82–88.
35 Caesar, BG 7. 89, Plutarch, Caesar 27. 5, Dio 40. 41. 1–3.
36 Caesar, BG 7. 89–90.
XVI ‘All Gaul is Conquered’
1 Cicero. ad Fam. 8. 1. 4
2 Suetonius, Caesar 56. 5, Cicero, Brutus 252–255, ad Quintum Fratrem 2. 16. 5, 3.
9. 6–7.
3 On the opening of Pompey’s theatre see Dio 39. 38. 1–6, Pliny, NH 7. 34, 8.
21–22, Plutarch, Pompey 52–53. 1; for criticism of Pompey see Cicero, de Officiis
2. 60, and of others, Tacitus, Annals 14. 20; the number of elephants was
variously reported as seventeen, eighteen and twenty.
4 Cicero, ad Att. 4. 17. 7, Suetonius, Caesar 26. 2, Pliny, NH 36. 103; for gladiators
in school at Capua see Caesar, BC 1. 14, and on the importance of games see Z.
554
Notes
Yavetz, Julius Caesar and His Public Image (1983), pp. 165–168.
5 See Dio 40. 48. 1–52. 4, Plutarch, Pompey 54–55, and also R. Seager, Pompey the
Great (2002), pp. 130–135, M. Gelzer, Caesar (1968), pp. 148–152.
6 Plutarch, Cicero 35, Dio 40. 54. 1–4, E. Gruen, The Last Generation of the
Roman Republic (1974), pp. 338–342.
7 Seager (2002), pp. 137–139, Gruen (1974), pp. 150–159.
8 Plutarch, Pompey 55. 1–2, Cato the Younger 49–50, Dio 40. 56. 3–58. 4,
Suetonius, Caesar 28. 3; Seager (2002), pp. 131–132, Gruen (1974), pp. 154, 454.
9 Caesar, BC 1. 32, Suetonius, Caesar 26. 1, Appian, BC 2. 25, Dio 40. 51. 2, and
Gelzer (1968), pp. 146–148, Seager (2002), pp. 137–139.
10 Caesar, BG 8. 1–5.
11 For the campaign against the Bellovaci see Caesar, BG 8. 6–23; Commius, 8. 23,
47–48; Ambiorix, 8. 25.
12 Caesar, BG 8. 49.
13 On Uxellodunum see Caesar, BG 8. 26–44, and comments on executions in A.
Powell, ‘Julius Caesar and the Presentation of Massacre’, in K. Welch & A.
Powell (eds.), Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter: The War Commentaries as
Political Instruments (1998), pp. 111–137, esp. 129–132; Carnutes, 8. 38; for
rebellion of Bellovaci in 46 BC see Livy Pers. 114.
14 On casualties see Plutarch, Caesar 15, Pliny, NH 7. 92, Velleius Paterculus 2. 47.
1, and see comments in C. Goudineau, César et la Gaule (1995), pp. 308–311.
15 For a discussion of Caesar as a general see A. Goldsworthy, ‘Instinctive Genius:
The depiction of Caesar the General’, in K. Welch & A. Powell (1998), pp.
193–219.
XVII The Road to the Rubicon
1 Suetonius, Caesar 31. 2.
2 Cicero, ad Att. 7. 3.
3 On the struggle to get the ten tribunes to pass the law see Cicero, ad Fam. 6. 6. 5,
and ad Att. 7. 3. 4, 8. 3. 3.
4 On Caesar’s alleged ambition see Suetonius, Caesar 9, Plutarch, Caesar 4, 6, 28,
Cicero, Philippics 5. 49.
5 For Cato and Pompey see Plutarch, Cato the Younger 48. 1–2, Pompey 54; Cato
and Milo see Asconius on Cicero, pro Milonem 95, pp. 53–54, Velleius Paterculus
2. 47. 4, Cicero, ad Fam. 15. 4. 12.
6 Suetonius, Caesar 28. 2–3, Appian, BC 2. 25, Dio 40. 59. 1–4; on debate over the
legion see Cicero, ad Fam. 8. 4. 4; for the debate on 29 September see 8. 8. 4–9;
for a general discussion see M. Gelzer, Caesar (1968), pp. 175–178, R. Seager,
Pompey the Great (2002), pp. 140–143, J. Leach, Pompey (1978), pp. 150–172, esp.
161.
7 For the flogging of the magistrate see Suetonius, Caesar 28. 3, Appian, BC 2. 26,
Plutarch, Caesar 29, Cicero, ad Att. 5. 11. 2; see Caelius’ quote from Cicero, ad
Fam. 8. 8. 9.
8 Discussions of the terminal date of Caesar’s command see Seager (2002), pp.
191–193, T. Mitchell, Cicero: The Senior Statesman (1991), pp. 237–239, P. Cuff,
555
Notes
‘The Terminal Date of Caesar’s Gallic Command’, Historia 7 (1958), pp.
445–471, D. Stockton, ‘Quis iustius induit arma’, Historia 24 (1975), pp. 222–259,
and in general E. Gruen, The Last Generation of the Roman Republic (1974), pp.
460–497.
9 Suetonius, Caesar 30. 3; for a discussion of Pompey’s attitude see Seager (2002),
pp. 138–147.
10 On buying Curio and Paullus see Suetonius, Caesar 29. 1, Plutarch, Caesar 29,
Pompey 58, Dio 40. 60. 2–3, Appian, BC 2. 26, Valerius Maximus 9. 1. 6, Velleius
Paterculus 2. 48. 4; on revolving theatres see Pliny, NH 36. 177; on Caelius’ belief
in Curio’s planned opposition to Caesar see Cicero, ad Fam. 8. 8. 10, moderated
at 8. 10. 4.
11 Quotation from Cicero, ad Fam. 8. 11. 3; for the earlier debate see Velleius
Paterculus 2. 48. 2–3, Plutarch, Pompey 57, Caesar 30, Cato the Younger 51, and
Dio 40. 62. 3; for discussion see Seager (2002), p. 144, and Gelzer (1968), pp.
178–181.
12 Quotation from Cicero, ad Fam. 8. 14. 4; more generally see Cicero, ad Fam. 8.
13. 2, 8. 14, Appian, BC 2. 27–30, Plutarch, Caesar 29, Dio 40. 60, 1–66. 5.
13 Appian, BC 2. 28, with a slightly different version in Plutarch, Pompey 58, cf. Dio
60. 64. 1–4; on Cicero’s attitude see Mitchell (1991), pp. 243–248.
14 Cicero, ad Att. 7. 3. 4–5, 7. 4. 3, 7. 5. 5, 7. 6. 2, 7. 7. 5–6, ad Fam. 8. 14. 3;
Mitchell (1991) pp. 232–248.
15 For Caesar’s attitude see especially Suetonius, Caesar 30. 2–5; on Gabinius see
Seager (2002), pp. 128–130.
16 Lucan, Pharsalia 1. 25–26, and in general 1. 98–157; on censorship of Appius
Claudius see Dio 40. 57. 2–3, 63. 2–64. 1.
17 Plutarch, Antony 2–5.
18 For Hirtius see Cicero, ad Att. 7. 4; Plutarch, Pompey 59, Caesar, BG 8. 52. 3, Dio
40. 64. 3–4, Appian, BC 2. 31.
19 Caesar, BC 1. 1–5, Plutarch, Pompey 59, Caesar 31, Suetonius, Caesar 29. 2,
Appian, BC 2. 32; on Cicero’s involvement in negotiations see ad Fam. 16. 11. 2,
ad Att. 8. 11d.
20 Caesar, BC 1. 5, Dio 41. 1. 1–3. 4, Appian, BC 2. 32–33, Cicero, ad Att. 7. 8, ad
Fam. 16. 11. 3; on Antony vomiting his words see ad Fam. 12. 2.
21 Suetonius, Caesar 31–32, Plutarch, Caesar 32, Appian, BC 2. 35.
XVIII Blitzkrieg: Italy and Spain, Winter–Autumn, 49 BC
1 Cicero, ad Att. 7. 11.
2 Cicero, ad Att. 9. 7C.
3 Caesar, BC 1. 7-8, Appian, BC 2. 33, Suetonius, Caesar 33, Dio 41. 4. 1; on the
centurions recommended by Pompey see Suetonius, Caesar 75. 1; on soldiers’ pay
see Suetonius, Caesar 26. 3, and discussion of pay in G. Watson, The Roman
Soldier (1969), pp. 89–92.
4 For Marcellus in R. Syme, Roman Revolution (1939), p. 62; Brutus see Plutarch,
Brutus 4.
556
Notes
5 See Caesar, BG 8. 52, Cicero, ad Att. 7. 7. 6, 7. 12. 5, 7. 13. 1, ad Fam. 16. 12. 4,
Dio 41. 4. 2–4, and R. Syme, ‘The Allegiance of Labienus,’ JRS 28 (1938), pp.
113-125, & W. Tyrell, ‘Labienus’ Departure from Caesar in January 49 BC’,
Historia 21 (1972), pp. 424–440.
6 Cicero, ad Fam. 8. 14. 3.
7 Caesar, BC 1. 6, Cicero, ad Fam. 16. 12. 3.
8 Cicero, ad Att. 7. 14.
9 Caesar, BC 1. 8–11, Dio 41. 5. 1–10. 2, Appian, BC 2. 36–37, Plutarch, Caesar
33–34, Pompey 60–61, Cato the Younger 52.
10 Caesar, BC 1. 12–15.
11 Caesar, BC 1. 16–23 and quote from 1. 23, cf. Dio 41. 2–11. 3; for the letters
between Domitius and Pompey see Cicero, ad Att. 8. 11A, 12B, 12C, 12D.
12 Plutarch, Pompey 57, 60.
13 Caesar, BC 1. 24–29, Dio 41. 12. 1–3, Appian, BC 2. 38–40; for surveys of the
beginning of the Civil War see M. Gelzer, Caesar (1968), pp. 192–204, C. Meier,
Caesar (1996), pp. 364–387, and R. Seager, Pompey the Great (2002), pp. 152–161.
14 Caesar, BC 1. 29–31, Cicero, ad Att. 7. 11. 3, 9. 1. 3, 11. 3, Appian, BC 2. 37;
Suetonius, Caesar 34. 2 for the quote.
15 T. Mitchell, Cicero: The Senior Statesman (1991), pp.243–266.
16 Cicero, ad Fam. 2. 15, 8. 11. 2, ad Att. 7. 1. 7, 2. 5–7, 3. 5, cf. Mitchell (1991), pp.
235–236.
17 Cicero, ad Att. 9. 6a; see also ad Att. 8. 13, 9. 13. 4, 15. 3, 16. 1–2, 9. 1. 2, 5. 4, 8. 1.
18 Cicero, ad Att. 9. 11a for Cicero’s letter of 19 March; 9. 16 for Caesar’s letter of
26 March; 9. 18 for the meeting.
19 Caesar, BC 1. 32–33, Dio 41. 15. 1–16. 4.
20 Caesar, BC 1. 32–33, Dio 41. 17. 1–3, Appian, BC 2. 41, Plutarch, Caesar 35,
Pliny, NH 33. 56, Orosius 6. 15. 5.
21 See, for example, Cicero, ad Att. 10. 4. 8, ad Fam. 8. 16. 2–5.
22 Sallust, Bell. Cat. 59. 6, Pliny, NH 22. 11; Caesar, BC 1. 38–39.
23 Caesar, BC 1. 37, 39, Dio 41. 19. 1–4, Velleius Paterculus 2. 50. 3, Cicero, ad Att. 10.
8b.
24 For the quotation see Caesar, BC 1. 39; more generally see 1. 37–40.
25 Caesar, BC 1. 41–42.
26 Caesar, BC 1. 44–48.
27 Caesar, BC 1. 47–55, 59–61.
28 Caesar, BC 1. 61–65.
29 Caesar, BC 1. 66–76.
30 Caesar, BC 1. 77–87, for the siege of Massilia see 1. 56–58, 2. 1–16, 22, Varro 2.
17–21.
XIX Macedonia, November 49–August 48 BC
1 Cicero, ad Fam. 9. 9.
2 Caesar, BC 3. 68.
3 Suetonius, Caesar 56. 4, 72, Cicero, ad Att. 9. 18; on the partisans of both sides
see R. Syme, The Roman Revolution (1939), pp. 50–51, 61–77; for ‘what you need
557
Notes
is a civil war’ see Suetonius, Caesar 27. 2; for the campaign in Sicily and Africa
see Plutarch, Cato the Younger 53. 1–3, Caesar, BC 2. 23–44.
4 Appian, BC 2. 47, Dio 41. 26. 1–35. 5, Suetonius, Caesar 69.
5 Caesar, BC 3. 3–4, Plutarch, Pompey 63–64, Appian, BC 2. 40, 49–52.
6 Cicero, ad Att. 8. 11. 2, 9. 7, 9. 10. 2,10. 4, and for Cicero’s attitude see T.
Michell, Cicero: The Senior Statesman (1991), pp. 252–266.
7 Cicero, ad Att. 9. 9. 3, for Servilius see CAH2 IX, p. 431, Dio 41. 36. 1–38. 3,
Caesar, BC 3. 1–2, Plutarch, Caesar 37, Appian, BC 2. 48.
8 Caesar, BC 3. 2–8, Dio 41. 39. 1–40. 2, 44. 1–4, Appian, BC 2. 49–54, Plutarch,
Caesar 37.
9 Caesar, BC 8–13, Appian, BC 2. 55–56.
10 Caesar, BC 3. 14; for death of Bibulus’ sons see BC 3. 110 and Valerius Maximus
4. 1. 15; for Cicero’s attitude to the Pompeians see Cicero, ad Fam. 7. 3. 2–3.
11 Caesar, BC 3. 15–17, 17 for the quote; on the properties of ancient warships see
the very useful summary in B. Rankov, ‘The Second Punic War at Sea’ in T.
Cornell, B. Rankov, & P. Sabin, The Second Punic War: A Reappraisal (London,
1996), pp. 49–57, as well as more generally J. Morrison & J. Coates, Greek and
Roman Oared Warships (1996).
12 Caesar, BC 3. 19 for the meeting, 3. 18 for Bibulus’ death and Pompey’s comment;
for the attempt to cross to Brundisium see Appian, BC 2. 50–59, Plutarch, Caesar
65, Dio 41. 46. 1–4.
13 Caesar, BC 3. 39–44, Dio 41. 47. 1–50. 4, Appian, BC 2. 58–60.
14 Caesar, BC 3. 45–49, Plutarch, Caesar 39, Appian, BC 2. 61.
15 Caesar, BC 3. 50–53; for Scaeva see Suetonius, Caesar 68. 3–4, Appian, BC 2. 60,
Dio mentions a Scaevius who served with Caesar in Spain in 61 BC, Dio 38. 53. 3,
and for the ala Scaevae CIL10. 6011 and comments in J. Spaul, ALA 2 (1994), pp.
