THE CIVIL WAR: THE TRUE STORY BOOK 1

Confederate General J.E.B. Stuart: The Death of a Legend

Confederate Maj. Gen. James Ewell Brown Stuart, commander of the cavalry corps of the Army of Northern Virginia, vowed that he "had rather die than be whipped." His vow would be answered at Yellow Tavern.

"We have been badly used up," a sergeant in the 5th New York Volunteer Cavalry Regiment complained in a letter to his wife on May 8, 1864, four days before J.E.B. Stuart's death. Another Union trooper, a member of the 6th Ohio Volunteer Cavalry Regiment, echoed those sentiments about the just concluded operations in the Virginia Wilderness. The Federal cavalry, said the Buckeye, had been "used in such a bumbling manner" that it brought into question the leadership ability of Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan, the Army of the Potomac's new cavalry commander, and at least partially explained why Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant had failed to decisively defeat Confederate General Robert E. Lee in their first encounter. The men's complaints were valid. Sheridan's debut as head of the mounted units during the fighting was far from what his superiors had expected of him. Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, Union Army chief of staff, in March 1864 had suggested to Grant that Sheridan lead the Federal cavalry corps in the eastern theater. "The very man I want," Grant replied. Sheridan had served under Grant and Halleck in the western theater of the war, and they had been duly impressed with Little Phil's performance. But the early achievements of Sheridan in his new role were less than reassuring when measured against what an experienced cavalry commander might have accomplished under the same circumstances. Even before Sheridan's shortcomings were revealed on the battlefield, the new cavalry commander had clashed with his immediate superior, Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, head of the Army of the Potomac. The issue between them was the proper role of the army's mounted force. Meade insisted that the horse soldiers' primary tasks were picketing and scouting for the army and protecting its front, flanks, and rear. Sheridan fired back, arguing that if his command were kept concentrated, "I could make it so lively for the enemy's cavalry that, so far as attacks from it were concerned, the flanks and rear of the Army of the Potomac would require no or little defense." He further insisted that the true objectives of his troopers were to "defeat the enemy's cavalry in general combat." As for the legendary Confederate horse commander, Maj. Gen. James Ewell Brown (J.E.B.) Stuart, Sheridan professed little fear of his Rebel counterpart. He could, said Sheridan, "thrash hell out of Stuart any day."
Sheridan's confidence seemed premature. During the movement of the Army of the Potomac south of the Rapidan River, Sheridan's cavalry completely failed to detect the approach of two enemy infantry corps from the rugged area known as the Wilderness. The result was that on May 5 the Confederate advance threatened to cut off and destroy a Union cavalry division and an entire infantry corps that was isolated from the rest of the army. Compounding the problem, Sheridan kept two-thirds of his command (two divisions) out of the brewing battle for the better part of the day. The poor performance of the Federal cavalry enabled Lee to surprise Grant and exploit the awkward Union deployments. The failure of the Union cavalry to pierce the protective cavalry screen around the Confederate army prevented Meade and Grant from forming a clear picture of where their enemy was, resulting in a Union tactical defeat during the brutal two-day Battle of the Wilderness. After Meade countermanded Sheridan's orders during the army's race to Spotsylvania Court House, 10 miles south of the Wilderness, the stage was set for fireworks between the two hardheaded generals. Meade had worked himself into a towering passion regarding delays by Sheridan's cavalry the day before. When Sheridan appeared, Meade went at him hammer and tongs, accusing the cavalryman of committing several blunders during the recent battle. Sheridan shot back that Meade's interference with his command over the last four days "would render the [cavalry corps] inefficient and useless before long." Since Meade insisted on giving the cavalry directions without notifying him, Sheridan said, he "could henceforth command the cavalry corps himself." Sheridan spiced his rebuttal with hotly italicized expletives.