The Arab Agenda

Chapter 8

Dissemination of Information and Dynasties in the Bahrain Opposition.

Bahrainstorming (blogger)  wrote: There is an old Arabic expression that a man only cares about politics once his family is involved, and this idea is perhaps nowhere more pertinent than in the current conflict in Bahrain. Families play a significant role in every side of the dispute, from the royal family's penetration of government and even some elements of civil society to the domination of certain families within the organized opposition, even as they themselves criticize the regime for its own such practices.

The difference between the two is that while the government, being a monarchy, makes no qualms about its open favoritism, the nepotistic and cronyistic structures within the organized opposition are a bit more shrouded - but influential nonetheless.

Such dynasties exist throughout various segments of the opposition - from Shaikh Abdul Amir Al Jamri, deceased spiritual leader of Bahrain's Twelver Shi'a (Wilayat Al faqih), whose son owns the primary opposition newspaper Al Wasat that is in turn connected to both the Shi'a opposition society Al Wefaq to the socialist opposition National Democratic Action Society Wa'ad; to the now-imprisoned Hassan Mushaima, self-styled religious cleric and founding member of the opposition societies Al Wefaq, Haq Movement, and Coalition for a Republic, whose son Ali Hassan and several close associates are active in raising awareness for the Bahraini opposition in Europe.

Although it is normal, indeed expected, for a certain group of élites and their immediate circles to play a prominent role in any such political movements, the structural dominance of certain key networks in the Bahraini opposition is both unusually distinct and carries important repercussions.

Perhaps the most conspicuous such example is that of the circle surrounding Abdulhadi Alkhawaja, who is currently serving a life sentence for opposition activity, and his affiliated organizations. Alkhawaja's opposition activity began in the late 1970s when he quit Bahrain to pursue higher education in the UK and became associated with several student groups there.

These groups had links to the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, the Shi'a militant organization of which the Islamic Action Society is the modern-day political descendent and whose former members, exiled after a failed 1981 uprising, dominate the leadership of the Bahraini opposition today. Alkhawaja was among those exiles, and he spent his years abroad in the UK, Syria and Denmark, fermenting ties with not only other opposition figures but also western NGOs and activist groups.

As such, Alkhawaja eventually became Middle East and North Africa Protection Coordinator for Frontline Defenders, a prominent international human rights organization. He also helped to establish the Bahrain Center for Human Rights (BCHR), which has become the focal point of the activism-oriented Bahraini opposition, with his close friend and colleague Nabeel Rajab, who arguably serves as the opposition's primary connection to the international NGO and activist community. Aside from the BCHR, Rajab serves as president of the Gulf Center for Human Rights, deputy secretary general of the Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l'Homme, a member of the advisory committee for the Human Rights Watch MENA Division, and a member of the advisory board for the Bahrain Rehabilitation and Anti-Violence Organization.

The writer goes on to write:

The Alkhawaja family, not just Abdulhadi himself, is extremely active in both the BCHR and the opposition movement as a whole, particularly in gaining international media coverage. His daughter Zainab created a popular English-language Twitter account, @angryarabiya, which garnered a good deal of media attention, both within the MENA and around the world.

She has continued to remain prominent within the opposition scene due to a number of well-publicized media stunts and protest-related arrests. Another of Abdulhadi's daughters, Maryam, has likewise maintained a conspicuous media presence through her own popular Twitter account @MARYAMALKHAWAJA (this one in both Arabic and English), through continued appearances in international media, and as acting president of the BCHR. Maryam's sisters husband, Mohammed Al Maskati (@MohdMaskati), is a former member of the BCHR and president of the Bahrain Youth Society for Human Rights, which maintains strong ties with international human rights groups, Bahraini youth groups, and the socialist opposition society Wa'ad. Abdulhadi's brother, Salah Alkhawaja, is currently serving a five year prison sentence related to his documentation of the 14 February uprisings for the international media.

He is also vice president of the Islamic Action Society, the aforementioned modern descendent of the militant Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain and whose president Shaikh Mohammed Ali Mahfoodh was an associate of Abdulhadi's during their exile in Damascus together during the 1980s. Abdulhadi's wife, Khadija Al Mousawi (@tublani2010), is a close relative of Hadi Al Mousawi (@SHalMosawi), a former MP for the Al Wefaq society and chairman of the trade union for BATELCO, the state-operated telecommunications company.

Finally, Abbas Al Omran (@abbasalomran), a long-time associate of Abdulhadi and member of the BCHR currently living in exile in the UK, frequently speaks to the international media about the Bahraini opposition's cause - so much so, in fact, that the regime has sentenced him in absentia to 15 years' imprisonment and revoked his Bahraini citizenship.

The writer concludes:

The result of such a structure is that an outside observer - indeed, the primary target of all these individuals' efforts - may see a reasonable plurality of independent human rights-oriented activists and groups within Bahrain without realizing the reality that they are all in fact a very closely-affiliated network of family members, friends, and organizations.

This is not to make allegations of a covert conspiracy among Alkhawaja and his associates, as some elements of the pro-regime camp have done, nor is it to make claims that these individuals' work is invalidated by their relationships with one another.

It is, however, important to note that these relationships do mean that Alkhawaja's network has a disproportionate influence both over international media coverage of the opposition's (widely-varying) perspective and over the information that international NGOs and human rights groups have about the situation on the ground in Bahrain.

Moreover, such external observers working with Alkhawaja and Co. may be given the impression that they are dealing with NGOs or watchdog groups, rather than politically-savvy activists with a definite agenda to promote.

Indeed, there has been some discussion even within the opposition movement itself that Alkhawaja's network exercises an inordinate amount of influence within the international community and has presented the situation in Bahrain from a distinctly-biased perspective.

Personally, I can't comment on what occurs between the Government and the United Nations as I am not aware of the direct correspondence but I can comment on the abuses that I felt were ignored by the family dynasty of activists that the United Nations, the NGO's and the mass media rely on as a source. There are two sides to every story, two ways of looking at the same thing and two sides to present.