20–21; on Sulla’s caution see A. Goldsworthy, ‘Instinctive Genius: The depiction
of Caesar the General’, in K. Welch & A. Powell (eds.), Julius Caesar as Artful
Reporter: The War Commentaries as Political Instruments (1998), pp. 193–219,
esp. p. 205.
16 Caesar, BC 3. 54–58.
17 Caesar, BC 3. 59–61.
18 Caesar, BC 3. 61–65.
19 Caesar, BC 3. 66–70, quote from 69, Plutarch, Caesar 39, Appian, BC 2. 62.
20 Caesar, BC 3. 71–75, Appian, BC 2. 63–64, Dio 41. 51. 1.
21 Caesar BC 3. 77–81, Plutarch Caesar 41, Appian, BC 2. 63, Dio 41. 51. 4–5.
22 Caesar, BC 3. 72, 82–83, Cicero, ad Fam. 7. 3. 2; Plutarch, Cato the Younger 55,
Pompey 40–41, Appian, BC 2. 65–67, Dio 41. 52. 1; in general for Pompey’s
strategy and attitude see R. Seager, Pompey the Great (2002), pp. 157–163,
166–167.
23 Caesar, BC 3. 84–85, quotation from 85; Appian, BC 2. 68–69, Plutarch, Pompey
68, Caesar 42, Dio 41. 52. 2–57. 4.
24 Caesar, BC 3. 86–88, Appian, BC 2. 70–71, 76, Frontinus, Strategemata 2. 3. 22;
for a discussion of formations in this period see A. Goldsworthy, The Roman
Army at War 100 BC – AD 200 (1996), pp. 176–183.
25 Caesar, BC 3. 89.
558
Notes
26 Caesar, BC 3. 90–91, Dio 41. 58. 1–3, Appian, BC 2. 77–78, Plutarch, Pompey 71,
Caesar 44.
27 For the battle and losses see Caesar, BC 3. 92–99, Appian, BC 2. 78–82, Plutarch,
Caesar 42–47, and also Dio 41. 58. 1–63. 6 although he gives a vague,
impressionistic account; Suetonius, Caesar 30. 4.
28 Caesar, BC 3. 102–104, Dio 42. 1. 1–5. 7, Plutarch, Pompey 72–80, Appian, BC 2.
83–86, Velleius Paterculus 2. 53. 3; and Seager (2002), pp. 167–168.
XX Cleopatra, Egypt and the East, Autumn 48–Summer 47 BC
1 Suetonius, Caesar 52. 1.
2 Dio 42. 34. 3–5 (Loeb translation by E. Cary (1916), p.169).
3 Caesar, BC 3. 106, Plutarch, Caesar 48, Pompey 80, Dio 42. 6. 1–8. 3, Appian, BC
2. 86, 88; see also M. Gelzer, Caesar (1968), pp. 246–247, and C. Meier, Caesar
(1996), p. 406.
4 Caesar, BC 3. 106, Alexandrian War 17, 29, and 69.
5 On the wealth of Egypt and the impression it made on the Romans see Diodorus
Siculus 28 b.3; on Egypt in this period see S. Walker & P. Higgs (eds.), Cleopatra
of Egypt: From History to Myth (2001), especially the papers by A. Meadows,
‘The Sins of the Fathers: The Inheritance of Cleopatra, Last Queen of Egypt’, pp.
14–31, and J. Ray, ‘Alexandria’, pp. 32–37, and also S. Walker & S. Ashton,
Cleopatra Reassessed (2003), esp. G. Grimm, ‘Alexandria in the Time of
Cleopatra’, pp. 45–49.
6 See chapter 6; for Cleopatra’s possible visit to Italy see G. Gouldaux, ‘Cleopatra’s
Subtle Religious Strategy’, in Walker & Higgs (2001), pp. 128–141, esp. 131–132.
7 On the history of the later Ptolemies see CAH2 IX, pp. 310–326, esp. 323; on the
low level of the Nile see Pliny, NH 5. 58; for the story of Cnaeus Pompeius see
Plutarch, Antony 25.
8 In general see M. Grant, Cleopatra (1972), and for a useful survey E. Rice,
Cleopatra (1999); for her skill with languages see Plutarch, Mark Antony 27; on
her support for Egyptian cults see Goudchaux (2001), pp. 128–141, and Walker &
Ashton (2003), esp. J. Ray, ‘Cleopatra in the Temples of Upper Egypt: The
Evidence of Dendera and Armant’, pp. 9–11, and S. Ashton, ‘Cleopatra: Goddess,
Ruler or Regent’, pp. 25–30, D. Thompson, ‘Cleopatra VII: The Queen of Egypt,’
pp. 31–34.
9 On her appearance see Plutarch, Mark Antony 27, Dio 42. 34. 3–5, and also
Grant (1972), pp. 65–67, Rice (1999), pp. 95–102, Walker & Higgs (2001), esp. S.
Walker, ‘Cleopatra’s Images: Reflections of Reality’, pp. 142–147, G. Goudchaux,
‘Was Cleopatra Beautiful? The Conflicting Answers of Numismatics’, pp.
210–214, and also in Walker & Ashton (2003), esp. S. Walker, ‘Cleopatra VII at
the Louvre’, pp. 71–74, and F. Johansen, ‘Portraits of Cleopatra – Do They
Exist?’, pp. 75–77.
10 See Ray (2001), Grimm (2003), pp. 45–49, and G. Goudchaux, ‘Cleopatra the
Seafarer Queen: Strabo and India’, in Walker & Ashton (2003), pp. 109–112.
11 Caesar, BC 3. 106–112, Alexandrian War 1–3, Plutarch, Caesar 48, Appian,
BC 2. 89.
559
Notes
12 Alexandrian War 4, Plutarch, Caesar 48–49, Dio 42. 34. 1–38. 2, 39. 1–2,
Suetonius, Caesar 53. 1.
13 Alexandrian War 5–22, Plutarch, Caesar 49, Dio 42. 40. 1–6, Suetonius, Caesar
64, Appian, BC 2. 90.
14 Alexandrian War 23–32, Dio 42. 41. 1–43. 4, Josephus, Jewish Antiquities 14. 8.
12, Jewish War 1. 187–192.
15 Alexandrian War 33, Dio 42. 35. 4–6, 44. 1–45. 1, Suetonius, Caesar 52. 1,
Appian, BC 90; for the bemused attitude of scholars to this cruise see Gelzer
(1968), pp. 255–259 and also Meier (1995), pp. 408–410, 412.
16 For Caesar’s baldness see Suetonius, Caesar 45. 2.
17 Suetonius, Caesar 76. 3, Alexandrian War 33, Plutarch, Caesar 49.
18 Alexandrian War 34–41.
19 Alexandrian War 65–78, Dio 42. 45. 1–48. 4, Josephus, Jewish War 1. 190–195,
Jewish Antiquities 14. 8. 3–5, Plutarch, Caesar 50, Suetonius, Caesar 35. 2, 37. 2.
XXI Africa, September 47–June 46 BC
1 Cicero, ad Att. 11. 17a. 3.
2 Plutarch, Cato the Younger 66. 2 (Loeb translation by B. Perrin (1919), p. 397).
3 Dio 42. 17. 1–19. 4, 22. 1–25. 3, Caesar, BC 3. 20–22, Velleius Paterculus 2. 68.
1–3, Livy Pers. 111; for discussion of Caelius’ and Milo’s unsuccessful rebellion
see T. Rice Holmes, The Roman Republic, 3 (1923), pp. 223–225, M. Gelzer,
Caesar (1968), pp. 227–228.
4 Dio 42. 21. 1–2, 26. 1–28. 4, Plutarch, Antony 8–10, Cicero, Philippics 2. 56–63,
and in general see Holmes (1923), pp. 226–229, Gelzer (1968), pp. 253–254; for
book on drinking see Pliny, NH 14. 148; on lions see Pliny, NH 8. 21, Plutarch,
Antony 9.
5 Appian, BC 2. 92, Dio 42. 29. 1–32. 3, Plutarch, Antony 9, Alexandrian War 65,
African War 54, Cicero, ad Att. 11. 10. 2, Philippics 6. 11, 11. 14; on the rumour
of Pompeian attack on Italy see Cicero, ad Att. 11. 18. 1, Plutarch, Cato the
Younger 58.
6 Dio 42. 19. 2–20. 5, Plutarch, Brutus 6, and Cicero 39; and T. Mitchell, Cicero:
The Senior Statesman (1991), pp. 264–265.
7 Appian, BC 2. 92–94, Dio 42. 52. 1–55. 3, Suetonius, Caesar 70, Plutarch, Caesar
51, Frontinus, Strategemata 1. 9. 4. In Dio’s version the troops were allowed into
the city and the confrontation took place there rather than in a camp outside.
8 Dio 42. 49. 150. 5, Suetonius, Caesar 38. 2, 51. 2, Plutarch, Antony 10, Cicero,
Philippics 2. 65, 71–73; and Gelzer (1968), p. 262, Holmes (1923), pp. 234–235.
9 Quote from African War 1; African War 60 for legion numbers; Suetonius, Caesar
59, Dio 42. 58. 3 for story of stumbling; for ignoring bad omens see Cicero, de
Divinatione 2. 52, where he uses this for further evidence of the spurious nature
of such predictions.
10 African War 1–3, 10–11, 19, 27, Appian, BC 2. 96.
11 African War 4–15.
12 African War 16.
560
Notes
13 African War 16–19, Dio 43. 2. 1–3, Appian, BC 2. 95, who implies that the
Pompeians deliberately withdrew, and Holmes (1923), pp. 242–245, J. Fuller,
Julius Caesar: Man, Soldier and Tyrant (1965), pp. 267–270; rallying the
standard-bearer, Suetonius, Caesar 62, Plutarch, Caesar 52.
14 African War 20–21, 24–26, 28, 33–35, 44–46; on seaweed used as fodder see
African War 24; on Scipio Salvito see Dio 42. 58. 1, Plutarch, Caesar 52,
Suetonius, Caesar 59.
15 African War 24–43, quotation from 31.
16 African War 48–55, Suetonius, Caesar 66.
17 African War 56–67.
18 African War 68–80.
19 African War 82–83.
20 Plutarch, Caesar 53.
21 African War 81–86, 91, 94–6, Appian, BC 2. 100.
22 African War 87–90, 97–98, Dio 43. 10. 1–13. 4, Appian, BC 2. 98–99, Plutarch,
Cato the Younger 56. 4, 59. 1–73. 1; on Queen Eunoe see Suetonius, Caesar 52. 1.
XXII Dictator, 46–44 BC
1 Cicero, ad Fam. 12. 18.
2 Velleius Paterculus, 2. 61. 1.
3 For accounts of the triumphs see Dio 43. 19. 1–21. 4, Appian, BC 2. 101–102,
Plutarch, Caesar 55, Suetonius, Caesar 37, Pliny, NH 7. 92, Cicero, Philippics 14.
23; see also comments in M. Gelzer, Caesar (1968), pp. 284–286, T. Rice Holmes,
The Roman Republic, 3 (1923), pp. 279–281, and S. Weinstock, Divus Julius
(1971), pp. 76–77, who suggests that the story of the chariot axle breaking was a
confused version of Caesar’s superstitious mantra recited before travelling in a
chariot, Pliny, NH 28. 21.
4 Suetonius, Caesar 49. 4.
5 Suetonius, Caesar 51, Dio 43. 20. 2–4.
6 For celebrations and games see Dio 43. 22. 1–24. 4, Appian, BC 2. 102, Suetonius,
Caesar 38. 1, 39. 2, Plutarch, Caesar 55, Pliny, NH 8. 21–22, 181, Cicero, ad Fam.
12. 18. 2, Macrobius, Saturnalia 2. 7. 2–9, and also Gelzer (1968), pp. 285–287,
Holmes (1923), pp. 280–282.
7 On behaviour at games see Suetonius, Augustus 45. 1; one of the most useful
discussions of Caesar’s legislation can be found in Z. Yazetz, Julius Caesar and
His Public Image (1983).
8 Caesar, BC 3. 57; for an introduction to the differing interpretations of Caesar
see Yazetz (1983), pp. 10–57.
9 Dio 43. 50. 3–4, Suetonius, Caesar 42. 1, 81, Tiberius 4. 1, Plutarch, Caesar
57–58, Strabo, Geog. 8. 6. 23, 17. 3. 15, Appian, Punic History 136, Cicero, ad
Fam. 9. 17. 2, 13. 4, 13. 5, 13. 8; also Yazetz (1983), pp. 137–149, E. Rawson,
CAH2IX , pp. 445–480, and Holmes (1923), pp. 320–324.
10 Suetonius, Caesar 41. 2, 76. 2, 80. 3, Dio 43. 46. 2–4, Plutarch, Caesar 58, Pliny,
NH 7. 181, Cicero, ad Fam. 7. 30. 1–2, Gelzer (1968), p. 309, 310–311, and
Holmes (1923), pp. 328–330.
561
Notes
11 Cicero, ad Fam. 6. 18. 1, Philippics 11. 5. 12, 13. 13. 27, Dio 43. 47. 3, Suetonius,
Caesar 76. 2–3, 80. 2; for a detailed discussion of the origins of Caesar’s senators
see R. Syme, The Roman Revolution (1939), pp. 78–96.
12 On Sallust see Dio 43. 9. 2, 47. 4, Sallust, Bell. Cat. 3. 4, cf. Dio 43. 1. 3; on the refusal
of a province to a follower see Dio 43. 47. 5, and Appian, BC 3. 89 for his cruelty.
13 Cicero, pro Marcello 3; cf. Titus Amplius Balbus, the ‘trumpet of the Civil War’
allowed back in November, Cicero, ad Fam. 6. 12. 3.
14 Suetonius, Caesar 42. 1, 44. 2.
15 Suetonius, Caesar 44. 2, Pliny, NH 18. 211, Plutarch, Caesar 59, Macrobius,
Saturnalia 1. 14. 2–3, Holmes (1923), pp. 285–287, Gelzer (1969), p. 289, and Yazetz
(1983), pp. 111–114.
16 Suetonius, Caesar 42. 1, 43. 1–2, Cicero, ad Att. 12. 35. 36. 1, 13. 6, 7, ad Fam. 7.
26, Dio 43. 25. 2, and Yazetz (1983), pp. 154–156 on sumptuary law; on the collegia
see Suetonius, Caesar 42. 3, Josephus, Jewish Antiquities 14. 215–216, and Yazetz
(1983), pp. 85–95.
17 Provincial law, Dio 43. 25. 3, and Cicero, Philippics 1. 8. 9 for approval; herders,
Suetonius, Caesar 42. 1; on the municipia see discussion in Yazetz (1983), pp. 117–121.
18 Quotation from Cicero, ad Fam. 15. 19. 4; for Quintus Cassius in Spain see
Alexandrian War 48–64, Spanish War 42, Appian, BC 2. 43, 103, Dio 43. 29. 1–31.
2, and Holmes (1923), pp. 293–295; the journey and the poem, Suetonius 56. 5,
Strabo, Geog. 3. 4. 9, and Holmes (1923), p. 296.
