The special trick of consciousness is being able to project action and time into a range of possible futures.
I have a confession. As a physicist and psychiatrist, I find it difficult to engage with conversations about consciousness. My biggest gripe is that the philosophers and cognitive scientists who tend to pose the questions often assume that the mind is a thing, whose existence can be identified by the attributes it has or the purposes it fulfils.
But in physics, it's dangerous to assume that things 'exist' in any conventional sense. Instead, the deeper question is: what sorts of processes give rise to the notion (or illusion) that something exists? For example, Isaac Newton explained the physical world in terms of massive bodies that respond to forces. However, with the advent of quantum physics, the real question turned out to be the very nature and meaning of the measurements upon which the notions of mass and force depend – a question that's .
As a consequence, I'm compelled to treat consciousness as a process to be understood, not as a thing to be defined. Simply put, my argument is that consciousness is nothing more and nothing less than a natural process such as evolution or the weather. My favourite trick to illustrate the notion of consciousness as a process is to replace the word 'consciousness' with 'evolution' – and see if the question still makes sense. For example, the question What is consciousness for? becomes What is evolution for? Scientifically speaking, of course, we know that evolution is not for anything. It doesn't perform a function or have reasons for doing what it does – it's an unfolding process that can be understood only on its own terms. Since we are all the product of evolution, the same would seem to hold for consciousness and the self.
My view on consciousness resonates with that of the philosopher Daniel Dennett, who has spent his career trying to understand the origin of the mind. Dennett is concerned with how mindless, mere 'causes' (A leads to B) can give rise to the species of mindful 'reasons' as we know them (A happens so that B can happen). Dennett's solution is what he calls 'Darwin's dangerous idea': the insight that it's possible to have design in the absence of a designer, competence in the absence of comprehension, and reasons (or 'free-floating rationales') in the absence of reasoners. A population of beetles that has outstripped another has probably done so for some 'reason' we can identify – a favourable mutation which produces a more camouflaging colour, for example. 'Natural selection is thus an automatic reason-finder, which "discovers" and "endorses" and "focuses" reasons over many generations,' Dennett writes in From Bacteria to Bach and Back: The Evolution of Minds (2017). 'The scare quotes are to remind us that natural selection doesn't have a mind, doesn't itself have reasons, but is nevertheless competent to perform this "task" of design refinement.'
I hope to show you that nature can drum up reasons without actually having them for herself. In what follows, I'm going to argue that things don't exist for reasons, but certain processes can nonetheless be cast as engaged in reasoning. I use 'reasoning' here to mean explanations that arise from inference or abduction – that is, trying to account for observations in terms of latent causes, rules or principles.
This perspective on process leads us to an elegant, if rather deflationary, story about why the mind exists. Inference is actually quite close to a theory of everything – including evolution, consciousness, and life itself. It is abduction all the way down. We are thrown into the world as a process already in motion; and processes can only reason towards what is 'out there' based on sparse (if carefully selected) samples of the world. This view dissolves familiar dialectics between mind and matter, self and world, and representationalism (we depict reality as it is) and emergentism (reality comes into being through our abductive encounters with the world). But just how did inference happen before there were inferrers around to do it? How did inert matter ever begin the processes that led to consciousness?
