Il Principe

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e-ISBN: 978-1-60384-043-9 (e-book)

Niccolo Machiavelli - The prince (2008, Hackett Pub. Co) - libgen.lc.pdf

Start p.g. 91

99: Hereditary states are easier to retain due to the populace being accustomed to the Prince's lineage. The longer the lineage, the more likely he will be loved, unless suspect to overwhelming vices. Stability causes complacency.

107: It is easier for a new prince to claim a populace if they previously had a prince. The longer a populace is free (such as a republic), the less likely they are to adjust to a totalitarian system. Transitions are easier with the homogeneity of customs. The previous lineage must, however, we wiped out lest there be a reinstatement. Possible threats (including those with political influence) must be fully eliminated – exiles do not work.

107: If a new prince claims a populace with heterogeneous language, customs and institutions, the best remedy is for the new prince to reside within the new populace. Transparency and public (compassionate?) availability reduces resentment. Personal involvement also allows one to see disorders for oneself and quickly remedy them before they get out of hand.

109: If a new prince cannot personally reside within the new populace, the second-best option is integrating the new populace through colonial settlements that expand on the claimed region instead of superimposing upon it. Blending the new and old populaces into a single populace breaks down segregation and gives a sense of community rather than a lower caste dominion. Additionally, disgruntled individuals are dispersed throughout the blended populace, creating a disincentive to revolt.

111: To retain a new populace, a new prince should not enforce garrisons nor should they replace settlements. Doing so amplifies hardships and resentment; segregation also makes it easier for planned revolt.

116: A new prince must always be diligent and beware of potential threats. War can be postponed but is inevitably unavoidable. It is better to defeat an opponent when they arise than to let them grow strong. Additionally, colony states must be kept small until the populace is fully blended – all it takes is a traitor to invite a Trojan horse to undermine everything.

125: Never help someone become more powerful than oneself, otherwise they will ultimately betray you through destruction or absorption. Nevertheless, allies are permittable, but allies must be maintained thoroughly as a mercenary force instead of a partnership – a partnership could also be viewed as a remote feudal system where serfs are more loyal to their baron than the prince. A partner is a potential enemy for they are a bargaining chip for one's own enemies as either a rival or a hostage. As a rival, one's partner could ally with the enemy to become a monarch; as a hostage, a partner could we a key weakness in undermining everything.

129: A new prince must never succeed to a remote feudal lineage and instead divide his kingdom into sections ruled by temporary agents. Said agents are administrators that are moved around and replaced. A prince must never allow the populace to become subservient to an agent – as soon as a populace is loyal to an agent, they are not fully loyal to the prince and therefore a potential threat. Sections within the kingdom must therefore be maintained through temporary agents whose power can be retracted by the prince without endangering the prince's position.

137: If a new prince is to acquire a populace that was once free, the prince can either (1) devastate them into submission; (2) personally reside along with them; (3) allow them freedom yet extract fealty as a mercenary – in this way, the only indignation is the tax owed the new prince, yet as long as the new prince promises to protect their freedom from other aggressors and the new prince's army is significantly stronger, then the acquired populace should not have any qualms for what is considered a good deal. For the purpose of (3), the new prince must still keep the free state well disposed towards him, the acquired state must be shown that it cannot survive without the prince's good will and power; they must be shown why they should have gratitude instead of resentment – they must be willingly grateful and not brainwashed or forced. As (3) is the most difficult and willing gratitude can possibly be overcome with rosy retrospection and false memories of superior ancient liberty, (1) and (2) are more favourable. If a populace has not been free for long, then (2) is the most economical, however, the longer a populace has been free, the more suitable (1) is.

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