19 Spanish War 2–27; for a more detailed discussion of the events of the war see
Holmes (1923), pp. 297–306.
20 Spanish War 28–42, Appian, BC 2. 103–105, Plutarch, Caesar 56, Dio 43. 36. 1–41.
2, and Holmes (1923), pp. 306–308.
21 For honours see Dio 43. 42. 3, 44. 1–3; For Antony meeting Caesar see Plutarch,
Antony 11; for Cicero’s daughter see Cicero, ad Att. 13. 20. 1, and T. Mitchell,
Cicero: The Senior Statesman (1991), p. 282; for Pontius Aquila see Suetonius,
Caesar 78. 2, see also R. Holmes, p. 318.
22 Dio 43. 14. 7, 44. 1–46. 2, Cicero, ad Att. 12. 47. 3, 45. 3, ad Fam. 6. 8. 1, 6. 18. 1,
Suetonius, Caesar 76. 1, and see Holmes (1923), pp. 315–316, Gelzer (1968), pp.
307–308, Mitchell (1991), pp. 282ff.
23 Cicero, ad Att. 13. 40. 1.
24 Cicero, ad Att. 12. 21. 1, 13. 40. 1, 46, 51. 1, Orator 10, 35, Plutarch, Cato the
Younger 11. 1–4, 25. 1–5, 73. 4, Cicero 39. 2, Caesar 3. 2, Suetonius, Caesar 56. 5,
and Gelzer (1968), p. 301–304, Holmes (1923), p. 311, and D. Stockton, Cicero
(1971), p. 138.
25 Cicero, ad Att. 12. 40. 2, 51. 2, 13. 2. 1, 27. 1, 28. 2–3, 40. 1.
XXVIII The Ides of March
1 Suetonius, Caesar 86. 1–2.
2 Cicero, pro Marcello 8, 25.
3 Dio 43. 51. 1–2, 44. 1. 1, Appian, BC 2. 110, 3. 77, Plutarch, Caesar 58, Velleius
Paterculus 2. 59. 4, Suetonius, Caesar 44. 3, T. Rice Holmes, The Roman Republic,
3 (1923), pp. 326–327.
562
Notes
4 Cicero, ad Att. 13. 52 for the visit, 14. 1 for calling on him in Rome; for the view
that Caesar’s character had changed profoundly, allegedly under the influence of
Cleopatra see J. Collins, ‘Caesar and the Corruption of Power’, Historia 4 (1955),
pp. 445–465.
5 Dio 43. 44. 1–45. 2, 44. 3. 1–6. 4, Suetonius, Caesar 76. 1; see also R. Carson,
‘Caesar and the Monarchy’, Greece and Rome 4 (1957), pp. 46–53, E. Rawson,
‘Caesar’s heritage: Hellenistic kings and their Roman equals’, Journal of Roman
Studies 65 (1975), pp. 148–159, S. Weinstock, Divus Julius (1971), esp. pp.
200–206; for the New Testament accounts of Jesus being questioned over
taxation see Matthew 22. 17–21, Mark 12. 14–17, for the famous ‘Render to
Caesar the things that are Caesar’s’.
6 Dio 43. 14. 6–7, 44. 6. 1, 5–6, Appian, BC 2. 106, Weinstock (1971), pp. 241–243,
276–286, 305–310.
7 Dio 44. 5. 3–7. 1, Cicero, Philippics 2. 43. 1; on Vespasian’s last words see
Suetonius, Vespasian 23; on the later imperial cult see S. Price, Rituals and Power:
The Roman Imperial Cult in Asia Minor (1984).
8 Suetonius, Caesar 44. 2, Dio 43. 2, 44. 6. 1–3, Cicero, de Divinatione 1. 119, 2. 37;
see also Weinstock (1971), pp. 271–3; on Cleopatra’s visit see Dio 43. 27. 3,
Appian, BC 2. 102; Suetonius, Caesar 52. 1 claims that Caesar summoned her, but
falsely states that she left during his lifetime; Cicero’s visit, ad Att. 15. 2; see also
M. Grant, Cleopatra (1972), pp. 83–94, and E. Rice, Cleopatra (1999), pp. 41–44.
9 Suetonius, Caesar 52. 2, Plutarch, Caesar 49; however, note also Plutarch, Antony
52, which suggests that the boy was not born until after Caesar’s death; for
discussions see Grant (1972), pp. 83–85.
10 Suetonius, Caesar 83. 1–2, Augustus 8. 1–2, Appian, BC 2. 143, Pliny, NH 35. 21,
Plutarch, Antony 11.
11 Plutarch, Caesar 61, Antony 12, Suetonius, Caesar 79. 1–2, Appian, BC 2. 108,
Dio 44. 9. 2–10. 3, Cicero, Philippics 13. 31, Velleius Paterculus 2. 68. 4–5,
Valerius Maximus 5. 7. 2.
12 Dio 44. 11. 1–3, Appian, BC 2. 109, Plutarch, Caesar 61, Antony 12, Cicero,
Philippics 2. 84–87, de Divinatione 1. 52, 119, Suetonius, Caesar 79. 2; see also
Weinstock (1971), pp. 318–341.
13 Bodyguard, see Dio 44. 7. 4, Suetonius, Caesar 84. 2, 86. 1–2, Appian, BC 2. 107;
on justice and juries see Suetonius, Caesar 41. 2, 53. 1.
14 Dio 44. 8. 1–4, Plutarch, Caesar 60, Suetonius, Caesar 78. 1; see also the
comments in Weinstock (1971), p. 276, M. Gelzer, Caesar (1968), p. 317, Rice
Holmes (1923), pp. 333–334.
15 See R. Syme, The Roman Revolution (1939), p. 64, 95, for Galba, and also
Suetonius, Galba 3; for Decimus Brutus being mentioned in Caesar’s will see
Suetonius, Caesar 83. 2, and also Dio 44. 14. 3–4; for Basilus see Dio 43. 47. 3,
Appian, BC 3. 98; for Trebonius and Antony see Plutarch, Antony 13.
16 Plutarch, Brutus 6–13, Caesar 62, Appian, BC 2. 111–114, Dio 44. 11. 4–14. 4,
Suetonius, Caesar 80. 1, 3–4, Velleius Paterculus 2. 58. 1–4; see also Syme (1939),
p. 44–45, 56–60.
17 Suetonius, Caesar 52. 2–3, Appian, BC 2. 113, Plutarch, Caesar 62, Brutus 8,
Antony 11.
18 Dio 43. 51. 7.
563
Notes
19 Plutarch, Caesar 63–65, Suetonius, Caesar 81. 14, Dio 44. 18. 1–4, Appian, BC 2.
115–116, Velleius Paterculus 2. 57. 2–3.
20 Plutarch, Brutus 14–15, Caesar 63, Suetonius, Caesar 80. 4, Cicero, de
Divinatione 2. 9. 23, Dio 44. 16. 1–19. 1.
21 Plutarch, Caesar 66, Brutus 17, Dio 44. 19. 1–5, Appian, BC 2. 117, Suetonius,
Caesar 82. 1–3; Dio and Suetonius both give Caesar’s words to Brutus as ‘You
too, my son’ (kai sou teknon); Suetonius gives his reply to Casca as ‘What, this is
violence!’ (Ista quidem vis est).
22 Plutarch, Caesar 67–68, Brutus 18–21, Antony 14, Dio 44. 20. 1–53. 7, Appian,
BC 2. 118–148, Suetonius, Caesar 82. 4–85.
23 Cicero, ad Att. 14. 1 for the quote from Caius Matius, and 14. 4 for prediction of
rebellion in Gaul.
Epilogue
1 For British readers Kenneth Williams’ portrayal of Caesar in Carry on Cleo
(1964) – with the immortal line ‘Infamy, infamy, they’ve all got it in for me.’ –
may be equally memorable, if not for reasons of historical accuracy. Similarly, for
many, Caesar may be familiar from his regular appearances in the Asterix comics
by Goscinny and Uderzo. Although the Romans are the principal villains of these
stories, Caesar himself is a little formal and pompous, but still largely
sympathetic.
564
Index
565
Pages references in italics refer
to illustrations.
Acco 312, 315, 317
Achillas 437, 441, 442
Adriatic Sea 55, 410
Advocates, legal 71
aediles 32, 105–106
Aedui tribe 198, 201, 203, 204,
239, 242, 243, 286, 307 see
also Vergobret
And first campaign (58 BC)
206, 208, 213, 215–216, 217,
223, 224–225, 227, 228
Great Revolt (52 BC) 316, 317,
319–320, 322, 324, 328, 329,
330, 331, 332, 333, 334–335,
336, 342
Aeneas 32
Afghan War, First (AD
1838–1842) 300
Afranius, Lucius (cos. 60)
156–157, 158, 163, 165, 423,
424, 425, 450, 465, 466, 481
Ilerda campaign 398, 399,
400, 402, 403, 404
Africa 92, 112, 117, 153, 261,
476 see also North Africa
African campaign 450–451,
452, 454–467
African War 458, 459, 464, 465
Agammemnon 423
Agedincum 321–322
Aggar 463
Ahenobarbus, Cnaeus Domitius
(cos. 122) 199–200
Ahenobarbus, Lucius Domitius
(cos. 54) 261, 264, 296, 343,
350, 361, 364, 369, 372–373,
385, 388–390, 398, 404, 423,
424, 425
death 430, 497
Aisne, River 240, 241, 251
Alba Longa 32, 495, 498
Alban Hills 155
Albanians (Transcaucasian
people) 154
Alesia, siege of (52 BC)
336–342, 337, 350, 351
Alexander the Great 10, 22,
100, 153, 154, 184, 185, 249,
309, 434, 444, 491
Alexandria 19, 260, 431, 432,
433, 434, 436, 437, 440–442,
445, 479, 496, 505
description 436, 440
harbour 440, 441, 442
Library 440, 441, 479
Pharos island 442
Pharos lighthouse 440, 442
Alexandrian War 433,
440–444, 448
Alexandrian War 443, 444
Alexandrians 433, 437, 442,
443, 446
Allier, River 329, 334
Allobroges, the 129, 192, 204,
208, 213, 214, 223, 335, 419
Alps 213, 265, 320, 321
Ambarri tribe 213, 239, 243
Ambiorix 299, 301, 306, 308,
310, 311, 352
Amiens (Samarobriva) 302,
305, 306, 307
Amorica (Brittany) 306
Ancona 380, 385
Antioch 447
Antipater (Father of Herod the
Great) 443, 447
Antium 177
Antonius, Caius (cos. 63) 74,
119, 133, 145, 176
Antonius, Lucius (cos. 41) 406
Antonius, Marcus (Mark
Antony’s father) 103, 373
Antonius, Marcus (Mark
Antony’s grandfather, cos.
99) 373
Antony, Mark (Marcus
Antonius, cos. 44) 46, 133,
338
family 31
and siege of Alesia 340
introduced to pleasures of
mistresses 365
career and character 373–374
lifestyle 450, 452
enamoured with Cytheris 84
as tribune 373, 375, 376
flees Rome disguised as slave
377, 380–381
in Civil War 388, 395, 414,
415, 420, 428
left in charge of Italy 397
affair with Cleopatra 437,
497
in Egypt 444
as Master of Horse 449
returns to Rome after
Pharsalus 450, 451
buys Pompey’s house 454
rift healed with Caesar 485
and the Parthians 492
named as priest (flamen of
Julius Caesar) 494, 495,
499
meets Caesar in Gaul 498
and Lupercalia festival 499
and conspiracy against Caesar
503, 504, 505
and Caesar’s assassination
507, 508, 509
and civil war after Caesar’s
death 511–512
and Second Triumvirate 165
death 511
Aous, River 414
Apollo (god) 54
Apollodorus of Rhodes 441
Apollonia 411, 412, 422
Appian 153, 172, 184, 261, 407,
425, 430, 444, 496
Index
566
Appian Way 80, 105, 108, 318
Apsus, River 412, 413
Apulia 387, 388
Aquae Sextiae 217
Aquila, Lucius Pontius 486, 489
Aquileia 209, 212, 213
Aquitania 265, 267, 274
Aquitanians 197
Arabia 437
Arausio, battle of (105 BC) 11,
13
Ardennes 299, 310
Arelate (Arles) 485
Ariminum (Rimini) 377, 378,
381, 385, 386, 387, 388
Ariovistus, King 204, 237, 246,
247, 252, 264, 271, 272,
278, 308, 316, 317, 318
first campaigns against the
Gauls 207, 208, 224–225,
226, 227, 228–229, 230
battle against 230–232, 231
Arles (Arelate) 485
Armenia 177, 446
Armenia, Tigranes (son of the
King) 258
arms, training 40
army, Roman see also
centurions; legionaries
allied soldiers (socii) 21, 22
auxilia (foreign soldiers) 196,
212–213, 240, 241
Gallic 196, 273, 274
Spanish 398, 500
cohorts 193
Caesar and army crosses the
Alps in 58 BC 213
enemies killed in Gaul 355
enemy dead listed in triumph
469
first time marches against
Rome 45
formation, testudo (tortoise)
288
formation, triple line (triplex
acies) 219, 229–230, 246,
275, 400, 418, 425, 465
generals 249
grain supply 215–216, 217,
219, 223, 225, 226, 227,
265, 324, 348, 415, 422
in Gaul 190–196 see also
Julius Caesar, Caius: in
Gaul
land granted to veterans 29,
33, 91, 156, 254 see also
land entries
legions 193, 194, 195, 244,
410, 411
First (Legio I) 306, 384, 388,
425
Third (formerly Fifteenth)
425, 483
Fifth Alaudae 391, 455, 465,
482, 483
Sixth 351, 352, 399, 433,
447
Seventh 193, 246, 249, 265,
278, 283, 285, 287, 288,
343, 351, 399, 462
Seventh’s first campaigns
against the Gauls 209, 213,
219, 220, 231
Eighth 193, 209, 213, 219,
220, 231, 246, 248, 351,
389, 391, 428, 462
Ninth 193, 246, 248, 351,
399, 401, 451, 462, 465
Ninth’s first campaigns
against the Gauls 209, 213,
219, 220, 231
Ninth’s Macedonian
campaign 406–407, 415,
416, 420, 428
Tenth 193, 209, 213, 219,
220, 227, 228, 231, 246,
248, 250, 278, 281, 287,
332, 333, 399, 427–428,
482, 483, 484
Tenth’s first campaigns
against the Gauls 209, 213,
219, 220, 227, 228, 231
Tenth in Africa 451, 453,
458, 462, 465
Eleventh 212, 213, 218,
219–220, 222, 231, 246,
248, 351, 399
Twelfth 212, 213, 218,
219–220, 222, 231, 246,
248, 249, 265, 388, 391
Thirteenth 233, 306, 333,
351, 352, 374, 377, 378,
460, 465
Thirteenth in Civil War
380–381, 385, 388, 391
Fourteenth 233, 299
Fourteenth (new) 306, 310,
351, 352, 399, 401, 460, 465
Fifteenth (later Third) 306,
384, 388
Twenty-Fifth 455
Twenty-Sixth 455
Twenty-Seventh 433
Twenty-Eighth 455
Twenty-Ninth 455
Thirtieth 455
Thirty-Seventh 442
loyalty to Caesar in Civil War
381–382, 384
mutinies 406–407, 452–453
service in pre-Marian army
24–25
training 234–235
volunteers from poorest class
sought by Marius 28–29
weapons 195–196, 221
artillery pieces, scorpion 326
decorated 235
Arretium (Arrezo) 385
Arsinoe (sister of Cleopatra)
441, 442, 443, 444, 468
Artemidorus 508
Arverni tribe 200, 317, 319,
321, 325, 328, 329, 330,
331, 342
Ascalon 437, 438
Asculum 388
Asia 34, 43, 44, 65, 77, 81, 104,
112, 121, 153, 157, 166,
256, 432, 446, 467
Asia Minor 10, 22, 74, 434
Asiatic Greeks 67
Aswan dam 434
Ategua 483
Athens 74
Athens, Assembly of 17
Atia (mother of Octavian) 36
Atlantic coast 265
Atrebates tribe 239, 244, 248,
280, 302, 308, 316
Atrius, Quintus 288, 290
Atticus, Titus Pomponius 155,
159, 164, 177, 474
Atuatuca 299, 310, 311
Atuatuci tribe 239, 244,
251–252, 301, 306, 310
auctoritas 16, 18, 19
Aude, River 200
Augustus, Emperor (Caesar’s
adopted son) 11, 39, 186,
195, 437, 490, 492, 494,
495, 497 see also Octavian
Index
567
Aurelia (Caesar’s mother) 33,
35, 36, 49–50, 52, 59, 87,
100, 125–126, 146, 148,
293–294
Aurelia Orestilla 117
Aurelius, Caius 95, 96
Autronius Paetus, Publius
(cos. elect for 65) 109–110
Auxinum 388
Avaricum (Bourges) 323, 324-
325, 326–328, 329, 332,
355
Avienus 462
Baculus, Sextus Julius 248
Balbus, Lucius Cornelius (cos.
40) 148, 164, 165, 167, 191,
236, 296, 374, 472, 477, 492,
501–502
and Spanish campaign 482,
486, 489
Balearic Islands, slingers 196,
240
Bardyaei (band of freed slaves)
46
Basilus, Lucius Minucius
502–503
bath-house 62
beast fights 344, 470
Belgae 197, 233, 237–252, 264
kings 239
method for attacking
fortifications 240
rebellion 298–304
Belgic army 241–242, 244, 247,
248, 250, 267, 304, 306
cavalry 241
Belgium 267
Bellienus, Lucius Annius 116
Bellovaci tribe 239, 242, 243,
343, 351, 352, 353
Berenice IV (older sister of
Cleopatra) 436–437
Besançon (Vesontio) 225–226,
233–234, 453, 461
Bestia, Lucius Calpurnius 142
Bibracte (Mont Beuvray) 201,
218, 219–220, 241, 334,
350–351
battle of (58 BC) 221–222, 221
Bibrax (Vieux-Laon?) 240–242
Bibulus, Marcus Calpurnius
(cos. 59) 106–107, 257, 258,
346, 348
in Caesar’s consulship
160–161, 163, 164, 166–167,
169, 170, 171–172, 174, 176,
178, 179, 180, 181
in Civil War 361, 364, 369,
393, 410, 411, 412, 413
Bigbury Wood 288
Bithynia 66, 68, 76, 470, 500
Bithynians 79
Bituriges tribe 206, 319, 320,
321, 323, 324, 351
Blücher, Marshal Gebhard 185
Bocchus of Mauretania 459
Boduognatus 247, 248
Bogudes, King 467
Boii tribe 322, 323, 324
warriors 222, 223
Boulogne (Portus Itius?) 279,
286
Bourges (Avaricum) 323,
324–325, 326–328, 329, 332,
355
bribery/bribes 72, 101–102,
318, 346, 347–348, 366
Brindisi (Brundisium) 55, 155,
391, 394, 406, 407, 410, 411,
412, 414, 449, 451
Britain 190, 243, 264–265,
267–268, 269–270, 279, 280,
310, 352–353, 359
first expedition to 269,
278–285, 279
second expedition to 285–292
trade with 291
Britons 269, 280, 281, 282–283,
284, 288, 289, 290
Brittany (Amorica) 265, 306
Brundisium (Brindisi) 55, 155,
391, 394, 406, 407, 410, 411,
412, 414, 449, 451
Brutus Albinus, Decimus Junius
88, 192, 266, 321, 338, 341,
398–399, 406, 498
conspiracy against Caesar
502, 503, 504, 505
Brutus, Marcus Junius 85, 92,
179, 180, 382, 430, 454, 477,
504, 509
birth 85
mistress Volumnia/Cytheris 84
and Catiline’s conspiracy
140–141
meets Caesar in Cisalpine
Gaul 487
writes Cato 487–488
governs Cisalpine Gaul 504
as Caesar’s assassin 84, 85,
88, 505, 507, 508, 509
councils held after Caesar’s
assassination 86
Bugeard, Marshal Thomas-
Robert 315
Burebista, King of Dacia 197,
491
Buthrotum 474
Cabillonum 330–331
Cadiz (Gades) 100, 150, 164
Caelius Rufus, Marcus
262–263, 343, 363, 365, 366,
367, 368, 383–384, 409, 449,
451, 454
Caepio, Quintus Servilius
174–175
Caesar, Julius see Julius
Caesar, Caius
Caesar, origin of name 31–32
Caesarean section 35
Caesarion 496–497
calendar, Roman 411, 415,
479–480
Calenus, Quintus Fufius (cos.
47) 452
Caleti tribe 239
Calpurnia (Caesar’s wife) 174,
496, 497, 507
Calvinus, Cnaeus Domitius
(cos. 53, 40) 428, 446–447
Campania 119, 175, 260, 261,
452, 492
publicly owned land in (ager
Campanus) 167
Campanian Law 177 see also
land bill/law
Caninius Rebilus, Caius 475
Cannae, battle of (216 BC) 11
Canterbury 288
Canuleius, Marcus 72
Cappadocia 446, 447
Capua 79, 80, 178, 345
Carbo, Cnaeus Papirius (cos.
120) 253
Carbo, Cnaeus Papirius (cos.
85, 84, 82) 55, 56
Carnutes tribe 201, 298, 306, 307,
312, 316, 318, 319, 351, 353
Carrhae, battle of (53 BC) 313,
349, 360, 491
Index
568
Carthage 10, 11, 20, 22, 349
colony established on site of
27, 473–474
Carthaginian fleet 255, 256
Carthaginians 21–22
Casca Longus, Publius
Servilius 508–509
Caspian Sea 491
Cassius Longinus, Caius 314,
477, 482, 502, 503, 504,
505, 508, 509
son 507–508
Cassius Longinus, Lucius (cos.
107) 215
Cassius Longinus, Quintus
375, 376, 377, 380–381,
405, 481
Cassivellaunus 289, 290, 291
Casticus 206, 208
Catiline, Lucius Sergius 110,
116, 117, 119, 127–129,
130, 131, 133, 166, 220, 398
debate 135, 136, 138, 140,
151
defeated 145
Cato, Caius 178, 253, 260, 263
Cato, Marcus Porcius (‘the
Elder’) 117
present when bathing son 36
during censorship 67
sleeps with slave girl 69
wife 35
Cato, Marcus Porcius (‘the
Younger’) 117, 118, 264,
369, 406, 450
as bitter opponent of Caesar
85
and conspiracy 115, 117–118,
127
prosecutes Murena 132
and the Catilinarian debate
140–141
in Caesar’s praetorship 142,
143, 144
prominence 151
prevents vote on postponing
elections 154
Pompey asks if he and his son
can marry his nieces 156
aims to cut Pompey down to
size 157
confrontation with Metellus
Nepos 157
opposes publicani 158
and Caesar’s consulship
campaign 159–160, 161,
163
and First Triumvirate 165
Caesar orders imprisonment
of 168–169
and land bill 168, 169, 170,
171, 172, 177, 181
unable to be muzzled 255
sent to Cyprus 258
prevented from winning the
praetorship 264
and Caesar’s massacre of
German tribes 276–277
stands as consul in election
348
backs Pompey 361
condemns Caesar’s actions
against Usipetes and
Tencteri 361, 364
opposes Caesar 376
urges Senate to appoint
Pompey as supreme
commander 387–388
votes twenty days
thanksgiving to Bibulus
393
in Civil War 424
and Ptolemy XIV 444
and Caesar’s agrarian law
474
respected by Brutus 487
death 467, 469, 504
books written about 487–488
as the object of praise 517
Catullus, Caius Valerius 68,
72, 236–237, 256, 383, 512
father 236, 237
Catulus, Quintus Lutatius (cos.
78) 108, 111, 114, 115, 117,
125, 126, 132–133, 143, 148
Catuvolcus 299, 310
Cavarinus, King of the Senones
306, 307
Celtiberian tribe 276, 401
Celtic/Gallic tribes 342
Celtic language, Gallo-Greek
inscription using 209
Celtic speaking peoples
198–199
Celts 197
Cenabum (Orléans) 319,
322–323, 325, 327, 351, 353
censors 94–95
censorship not functioning
properly 476
censuses of Roman citizens 15,
17, 95
centuria praerogativa 162, 163,
346
centuries 162
centurions 193–194, 195, 226,
227, 233–234
Cethegus, Caius Cornelius
133–134
brother 142
Cethegus, Publius Cornelius
83
Cevennes, Pass of the 321, 322
chariots 283–284, 290, 469,
470
children
birth of 34–35
breast-feeding 35
purification ceremony
(lustratio) 35, 464
upbringing of 35–38
Christianity 354
Churchill, Winston 187
Cicero, Marcus Tullius (cos.
63, orator) 61, 111,
512–513
and children and former
generations 38
listens to orators 39–40
in Social War 43
house 63, 177, 258
and Caesar’s homosexuality
scandal 68
Verres’ trial 72
compares an orator to a
famous actor 73
publishes speeches 73
and Apollonius 74
leaves Rome for further study
74
considers Caesar one of the
best orators 77
and Caesar as prosecutor 79
dismayed by Mark Antony
and Volumnia 84
and Servilia 86
praises Marius’s victories 99
and Autronius 110
and Crassus 113–114
and Catiline’s trial 116
as consul 119, 120, 121, 122,
123, 127, 128, 132, 172, 181
Index
569
and Roman citizens 130
and Caesar’s appearance 131
and Catiline’s conspiracy
131–132, 133, 134, 135, 136,
138–141, 142, 145
and Clodius’s trial 148
leaves province early 150–151
thoughts of his reputation in
the future 152
and Pompey 155, 164,
392–393
placates Metellus Celer 156
poor view of Lucius Afranius
156–157
and publicani contract
demands 158
and Caesar’s campaign for the
consulship in 58 BC 159,
160, 161,
consulship campaign 163
and land law 164
claims Caesar rewarded agents
with shares 173
and Caesar on Vatinius 174
criticises triumvirs 176, 253
offered post as legate in Gaul
177
and opponents of triumvirs
178–179
and plot to murder Pompey
179
keeps himself in public eye
185
praises Caesar’s
Commentaries 186–187
and history books 188
attacks Piso’s record as
proconsul 190
refuses Caesar’s request to
accompany him to Gaul as
legate 191
and fear of war in Gaul 205
feels that war in Gaul averted
207
and Pompey guarding his life
253
exile 253–254, 258–259, 372
charged for execution of
conspirators 257
and defence of Milo 260
campaigns to repeal Caesar’s
land law 260
and conference of Luca 261,
262
and Marcus Caelius Rufus
262–263, 449
praises Caesar’s victories in
Gaul 263
and Caesar in Britain 269
and campaigns in Britain 291
letter of condolence to Caesar
294
and Crassus’ expedition to
Parthia 295
letters from brother 296–297
and letters to Caius Trebatius
Testa 297
visits Caesar in Ravenna 319
closer relationship with
Caesar 343–344
and Pompey’s theatre 344
and Caesar’s Forum extension
345
agrees to defend Milo 347
appointed proconsul of Cilicia
348, 479
and Caesar’s rivalry with
Pompey 358
as governor of Cilicia 363,
367, 393
returns from Cilicia 369
sees no sense in fighting
Caesar 370
involved in negotiations
between Caesar and
Pompey 375–376
and Mark Antony 376
and Caesar in Civil War 380,
387, 394
in Civil War 392, 394–395,
399, 405, 408, 412, 423–424
major loan from Caesar 393
and no news of Caesar for six
months 448
decides war is lost 450, 451
meets Caesar on way from
Brundisium 451
and Caesar’s affair with Tertia
454
and Caesar winning Civil War
468
and community of Buthrotum
474
and Caninius’s consulship 475
pardoned and sits in Senate
477, 478
and calendar 480
death of Tullia 485
and Caesar’s statue 486
drafts letter of advice on
reforming Republic 489
with Caesar 492–493
and Cleopatra 496
and Caesar’s assassination
505, 509, 510
Cato 487–488
Fourth Catilinarian Oration
138–139
Philippics 373
Cicero, Quintus Tullius 138,
190, 262, 291, 296–297, 310,
311, 312, 338, 409
and rebellion 298, 301, 302,
303, 304, 305
Cilicia 75, 121, 125, 348, 363,
367, 393, 447, 479
Cimber, Lucius Tillius 508
Cimbri tribe 11, 13, 29, 44, 67,
99, 150, 200, 201, 210, 224,
227, 238, 358
Cingetorix 308
Cingulum 380, 388
Cinna, Lucius Cornelius 510
Cinna, Caius Helvius 505,
510
Cinna, Lucius Cornelius (cos.
87–84) 46, 49, 50, 51, 52,
53, 54, 55, 57, 96, 112, 408
Cirta, Numidia 28
Civil War 140, 226, 355, 360,
514–515
Africa 450–451, 452, 454–467
battle of Thapsus (46 BC)
464–467, 463
begins (49 BC) 379, 380–381
Dyrrachium (Durazzo) (48 BC)
411, 414–422, 417, 423, 424,
428, 429, 450
history of 158
Ilerda campaign (49 BC)
397–404, 403
Italian campaign (49 BC)
385–391, 386
Macedonia 411–431, 448–449
Pharsalus (48 BC) 422–431,
426, 427, 441, 448, 450
Roman army in 196
and Rome 391–397
Zela (47 BC) 446–448
end of 367
civil war after Caesar’s death
510–511
Index
570
Claudian family 255, 256 see
also Clodius Pulcher,
Publius
Claudius Pulcher, Caius 256
Claudius Caecus, Appius (cos.
307, 296) 135
Claudius Pulcher, Appius (cos.
54) 256, 296, 369, 372, 393,
409, 487
daughter 382
Claudius Pulcher, Publius (cos.
249) 255
Sister, Claudia 255–256
Cleopatra (film, 1963) 518
Cleopatra VI 436
Cleopatra VII 432, 436,
437–438, 441–442, 444,
445–446, 496–497, 512, 518
appearance 438–440
death 511
Clermont 319
Clodia (sister of Clodius) 260,
262
Clodius Pulcher, Publius 146,
180, 253, 258
family 256
father 256
and Bona Dea festival
146–147, 155, 156, 176–177
drops plans to attack Caesar’s
laws 179
made a plebian 253, 255, 256
tribunate 256–257, 258–259
elected aedile 260
prosecutes Milo 260
supported by Crassus 261
murder of 318, 346
Colchis, Lesser 446
collegia (guilds or associations)
257, 259, 480
Comitia Centuriata 16, 29, 50,
123, 124, 161, 162, 189,
194, 346, 409, 475
Comitia Tributa see Popular
Assemblies
Commius, King of the
Atrebates 280, 282, 284,
291, 308, 316, 339, 351,
352–353
competition for fame and
influence 19, 22, 23
Concilium Plebis see Assembly
of tribes
Concordia (deity) 134
concubines 83–84
Condrusi tribe 271
Considius, Quintus (senator)
177
Considius, Publius 218, 219
consuls 13, 15, 172, & passim
see also elections, consular
Convictolitavis 330
Corcyra 413, 418
Corduba 482, 483
Corfinium 42, 388, 389–391,
404, 436, 457
Corinth 22, 474
Corinth canal 491
Coriolanus 36
Cornelia (mother of the
Gracchi) 34, 36
Cornelia (Caesar’s wife) 49,
51, 57, 58, 63, 69, 82, 98,
99, 147
Cornelia (Pompey’s wife) 88,
349, 431
Correus 351, 352
Corsica 10
Cossutia 49, 69
Cotta, Caius Aurelius (cos. 75)
33, 59, 72, 78, 80–81
Cotta, Lucius Aurelius (cos. 65)
33, 94, 109, 110, 111,
Cotta, Lucius Aurunculeius
192, 242, 299, 300, 302,
303, 305, 310, 312, 356
Cotta, Marcus Aurelius (cos.
74) 33
court, murder (quaestio de
sicariis) 115–116
courtesans 83, 84, 86, 89
courts 70–71, 72
Crassus, Marcus Licinius the
Younger 298, 302, 305, 361
Crassus, Marcus Licinius (cos.
70, 55) 79–80, 396
father and brother 46
buys properties 63
and slave girls 69
uses wealth to gain political
influence 81
wife seduced by Caesar 85
and Slave war 92, 153
bad blood with Pompey
92–94, 95
seeks and attains consulship
93, 94
wins the censorship 111, 114
active in public life and buys
land in Rome 112–114
resigns as censor 115
backs Catiline 131
accusations against 131–132,
135, 139
stands surety for Caesar 149
avoided Catilinarian debate
151
takes family abroad 154
eulogises Cicero in Senate
155
measures blocked in Senate
157, 158
supports publicani 158
and First Triumvirate 165,
166, 168, 170, 176, 254
and land bill/law 168, 170,
173, 181
bribed by Ptolemy XII 174
uses fortified barrier in
Spartacus campaign 210
supports Caius Cato 253
renegotiates tax-farmers’
contracts 254
restores full powers to
tribunes of the plebs 255
wealth, fame and auctoritas
254–255
support for Clodius 261
conference of Luca 261, 262
re-elected as consul 264
takes cohorts into Aquitania
265, 267
and Spartacus 267
granted five-year command of
provinces 294–295
plans to conquer Parthia
295–296
main objectives in life
achieved 296
invasion of Parthia 313
waits outside Rome 359
hopes to annexe Egypt 435
death of 313, 361, 372
Crassus, Publius Licinius 192,
232, 264, 265, 313, 349
Crastinus, Caius 428-429, 430
Cretan archers 27, 196, 240
Crete 505
governor of 104
crown, civic (corona civica)
65–66, 67, 106
culture, Classical Greek 21, 66
Index
571
Curio, Caius Scribonius (the
Younger) 178, 179, 375,
377, 388, 390, 392, 393, 406,
408, 450, 459
and breakdown of alliance
365, 366–367, 368, 370, 371,
373
Curio, Caius Scribonius the
Elder (cos. 76) 178, 179, 365
Curius, Quintus 128, 133, 145
Cybele (goddess) 106
Cyprus 258, 260, 434, 444
Cyrenaica 434, 450
Cytheris (Volumnia) 84
D-Day landings 289
Dacia 184, 197
Dacians 491, 506
Dardanus, Peace of 55
Deal, Kent 281
Demosthenes 373
dignitas (dignity), quality of 37
Dio 166, 172, 175, 180, 226,
252, 265, 448, 486, 494, 495
and siege of Alesia 342
and Pompey’s theatre 344
and Cleopatra 432, 439, 441
and Caesar’s first triumph 469
and Caesar’s dictatorship 470,
471, 480, 481
Diviciacus 204, 206, 216–217,
224, 227, 239, 242, 243, 286,
287, 316
Divico 214, 215
divorce 146
Dolabella, Cnaeus Cornelius
(cos. 81) 71, 72, 73
Dolabella, Publius Cornelius
(cos. 44) 394, 405, 451, 454,
498, 505
Dordogne 353
Dover, Kent 280
dress, aristocratic Roman
62–63 see also Caesar,
Gaius Julius: dress
druids 201
Drusus, Marcus Livius 42, 63,
64
Dumnorix 206, 208, 211, 215,
216–217, 286–287, 298, 312,
317
Durazzo (Dyrrachium) see
Dyrrachium
Durocortorum (Reims) 312
Dyrrachium (Durazzo) (48 BC)
411, 414–422, 417, 423, 424,
428, 429, 450
Eastern Settlement 156, 166,
173, 181, 254, 258, 446
Ebro, River 401–402
Eburones tribe 271, 299, 301,
310, 311, 352
Education, Roman 36–37, 38, 39
of girls 87, 88
Egus 419
Egypt 75, 173–174, 177, 259,
295, 371, 373, 412, 431,
432–446, 496, 500
attempts to annexe 114–115
Egyptian army 442, 444
Egyptian navy 442
elections, consular 16, 17, 18,
96–98, 109, 119, 126–127,
154–155, 161–164, 180, 264,
346, 348, 409
saepta (‘sheep-pens’)
162–163, 478
elephants 456, 466, 470
elks 312
Elphinstone, Major general
William 300
England, south-eastern
coastline 279, 280 see also
Britain
English Channel 279, 280, 282,
285, 287, 354
Enipeus, River 425
Entremont 200, 202
Epirus 411, 412, 474
equites (equestrian order) 16,
17, 23, 27, 127, 157, 158,
228
estates, latifundia 25, 26, 200
Etruria 128
Eunoe, Queen 467, 496
Fabia tribe 98
Fabii clan 31
Fabius, Caius (Caesar’s legate)
302, 303, 305, 330, 341, 398,
399
Fabius, Lucius (centurion) 332,
333
Fabius Maximus, Quintus (cos.
45) 475, 486
family character traits and
deeds 17
Fanum (Fano) 385
farmers, service in pre-Marian
army 24–25
festival of Bona Dea (Good
Goddess) 145–146, 147,
176, 256, 293
festival of Liberalia 48
festival of Lupercalia 494, 499,
505
Fimbria, Caius Flavius 53
Flaccus, Lucius Valerius (cos.
100) 30
Flaccus, Lucius Valerius (cos.
86) 53
Flavius, Lucius 157, 167
Flavus, Lucius Caesetius
498–499, 505
Flora (concubine) 83–84
fortified barriers 210–211
Fortuna (goddess) 254
France, northern 238
France, Revolutionary 24
Fregellae people 42
Fulvia (mistress of Quintus
Curius) 128, 133
Fulvia (wife successively of
Clodius, Curio, and Mark
Antony) 365
funerals of aristocratic families
98–99
Gabinius, Aulus (cos. 58) 103,
178, 180, 258, 371, 373, 409,
431, 436, 437, 441
Gades (Cadiz) 100, 150, 164
Gaetulians 462
Galatians 447
Galba, King of the Suessiones
239, 242, 243
Galba, Servius Sulpicius
(Caesar’s legate) 191–192,
265, 372, 502
galleys, war 412–413
Gallia Comata 265
Gallic armies 203–204
cavalry 204
weapons 204
Gallic/Celtic peoples 233, 237
‘Games, Roman’ (Ludi Romani)
106–107
games and shows honouring
Cybele (Ludi Megalenses)
106–107
Ganymede 443
Index
572
Garonne, River 200
Gaul 161, 177 see also Julius
Caesar, Caius: in Gaul
Caesar’s army in 190–196
campaign against the Helvetii
212–213, 214–216, 217–223,
224, 227
campaigns against tribal
peoples in 22
clans (pagi) in 197–198
coinage 200
composition of 197–198, 198
later history 350–356
Great Revolt in 315, 317–318,
319–342
income from province 355
probable coastline facing
Britain 279
punishing the tribes for
rebellion (vastatio)
306–312
rebellion in 54–53 BC
298–306
religions 354
Roman influences in 354
sacred sites 252
Transalpine Gaul as Roman
province 10
stability 204
towns, walled 200, 201
trade with 200, 203, 359
tribes (civitates) 197–198,
200–201, 203
Gaul, Cisalpine 101, 114, 163,
176, 181, 197, 312, 317, 319,
477
Caesar spends winter in 232,
270, 286
garrison 193
Gaul, Transalpine 22, 176, 181,
197, 261, 299, 334–335, 350,
353, 358, 473, 485
conquest of 199, 200
garrison 193
Helvetii wish to migrate
across 205, 206–207, 208,
209–210, 211
recovering from rebellion 204,
208
Gaul, Transpadene 101, 363
Gauls 197, 199, 265
in Ilerda campaign 401
rituals 201–202, 354
sacking of Rome (390 BC) 13
serving in Roman army 196,
273, 274, 333
warfare and raiding 202–203,
206
Geminius 83–84
Geneva 209, 210
Gergovia 319, 356
setback at (52 BC) 328–336,
356
German army 225, 227–228,
229, 230–232
‘hundred’ light infantry
(centeni) 229
German cavalry 229, 230,
339–340
German troops 352
German warriors 70, 274, 459,
460
Germanic tribes 11, 13, 29, 70,
80, 199, 224, 263, 270, 272,
273–274 see also Cimbri;
the Seubi; Teutones tribe
Germans as pastoralists 309
Germany 199
gladiatorial fights/games 107,
345, 470, 471
gladiators 259, 508
Glaucia, Caius Servilius 13, 14,
29, 40–41
supporters of 121–122
Gnipho, Marcus Antonius
(teacher) 39
gods, Rome’s relationship with
276
Gomphi 422–423
Gorgobina 322
governors, provincial 23, 27,
71–72, 73, 91, 350
Gracchi, the 27–28, 34, 42,
44–45, 105, 119, 136, 139, 498
Gracchus, Caius Sempronius
26, 27, 29, 34, 41, 161,
473–474
Gracchus, Tiberius Sempronius
25–26, 27, 29, 34, 41, 170,
498
graffiti 97
Greece 44, 55, 391, 392, 411,
414, 423, 431, 478
Greek city-states, warfare
between 21
Greek culture, Classical 21, 66
Greek-speaking world, low
regard for Romans 11
Greeks 440
Greeks, Asiatic 67
Gregory XIII, Pope 479
Habra 146
Hadrumentum 455, 456
Hannibal 11, 184, 185, 349, 515
harbours, ‘Mulberry’ 289
Harrison, Rex 518
hat, apex (worn by flamen
dialis) 50
Hellenic culture 66
Hellenistic powers 11, 22, 75
Helvetii tribe 204, 238, 240,
242, 247, 252, 263, 264, 270,
271, 316, 317, 318, 322
Campaign against (58 BC)
205–208, 209–210, 211,
213–214
at battle of Bibracte (58 BC)
220–223
Helvii tribe 321
Hengistbury Head 279
Herculaneum 39
Hercules 95
Hiempsal, King of Numidia
121, 148
Hirtius, Aulus (cos. 43) 184,
188, 191, 350, 353, 375, 488
Holland 238
homosexuality 40, 66–68, 81,
87, 98
Hortensius Hortalus, Quintus
(cos. 69) 72, 112, 123, 132,
488
hostages in Gallic War 243, 267
Hostilius, Tullus (third king of
Rome) 32
houses as status symbols 63
houses of senators 64
human sacrifice 201–202, 354
Hyrcanus II, (Jewish High
Priest) 443, 447
Iberian Peninsula 149, 217,
391–392, 397
Iberians (Black Sea people) 154
Iggulden, Conn: Emperor series
of novels 519
Iguvium 388
Ilerda (Lérida) 398, 399, 400,
402
Ilerda campaign (49 BC)
397–404, 403
Index
573
Illyricum 176, 181, 193, 197,
209, 268, 286, 310, 312, 406
campaigns against tribal
peoples in 22
part of, ruled by the Romans
10, 22
imperial cult 495
imperium, symbols of 144
Indutiomarus 298, 306, 307,
308
Isauricus, Publius Servilius
Vatia (cos. 79) 70, 75, 78,
121, 125, 191
Isauricus, Publius Servilius
Vatia (cos. 48, 41) 409
Italian allies (socii) 41–42
Italian armies 43
Italian campaign in Civil War
385–391, 386
Italian Peninsula ruled by the
Romans 10, 20
Italians, citizenship granted 41,
42
Italy 92, 112, 120, 163, 358
rural 161
Iulus, son of Aeneas 32
Iuncus, Marcus 76, 78
Iuventus (deity of youth) 49
Jerusalem 154
Jewish population in Rome 64,
480, 510
Juba, King of Numidia 121,
406, 450, 456, 459, 461, 462,
464, 465, 466, 468
son 468
Judaea 373
Judaean royal family 154
Jugurtha, King of Numidia 28,
44, 99
Julia (aunt) 33, 98, 99
Julia (daughter) 82, 174–175,
262, 293–294, 345, 361, 372,
497
Julia (sisters) 34, 146, 148
Julii, the 31, 32–33, 34, 37, 98
Julius, month of 30
Julius Caesar (ancestor) 31–32
Julius Caesar (TV film, 2002)
518
Julius Caesar, Gaius
birth (13 July 100 BC) 11, 30,
35
and the Republican system 11
and res publica 15
at aunt’s funeral 33
early years 34–40
education 39
early writings 39
appearance 40, 61–62, 63
as natural horseman 40
weapons skills 40, 249
formally becomes a man 48
as head of household 49
and possible marriage to
Cossutia 49
marries Cornelia 49, 51, 69
nominated for priesthood of
Flamen Dialis 49–50, 51,
56, 58, 62, 102
epileptic fits 51, 100, 466, 490,
502
in Rome when Sulla’s army
takes city for second time
57
told by Sulla to divorce wife
and refuses 57, 58, 60
flees Rome 58–59
contracts malaria 59
saved by mother 59
and Sulla 60
dress 62, 89, 98, 130–131,
495–496, 498, 499
habits 63
house 63–64, 126
country villa 64–65
as collector of fine art, gems
and pearls 65
returns to Rome and begins
military service 65
awarded civic crown (corona
civica) 65–66, 106
military service, first overseas
66
homosexuality scandal 66–68,
69, 81, 87, 98
affairs with women 68–69 see
also Julius Caesar, Gaius:
mistresses, sex life
and Cossutia 69
first sexual experiences 69, 70
transfers to staff of governor
of Cilicia in 78 BC 70
returns to Rome and
contemplates joining
Lepidus’s rebels 70
appears as an advocate for the
first time 70
pardoned by Sulla 70, 72
prosecutes Cnaeus Cornelius
Dolabella 71, 72, 73–74
prosecutes Caius Antonius 74
travels to Rhodes 74–75
and pirates 75–77, 81
reaches Rhodes 77
defeats Pontic raiders 77–78,
81, 212
appointed to college of
pontiffs 78, 81
returns to Rome 78
prosecutes Marcus Iuncus
78–79
as military tribune 79, 80, 94,
193
and Crassus 81
character and qualities 81, 86,
151, 185
and marriage to Cornelia 82,
99–100
divorce ordered by Sulla 82
sex life 84–86, 87, 89, 131,
147, 155, 237, 454, 467, 469,
496 see also Julius
Caesar, Caius: affair
with Cleopatra; affairs
affection for Brutus 85
relationship with Servilia
85–86
mistresses 89 see also Julius
Caesar, Gaius: affairs, sex
life; Servilia
supports Plotius’s bill 96
elected quaestor 96, 98
sent to Further Spain 98, 100
death of aunt Julia 98, 99
death of wife Cornelia 98, 99
returns to Italy 101
marries Pompeia 101–102
and piracy law 103, 212
and lex Manilia 104–105
seeks to woo electorate 105
serves as curule aedile 105,
106–107, 108, 111, 114–115,
160
and the games 106–107
debts 107–108, 125, 131, 149,
160, 165, 185, 513
and Marius’s trophies 108
propaganda against 111
serves as magistrate 115,
116–117, 121–122, 123, 124
ambitions 118–119
Index
574
temper 121
elected praetor 124
candidature for Pontifex
Maximus 124, 125, 126
as Pontifex Maximus 126,
131, 147, 173, 177, 193, 215,
293, 423
and Catiline 130
and Catiline’s conspiracy 133,
135, 136–138, 139, 141, 142,
145
as an orator 136
as praetor 143, 144–145,
160–161
and Bona Dea (‘Good
Goddess’) scandal 145, 147
divorces Pompeia 146–147,
158–159, 174
career based on winning
friends 148
governs Further Spain
148–151, 212
returns from Spain 158, 159,
160, 165
and letter writing 158–159
campaigns for consulship 159,
160, 161–162, 163
gives up triumph for
campaigns in Spain 159,
160, 165
elected as consul 163–164,
166–167
and land bill/law 164, 167,
168–169, 170, 171–172, 474
and First Triumvirate 165,
175, 176, 178, 254, 261–262
consulship 170–175, 176, 188,
253
and Bibulus 171, 172–173
marries Calpurnia 174
needs Pompey’s support 175
command of Illyricum and
Cisalpine Gaul proposed
176, 181
offers Cicero post as legate in
Gaul 177
and Vettius’s plot to murder
Pompey 180
leaves for Gaul 180, 184, 185,
187, 205
as self-publicist 185–186
in Gaul 185, 188, 189, 190,
201, 205, 209–210, 271, 272,
286, 315–317, 358
and his army 190–196
campaign against the
Helvetii 212–213, 214–216,
217–223, 224, 227
protecting Gallic/Celtic
tribes from Ariovistus
224–225, 226, 227–230
battle against Ariovistus
230–232, 231, 272
and centurions 233–234
and the Belgae 233, 237–252
social life 236–237
at battle of the Sambre 244,
246–247, 248, 249, 250
and the Atuatuci 251, 252
and Germanic tribes’
migration 80, 270,
272–275, 276–277
rebellion 297–306
punishing the tribes for
rebellion (vastatio)
306–312
and the Great Revolt 315,
317–318, 319–342
setback at Gergovia
328–336, 356
siege of Alesia 336–342
the end 350–356
at battle of Bibracte 220–221,
222–223
relationship with army
234–235
army staff 235–236
loots sacred sites 252
and Orgetorix 205–206
and the Helvetii 208, 209–210,
211
writings 186–190 see also
specific writings
granted Illyricum, Cisalpine
Gaul and Transalpine Gaul
as his province 197
and tribes’ characteristics 199
and the Gauls 201, 202
passes law regulating
behaviour of governors 214
fifteen days public
thanksgiving voted for 252,
253
outside Rome 257
supports return of Cicero
from exile 259
victim of his own success 261
conference of Luca 261, 262
command confirmed and
extended 262, 263, 362–364
Veneti rebellion 265, 266–267,
268, 269
leads force against Menapii
and Morini 267
first expedition to Britain
269, 278–285
raid into German region
277–278
and chariots 283
voted twenty days of
thanksgiving 285
second expedition to Britain
285–292
on Sabinus and Cotta 293
and death of daughter Julia
293–294
pays tribute to Cicero
343–344
gladiatorial games to mark
death of daughter 345
hopes to return to second
consulship 349, 350
seeks second consulship
359–360
returns as rebel 360, 379
attacked by Marcus Claudius
Marcellus 361–362, 363
establishes colony at Novum
Comum 363
many senators loathe 369–370
and reasons for Civil War 371
tensions leading to Civil War
376–377
in Ravenna 377
crossing the Rubicon 378,
379, 385, 394, 445, 467, 514
and Civil War 380, 381, 384,
405–407, 408–410
Italian campaign 385,
386–387, 388, 389
in Rome 392, 393–394,
395–397
and Cicero 394–395
Ilerda campaign 397,
398–400, 402, 403, 404
Macedonia 411, 412,
413–414, 415, 416, 418, 419,
420, 421–423, 424–425, 427,
428, 429, 430–431
Zela 446–448
Africa 452, 454, 455–459,
460, 461, 462–463, 464, 465,
Index
575
466, 467
appointed dictator then
resigns and leaves Rome
409, 410
returns to Rome 396–397
in Egypt 432–433, 440–441,
442, 443, 444–446, 448
bribe from Ptolemy XII 174,
435–436, 441
meets Cleopatra 441–442
affair with Cleopatra 432,
442, 445, 446
VENI, VIDI, VICI 447, 469
returns to Italy 448, 450,
451–452
appointed dictator again 449
meets Cicero on way from
Brundisium 451
army mutinies 452–453
gifts to mark victory 454
returns to Rome from Africa
and celebrates four
triumphs 468–470, 471
rewards soldiers 471
as dictator 472–473
colonisation programme
473–474, 478
resigns consulship 475
appointments 476–478
improves living conditions in
Rome 478–479
and calendar 479–480
and regulation 480–481
Spanish campaign 482, 483,
484, 485
granted title of ‘Liberator’
and called imperator
permanently 485
returns to Rome from Spain
485–486
made dictator for ten years
486
statues erected 486, 494
chairs 486, 494, 508
position violates senatorial
ideal 487
writes book about Anticato
488
plans for further campaigns
491–492
long term plans 491, 493–494
visits Cicero 492–493
honours and awards 493–495
cult created a god 495
and becoming king 498–500
conspiracy against 500–505
assassination 84, 85, 184, 358,
472, 490, 491, 505–511
funeral 509–510
admiration through the ages
516–519
quotations 10, 490
A Collection of Maxims 186
(War) Commentaries 80, 150,
186–187, 188–189, 190, 191,
193, 194, 207, 210, 212, 213,
214, 218, 223, 226, 228, 230,
233, 235, 237, 238, 239, 250,
252, 270, 271, 272, 274, 277,
282, 300, 305, 311, 377, 380,
385, 395–396, 400, 406, 411,
413, 416, 418, 421, 425, 441,
512, 516
Commentaries on the Gallic
War 70, 186, 187, 188, 189,
193, 194, 197, 243, 316–317,
319, 326, 337, 338, 341, 342,
343, 350, 355
books Five and Six 312
The Journey (Iter) (poem) 482
Oedipus 39, 186
On Analogy (De Analogia) 343
Praises of Hercules 186
Julius Caesar, Lucius (cos. 157)
32
Julius Caesar, Lucius (cos. 90)
32, 43, 46
Julius Caesar, Lucius (cos. 64)
122, 133, 142, 335, 373, 466
Julius Caesar, Lucius (Lucius
Caesar the Younger) 386,
387, 466
Julius Caesar, Sextus (cos. 91)
32, 33, 34, 43
Julius Caesar Strabo, Caius 31,
32, 40, 43, 46, 73
Julius Caesar, Caius ( Caesar’s
father) 29, 32, 33, 43, 48,
49, 65, 107
Julius Caesar, Caius (Caesar’s
grandfather) 30, 33
Junia Tertia (daughter of
Servilia, sister of Brutus)
454, 503
Jupiter (god) 50, 66
Jupiter, priests of (Flamen
Dialis) 49–50, 51, 52, 56,
58, 62, 78, 102, 126, 494
Jupiter Optimus Maximus
(deity) 18
Jura Mountains 210, 211
juries 94
Kabul 300
Laberius, Decimus 470
Labienus, Titus 191, 192, 242,
250, 265, 267, 308, 310, 311,
352, 388, 450
uncle 122
perduellioI trial 121, 122, 123,
124
first campaigns in Gaul 212,
217, 218, 219
British and German
expeditions 284–285, 287,
289, 291
and the rebellion 298–299,
302–303, 306
and Great Revolt 320, 328,
335, 340–341
deserts Caesar 380, 382–383
and Macedonia 412, 413, 421,
425, 426–427, 429, 430
in Africa 457, 458, 459, 461,
462–463, 466
in Spain 482, 484, 485
land, public (ager publicus) 26,
41, 119, 167
land bill, Rullan 119–121, 122
land bill/law 164, 166, 167–169,
170, 171–172, 173, 175, 177,
260, 261
backlash against 175–181
land colonisation programme
175–176, 473–474
land granted to war veterans
29, 33, 91, 156, 254,
473–474
Latin status 21, 22, 299
laurel wreaths 19
law code, Twelve Tables 39,
146
laws, Roman 168
Gabinian (lex Gabinia) 105
Julian (lex Julia) 174, 480
Manilian (lex Manilia) 105,
119
Vatinian (lex Vatinia) 181
Lee, General Robert E. 185
legates 191–192, 247, 248–249
legionaries 194–195
Index
576
armour 195, 203–204, 246
in battle 219
diet 324, 415–416
helmets 195, 203–204
shields 195, 219
weapons 196, 221, 235
Lentuli, the 369
Lentulus Marcellinus, Cnaeus
Cornelius (cos. 56) 264
Lentulus Crus, Lucius
Cornelius (cos. 49) 375,
376, 377
Lentulus Spinther, Publius
Cornelius (cos. 57) 389,
394, 423, 436
Lentulus Sura, Publius
Cornelius (cos. 71) 133,
140, 142, 373, 513
Lepidus, Marcus Aemilius (cos.
78) 70, 85, 92, 96, 172, 348,
512
supporters 96, 136
Lepidus, Marcus Aemilius (cos.
46, 42) 165, 409, 452, 482,
507, 509, 511
Lepidus Livianus, Mamercus
Aemilius (cos. 77) 59
Leptis 457–458, 462
Lérida (Ilerda) 398, 399, 400,
402 see also Ilerda
campaign
Liberalia festival 48
Libo, Lucius Scribonius (cos.
34) 413
libraries 39
Licinia (wife of cato the Elder)
36
Licinia (Vestal Virgin) 113
Ligarius, Quintus 478
Lilybaeum 454, 455
Lingones tribe 312, 321, 335
chieftains 223
Liscus 216
Lissus 414
Litaviccus 330
literature 39
literature, Latin 512–513
Livy 32, 517
Loire, River 265, 320, 323, 335
London, central 290
Luca, conference of 261–262,
264, 265, 361
Lucan (Marcus Annaeus
Lucanus) 372
Pharsalia 517
Lucceius, Lucius 159, 160, 161,
163–164
luck, Roman belief in 54
Lucterius 353
Lucullus, Lucius Licinius (cos.
74) 74, 83, 104, 112, 151,
153, 156, 157, 173, 179, 256,
356
Lucullus, Marcus Licinius (cos.
73) 74, 256
Lupercalia, festival of 494, 499,
505
Luscius, Lucius 116
Lusitania, North Western
149–150
Lusitanians 150
Lutetia (Paris) 307, 335
Macedonia 44, 71, 75, 176,
190, 434
becomes Roman province 10,
22
in Civil War 411–431,
448–449
Macedonian War, Third
(172–167 BC) 11
Macedonians 73–74, 434, 435,
438, 439, 440
Macnaghton, Sir William 300
magistrates 15, 71, 169, 476
competence and honesty, lack
of 28
conduct business in the Forum
20
election of 17–18, 19
junior (aediles) 32, 105–106
symbol of power, fasces as 167
Mamurra 191, 236, 237, 492
Mancinus, Caius Hostilius (cos.
137) 276
Mandubii tribe 336
Mandubracius 290, 291
Manhood/coming of age
ceremony 48–49
Manilius, Caius 104
Manlii, the 31
Manlius, Caius 127–128, 129,
130
Marcelli, the 369
Marcellus, Caius Claudius (cos.
50) 348, 374, 382, 486
Marcellus, Caius Claudius (cos.
49) 348, 372, 374
Marcellus, Marcus Claudius
(cos. 51) 348, 361–362, 363,
364, 366, 367, 368, 477–478
Marcia (Caesar’s grandmother)
33
Marcii Reges, the 33
Marcius, Ancus (fourth king of
Rome) 33
Marius, Caius (cos. 107,
104–100, 86) 40–42, 263
consulship of 13–14, 30
as a ‘new man’ (novus homo)
17
campaigns for consulship and
given command in Numidia
28, 29
marries Caesar’s aunt Julia 33
in Social War 43
and Sulpicius 44, 45
joins Cinna 46, 50
massacres senators 46, 52
and war against Mithridates
VI 53
inspired by oracles 54–55
purchases house on the
Palatine Hill 63
awards corona civica to
soldier 67
remains great hero to Romans
99, 100
popularity 105
trophies 108
recruiting 194
against the Teutones 217, 227,
234
in Africa 460
death 46, 49, 51
Marius, Caius, the Younger
(cos. 82) 55–56, 57
marriage, fidelity in 84, 86–87,
88, 89
Mars, priests of (Flamen
Martialis) 50, 471
Marseilles 73
Marsi tribe 389
Marullus, Caius Epidius
498–499, 505
Massie, Alan: Caesar (novel)
519
Massilia 73, 209, 347, 398–399,
404, 406, 449, 502
Master of Horse (Magister
Equitum) 449–450, 482,
506–507
Index
577
Maubeuge 244
Mauretanians 459
McCollough, Colleen: Masters
of Rome (series of novels)
518–519
Mediolanum (Milan) 236
Mediterranean, eastern,
victories in 23
Memmius, Caius 13
Menapii tribe 267, 271, 273,
278, 285, 299, 306, 308, 310,
316
merchants (negotiatores) 24
Merula, Lucius Cornelius (cos.
87) 49, 50–51
Metelli, the 34, 155–156, 349
Metellus, Lucius Caecilius
396–397
Metellus Celer, Quintus
Caecilius (cos. 60) 123,
155, 156, 157, 158, 172, 176,
207
Metellus Nepos, Quintus
Caecilius (cos. 57) 142,
143–144, 154, 155, 157, 180
Metellus Pius, Quintus
Caecilius (cos. 80) 124
Meto, Valerius 236
Metrobius 54
Mettius, Caius 229, 232
Meuse, River 275
Milan (Mediolanum) 236
Miletus 76
Milo, Titus Annius 259, 260,
318, 346, 347, 348, 361, 364,
371, 409, 449
mistresses 83, 84, 85–86, 365
Mithridates VI, King of Pontus
44, 65, 75, 152, 153, 154,
156, 446
son 436
Mithridates of Pergamum 443,
444
Mithridatic Wars 44, 45, 53,
55, 74, 77, 104, 111, 127,
186, 210, 348
Molo, Apollonius 74
Mont Auxois see Alesia, siege
of
Mont Beuvray see Bibracte,
battle of
Morini tribe 239, 267, 278–279,
284–285, 302, 305
mother, role of 35–36, 38
Mount Amanus 393
Mucia (Pompey’s wife) 144,
155, 156, 157, 165
Munda, battle of (45 BC)
483–484, 484
Murena, Lucius Licinius (cos.
62) 127, 132, 135, 144, 163
Mytilene, siege of 65
names in Roman society 30–31
Napoleon Bonaparte 184, 185,
189, 247, 300, 336, 383,
516–517
Napoleon III 337, 517
Narbo (Narbonne) 200, 321,
398, 473, 485
navy, Roman 266, 278, 280,
282, 287–288, 465
Nero, Emperor 35
Nero, Tiberius Claudius 138
Nervii tribe 238, 239, 244, 246,
247, 248, 250, 251, 307
rebellion 301, 302, 304, 305,
306
Nicomedes, King of Bithynia
66, 67–68, 69, 76, 78, 87, 98,
237, 470
Nile, River 434–435, 437, 442,
444–445
Noricum 200
Normandy 265, 267, 289
Normandy, upper 238
North Africa 10, 22, 406, 473
see also Africa; African
campaign
law granted passing land to
war veterans in 29, 33
Noviodunum 242–243, 323,
334
Novum Comum 363, 477
Numantia/Numantines 276
Numidia, Kingdom of 13, 28,
29, 44, 460
Numidian archers 196
Numidian army 406
Numidian client 121, 148
Numidian troops 240, 241
Numidians 456, 457, 461, 464,
465, 466
Nysa 79
oaths, swearing of 166
Octavia (Caesar’s great niece)
294, 348
Octavian (Caius Julius Caesar
Octavianus – Caesar’s
adopted son) 50, 165, 472,
497–498, 506, 511, 512, 517
see also Augustus, Emperor
Octavius, Cnaeus (cos. 87) 46
Octogesa 401, 402
Ofella, Quintus Lucretius 116
Opimius 27, 29
servant 27
Oppius, Caius 472, 477, 482,
486, 489, 497
Orange, southern France 11
Orgetorix 205–206, 207, 208,
211, 215
son and daughter 222
Oricum 411, 412
Orléans (Cenabum) 319,
322–323, 325, 327, 351, 353
Ostia 75
Osuna (Urso) 483
Paeleste 411
Palestine 434, 437
Paris (Lutetia) 307, 335
Parisii tribe 307, 328
Parthia 184, 295, 313–314, 372,
407, 491, 492, 496
Parthian cavalry 313
Parthians 360, 367, 407, 431,
491, 492, 500, 506
Pas de Calais 238, 267, 278
Pas de l’Ecluse 213
Paterculus, Velleius 10, 30, 355,
366, 468
patrician clans 31
patronage 38
Patton, General George 185
Paullus, Lucius Aemilius (cos.
50) 365, 366, 372
Pedius, Quintus (cos. 43) 191,
239, 242, 486
Pelusium 443
Pergamum 76
Persians 434, 435
Petra (hill) 415
Petreius, Marcus 168, 398, 400,
402, 403, 404, 450, 458, 459,
466, 481
Petronius, Marcus (centurion)
333
Phagites, Cornelius 59,
116–117
Pharmacussa 75, 76
Index
578
Pharnaces, King pf Bosporus
446–447
Pharsalus (48 BC) 422–431, 426,
427, 441, 448, 450
physical training 40
Piacenza (Placentia) 406
Picenum 92, 121, 383, 388
pietas (piety), quality of 37
pila 196, 221
pirates 75–77, 78, 103–104,
111, 152, 153, 348
Pisaurum 385, 388
Piso (Aquitanian aristocrat)
274
Piso, Caius Calpurnius (cos. 67)
121, 133
Piso, Calpurnius Lucius (cos.
58, Caesar’s father-in-law)
39, 165, 174, 180, 190, 371,
372, 376, 382, 478
grandfather 214
Piso, Cnaeus Calpurnius 110,
111
Piso, Marcus Pupius (cos. 61)
154–155, 156
Placentia (Piacenza) 406
Plato: Phaedo 467
Plautius (Plotius) 96
plebian families 31
plebs, ‘patrician’ tribune of
255–257
Pliny the Elder (Caius Plinius
Secundus) 184, 355, 469
Plotius (Plautius) 96
Plutarch
biography of Caesar 30
and Caesar as natural
horseman 40
and Caius Marius 41
and Sulla’s dictatorship 48
and proscribed people 48
and Caesar standing for
election to priesthood 58
description of Caesar 62
and Caesar’s capture by
pirates 75–76
and Caesar’s generosity 82
and rumour that Brutus was
Caesar’s son 85
description of Pompey’s wife
Cornelia 88
and Caesar’s wife’s funeral 99
and Caesar’s visit to Gades
100
and Caesar’s debts 107–108
and Crassus 114, 140
and Marcius Porcius Cato 118
and Caesar’s election as
Pontifex Maximus 126
and ‘Good Goddess’ festival
146
and Caesar’s journey to Spain
151
and First Triumvirate 166
and death of Vettius 179
and Caesar’s relationship with
army 235
and men seeking favours from
Caesar 236
and conference of Luca 261
and Pompey’s fidelity 294
and siege of Alesia 342
Gauls killed in Caesar’s
campaigns 355
and Caesar crossing the
Rubicon 378
and the Civil War 396, 414
and Pompey 408
and Cleopatra 438, 439
Cato unwilling to be under
obligation to Caesar 448
and battle of Thapsus 466
and Ligarius 478
and battle of Munda 484
and Corinth canal 491
and Brutus 503, 507
Po, River 43, 101
Po Valley 22, 101, 121, 199,
236
politics, Roman 169–170, 255
politics and increasing
frequency of bloodshed
25–29
Pollio, Caius Asinius (cos. 40)
188, 189–190, 378, 406, 430,
431, 517
Polybius 11, 14, 98–99, 327
Universal History 11
Pompeia (Caesar’s wife)
101–102, 146–147, 158–159,
174, 175, 176, 294, 497
Pompeian fleet 410, 411,
412–413
Pompeians 442, 446, 447, 450,
451, 452, 473, 477, 478, 515
in Africa 454, 455, 456, 457,
458, 459, 460–461, 462, 463,
464, 465, 466, 467
in Civil War 388, 389–390,
391, 392, 394, 397, 400–401,
402, 403–404, 441
in Macedonia 406, 407–408,
410–412, 414–416, 417, 418,
420, 421, 422, 423, 424,
425–427, 428, 429, 430
in Spain 482, 483–485
Pompeius Strabo, Cnaeus (cos.
89, Pompey’s father) 31, 43,
46, 91, 119
Pompeius, Cnaeus (Pompey’s
son) 437, 450, 466,
481–484, 485
Pompeius, Quintus (cos. 88)
46, 101
Pompeius, Sextus (Pompey’s
son) 413, 466, 481–483, 485
Pompeius Trogus 235
Pompey (Pompeius), Cnaeus,
‘the Great’ (Magnus)
family 31
in Social War 43
told to divorce wife by Sulla
57
in love with Flora 83–84
rise of 91–95
cruelty of 92
hailed by Sulla as Pompey ‘the
Great’ (Magnus) 92, 93
seeks and attains consulship
93, 94, 95
manoeuvres for new
command 102–103
and pirates 103–104, 186
replaces Lucullus in Asia 104
Spanish soldiers loyal to 110
and war with Mithridates 111
as lieutenant of Sulla 112
wealth and auctoritas 114
and Cicero 119, 164, 258, 259
and land bill/law 120, 156,
157, 168, 170, 171
honours granted 121
imminent return 142–143
celebrates third triumph
152–153, 154, 155
leading his legions 153–154
captures Jerusalem 154
asks Senate to postpone
elections 154, 155
as consul 155
divorces wife Mucia 155, 156,
157
Index
579
aims to secure ratification of
Eastern Settlement 156, 157
army veterans 156, 157,
170–171, 254
thwarted by noble families in
Senate 158
triumphs 160, 468
house’s garden 163
and First Triumvirate 165,
166, 168, 170, 175, 176, 178,
180, 254
and Eastern Settlement 166,
173, 181, 254, 258, 446
and eastern Mediterranean 173
bribed by Ptolemy XII 174
marries Caesar’s daughter
Julia 174, 175
supports Caesar 175
accused of planning to
establish tyrannical rule
177–178
plot to murder 179–180
uses fortified barriers 210
eastern campaigns 238
heroic style of leadership 249
unhappy at success of Caesar
252
fear of assassination 253, 258,
259
wealth, fame and auctoritas
254–255
restores full powers to tribunes
of the plebs 255
given command to sort out
grain import problem
259–260
claims Crassus plotting to
murder him 260
conference of Luca 261–262
re-elected to second
consulship 264
and wife Julia 294
granted five-year command of
provinces 294–295
loans legion to Caesar 306
appointed to third consulship,
initially without a colleague
320, 347, 348, 361
commemorates victories with
theatre 344–345
called on by Senate to protect
the State 346–347
introduces law to reduce
bribery 348
marries Cornelia 349
dedicates temple to Victory
350
passes law preventing
consulship candidates
standing in absentia 350
waits outside Rome 359
disapproves of Caesar
standing for second
consulship 362, 363,
364–365, 370–371
falls ill 368
called upon to protect
Republic 374
and Mark Antony 376
and Civil War 384, 385, 387,
390–392
in Civil War 407–408, 410,
423, 424, 425, 426–427, 428,
429, 431, 432–433
at Dyrrachium 414, 415,
416, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422
takes Syria under Roman rule
434
house 454
killed in Alexandria 431, 433,
445
Pomptine marshes 474
Pomptinus 192
ponds, saltwater 112
Pontic raiders 77–78, 81
Pontifex Maximus (senior
priest) see priesthoods:
Pontifex Maximus
pontiffs 78, 479
Pontus, Eastern 446
Popular Assemblies (Concilium
Plebis or Comitia Tributa)
15, 16, 19, 20, 26, 39, 44–45,
57, 97, 103, 104, 124, 136,
159, 167, 170, 172, 173, 395,
475
Porcia (daughter of Cato,
married to Bibulus and then
Brutus) 487, 503–504
Portus Itius (Boulogne?) 279,
286
Poseidonius 202
Pothinus 437, 441, 442
Praecia (courtesan) 83, 104
Praeneste 55–56
praetors 15, 18, 70–71, 75, 124
priesthoods
augurs 60, 449–450
college of pontiffs 78
Flamen Dialis 49–50, 51, 52,
56, 58, 62, 78, 102, 126, 494
Flamen Quirinalis 50
Flamen Martialis 50, 471
Pontifex Maximus 51–52, 55,
78, 124–125, 126, 131, 147,
173, 177, 215, 293, 423, 513
Priests of Lupercal 499
Procillus, Caius Valerius 216,
229, 232, 235
prosecutors 71, 72–73
prostitutes 83, 84
Provence 22 see also Gaul,
Transalpine
provinces, business in 23–24
Ptolemaic dynasty 22, 114, 431,
434, 435, 438, 439, 440, 445
Ptolemy I 434
Ptolemy II 434
Ptolemy IX 435
Ptolemy X 435
Ptolemy XI 435
Ptolemy XII (‘Auletes’) 174,
371, 409, 435–437, 441
Ptolemy XIII 437, 441, 442,
443, 444, 496
Ptolemy XIV 444
public speaking 39
private companies for state
contracts (publicani)
23–24, 157–158, 173, 347
Punic War, First (264–241 BC)
21–22, 24, 255
Punic War, Second (218–201 BC)
22, 24, 32, 66, 117, 349, 409
Punic War, Third (149–146 BC)
349
Puteoli 492
Pyrenees 398
Pyrrhus, King of Epirus 135,
515
quaestorship 96–98
Quinctilis, month of 30
Quirinus, priests of (Flamen
Quirinalis) 50
Rabirius, Caius 121–124, 134,
162, 173, 191
Ravenna 261, 319, 377, 381
Reims (Durocortorum) 312
Remi tribe 239–240, 241, 242,
243, 312, 319, 352
Index
580
Remus 32
res publica 14–15, 513
Rex (king), origin of name 33
Rex, Quintus Marcius 33
Rhine, River 199, 206, 224,
225, 228, 270, 272, 273, 275,
277, 278, 308, 310, 354, 517
bridges across 277, 278,
308–309, 310
Rhineland, rebellion in 237
Rhodes 74, 77, 144
Rhône, River 211
line of defences 210, 212
Rhône Valley 200–201, 203,
205
Ribemont-sur-Ancre 202
Rimini (Ariminum) 377, 378,
381, 385, 386, 387, 388
roads, Roman 22
Rocquepertuse 202
Roman Empire, profits and
price of 21–25
Roman Empire in the first
century BC 12
Roman Republic
constitution of 11
nature of 14–19
nearing its end 11
political system 14–15
revenue 152–153
war-making 21
Roman status 21, 22
Romans’ fear of northern
barbarians 13
Rome 20
Alban Hill 498
army marches against for first
time 45
Aventine Hill 27
Basilica Fulvia et Aemilia 365
Basilica Julia 345
Caesar improves living
conditions 478–479
Caesar’s building projects 345
Caesar’s regulation in
480–481
Campus Martius 40, 97, 123,
162, 294, 344, 345, 470, 471,
510
saepta (‘sheep-pens’)
162–163, 478
Capitol 469, 486, 494, 509
Capitoline Hill 14, 48–49, 50,
143
captured by Marian and
Cinnan forces 46, 49
celebrations on Caesar’s
return 468–471
Circus Flaminius 257, 344
in Civil War 391–397
Colline Gate 55, 57, 79
fire brigade 112
as focus of all aspects of
political life 19
Forum 19–20, 56, 57, 167, 169,
170–171, 172, 476, 496, 510
Caesar’s extension 345
complex 478
during the games 106
Rostra see Rome: Rostra
trials in 71, 72
founded (753 BC) and early
days 14
infant mortality in 34
Janiculum Hill 46, 123, 162,
173
Jewish population 64, 480,
510
Library 479
Palatine Hill 63
pomerium (sacred boundary)
155, 159, 160
Pompey’s theatre 344–345,
507, 508
poor citizens move to 120
rebuilt in more spectacular
form 23
Regia 126
Rostra (Speakers Platform)
20, 46, 47, 56, 103, 143, 169,
509
and funerals 98, 99
severed heads decorating 111
running of, administrative role
of aediles 106
sacked by Gauls 13, 199
Sacra Via 20, 63, 126
Senate House (Curia) 14, 20,
122, 134, 318, 476 see also
Senate
shrine to goddess of liberty
(libertas) 258
strength in 100 BC 10–11, 19
Subura district 63–64
taken by Sulla (82 BC) 55, 56
Temple of Bellona 56
Temple of Castor and Pollux
143, 157, 171
Temple of Concord 134, 142
Temple of Diana 27
Temple of Jupiter 48–49, 50,
143, 469, 499
Temple of Quirinus 486
Temple of Saturn 396
Temple of Venus Genetrix 496
Temple of Vesta 126
Tullianum 142
violence of the eighties BC
111–112
voting assemblies 15–18
Romney Marshes, Kent 280
Romulus 32–33, 486
Roscius (famous actor) 61
Roscius, Lucius (Caesar’s
legate) 306, 386
Roucillus 419
Rubicon, River 358, 377, 378,
379, 381, 385, 394, 445, 467,
514
Rufio 446
Rullus, Publius Servilius 119,
120, 122, 164, 167
Ruspina 456–459, 460, 462
Sabine women 102
Sabinus, Quintus Titurius
(Caesar’s legate) 192, 240,
265, 267, 299, 300, 302, 303,
305, 310, 312, 356
St Bernard Pass, Great 265
St Helena 516
Sallust (Caius Sallustius
Crispus) 512
description of Sempronia
87–88
and problems caused by
wealth 109
and Aurelia Orestilla 117
and Catiline’s conspiracy
131–132, 136, 140
on Caesar’s commitment 152
expelled from Senate 372
and Petreius 398
recalled by Caesar 409
and army mutiny 452
governs Africa 476
Samarobriva (Amiens) 302,
305, 306, 307
Sambre, battle of the (57 BC)
244, 245, 246–250
Sambre, River 244, 248, 250,
282, 421, 484
Index
581
Santones tribe 212
Saône, River 215, 216, 223
Saône Valley 200–201, 203, 214
Sardinia 10, 22, 261, 392, 397
Sarsura 464
Saturninus, Lucius Appuleius
13–14, 29, 33, 40–41, 44,
105, 122, 123, 137, 139, 157
followers 121–122, 512
Saylor, Steven: Roma sub rosa
(mystery novels) 519
Scaeva 416–417, 418
Scaevola, Quintus Mucius
(cos. 95) 51–52, 55
Scaurus, Marcus Aemilius
(cos. 115) 18
Scheldt, River 310
Scipio see Metellus Pius Scipio
Nasica, Quintus Caecilius
Scipio Africanus, Publius
Cornelius (cos 205, 194) 516
Scipio Aemilianus Africanus,
Publius Cornelius (cos. 147,
134) 253
Scipio Nasica, Publius
Cornelius (cos. 138) 26
Scipio Nasica, Quintus
Caecilius Metellus Pius
(cos. 52) 348–349, 362, 364,
369, 375, 376, 385, 450
and Macedonia 407, 418, 423,
424, 425
in Africa 456, 459, 460, 461,
464
kills himself 466, 469
Scipio Salvito (or Salutio) 460
Scipiones, the 460
Segre (Sicoris), River 399,
401–402, 404
Seleucid Empire 22, 75, 434
Seleucids 44
Semiramis 181
Sempronia (sister of the
Gracchi) 34
Sempronia (mother of Decimus
Brutus) 87–88, 192, 502
Senate 38 see also Rome: Forum;
Rostra; Senate House
addressed to in Greek for first
time 74
Caesar violates senatorial
ideal 487
calls on Pompey to protect the
State 346
in Cinna’s time 52
and Civil War 385, 395
in conflict with Marcus
Aemilius Lepidus 70
and Catiline’s conspiracy 133,
134, 136, 137
as creation of Sulla 91, 92
debating in 134–135
decrees fifty days of
thanksgiving 485
dispute with equestrians 157
‘foreigners’ in 476
free grain bill 257, 258
‘good/best men’
(boni/optimates) 255, 361,
423–424
and ‘Good Goddess’ festival
147
and the Gracchi 28
importance of 15–16
and magistrates 15
meets on certain days 159
members 151
number of 476
and ‘new men’ in consulship
119
pass senatus consultum
ultimum against Saturninus
122, 123–124
and rebel army under Manlius
128
refuses to let Caius Marius
raise legions to take to
Africa 28
send envoys to Transalpine
Gaul 204, 207
and the Social War 43
after Sulla takes Rome 56
tribuni aerarii 501
votes Caesar twenty days of
thanksgiving 285
votes Caesar forty days of
thanksgiving 468
votes Cicero public
thanksgiving 393
votes honours on Caesar
501–502
senators 15–16, 87, 176, 253,
476
competition between 19, 22,
23
court to try those accused of
malpractice 27
and homosexuality 67
houses of 64
lives 53
Senones tribe 306, 307, 312,
316, 322, 328
Sens 321
Sequani tribe 201, 203, 204,
206, 207, 208, 211, 213, 224,
225, 232, 237, 317, 335
Sertorius, Quintus 91, 92, 149,
348, 512
supporters of 96
Servilia (Caesar’s mistress,
Brutus’ mother) 85–86, 87,
89, 92, 118, 141, 147, 161,
174, 179, 454
daughters 156
Servilia (sister of Servilia) 86
Sestius, Publius 259
Seubi tribe 225–226, 232
Severus, Quintus Varius 18
sex lives of Roman aristocrats
82–84, 86, 88
sexes, disparity between 31
Shakespeare, William 85, 338,
508, 509, 512, 515, 518
Shaw, George Bernard: Caesar
and Cleopatra 518
shields 195, 219
ships, Gallic 266
ships, transport 285–286, 287,
288–289
Sicily 10, 22, 56, 92, 112, 392,
397, 406, 408, 454, 455, 456
governor of 72
Sicoris (Segre), River 399,
401–402, 404
siege earthworks 337–338
siege machines 243
siege towers 251, 324, 325
Silanus, Decimus Junius (cos.
62) 86, 127, 135, 136–137,
138, 139, 141, 142, 174
Silvia, Rhea 32
Sisto, Jeremy 518
Sittius, Publius 459, 461, 466
slave, nomenclator 97
Slave War (73–71 BC) 79, 80,
91–92, 107, 153, 267
slavery 355
slaves 69–70
German 227
Social War (91–88 BC) 42–43,
45, 92, 119
Soissons 242
Index
582
Sosigenes 479
Spain 10, 22, 24, 110, 112, 153,
156, 158, 466, 467, 472
civil war in 91, 92, 93
Spain, Further (Hispanis
Ulterior) 98, 100, 397, 404,
482
Caesar governs 148–151
Spanish campaign (46–45 BC)
481–489
Spanish Peninsula 149, 217,
391–392, 397
Spanish provinces 286, 295, 348
Spanish War 482
Spartacus 79, 80, 91, 92, 93–94,
107, 210, 220, 227, 267, 295,
481, 512
Stour, River (Kent) 288
Sucro, Spain 18
Suebi, the 270–271, 272–273,
277, 278, 309
Suessiones, the 239, 242, 243
Suetonius
biography of Caesar 30
Caesar’s oration at aunt’s
funeral 33
and Caesar’s early writings 39
and Caesar’s possible
marriage to Cossutia 49
and Caesar’s flight 59
description of Caesar 61–62
and Caesar’s country villa 64
and Caesar contemplating
joining Lepidus’s rebels 70
and Marcus Licinius
Lucullus’s activities 74
and Caesar’s sex life 84–85
and Caesar leaving Further
Spain 100
and alleged conspiracy to
massacre opponents 111
and Caesar’s plan to govern
Egypt 114–115
and Caesar’s refusal to
prosecute Cornelius
Phagites 116
and Caesar’s prosecution
against Caius Rabirius 121
and Caesar’s election as
Pontifex Maximus 126
and Caesar’s consulship
campaign 159, 163
and Caesar’s bond with
Pompey and Crassus 164
and Caesar’s consulship 172
and Ptolemy XII 174
and death of Vettius 179
and Caesar’s writings 189
and Caesar on men’s courage
233
and Caesar’s looting of sacred
sites 252
and conference of Luca 261
and Caesar in Britain 270
and Caesar breaking bad news
to army 304
and Caesar disguising himself
as a Gaul 322
and Caesar’s Forum extension
and gladiatorial games 345
and Caesar crossing the
Rubicon 358, 378
and Caesar’s return 378
and Civil War 405
and Caesar’s affair with
Cleopatra 432
and Caesar in Egypt 443, 444
and battle of Thapsus 461
and Caesar’s first triumph
469, 471
and Spanish campaign 482
and Caesar not wishing to live
any longer 490
and Caesar’s possible child
497
and Caesar’s funeral 510
biographies of rulers of Rome
517
Sugambri tribe 275, 277
Sulla, Faustus 175, 294, 416,
466
Sulla, Lucius Cornelius (cos. 88,
80) 43–44, 45, 240, 380,
454, 476, 493, 500
and Caesar 30
waiting for 52–57
appearance 53
successful life 53–55, 59–60
takes Rome (82 BC) 55, 56
named ‘dictator to make laws
and reconstitute the state’
57
orders execution of one of his
senior officers 57
orders divorces 57–58
pursuit of Caesar 59
remarries 60
retirement 60
warns senators about Caesar
62
rents a flat 64
defeats Mithridates 65
pardons Caesar 70, 72
establishes courts 70–71
casts long shadow over
Republic 91
employs Pompey’s services 92,
94
ban on public honouring of
Marius 99
orders Marius’s trophies to be
torn down 108
allows ‘loans’ from public
funds 115
proscription law 115, 116
establishes court to deal with
crime of maiestas 122
proscriptions 136
expels Mithridates from
Greece 153
as dictator 449
and land for troops 473
death 70
Sulla, Publius Cornelius 109,
110, 416, 428
Sulmo 388
Sulpicius Rufus, Publius 44, 45,
59, 105
Sulpicius Rufus, Sergius (cos.
51) 478
Switzerland 204, 205
swords (gladii) 196
Syria 295, 314, 348, 364, 371,
385, 393, 407, 418, 434, 443,
447, 491
Tacitus, Publius Cornelius
(historian) 36, 237, 238, 269
Tarpeian Rock 45
Tarquinius 131
Tarsus 447
Taylor, Elizabeth 518
Teanum 387
Tencteri tribe 270–271, 272–275,
277, 278, 308, 355, 361
‘tent-companions’
(contubernales) 65
Tertulla (wife of Crassus) 85,
165
Teutones tribe 11, 13, 29, 150,
200, 210, 217, 224, 227, 238,
358
Index
583
Thames, River 290
Thanet, Isle of (Kent) 280, 289
Thapsus, battle of (46 BC)
464–467, 463
Theophanes of Mytilene 186
Thermus, Marcus Minucius 65
Thermus, Quintus Minucius
143, 144, 388
Thessaly 414
Thrace 22
Tiber, River 26, 40, 47, 470,
474, 496
Tigranes, King of Armenia 104
Tigurini tribe 214–215, 217,
223
toga candidus 96
toga praetexta 48, 144
toga virilis 48
Tolosates tribe 212
Torquatus, Lucius Manlius
(cos. 65) 109, 110, 411
towns, fortified, of northern
Gaul 239, 242
Transylvania 197
Treasury 23, 58, 106, 115, 157,
158, 167, 260, 396, 397
Trebatius Testa, Caius 297,
302, 305
Trebonius, Caius (cos. 45)
294–295, 298, 310, 338, 340,
351, 398, 406, 449, 475, 502,
503, 508
Treveri tribe 225, 238, 286, 298,
303, 305, 306, 307, 308, 312
trials 71, 73
Tribal Assemblies see
Assembly of tribes
tribunes 25, 28, 41, 79, 193, 226
Trinovantes tribe 290, 291
triumphal celebrations
152–153, 154, 155, 159, 161,
468–470, 471
triumphs 160, 468
triumvirates 165
First 164, 165–166, 168, 170,
175, 176, 178, 180, 252, 254,
261–262
Second 164–165, 511
Trojan exiles 32
Troy 505
Tulingi, the 222
Tullia (daughter of Cicero) 86,
294, 485
Ubii tribe 273, 277, 278, 309
Ulia 482–483
Urso (Osuna) 483
Usipetes tribe 270–271,
272–275, 277, 278, 308, 355,
361
Utica 467, 504
Uxellodunum 353
Uzitta 460, 462, 463
Valerius Maximus 366
Varro, Marcus Terentius 40,
155, 166, 397, 404, 479
Vatinius, Publius (cos. 47) 174,
176, 179, 191, 192, 413, 452
Vellaunodunum 322
Veneti tribe 265, 266–267, 268,
269, 278, 291, 355, 399
Venus (goddess) 32, 33, 54, 99,
425, 428, 495
Vercassivellaunus 339, 340
Vercingetorix 319, 320, 321,
322, 323–327, 351, 353, 362,
373, 468
at Gergovia 328–329, 330,
331, 333, 334–335
siege of Alesia 336–337, 339,
340, 341, 342, 350
Vergobret (Aedui magistrate)
198, 204, 216, 328, 330, 335
Vesontio (Besançon) 225–226,
233–234, 453, 461
Vespasian, Emperor 495
Vestal Virgins 59, 113, 117,
139, 146
Vettius, Lucius 145, 179, 180
Vetus, Antistius 100, 148
Via Domitia 199–200
Vienna (Vienne, Rhône Valley)
321
Vieux-Laon (Bibrax?) 240–242
Virgil 32
Viromandui tribe 244, 248
virtus (virtue), quality of 37
Voltaire 518
Volumnia (Cytheris) 84
Volusenus, Caius 280, 281
Walmer (Kent) 281
Wantsum Channel (Kent) 280,
288, 289
Waterloo, battle of (1815) 185
wedding ceremony, confarreatio
49, 51
weddings 101–102
Wellington, Duke of (Arthur
Wellesley) 185, 315
wine, exports of 200, 203, 238
wives, aristocratic 87
wives, duties of 88–89
Zela, Battle of, 47 BC 446–448